HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge:

This case is a logical sequel to the decision of this Circuit a little more than a year ago in Abramson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 658 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 452 U.S. 937, 101 S.Ct. 3079, 69 L.Ed.2d 951 (1981) (No. 80-1735). In Abramson we held, inter alia, that documents in the possession of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") must satisfy the threshold language of Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") — "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes" — before any of the constituent parts of Exemption 7 may be asserted as a basis for nondisclosure of agency records requested under the Act. Abramson, 658 F.2d at 811-12. Because the District Court in Abramson found that certain of the requested records ( i.e., "name check" summaries) were compiled solely for political purposes, and because the Government did not challenge that finding on review, see id. at 810-11, that case presented the question of whether the threshold language of Exemption 7 was to have any application to the FBI. Based on the plain meaning of section (b)(7) of FOIA, we held that it did.

The decision in Abramson, however, did not reach one of the principal questions raised by this appeal. Because the Government did not challenge the finding in Abramson that the records at issue were not compiled for law enforcement purposes, we had no occasion to pass upon the appropriate judicial test for determining whether documents held by the FBI are indeed "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes." This case, however, requires us to express and apply such a test.

In this case, Elmer G. ("Geronimo") Pratt, a former officer of the Black Panther Party, requested from the FBI all documents and records filed under his name and all other records containing his name or pertaining to him. Through his original request to the FBI, administrative appeals within the agency, and his action in the District Court, Pratt has obtained over 1,200 documents in whole or in part. At issue on this appeal is the proper treatment to be accorded twenty documents, all of which were generated by the FBI's Counter-Intelligence Program ("COINTELPRO") activities directed at the Black Panther Party.

The District Court held that the disputed documents were not the result of "any legitimate law enforcement purpose," Pratt v. Webster, 508 F.Supp. 751, 761 (D.D.C. 1981), and hence did not satisfy the Exemption 7 threshold. Although we note that certain of these documents evince illegal FBI practices, we are constrained to find that the records sought derived at least in part from a purpose to enforce and prevent violations of the criminal laws. In light of this finding, we must reverse the decision of the District Court denying the Government's requests for nondisclosure. We remand so that the District Court may consider the proper application of the subparts of Exemption 7 to the twenty documents in question.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

During the late 1960s, plaintiff-appellee Pratt was the Deputy Minister of Defense for the Southern California Branch of the Black Panther Party ("BPP"). During the late 1960s and early 1970s the Black Panther Party was the object of intensive scrutiny by the FBI as an allegedly subversive, and potentially violent, domestic organization. Pratt's position in the BPP made his activities a likely subject of concern and surveillance by the FBI.

On July 28, 1972, Pratt was found guilty of murder and robbery in a California state court and, on August 28, 1972, he was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, which he is presently serving in San Quentin Prison. The murder for which Pratt was convicted occurred on December 18, 1968, in Santa Monica, California. Pratt has consistently maintained his innocence of that crime, claiming that on the night of the murder he was attending a meeting with BPP officials in Oakland, California, several hundred miles from Santa Monica.

Based in part on his belief that the FBI possessed documents that would verify his presence in Oakland on December 18, 1968, and thus substantiate his alibi, Pratt filed two FOIA requests with the FBI. Complaint ¶¶ 3, 8, 12, 25, reprinted in Jt.App. at 7-9, 12. On June 5, 1976, Pratt requested then FBI Director Clarence Kelley to provide him with:

All files, records, memoranda, or other data or materials filed under my name or obtainable by your agency by searching through other files and materials for documents which contain my name.

On May 20, 1977, the FBI released 499 partially expurgated pages to Pratt. Pratt appealed certain deletions within the agency and, on September 8, 1977, he made a supplemental request for "any records pertaining to him which may be contained in the Bureau's files concerning" five named organizations and twenty-two named individuals.

