PITTMAN v. SVIR

Full title: EDDIE LAREECE PITTMAN, Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN TERRY SVIR, etc.; et al.…

Court: United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

Date published: Jan 30, 2006

Case No. 3:03-cv-1042-J-25MMH (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2006)

Opinion

Case No. 3:03-cv-1042-J-25MMH.

January 30, 2006

ORDER

HENRY ADAMS JR., District Judge

I. Status

On December 9, 2003, Plaintiff Eddie LaReece Pittman, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a civil rights complaint (Doc. #1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Pittman paid the $150.00 filing fee in this case. On May 26, 2004, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. #14), which was stricken by the Court. See Court's Order (Doc. #16), filed June 4, 2004. On July 1, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, in which he names the following individuals as the Defendants in this case: (1) Captain Terry Svir; (2) Officer Ginger Parker; (3) Sergeant Douglas Barnett; (4) Officer Melvin Eberle; (5) Lieutenant Archie Clemons; (6) Sergeant Kevin Graham; (7) Officer Leonard Meyers; (8) Assistant Warden Mikeal Eberhard; (9) Sergeant Bobby Davis; (10) Sergeant Joseph A. Roberson; (11) Officer Bradford W. Brady; (12) Sergeant Johnny Jerry; (13) Vaughn Foust; (14) Major George Moultrie; (15) Dr. Anil Arora; and, (16) Sergeant Eddie L. Allen. Plaintiff claims that the Defendants retaliated against him for his exercising his rights to access to the courts and his attorneys and for filing grievances.¹ As relief, he requests compensatory, nominal and punitive damages.

1 Plaintiff Pittman "wishes to inform the Court that he does not desire to p[u]rsue any 8th Amendment Claims for Deliberate Indifference or Cruel and Unusual Punishment in order to keep his complaint simple. . . ." Plaintiff's Motion to Be Heard (Doc. #55), filed January 18, 2005, at 1.

Before this Court are the following dispositive motions by Defendants: Defendants Svir, Barnett, Eberle, Graham, Myers, Brady, Eberhard and Jerry's Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #73); Defendants Roberson, Davis, Clemons, Parker and Foust's Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #74); and, Defendants Arora, Moultrie and Allen's Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #75). In support of Defendants' motions for summary judgment, they filed affidavits. See Notice of Filing (Doc. #76), filed August 26, 2005, Exhibits 1-17, attached affidavits (hereinafter Defendants' Affidavits). Plaintiff has been instructed on how to respond to a motion for summary judgment and has been given sufficient time in which to respond. See Court's Orders (Docs. #7, #79). Plaintiff has properly responded. See Plaintiff's Replies (Docs. #81, #82, #83), attached exhibits. Also, before this Court is Plaintiff's Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Foust (Doc. #85). Defendant Foust has responded. See Defendant Vaughn Foust's Response to Plaintiff's Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #86).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

With respect to the standard for granting summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:

[S]ummary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In re Optical Technologies, Inc., 246 F.3d 1332, 1334 (11th Cir. 2001).

The parties' respective burdens and the Court's responsibilities are outlined as follows:

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden to demonstrate to the district court the basis for its motion for summary judgment and identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions which it believes show an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Taylor v. Espy, 816 F.Supp. 1553, 1556 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (citation omitted). In assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the district court must review the evidence and all factual inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Welch v. Celotex Corp., 951 F.2d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 1992); Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). If the movant successfully discharges its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that there exist genuine issues of material fact. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.[,] 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Clark v. Coats Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991).

Applicable substantive law will identify those facts that are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Genuine disputes are those in which the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. For factual issues to be considered genuine, they must have a real basis in the record. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56. It is not part of the court's function, when deciding a motion for summary judgment, to decide issues of material fact, but rather determine whether such issues exist to be tried. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2135. The Court must avoid weighing conflicting evidence or making credibility determinations. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14. Instead, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. Where a reasonable fact finder may "draw more than one inference from the facts, and that inference creates a general issue of material fact, then the court should refuse to grant summary judgment." Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933-34 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).

Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918-19 (11th Cir. 1993); see Mulhall v. Advance Sec. Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 589-90 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 919 (1994).

"It is true that on a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the non-moving party." Cuesta v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 285 F.3d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). "A court need not permit a case to go to a jury, however, when the inferences that are drawn from the evidence, and upon which the non-movant relies, are `implausible.'" Id. (citations omitted).

