Opinion
C/A No. 8:20-cv-01157-SAL-JDA
05-19-2020
Richard Joseph Piucci, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Anthony Dennis, Darryl Maghaney, Capt. Blanding, Capt. Lumpkin, Lt. Shirah, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Richard Joseph Piucci, Jr. ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is a detainee at the Sumter Lee Regional Detention Center (the "Detention Center"). He files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint, which was entered on the docket on March 25, 2020. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated April 23, 2020, the Court notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in its Order. [Doc. 11.] The Court, however, noted that Plaintiff may be able to cure the deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to amend his Complaint. [Id. at 12-13.] Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies [identified in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (explaining that, as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).[Id. at 13.] Nevertheless, Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint, and he has failed to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court in its Order.
Because Plaintiff did not respond to the Court's Order, and the time for response has lapsed, he has failed to prosecute this case and has failed to comply with an Order of this Court. Further, as Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is personally responsible for his failure to comply with this Court's Order requiring that he notify the Court as to any address changes and for his failure to file an amended Complaint. Despite being advised of the possible consequences if he failed to notify the Court of his current address [Doc. 7 at 3], Plaintiff has elected not to provide the Court with an updated or current address. This Court's Order regarding amendment was returned the Court as undeliverable on May 15, 2020. [Doc. 13.] Because Plaintiff has already ignored this Court Orders and deadlines, sanctions less drastic than dismissal would not be effective. Accordingly, as an additional basis for dismissal, the case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
Plaintiff brings this action against the Defendants named above, alleging violations of his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1 at 5.] Specifically, Plaintiff asserts his claims based on two incidents, alleging (1) that religious services are being conducted in the open pod subjecting Plaintiff to hear religious services against his will and (2) that there is only one working shower head in the pod. [Id. at 11.]
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Dennis, the Sheriff of Sumter County, allowed the other Defendants, who are all employees of the Sumter County Sheriff's Office and are all employed at the Detention Center, to deprive Plaintiff of his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff alleges the events giving rise to his claims occurred beginning on December 13, 2019, and have continued to the present. [Id. at 7.] Plaintiff alleges Defendants have stopped all programming in the E-pod on each Wednesday and Sunday when the Christian Volunteer Ministers come to hold religious services. [Id. at 8.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the Defendants turn off all televisions, close the showers, close the outside recreation yard, and cut off the phones. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges all inmates not participating in the religious services are instructed to go back to their cubicles and remain quiet during the services. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges he is forced to hear the services, even though he does not participate in them because the services are being conducted in the middle of the open pod in living quarters instead of in a classroom or other designated location. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he grieved the issue, but was threatened with being moved to the B-pod, which is the lockdown pod, or not listen to the services. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that these actions violate his First Amendment rights.
Plaintiff also alleges that the E-pod facility has only one shower with one working shower head. [Id. at 9.] Plaintiff alleges that fifty or sixty inmates are housed in the E-pod. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges he grieved this issue to Defendant Shirah, who is in charge of maintenance, and to Defendants Blanding, Lumpkin, and Maghaney. [Id.] However, Defendants neglected to take action to resolve the situation in violation of the South Carolina prison policy. [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges he has suffered emotional distress, mental anguish, and other injuries. [Id. at 10.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks actual damages, punitive damages, and exemplary damages. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, this Court is charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Amended Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). "And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant." Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where "liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations." Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). "In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. . . . Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable." Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons explained below.
Defendants entitled to dismissal
Defendant Dennis
First, Defendant Dennis should be dismissed because Plaintiff makes no allegations against this Defendant about his direct, personal involvement in the events underlying Plaintiff's claims. Instead, Plaintiff makes only general, vague allegations about Defendant Dennis's obligations as the Sheriff of Sumter County and his control over the Detention Center and its employees. [Doc. 1 at 6, 8.] "However, such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim." Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012).
Further, construing Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Dennis as one for supervisory liability, the undersigned notes that the doctrine of respondeat superior generally is not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). To hold a supervisory official liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221; Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984). Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against Defendant Dennis to demonstrate that he was aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any constitutional risk of injury to Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded the supervisory liability exception because he has made no particular allegations of any knowledge, personal or subjective, on the supervisor's part of the bare facts in his Complaint. Defendant Dennis cannot be held liable simply based on his oversight of his subordinates. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted because the Complaint does not indicate any personal involvement by Defendant Dennis and does not allege facts to meet the supervisory liability exception. See Juste v. Columbia Reg'l Care Ctr., No. 4:16-cv-2974-MGL-TER, 2017 WL 782505, at *4-5 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 770549 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2017). Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff sues Defendant Dennis in his official capacity as Sheriff of Sumter County, this Defendant is protected from suit by the Eleventh Amendment.
Defendants Maghaney , Blanding , Lumpkin , and Shirah
Additionally, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim rising to the level of a constitutional violation against the remaining Defendants. Plaintiff's sole allegations against these Defendants are that they "all run the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center" and that he grieved his claims to these Defendants. [Doc. 1 at 8-9.] However, Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the Complaint of personal involvement against Defendants Maghaney, Blanding, Lumpkin, and Shirah, and they are therefore entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed."); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading). Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts against any of the named Defendants to support a claim for relief, the Complaint is subject to dismissal. See Weller v. Dept. of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding dismissal is proper where complaint contained no allegations against defendants).