Through his supplemental request and the processing of his administrative appeals, Pratt eventually obtained access to over 1,000 documents, totaling several thousand pages. The FBI deleted portions of many of these documents, claiming that the deletions were justified by Exemptions 1, 2, 7(C), 7(D), 7(E) and 7(F) of FOIA. Because Pratt and his counsel believed that the deletions made in the released documents did not comply with FOIA and that the FBI had not fully searched its files, Pratt instituted this action in the District Court seeking to compel a further search and full disclosure.

B. Proceedings in the District Court

The District Court directed the FBI to submit affidavits, pursuant to Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977, 94 S.Ct. 1564, 39 L.Ed.2d 873 (1974), indexing and explaining the agency's deletions. The court determined that the first Vaughn index was inadequate and ordered the FBI to submit new and more detailed Vaughn filings. These were submitted in November 1979.

On April 6, 1979, while the District Court proceedings were pending, Congressman Paul McCloskey requested the FBI "to determine whether there is any evidence in the files to indicate the possibility of Pratt's innocence or doubt as to Pratt's guilt" of the December 18, 1968 Santa Monica murder. In response to Congressman McCloskey's request, the FBI conducted a search of its California field offices. On June 18, 1980, as a result of this search, the FBI released to Pratt 1,290 pages of previously withheld documents.

On February 15, 1980, the FBI moved for summary judgment based on its second Vaughn index and the completeness of its document production. On February 12, 1981, the District Court denied the FBI's motion for summary judgment. Pratt v. Webster, 508 F.Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1981). The District Court ordered all documents containing redactions based on Exemptions 1 and 7(E) submitted for in camera review. 508 F.Supp. at 756-58, 760-61. The deletions from partially disclosed documents based on Exemptions 2, 7(C) and 7(D) were upheld, id. at 758-60, with the exception of nine documents generated by COINTELPRO activities. The District Court held that these COINTELPRO documents could not "reasonably be considered or interpreted as generated through any legitimate law enforcement purpose," and hence could not "be redacted pursuant to exemption (b)(7)." Id. at 761. Finally, the District Court ordered the agency to explain certain inadequacies in its search of FBI Headquarters files and expanded the scope of Pratt's FOIA suit to include all documents generated by COINTELPRO concerning Pratt. Id. at 762-64.

In response to an Order of the District Court, dated February 13, 1981, the FBI identified for the court sixteen COINTELPRO documents contained in the June 1980 release of documents from the search of FBI California field offices. The FBI also submitted an affidavit and index seeking to justify deletions from twelve of these documents. The agency sought reconsideration of the court's earlier ruling that COINTELPRO documents were not "compiled for law enforcement purposes" and hence not within Exemption 7's purview; in the alternative, the agency claimed that Exemption 6 of FOIA justified the deletions in the additional sixteen and in the original nine COINTELPRO documents.

In a June 16, 1981 Memorandum Opinion, the District Court ordered the release of material from five documents that had been expurgated based on an Exemption 1 claim. Deletions from fifty-seven other documents based on Exemption 1 and from two documents based on Exemption 7(E) were approved after in camera review. Pratt v. Webster, ___ F.Supp. ___, Civ. No. 78-1688, Memorandum Opinion at 2-4 (D.D.C. June 16, 1981), reprinted in Jt. App. at 336-38. The District Court also sought further explanation of the scope of the agency's document search. Id. at 5-9, reprinted in Jt.App. at 339-43. Finally, the District Court refused to alter its previous ruling on the applicability of Exemption 7 to COINTELPRO documents, accepted a deletion from one COINTELPRO document based on Exemption 6, and sought further description of the proposed deletions from four other COINTELPRO documents. Id. at 9-12, reprinted in Jt.App. at 343-46.

On August 7, 1981, the District Court approved the deletion of identifying information from one additional COINTELPRO document based on the FBI's Exemption 6 claim. The District Court also ordered release of the remaining COINTELPRO documents in their entirety, denied the Government's request for a stay of disclosure pending appeal, and granted summary judgment to the defendants in all remaining aspects of the case. Pratt v. Webster, Civ. No. 78-1688 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 1981), reprinted in Jt.App. at 377-80.