If a reasonable jury could not find in favor of the nonmoving party, no genuine issue of material fact does exist; and summary judgment is proper. Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994). A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party will not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). As Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) states, "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, "[s]ummary judgment should be granted when, after an adequate time for discovery, a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element of that party's case." Nolen v. Boca Raton Community Hospital, Inc., 373 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

Finally, "a pro se litigant does not escape the essential burden under summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment." Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.3d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933 (1991).

III. Plaintiff's Claims

Plaintiff Pittman sets forth the following retaliation claims against the Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the Defendants retaliated against him by the following actions: Defendant Svir made a death threat to him after Plaintiff filed a grievance against Sergeant Hooten; Defendant Parker conducted retaliatory locker searches and illegally confiscated personal items before he reported to confinement; Defendant Barnett gave illegal advice and made unprofessional comments to Plaintiff; Defendant Eberle made "an insinuated death threat" (Second Amended Complaint at 12); Defendant Clemons threatened him and took credit for placing him into confinement; Defendant Graham threatened him with close management confinement; Defendant Myers used racial slurs towards Plaintiff; Defendant Eberhard changed Plaintiff's custody level from minimum to medium; Defendant Davis issued a false disciplinary report; Defendants Roberson and Brady led "an act of fabricated disturbances in order to justify entering the Plaintiff's cell to issue physical abuse" (id. at 8); Defendant Jerry issued a threat of more confinement time; Defendant Foust harassed Plaintiff, made unprofessional and sarcastic remarks to Plaintiff and denied him photocopying services; and, Defendants Arora, Moultrie and Allen conspired to have Plaintiff's work release revoked and to have Plaintiff transferred back to prison.

IV. Applicable Law

In any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action, the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a section 1983 action are present.

A successful section 1983 action requires a showing that the conduct complained of (1) was committed by a person acting under color of state law and (2) deprived the complainant of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992); Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995).

"The First Amendment protects inmates from retaliation by prison officials for filing lawsuits or administrative grievances." Redd v. Conway, No. 05-12337, 2005 WL 3528932, at *4 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2005) (per curiam) (not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter) (citing Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); see also Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has outlined the standard for stating a retaliation claim:

The First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliating against prisoners for exercising the right of free speech. Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 1989). "To state a [F]irst [A]mendment claim for retaliation, a prisoner need not allege violation of a separate and distinct constitutional right." Id. at 1242. Rather, "[t]he gist of a retaliation claim is that a prisoner is penalized for exercising the right of free speech."² Id. A prisoner can establish retaliation by demonstrating that the prison official's actions were "the result of his having filed a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment." Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989).

Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003); Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1253 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2005). InFarrow, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that summary judgment in defendants' favor was proper on Farrow's retaliation claim because Farrow "has not established a causal relationship between his complaints and the alleged denial of treatment" by the defendant and her staff. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1249 (citing Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991) ("If the party seeking summary judgment meets the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut this showing with affidavits or other relevant and admissible evidence.")). Thus, Plaintiff must establish that he engaged in protected conduct (i.e., the filing of administrative grievances); that he suffered an adverse action by the defendant prison officials; and, that there is "a causal relationship" between the two. See id. at 1248-49; Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that a prisoner can establish retaliation by demonstrating that the prison official's adverse actions were "the result of his having filed a grievance concerning the conditions of his imprisonment. . . .").

2 "The penalty need not rise to the level of a separate constitutional violation." Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1026 (1993) (citingWright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (concluding that the prisoner stated a retaliation claim and a claim of denial of access to the courts based on the confiscation of legal materials); Hall v. Sutton, 755 F.2d 786 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the prisoner stated a retaliation claim based on the confiscation of various personal possessions)).

"[S]ummary judgment serves as the ultimate screen to weed out truly insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial." Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998). Therefore, at the summary judgment stage, "if the defendant-official has made a properly supported motion, the plaintiff may not respond simply with general attacks upon the defendant's credibility, but rather must identify affirmative evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of proving the pertinent motive." Id. (citation and footnote omitted).

V. Conclusions

Plaintiff Pittman, in the Second Amended Complaint, sets forth the Defendants' various actions that he claims were retaliatory measures that resulted from his filing of grievances, his corresponding with attorneys, the courts and the institutional Inspector General and his utilizing the institution's legal resources and services.

