Summary
finding that plaintiff's decision to take FMLA leave did not constitute protected activity under the ADA
Summary of this case from Johnson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-0269-D
August 15, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Nancy Price ("Price"), finding that defendant City of Terrell ("City") had terminated her employment in retaliation for engaging in an activity protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Because the court concludes that the jury could not reasonably have found that Price engaged in any protected activity except filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and because the jury could not reasonably have found that the decisionmaker who discharged her even knew beforehand that she had filed the EEOC charge or that she had otherwise established causation, the court grants the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law and enters judgment in its favor.
I
The background facts of this case and the court's prior rulings are set out in a memorandum opinion and order filed December 20, 2000, see Price v. City of Terrell, 2000 WL, 1872081, at *1-*2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2000) (Fitzwater, J.). The court need add to them only the facts and procedural history necessary to decide the present motions.
In deciding the City's summary judgment motion, the court recounted the facts favorably to Price as the summary judgment nonmovant. Likewise, to determine whether the City is entitled to. judgment as a matter of law, the court draws all inferences in favor of Price as the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods:, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
Price worked for the City from 1990 until 1997, first as a Police Department Dispatcher and ultimately in the Municipal Court, where she served as a Court Clerk under Municipal Court Judge David Watson ("Judge Watson"). Price and Judge Watson had a good working relationship and she received high marks from him for her job performance. In 1997 Judge Watson died unexpectedly. His death was hard on Price emotionally, and it caused her considerable grief
Following Judge Watson's death, Price was placed under the supervision of John Rounsavall ("Rounsavall"), the City Secretary and Finance Director, who was appointed Municipal Court Administrator. Although Judge Watson had given her favorable evaluations, she quickly began to experience problems with Rounsavall. Rounsavall's supervisory style was much different from Judge Watson's, and Price and Rounsavall did not get along. These problems became particularly pronounced as the City, under Rounsavall's direction, undertook efforts that were said to be necessary to improve the accuracy and reliability of warrants issued by the Municipal Court. Price believed that Rounsavall's "management by memo" style belittled her. She also objected to moving from her old office into the space near the City Hall lobby.
In June 1997 Price filed an internal grievance with the City, citing an unprofessional atmosphere at the Municipal Court and requesting a temporary transfer back to her old office. Not satisfied with Rounsavall's response, she complained that he had taken away her ministerial and administrative responsibilities as Court Clerk and had demoted her to Cashier. She classified this as a punitive action in violation of the City's internal grievance procedure.
In July 1997, experiencing depression and stress over Judge Watson's death and the persistent problems in her relations with Rounsavall, Price took a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. Rounsavall prepared a questionnaire seeking an explanation of on-the-job errors he said she had made prior to her leave of absence. When Price returned to work on August 11, she advised him that she was experiencing problems with her medications that might impact her ability to respond to the questionnaire. Rounsavall sent her home and later required that she consult with Kay Hale, Ph.D. ("Dr. Hale"), a Police Department psychologist, for the purpose of evaluating her fitness to return to work. When she did return in early September, she was told that she would resume her duties as Cashier. On September 8, 1997, Price was suspended without pay for 30 days. When she returned, the City terminated her employment.
Her suspension is not at issue as an independent retaliation claim in this suit.
Price sued Rounsavall and the City alleging discrimination and retaliation under the ADA, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court dismissed all of Price's claims except her retaliation cause of action against the City. See Price, 2000 WL 1872081, at *1. The parties tried that claim to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Price, awarding her $15,000 in back wages, $100,000 in past mental anguish, and $125,000 in future mental anguish. The City now renews its earlier motions for judgment as a matter of law and moves in the alternative for a new trial or to amend or modify the judgment.