The Government appealed to this court from the District Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of June 16, 1981 and from its Order of August 7, 1981. We issued a stay of the ordered disclosure of the COINTELPRO documents pending appeal. Pratt v. Webster, No. 81-1907 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 14, 1981) (per curiam). On appeal the Government challenges only the District Court's disclosure order with respect to the twenty disputed COINTELPRO documents. Thus, the proper treatment of these twenty documents under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7 is the only issue before us.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE EXEMPTION 7 THRESHOLD

A. The Existence of an Exemption 7 Threshold for Law Enforcement Agencies

The Freedom of Information Act was enacted by Congress in 1966, and substantively amended in 1974 and 1976, in order to provide a statutory right of public access to documents and records held by agencies of the federal government. As such, FOIA embodies "a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language." S.Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965). Subsection (a)(3) of the Act, under which Pratt has proceeded in this case, requires "each agency" to make available upon request any records it possesses "to any person." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).

The broad right of access and disclosure under FOIA is subject to nine exemptions set out in subsection (b), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (Supp. IV 1980). Like the rest of the Act, all but two of these exemptions on their face apply with equal force and effect to all federal agencies.

In this case we are primarily concerned with the appropriate interpretation of one exemption, Exemption 7, as applied to a single agency, the FBI. There is no indication in the threshold language of Exemption 7 that it does not apply to documents held by the FBI. Rather, in all cases Exemption 7 protects from disclosure "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that" one of the exemption's subparts applies. This statutory language on its face prescribes a three-part test for withholding information under Exemption 7: In order to be withheld, the material (1) must be an "investigatory record," (2) must have been "compiled for law enforcement purposes," and (3) must satisfy the requirements of one of the six subparts of Exemption 7.

The Government contends, however, that the FBI need not establish a law enforcement purpose for its investigatory files in order to qualify its records for redaction under the subparts of Exemption 7. It argues that "the threshold Exemption 7 criterion of `investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes' was meant to define the FBI's files rather than limit the Bureau's potential access to the exemption." Appellants' Brief at 20. The Government primarily relies on two decisions by the First and Eighth Circuits, Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1980); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1979). In those cases, the courts held:

The character of the materials excluded under Exemption 7 at least suggests that "law enforcement purpose" is as much a description of the type of agency the exemption is aimed at as it is a condition on the use of the exemption by agencies having administrative as well as civil enforcement duties.

Irons, 596 F.2d at 474, quoted in part in Kuehnert, 620 F.2d at 666.

The simplest response to the Government's contention that FBI records per se meet the threshold criterion of Exemption 7 is that that argument has been rejected by this Circuit in Abramson v. FBI, 658 F.2d 806 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 452 U.S. 937, 101 S.Ct. 3079, 69 L.Ed.2d 951 (1981). In Abramson we were confronted with a FOIA request to the FBI for a group of "name checks," i.e., "summaries of information from FBI files on certain public personalities which had been prepared pursuant to requests received from the White House." 658 F.2d at 808. The District Court in Abramson had held that the name checks were not compiled pursuant to any law enforcement purpose, but nevertheless applied Exemption 7(C) to prevent disclosure as "an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1976). We reversed, holding, inter alia, that documents in the possession of the FBI must nevertheless pass the Exemption 7 threshold before any of the six subparts in Exemption 7 may be applied to prevent disclosure. Id. at 811-12.

The Government argues that Abramson does not foreclose their contention that records held by the FBI per se satisfy the Exemption 7 threshold. Appellants' Brief at 39-41. That argument is simply untenable. If the panel in Abramson had accepted the Government's per se argument, the documents held by the FBI would have passed the Exemption 7 threshold despite their lack of law enforcement purpose, and the court would have had to consider whether the District Court correctly ruled that Exemption 7(C) justified nondisclosure. Quite the contrary, the Abramson court did not reach the Exemption 7(C) question and reversed the District Court because, failing the Exemption 7 threshold, the "name check" summaries were improperly withheld under FOIA. See Abramson, 658 F.2d at 812. Thus, the Government's per se argument is foreclosed by the plain holding of this court in Abramson.