Plaintiff Pittman was an inmate within the Florida Department of Corrections from June 12, 2000, until June 9, 2003, and was assigned to North Florida Reception Center, Columbia Correctional Institution, Lake City Work Release Center, South Florida Reception Center and Everglades Correctional Institution. Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. #81) at 1-2; see http://www.dc.state.fl.us/InmateReleases (website for the Florida Department of Corrections, Inmate Releases Information). On June 9, 2003, Plaintiff Pittman was released from the Florida Department of Corrections; he is no longer incarcerated and resides in the state of North Carolina. See http://www.dc.state.fl.us/InmateReleases.

First, Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Hooten, on April 23, 2001, woke Plaintiff because he had been snoring and then used profanity towards Plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a grievance against Sergeant Hooten for unprofessional conduct and the unwarranted use of abusive language towards an inmate. Plaintiff claims that, on June 15, 2001 (after Plaintiff filed the grievance against Sergeant Hooten), Defendant Svir retaliated against Plaintiff by issuing a "death threat" to him. According to Plaintiff, the grievance against Sergeant Hooten had initially been submitted as a formal grievance, but was returned to Plaintiff, instructing him to resubmit the complaint as an informal grievance to Defendant Captain Svir (Hooten's supervisor). Plaintiff did as he was instructed. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Svir confronted him about the grievance that Plaintiff had resubmitted against Sergeant Hooten.

In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Svir has stated, in pertinent part:

I have been employed by the Florida Department of Corrections for over 22 years. For the past 9 years[,] I have been a captain at [the] Reception and Medical Center ("RMC"), formerly known as North Florida Reception Center ("NFRC").

On June, 2001, I worked on a 12:00 AM to 8:00 AM shift at the west unit. None of the other named Defendants in this law suit worked with me on that shift.

At that time, answering grievances was a routine part of my duty. I have responded to thousands of grievances in my career.

When answering inmate grievances at RMC [,] my standard operating procedure was to sit in my office and write out a response based upon the inmate's allegations contained in the written grievance paper which had been submitted. If necessary, on occasion [,] I would call the corrections officer involved to obtain information. I never deviated from the procedure and never called an inmate in my office to discuss a grievance with him.

I categorically deny all of the allegations against me made by Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman. I never met with him. I never talked to him. I would not know Mr. Pittman if he was standing in front of me.

I did not retaliate in any fashion against Mr. Pittman for his filing of a grievance.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's civil rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Svir's Affidavit.

As reflected by his Affidavit, Defendant Svir concludes that he never met with Plaintiff, never talked to Plaintiff and never retaliated against Plaintiff. However, it is clear that answering grievances was a routine part of Defendant Svir's job at that time, and it would not have been inappropriate for Defendant Svir, as the supervisor, to interview Plaintiff Pittman concerning the grievance that had been submitted to him concerning Sergeant Hooten. Therefore, even assuming that Defendant Svir met with Plaintiff to discuss the grievance and then made the statements to Plaintiff, the statement that "something drastic may happen to you" should be evaluated within the context in which it was apparently made. Plaintiff, in his Second Amended Complaint, also alleges that Defendant Svir stated, "Those convicts do not care anything about you. They'd hurt you for keeping them awake with your snoring." Plaintiff concedes that Defendant Svir was inquiring about the incident, and the record clearly reflects that Svir's responding to grievances as well as supervising other officials within his unit were his duties as a captain.³ Defendant Svir's alleged statements were not threats to Plaintiff's life. Thus, even based on Plaintiff's version of the conversation, Defendant Svir was merely attempting to inform Plaintiff that Plaintiff's loud snoring was disturbing to the other inmates. Plaintiff, here, has not shown adverse action taken against him in retaliation for the filing of the grievance against Sergeant Hooten. It is noteworthy that Plaintiff, the very next day (June 16, 2001), filed another grievance and thereafter filed a multitude of grievances. See Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. #1), attached exhibits. The record certainly reflects that any alleged actions by Defendants did not thereafter have a chilling effect on Plaintiff's submissions of administrative grievances. In sum, Plaintiff has not established a causal relationship between his protected conduct and the alleged adverse action by Defendant Svir. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

3 Based on Plaintiff's exhibit, the grievance concerning Sergeant Hooten was resubmitted to Defendant Svir on June 13, 2001. See Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. #1), Exhibit B1.