II
Price first contends that Terrell waived its right to move for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict by not moving previously for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all evidence. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), "if a party moves for judgment as a matter of law] at the close of all the evidence, it may renew its motion after judgment." Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 481 (5th Cir. 2001). This right is waived, however, if the defendant, after moving for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff's case, offers its own evidence but fails to renew the motion at the end of the presentation of all evidence. Id. at 481-82 (citing Tamez v. City of San Marcos, 118 F.3d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1997)). The Fifth Circuit has excused minor violations of this procedure when the basic purposes of Rule 50 are met, such as when the trial court has reserved a ruling on an earlier motion. Id.
In the present case, the City moved for an instructed verdict and provided detailed grounds for the motion. Tr. 4A:50-52. The court denied the motion, but explicitly stated that the City would be allowed to move anew for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict, if necessary. Id. at 52. After the City completed its case-in-chief and both sides rested, the court inquired whether the City wished to renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 77. The City stated that it did, and, with the court's permission, it adopted the arguments it had made previously at the close of Price's case. Id. The court explicitly afforded Price an opportunity to object to the City's adopting its prior motion, and her counsel stated that he did not object to this procedure. Id. In light of the City's earlier detailed motion, its adoption of the motion at the close of the evidence, and Price's explicit decision not to object to the adoption procedure, the court holds that the City complied with Rule 50(b) and therefore has not waived its right to bring its renewed motion.
Price contends that because the motion for judgment as a matter of law was denied twice, she "could not reasonably be expected to believe that Terrell seriously challenged the evidence supporting her prima facie case." P. Br. at 2. It is not immediately obvious, nor does Price elaborate concerning, how the court's denial of the City's motions had any bearing on her awareness of the City's continued belief that the evidence was insufficient. Accordingly, the court holds that its denial of the previous motions did not deprive Price of notice that the City intended to continue to challenge the evidence as insufficient.
Price also argues that allowing anything less than technical compliance of Rule 50 would violate her due process and equal protection rights because the court's time limitations prevented her from putting on more evidence. Even if the court's holding that the City has not waived its right to renew its motion for judgment as a matter of law represents a departure from technical compliance with the rule, the court rejects Price's due process and equal protection arguments. Price has not articulated these arguments with any specificity, failing to explain how the time limitations violated fundamental fairness or constituted unequal treatment. Moreover, if necessary, the court would set out in greater detail how Price wasted substantial trial time allocated to her by addressing general employment grievances that were irrelevant to the sole claim at issue — retaliation for engaging in an activity protected by the ADA.
III
The court now considers the merits of the City's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The City argues that Price (1) failed to present sufficient evidence that she engaged in an activity protected under § 12203(a) of the ADA and therefore has failed to establish her prima facie case of retaliation; (2) did not adduce sufficient evidence that the City's proffered reasons for firing her were pretextual, and (3) did not present adequate evidence of actual compensable damages.A
"Judgment as a matter of law is warranted if, after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no `legally sufficient evidentiary basis' for a reasonable jury to have found for the prevailing party. `[T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that "evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses."'" Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Science Ctr., ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 897191, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001) (footnotes omitted).
To prove retaliation under the ADA, "a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of (1) engagement in an activity protected by the ADA, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection between the protected act and the adverse action." Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 1999).
B
The court addresses first whether a reasonable jury could have found that Price engaged in an activity protected by the ADA. Price maintains that she engaged in the following protected activities: (1) she took FMLA leave, (2) she attended Dr. Hale's examination regarding her fitness to return to work, (3) she sought an accommodation by seeking a transfer from Rounsavall's supervision, (4) she filed grievances complaining of Rounsavall's treatment of her, (5) she filed with the EEOC a charge of disability discrimination, and (6) she filed with the EEOC a charge of retaliation. See P. Br. at 11.
1
Price's decision to take FMLA leave does not constitute a protected activity under the ADA. Taking FMLA leave does not of itself constitute opposition to disability discrimination and certainly does not put an employer on notice that an employee is opposing disability discrimination. As such, it is not a protected activity under the ADA. A reasonable jury could not have found that Price engaged in an ADA-protected activity on this basis. Moreover, "[a]n employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees . . . who have used FMLA leave." 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2001). If Price had any cause of action based on taking FMLA leave, it does not arise under the ADA anti-retaliation proviso at issue in the present case.