The three-pronged test for Exemption 7 claims that the Abramson opinion sets out, 658 F.2d at 811-12, follows from the plain meaning of the statute, is consistent with this Circuit's judicial interpretations of Exemption 7 both before and after the 1974 amendments, and was even adopted as the appropriate interpretation of the exemption in the Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments. If the Government is now suggesting that arguments of public policy require that FOIA be rewritten, those arguments should be directed not to us, but to the Congress. We continue to hold that federal agencies, including the FBI, must meet the threshold requirements of Exemption 7 before they may withhold requested documents on the basis of any of its subparts.

B. The Definition of the Exemption 7 Threshold Test for Law Enforcement Agencies

Our conclusion that a threshold test exists for the application of FOIA Exemption 7 to documents held by law enforcement agencies is, however, only the beginning of our inquiry. The resolution of this case necessarily requires the expression of that threshold test and its application to the COINTELPRO documents presented here.

1. The Deference Accorded Law Enforcement Agencies Claiming a "Law Enforcement Purpose"

While FOIA makes no distinction on its face between agencies whose principal function is criminal law enforcement and agencies with both law enforcement and administrative functions, it would be unnecessarily wooden to treat both groups identically when they claim Exemption 7 as a basis for withholding. In fact, courts often accord different treatment to Exemption 7 claims from different agencies. E.g., Church of Scientology v. Department of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 473 (1st Cir. 1979); Ramo v. Department of the Navy, 487 F.Supp. 127, 130-31 (N.D.Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-4791 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 1981) (submission vacated pending Supreme Court decision in FBI v. Abramson); see Note, FOIA Exemption 7 and Broader Disclosure of Unlawful FBI Investigations, 65 Minn.L.Rev. 1139, 1145-49 (1981). This judicial development, most often taking the form of more exacting scrutiny of Exemption 7 claims by agencies whose principal function is not law enforcement, is well-grounded in congressional purpose, common sense, and notions of judicial economy. Three related justifications for the differential review can be posited.

First, Congress amended Exemption 7 of FOIA in 1974 in response to a series of decisions by this Circuit that had interpreted the exemption rigidly. These decisions, if left to stand, threatened to exempt large portions of agency files whenever a label of "law enforcement purpose" and "investigatory file" could be attached to agency records. In the view of the Congress, this result would have substantially undercut the Act's disclosure requirements, especially in the context of agencies with both general administrative and law enforcement functions. Congress' amendment of Exemption 7 in 1974 was intended to overrule those judicial decisions and, therefore, evinced in part an intent that the exemption not be read too broadly in its application to agencies with general administrative and regulatory functions.

Second, in its 1974 amendment to Exemption 7, Congress set out six subparts to the exemption representing the potential harms that it believed justified nondisclosure of government investigatory records. These subparts, perhaps predictably, apply more extensively in criminal than in civil law enforcement. Thus, the language of the exemption itself suggests a greater congressional concern with the secrecy of documents held by agencies, such as the FBI, principally committed to criminal law enforcement.

Third, courts can usually assume that government agencies act within the scope of their legislated authority. This assumption is not the product of wishful judicial thinking, but instead results from our observations over time that, despite occasional and regrettable lapses, government agencies typically go about their intended business. This experience has specific application to the court's consideration of FOIA Exemption 7 claims by different types of federal agencies.

On the one hand, the assumption that a mixed-function agency is acting within the scope of its authority tells a court nothing about whether it has met the Exemption 7 threshold requirement of a "law enforcement purpose." Law enforcement, indeed, is often one of such an agency's proper functions, but other functions are also a major part of the agency's day-to-day business. Thus, a court must scrutinize with some skepticism the particular purpose claimed for disputed documents redacted under FOIA Exemption 7. Ramo v. Department of the Navy, 487 F.Supp. 127, 131 (N.D.Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-4791 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 1981) (submission vacated pending Supreme Court decision in FBI v. Abramson). If courts accept a mixed-function agency's claims of "law enforcement purpose" without thoughtful consideration, the excessive withholding of agency records which Congress denounced and sought to avoid with the 1974 amendments might well result.