Secondly, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Parker retaliated against him by "issuing her attempts to conspire with other officers to punish" him for his exercising his right to file grievances, his right to correspond with attorneys and the courts and his right to use the legal resources at the penal facility. Specifically, he alleges that she conducted retaliatory locker searches and illegally confiscated personal items before he reported to confinement. He concludes that she was responsible for his placement in administrative confinement from June 28, 2001, until August 31, 2001. In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Parker states that it was part of her job to search inmates' lockers and such searches were "routine and a log of all searches [were] kept." Defendant Parker's Affidavit. Further, a property receipt was given to the inmate whenever contraband or unauthorized items were taken from an inmate's locker. Id. Defendant Parker finally noted that she did not have the authority to place an inmate in confinement. Id.

The record clearly reflects that Defendant Parker was responsible for conducting inmate locker searches at the Reception and Medical Center. And, certainly, this is an event that is appropriate as part of the internal prison administration to secure and maintain order within the prison. Defendant Parker states that she did not know that Plaintiff had filed grievances against her. Id. Plaintiff even concedes that he had materials beyond the permissible amount when he noted that Officer "Woodville ended up taking most of the excess stuff and allow[ed] the Plaintiff to keep a certain amount. . . ." Second Amended Complaint at 10. Finally, the record reflects that Plaintiff was placed in administrative confinement by Inspector B. Clark, the Chair of the Classification Committee, and Defendant Parker had no authority to place Plaintiff in administrative confinement. See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #74), Exhibit C; Defendant Parker's Affidavit. At the time of his placement into administrative confinement, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to respond, but did not offer a statement. Id. Based on the record before this Court, Plaintiff has not established a causal relationship between his protected conduct (i.e., his exercising his right to file grievances, his right to correspond with attorneys and the courts and his right to use the legal resources at the penal facility) and the alleged adverse actions by Defendant Parker. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1249 (citing Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d at 1577 ("If the party seeking summary judgment meets the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to rebut this showing with affidavits or other relevant and admissible evidence.")).

Further, Plaintiff's Affidavit (see Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. #83), Exhibit P), to the extent it relies on hearsay, is not sufficient to oppose Defendants' motions for summary judgment.See Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1267-68 n. 1, n. 2 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (stating that, "in discerning the facts for summary judgment" purposes, the court cannot consider hearsay); Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) (stating that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein"); Cunningham v. O'Leary, 40 Fed. Appx. 232, 235 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (unpublished order) ("Affidavits, even from pro se litigants, must be based on personal knowledge and relate admissible facts."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1119 (2003).

Thirdly, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Barnett retaliated against him by giving illegal advice to Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff's exercising his right to correspond with attorneys and the courts. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Barnett made unprofessional comments to Plaintiff on June 28, 2001, stating "Who do you think you are . . . The Inmate Spokesman . . . You're going to be a Prisoner's Advocate or something once you are released" and then responding, "Well you should be concerned at how staff perceives you if you want to get all of your gain time. As a result of your legal endeavors, you stick out like a sore thumb and that's created a problem for staff." Plaintiff concludes that Defendant's acknowledging that Plaintiff's abundance of legal endeavors was "unofficially unacceptable to him and to other staff members tells the Plaintiff that they felt threatened by the Plaintiff's activities and were inclined to retaliate." Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 12.

In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Barnett states, in pertinent part:

I was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections for 25 years, retiring as a Sergeant in December, 2003. Throughout my entire career, I worked as a Correctional Officer at [the] Reception and Medical Center ("RMC") formerly known as North Florida Reception Center ("NFRC").

In 2001, my general duties were to oversee outside work squads and to control inmate movement between the west unit and main unit by operating the sallie port gate, which separated those units.

I recall the inmate, Eddie Pittman. It is likely that I was working at the sallie port gate on June 28, 2001. If that was the date that Mr. Pittman was placed in confinement, he likely passed through the gate on his way from the west unit to the confinement area in the main unit. I specifically deny making statements to Mr. Pittman as reflected in pages 11 and 12 of his Second Amended Complaint. I never made any comments to Mr. Pittman about him [sic] being an inmate spokesman or prisoners' advocate. I never told him that he stuck out like a sore thumb or created a problem for staff.

Prior to June 28, 2001, I had no knowledge that Mr. Pittman submitted grievances against correctional officers at NFRC. Only when he filed a grievance against me at a later date did I learn that he had been filing grievances against other officers as well.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Barnett's Affidavit.