2
Price contends she engaged in a protected activity by meeting with Dr. Hale. A jury could not reasonably have found this to be so. Viewed favorably to Price, the trial evidence only permits the conclusion that the meeting was an adverse employment action and an ad hoc justification for Rounsavall's mistreatment of her, not a protected activity. Price's participation in the interview was not even her idea; she was complying with a directive of the City that she meet with Dr. Hale before she would be permitted to return to work. Compliance with this requirement is far removed from the type of oppositional activity protected by the ADA.3
Price also maintains that she engaged in protected activities by seeking a transfer from Rounsavall's supervision and filing grievances complaining of his treatment of her.Not every workplace complaint rises to the level of a protected activity under the ADA. "An employee's statement cannot be deemed to be in opposition to an unlawful employment practice unless it refers to a specific practice of the employer that is allegedly unlawful." DuPont-Lauren v. Schneider (USA), Inc., 994 F. Supp. 802, 823 (S.D. Tex. 1998). The internal grievances and the "accommodation" that Price filed regarding Rounsavall's treatment of her also do not qualify as protected activity under the ADA. These grievances include a complaint that Price sent to Rounsavall, a follow-up letter to City Manager Linda Seabolt ("Seabolt") regarding Rounsavall's response, and a letter protesting her suspension. On June 19, 1997 Price wrote Rounsavall regarding an incident involving the disappearance of coworker Cozette Moore's ("Moore's") nameplate. In addition, she complained that a previous memo that Rounsavall had sent to her belittled her, and she asked for a temporary transfer. Although a courtesy copy was furnished to the City Personnel Director Cathy Holland ("Holland") and to "Equal Employment Opportunity," the letter neither mentioned Price's disability nor complained of any specific discriminatory practice. See P. Exh. 37.
Price also asked for a temporary transfer back to her former office, but did not link this request to her disability. See P. Exh. 36. Similarly, Price's letter to Seabolt primarily expressed her dissatisfaction with Rounsavall's response. Id. She highlighted a sentence of the grievance procedure that disapproved of punitive action taken in retaliation for submitting a complaint, but did not reference any particular disability discrimination. Id. In fact, she specifically characterized Rounsavall's actions as violations of the grievance procedure, not disability law.
The second grievance on which Price relies is her September 19, 1997 letter to Rounsavall and Seabolt registering her disagreement with her 30-day suspension and requesting an extension of the time to file an appeal. See P. Exh. 52. Although the letter complains that "the harsh measures you have imposed have had a definite effect on my state of depression[,]" it does not cite any particular discriminatory act by the City. Neither of these complaints constitutes activity protected by the ADA because neither reflects Price's belief that the City was discriminating against her based on her disability, as opposed to merely treating her unfairly. Considering this evidence, a reasonable jury could only find that Price was complaining solely about general employment conditions and adverse treatment generally, not about disability discrimination.
4
Price also relies on her filing of two charges with the EEOC to support the necessary finding that she engaged in protected activities. The first charge followed immediately after her suspension, and the second followed her October 7, 1997 termination. The City argues that because Price only testified about the EEOC complaints and did not offer them into evidence, the jury had no basis to believe that they pertained to disability discrimination rather than to general employment practices.
Although general complaints regarding workplace conditions are insufficient to constitute an ADA-protected activity, the court will assume that the jury could reasonably have found that the first EEOC complaint related to disability discrimination and therefore constitutes a protected activity under the ADA.
Price filed the second charge, however, after her termination. In this complaint she asserted the retaliation claim that the parties tried to the jury and that is before the court for decision on the City's present renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The jury could not reasonably have found that the filing of the second EEOC complaint was a protected activity that gave rise to retaliation, since the retaliation Price alleges — termination of her employment with the City — predates this activity.