On the other hand, the generally accurate assumption that federal agencies act within their legislated purposes implies that an agency whose principal mission is criminal law enforcement will more often than not satisfy the Exemption 7 threshold criterion. Thus, a court can accept less exacting proof from such an agency that the purpose underlying disputed documents is law enforcement. This less exacting judicial scrutiny of a criminal law enforcement agency's purpose in the context of the FOIA Exemption 7 threshold is further bolstered by Congress' concern that inadvertent disclosure of criminal investigations, information sources, or enforcement techniques might cause serious harm to the legitimate interests of law enforcement agencies.

Thus, we conclude that a court may apply a more deferential attitude toward the claims of "law enforcement purpose" made by a criminal law enforcement agency. The result of this conclusion is that our prior precedent identifying the standard for ascertaining law enforcement purpose vel non of general regulatory and administrative agencies, while instructive, is not necessarily determinative of the issue for criminal law enforcement agencies. These specialized agencies require a separate standard of judicial review.

2. The "Law Enforcement Purpose" of Law Enforcement Agencies

On one of the few occasions that required this Circuit to ascertain the presence or absence of a "law enforcement purpose" for FOIA Exemption 7, in a case involving a mixed-function agency, the court drew a line between general agency oversight (including program monitoring) and agency investigations specifically directed at allegedly illegal activity. Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 81-82 (D.C. Cir. 1974). At issue in Rural Housing Alliance was the disclosure of portions of a report by the Department of Agriculture's Inspector General regarding allegations of governmental housing discrimination in Florida. In expressing the "law enforcement purpose" test for the District Court to apply on remand, the court identified law enforcement investigations as "investigations which focus directly on specifically alleged illegal acts, illegal acts of particular identified officials, acts which could, if proved, result in civil or criminal sanctions." Id. at 81 (footnote omitted). The panel further stated: "The purpose of the `investigatory files' is thus the crucial factor. . . . If the purpose of the investigation was . . . an inquiry as to an identifiable possible violation of law, then such inquiry would have been `for law enforcement purposes' whether the individual were a private citizen or a government employee." Id. at 82.

Because we believe that a court may apply a more deferential standard with respect to claims of "law enforcement purpose" made by a criminal law enforcement agency, the test enunciated in Rural Housing is not adequate to dispose of the question at issue here. We must, therefore, consider alternative tests suggested by other courts.

The various courts that have rejected the per se argument, i.e., that all law enforcement agency files manifest a law enforcement purpose, have, quite naturally, each phrased their tests in slightly different language. For example, Judge Weinfeld has opined: "The appropriate test is whether the records indicate that the agency was gathering information with the good faith belief that the subject may violate or has violated federal law, or was merely monitoring the subject for purposes unrelated to enforcement of federal law." Lamont v. Department of Justice, 475 F.Supp. 761, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (footnote omitted). The Northern District of California announced "a liberal test that would require that the FBI show a sufficient connection between the conduct of the investigation and legitimate concerns for maintaining national security or preventing criminal activity." Ramo v. Department of the Navy, 487 F.Supp. 127, 131 (N.D.Cal. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-4791 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 1981) (submission vacated pending Supreme Court decision in FBI v. Abramson). Shortly after the decision in Ramo, the Ninth Circuit stated that: "An agency which has a clear law enforcement mandate, such as the FBI, need only establish a `rational nexus' between enforcement of a federal law and the document for which an exemption is claimed." Church of Scientology v. Department of Defense, 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979). Chief Judge Peckham interpreted the language from Church of Scientology as requiring "that an agency with a clear law enforcement purpose . . . need only be held to a minimal showing that the activity which generated the documents was related to the agency's function." Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F.Supp. 1059, 1076 (N.D.Cal. 1981). Finally, Judge Weinfeld has tersely commented: "To meet this requirement an agency must demonstrate at least `a colorable claim of a rational nexus' between activities being investigated and violations of federal law." Malizia v. Department of Justice, 519 F.Supp. 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (footnote omitted).