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal
Further, the Complaint as a whole is subject to summary dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief. Plaintiff appears to allege a claim for the violation of his First Amendment rights and a conditions of confinement claim. The Court will address each claim in turn.
Plaintiff also purports to assert an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. [Doc. 1 at 5.] However, Plaintiff makes no allegations whatsoever to support such a claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is subject to summary dismissal.
First Amendment Claim
Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to hear religious services that are conducted in the open areas of the pod where he is housed in violation of his First Amendment rights. [Doc. 1 at 8.] The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits "excessive government entanglement with religion." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). At a minimum, the Establishment Clause guarantees that the government may not "coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes a State religion or religious faith, or tends to do so." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has noted that "the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause," so long as "the accommodation at issue . . . does not entangle the State in an unlawful fostering of religion." Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987).
Here, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, because "there is no indication that he was forced, encouraged, or required to attend the religious services" at issue. Justus v. Sw. Virginia Reg'l Jail Auth., No. 7:06-cv-00753, 2007 WL 45822, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2007). Simply put, the Detention Center's alleged "accommodation of [Christian] inmates' beliefs does not constitute an improper endorsement of the [Christian] faith over other religions" and "the practice of allowing the [religious services in the common area of the pod] does not require other inmates to alter their leisure activities or work routines any more than they would to accommodate other inmates' nonreligious activities in a limited space." Priddy v. Garman, No. 7:12-cv-00017, 2012 WL 7151299, at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2012) (holding prison's practice of allowing Muslim prayers in inmate common areas did not violate inmate's constitutional rights), aff'd, 474 F. App'x 968 (4th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, Plaintiff's First Amendment claim is subject to summary dismissal.
Conditions of Confinement Claim
Plaintiff alleges that there is only one shower, with one working shower head, in the pod where he is housed. [Doc. 1 at 8.] A pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement claim is evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). In any event, "[t]he due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner." Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" imposes certain basic duties on prison officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). These include maintaining humane conditions of confinement. Id.
Here, Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants have subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement fail to state a claim for relief. Importantly, Plaintiff has not alleged that he has been deprived of a shower. Instead, he merely alleges that there is only one shower with one working shower head in the pod. In any case, "[t]he law is clear that bathing opportunities may be severely reduced or curtailed without violating an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights." Ham v. McCall, No. 6:13-cv-00694-JMC, 2014 WL 51229, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2014) (collecting cases), adhered to on reconsideration, 2016 WL 915291 (D.S.C. Mar. 10, 2016). Additionally, Plaintiff appears to argue that the Detention Center did not follow its own procedures and policies in failing to provide an adequate number of working showers. [Doc. 1 at 9.] However, that alone does not give rise to a valid claim. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F. Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) ("[Section 1983] guarantees a person's constitutional rights against violation by state actors. It does not provide any relief against prison rules violations assuming, arguendo, that such a violation occurred.").
Plaintiff's Alleged Injury
Further, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to identify a compensable injury. Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered "[e]motional distress, mental anguish, and other [grievous] injuries." [Doc. 1 at 10.] "There is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, psychological stress, or mental anguish; hence, there is no liability for compensatory or punitive damages under § 1983 regarding such claims." Khan v. Stirling, No. 9:18-cv-3130-BHH-BM, 2019 WL 3976626, at *5 (D.S.C. July 24, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3973708 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2019). Plaintiff's claims for money damages are governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), which expressly prohibits the filing of civil actions by prisoners "for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Although the PLRA does not define physical injury, "courts have held that the 'physical injury' referenced by the Act need not be significant, but must be more than de minimis." Wilson v. United States, 332 F.R.D. 505, 520 (S.D.W. Va. 2019) (collecting cases). "A plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for emotional distress cannot rely on 'conclusory statements that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress [or] the mere fact that a constitutional violation occurred,' but, rather, 'the testimony must establish that the plaintiff suffered demonstrable emotional distress, which must be sufficiently articulated.'" Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 640 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1254 (4th Cir. 1996)). Courts have found that "generalized claims of adverse mental health" are not sufficient to establish a significant mental injury without some further specification. Germain v. Bishop, No. TDC-15-cv-1421, 2018 WL 1453336, at *13 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2018); see also Powell v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 1:08-CV-00199, 2009 WL 3160124, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 25, 2009) ("Plaintiff merely alleges that she has suffered 'mental anguish' as a result of the above conditions of confinement," which is not sufficient to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim); In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 472 (4th Cir. 1999) (inmates failed to sufficiently specify a mental injury where they said only that "the overall conditions of their confinement [placed] them under 'great stress' and caused them 'great emotional and physical suffering.'"). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that any of his constitutional or statutory rights were violated such that he could recover for an emotional injury.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As noted above, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court in its Order dated April 23, 2020. [Doc. 11.] Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or attempted to cure the deficiencies in his original filings. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal without further leave to amend. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining that, where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice); Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge May 19, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).