C
Based on the foregoing rulings, the only protected activity that a reasonable jury could have found is Price's filing of the first EEOC charge. The court now decides whether the jury could reasonably have found that the City terminated her employment in retaliation for filing this discrimination charge — i.e., whether it could reasonably have found that Price proved the required causal connection between the filing of the EEOC charge and her discharge.
Even if the court assumes arguendo that a reasonable jury could have found that the other activities on which Price relies were protected activities, the court would reach the same result based on the unreasonableness of the jury's finding of a causal link between her engaging in those activities and her termination from employment.
Under the traditional burden-shifting framework, assuming that Price presented sufficient evidence to establish her prima facie case, the City must produce evidence of a non-retaliatory justification for her termination. Neither party disputes that the City's explanation is that "Price was terminated on account of persistent errors in data entry and document processing, insubordination and neglect of duties along with past performance issues relating to the preparation of warrants using the wrong verbage." D. Br. at 24. To prove retaliation, Price was obligated to adduce sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the City's proffered reasons for her discharge were pretextual. See Seaman, 179 F.3d at 300. "Ultimately, the employee must show that `but for' the protected activity, the adverse employment action would not have occurred." Id. The City contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding that there is a causal connection between a protected activity and an adverse employment action. The court agrees.
Price contends the trial evidence supports her theory that "upon learning that Price would not roll over and do his bidding in connection with his desires to remold the Municipal Court, [Rounsavall] started his paper trail in an effort to discredit and demoralize Price[.]" P. Br. at 14. She posits that this pattern of harassment "only worsened when Price filed her charge of disability discrimination with the EEOC." Id. at 15. She points to the temporal proximity between the filing of the first EEOC charge in early September 1997 and her suspension days later, including her termination soon after returning to work from that suspension. Moreover, she maintains that Rounsavall and her coworker Moore had access to the computer system and could have sabotaged her work by entering erroneous information on warrants for which she was responsible. Finally, she points to the testimony of Julia Boyd ("Boyd"), who stated that while she was a temporary assistant in the City's Personnel Office, she witnessed Rounsavall and Seabolt discuss how they would "come up with something, to justify why they sent [Price] home. And they came up with this thing of sending her to a psychiatrist to justify why [ ] they had dismissed [her]." Tr. 3:177.
None of this evidence, considered separately or together, is sufficient to support the jury's finding that the City terminated Price in retaliation for filing the EEOC discrimination charge. Temporal proximity between a protected activity and an adverse employment action, while relevant to the determination whether a decision was retaliatory, is not alone sufficient to prove pretext. See Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1997). This is particularly true where, as with the first EEOC charge, the undisputed evidence shows that Rounsavall did not even know about the EEOC complaint when he terminated Price. City Personnel Director Holland testified, without contradiction, that she did not inform Rounsavall of the first EEOC charge until December 1997, well after he terminated Price's employment. See Tr. 3:163.
Moreover, Price is unable to buttress her reliance on temporal proximity with any evidence tending to show retaliation. Her suggestion that Rounsavall or Moore entered false data under her login name is unsupported by any evidence except her own speculation. Even if believed by the jury, Boyd's testimony that Rounsavall and Seabolt manufactured a justification for Price's ultimate discharge by sending her to Dr. Hale does not even hint that the real motivation was retaliation for taking part in an activity protected by the ADA. Boyd's testimony makes it no more likely that the City terminated Price based on an ADA-retaliatory animus than on the basis of her persistent conflicts with her supervisor.
D
Accordingly, the court grants the City's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
IV
Rule 50(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted, the court shall also rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for the new trial." Accordingly, the court grants the City's alternative motion for new trial on the following grounds: that (1) the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence on the issue whether Price engaged in a protected activity under the ADA (except for filing the single EEOC charge addressed supra); (2) the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence on the issue of causation; and (3) the court should have defined in its charge what is a protected activity under the ADA so that the jury would clearly have understood that merely opposing any employment practice was not a protected activity under the ADA anti-retaliation clause.* * *
The court grants the City's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and enters judgment in favor of the City by judgment filed today.