As we read these various tests, however phrased, and consider the applicable language of FOIA (and the related legislative history), it appears inescapable to us that there are two critical conditions that must be met for a law enforcement agency to pass the Exemption 7 threshold. First, the agency's investigatory activities that give rise to the documents sought must be related to the enforcement of federal laws or to the maintenance of national security. To satisfy this requirement of a "nexus," the agency should be able to identify a particular individual or a particular incident as the object of its investigation and the connection between that individual or incident and a possible security risk or violation of federal law. The possible violation or security risk is necessary to establish that the agency acted within its principal function of law enforcement, rather than merely engaging in a general monitoring of private individuals' activities. While Congress intended that "law enforcement purpose" be broadly construed, it was not meant to include investigatory activities wholly unrelated to law enforcement agencies' legislated functions of preventing risks to the national security and violations of the criminal laws and of apprehending those who do violate the laws. See Lamont v. Department of Justice, 475 F.Supp. 761, 774-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (seventeen years of generalized monitoring unrelated to law enforcement).

Second, the nexus between the investigation and one of the agency's law enforcement duties must be based on information sufficient to support at least "a colorable claim" of its rationality. This second condition is deferential to the particular problems of a criminal law enforcement agency. Such an agency, in order to carry out its functions, often must act upon unverified tips and suspicions based upon mere tidbits of information. A court, therefore, should be hesitant to second-guess a law enforcement agency's decision to investigate if there is a plausible basis for its decision. Nor is it necessary for the investigation to lead to a criminal prosecution or other enforcement proceeding in order to satisfy the "law enforcement purpose" criterion. E.g., Bast v. Department of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 82 n. 48 (D.C. Cir. 1974); cf. Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v. Regan, 670 F.2d 1158, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (enforcement proceeding not required for operation of Exemption 7(D)). Of course, the agency's basis for the claimed connection between the object of the investigation and the asserted law enforcement duty cannot be pretextual or wholly unbelievable. See Abramson v. FBI, 658 F.2d 806, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 452 U.S. 937, 101 S.Ct. 3079, 69 L.Ed.2d 951 (1981) (asserting appointment functions of Nixon White House as basis for "name checks" of individuals prominently associated with liberal causes).

Thus, while our measure of a criminal law enforcement agency's "law enforcement purpose" is necessarily deferential, in recognition of the realities of these agencies' duties and the importance of their functions, it is not vacuous. In order to pass the FOIA Exemption 7 threshold, such an agency must establish that its investigatory activities are realistically based on a legitimate concern that federal laws have been or may be violated or that national security may be breached. Either of these concerns must have some plausible basis and have a rational connection to the object of the agency's investigation.

III. APPLICATION OF THE EXEMPTION 7 THRESHOLD IN THIS CASE

In this case the FBI averred that all of the records responsive to Pratt's FOIA request were "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes." Affidavit of David S. Byerly at 7-10, 35 (Nov. 21, 1979), reprinted in Jt.App. at 79-82, 111. The District Court accepted this statement of purpose for all of the documents in the original production except for nine COINTELPRO documents, which it held "cannot reasonably be considered or interpreted as generated through any legitimate law enforcement purpose." Pratt v. Webster, 508 F.Supp. 751, 761 (D.D.C. 1981). The District Court's February 13 Order led to the inclusion of sixteen additional COINTELPRO documents in this litigation, all of which had previously been identified during the field office search requested by Congressman McCloskey. The District Court similarly concluded that none of these COINTELPRO documents satisfied the Exemption 7 threshold. With the exception of two passages deleted under Exemption 6 as "clearly unwarranted invasions of personal privacy," the District Court ordered that all twenty-five COINTELPRO documents be released in their entirety. With all respect for the District Court's otherwise exemplary handling of this case, we must disagree.

At the outset, it is clear that the District Court singled out this handful of documents only because they were designated as "COINTELPRO" documents. See id. Document 22, labeled as a COINTELPRO document, was the only document found to lack a law enforcement purpose out of a particular file of 156 documents. This entire file was a national security file generated by an investigation "instituted as a result of the FBI receiving information that [Pratt] was engaged in activities which could involve a violation of" 18 U.S.C. §§ 2383- 2385 (1976), Affidavit of David S. Byerly at 8 (Nov. 21, 1979), reprinted in Jt.App. at 80. Documents 519 to 524 include eight documents, see note 8 supra, out of more than 400 referring to Pratt that were collected from investigatory files of other individuals or organizations by means of the FBI's "see" or cross references. The FBI averred that "[a]ll `see' reference documents herein are investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes and were collected in the course of lawful national security investigations or other mandated investigations imposed by law." Affidavit of David S. Byerly at 35 (Nov. 21, 1979), reprinted in Jt.App. at 111. The District Court accepted the FBI's claim of law enforcement purpose for all of these documents except for the eight bearing the appellation "COINTELPRO." Pratt v. Webster, 508 F.Supp. at 759-61.

We recognize, of course, that Exemption 7 refers to "records" rather than files, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976), and that the location of a non-exempt document in an investigatory file does not necessarily make that document exempt from FOIA's disclosure requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). We believe, however, that the District Court distinguished these nine documents from the other documents contained in the same files not on the FOIA grounds of law enforcement purpose, but on the grounds of law enforcement method.

The FBI's Counter-Intelligence Program has been the subject of congressional inquiry, see Church Committee Report, note 3 supra, and of individual litigation, see, e.g., Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hobson v. Wilson, Civ. No. 76-1326 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1981) (judgment on verdict to anti-war demonstrators); Stern v. Richardson, 367 F.Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973). Those proceedings have established that COINTELPRO activities included the use of questionable, and at times illegal, methods. The documents at issue in this case also reveal questionable actions by the FBI to foment distrust and suspicion and to create and enhance dissension within the Black Panther Party. See Pratt v. Webster, 508 F.Supp. at 761; Jt.App. at 104-06, 113-41, 229-83. But whatever we may think of the FBI's methods, we cannot conclude therefrom that the COINTELPRO activities involved in this case lacked any law enforcement purpose.

The Church Committee Report's discussion of the FBI's actions against the BPP (offered by Pratt as Exhibit 1 to his May 21, 1981 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, reprinted in Jt.App. at 316-34) quoted from a February 1968 FBI memorandum expanding the agency's program against what it termed "black nationalist groups," including the BPP. That memorandum described the program's goals as follows:

1. Prevent a coalition of militant black nationalist groups. . . .

2. Prevent the rise of a messiah who could unify and electrify the militant nationalist movement . . . Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position. . . .

3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups. . . .

4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting them. . . .

5. . . . prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth.

Church Committee Report, supra note 3, Book III at 187, reprinted in Jt.App. at 316. While many of the FBI's goals and methods in its COINTELPRO activities against the BPP give us serious pause, we believe that the third goal on this list — the prevention of violence — establishes that law enforcement was a "significant aspect" of the FBI's overall purpose. See Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F.Supp. 313, 315 (D.D.C. 1974).

In particular, we believe that the documents at issue in this case evince law enforcement as a "significant aspect" of the FBI's purpose. Document 22 is part of an investigatory file based on FBI concerns that Pratt might violate three specific provisions of the Criminal Code. From the record before us, we cannot conclude that that concern was implausible or irrational, especially since the District Court recognized the validity of that concern with respect to the other 155 documents in the file. Documents 519 to 524 were all found in the FBI's "see" reference files and, according to the Government's affidavits, were "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes and were collected in the course of lawful national security investigations or other mandated investigations imposed by law." Affidavit of David S. Byerly at 35 (Nov. 21, 1979), reprinted in Jt.App. at 111. While this affidavit is indeed a "minimal showing," it appears sufficient to establish the FBI's concern for possible violations or security risks. See Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F.Supp. 1059, 1076 (N.D.Cal. 1981). Our conclusion again is bolstered by the District Court's acceptance of the FBI's law enforcement purpose with respect to all other "see" reference documents.

Documents COINT-1 to COINT-16 were located through the FBI's supplemental search for records concerning Pratt in the agency's California field offices. Several of these COINTELPRO documents are directly related to the documents disclosed from the previous search of FBI Headquarters. For example, document COINT-5 was apparently a supplement by the Los Angeles office to its previously dispatched document 520. See Jt.App. at 117-24, 240-41. In addition, the subject matter of these sixteen COINT documents is often the same as is found in documents 519 to 524. In short, these documents, but for their COINTELPRO label, are indistinguishable from other FBI documents for which the District Court found a law enforcement purpose. Moreover, these documents provide independent support for a claim of law enforcement purpose. Document COINT-1, for example, discusses cooperation with the Los Angeles Police Department in identifying violations of state and local laws, reports on the arrest of a BPP member for firearms violations, and identifies Pratt "as a possible bomb suspect." Jt.App. at 229-30.

Thus, we conclude that the District Court incorrectly distinguished COINTELPRO documents from other documents for which it found a law enforcement purpose. While the methods frequently used by the FBI in its COINTELPRO activities offer a ready distinction from more typical means of law enforcement, FOIA Exemption 7 refers to purposes rather than to methods. Because law enforcement was a significant aspect of the FBI's purpose, we conclude that the District Court erred in holding that these documents failed to pass the Exemption 7 threshold. Accordingly, we reverse its holding in this regard.

Our conclusion that the twenty COINTELPRO documents at issue in this appeal meet the Exemption 7 threshold criterion requires us to return the case to the District Court. On remand the District Court must determine whether the withholding of portions of the contested documents, which the Government seeks on the basis of Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D), is justified.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because of public interest in the effective disclosure of malfeasance by government agencies, we feel compelled to add a few words about the practical effect of our decision and about the means for redress of any alleged wrongs committed by federal agencies.

FOIA requires disclosure of government records to the fullest extent possible and allows the withholding of only so much of the document as fits squarely within an enumerated exemption. In this case, for example, the Government primarily seeks only to delete the names of its FBI Special Agents and the identities of its confidential sources; the FBI's plans to increase discord within the Black Panther Party and to discredit its leaders have been revealed. The public's interest in the disclosure of government malfeasance is therefore not defeated by the FOIA exemptions or by our interpretation in this case of the reach of one of them.

Of course, nothing we say or hold represents our approval of the measures attributed to the FBI's Counter-Intelligence Program by the Church Committee Report, note 3 supra. The use of government force and deception to quash lawful political dissent and expression is antithetical to a democratic society. Where substantiated, we find these actions reprehensible.

The proper and most effective means of redress for these actions, however, is not a FOIA action. While a suit under the Freedom of Information Act is an important mechanism for discovering the malfeasance of government agencies, see, e.g., Stern v. Richardson, 367 F.Supp. 1316 (D.D.C. 1973) (disclosing existence of COINTELPRO), it can do no more than reveal these actions. FOIA is thus a useful supplement to, but not a substitute for, private damage actions by aggrieved individuals and political action by concerned citizens and their representatives. The Church Committee Report is a prime example of the latter, and a recent case in the District Court for the District of Columbia exemplifies the former, Hobson v. Wilson, Civ. No. 76-1326 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1981). Our holding in this case in no way limits access to either of these remedies.

V. DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the twenty COINTELPRO documents at issue in this appeal meet the "law enforcement purpose" criterion of the FOIA Exemption 7 threshold. As a result, we reverse the decision of the District Court in this regard and remand the case to the District Court for its consideration of the Government's claims for nondisclosure under Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D) and for any other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

ORDER