The record does clearly reflect that Defendant Barnett was working the sallie port gate on June 28, 2001; however, Defendant Barnett denies that he made the above-cited statements. But, even assuming Plaintiff's version of the facts to be true, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant's actions were the result of Plaintiff's filing of grievances and corresponding with attorneys and courts. Plaintiff, in his Second Amended Complaint, concludes that the prison officials (including Defendant Barnett) "were inclined to retaliate." Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 12. An inclination to retaliate based on mere conjecture is not enough to demonstrate an actual retaliatory motive. See Cordoba v. Dillard's, 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) ("Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact, instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary judgment.") There must be a causal relationship between the protected conduct and the alleged adverse action, which Plaintiff has not shown. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

As Plaintiff Pittman's fourth claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Eberle retaliated against him by threatening him for exercising his right to legal correspondence. Specifically, Plaintiff states that Defendant Eberle, on July 20, 2001, while delivering Plaintiff's legal mail, angrily stated, "I'm going to see if I can get someone to come in there and take care of you . . . then I won't have to worry about you anymore." Second Amended Complaint at 12.

In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Eberle states, in pertinent part:

I have been employed by the Florida Department of Corrections for 25 years. For the past 23 years, I have worked as a correctional officer at [the] Reception and Medical Center ("RMC") formerly known as North Florida Reception Center ("NFRC").

On July 20, 2001, I worked the fog patrol from 6:30 AM to 8:00 AM. From 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM, I worked as an escort officer for the confinement area, K dorm.

As an escort officer, I would deliver legal mail to inmates in K dorm.

Although it is possible that I delivered legal mail on July 20, 2001, I categorically deny the allegations of Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, in this case. I have no recollection of Mr. Pittman.

I did not ever have a dispute with an inmate over a pen nor did I ever threaten any inmate over legal mail.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Eberle's Affidavit.

Thus, while the record clearly reflects that Defendant Eberle worked as an escort officer for the confinement area (K dormitory) and would deliver legal mail to inmates in K dormitory, Defendant Eberle denies that he threatened Plaintiff Pittman. Plaintiff describes Defendant Eberle's statements as "an insinuated death threat" that was based on Eberle's providing a pen for Plaintiff to use to receive the legal correspondence. Second Amended Complaint at 12. Plaintiff was not denied his legal correspondence. Even assuming Plaintiff's version of the facts to be true, Plaintiff has not established a causal relationship between his protected conduct (his right to receive legal correspondence) and any adverse action by Defendant Eberle.See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

As Plaintiff's fifth claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Clemons retaliated against him on two occasions: on August 14, 2001, by intercepting a letter Plaintiff had sent to the Institutional Inspector and by threatening Plaintiff; and, on September 27, 2001, when Defendant Clemons told Plaintiff that he had him brought back to confinement.

In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Clemons states, in pertinent part:

I have been employed by the Florida Department of Corrections for 21 years. For the past year, I have been a captain. For the ten years previous, I served as the administrative lieutenant at [the] Reception and Medical Center ("RMC"), formerly known as North Florida Reception Center ("NFRC"). As administrative lieutenant, I worked from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 A.M., [sic] Monday through Friday.

I categorically deny all of the allegations made against me by Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman.

I never intercepted a letter Plaintiff sent to the institutional inspector. Mail was not even taken up on my shift.

At no time did I ever have knowledge that Plaintiff had any complaints or had filed a grievance against Captain Svir.

I never made the statement to Plaintiff "Learn to play the game or have a boot put in your ass," or any statement remotely like that.

As the administrative lieutenant, I had no authority over an inmate assignment.

As the administrative lieutenant for confinement, I did not make the decision as to which inmates were placed in confinement. That decision was solely the responsibility of the classification department.

I never said, "It was me, it was me . . . I had you brought back here."

At no time did I ever have the knowledge that Plaintiff had filed a grievance against Sergeant Graham.

From a review of the records, it appears that Plaintiff was placed in confinement on September 27, 2001. It is routine for all inmates to be strip searched upon entrance to confinement, however, I have no personal recollection of this particular incident. In September, 2001, I was not the person who conducted strip searches.

I never brought Plaintiff to my office. I never threatened Plaintiff's life.

As far as allegations of conspiracy are concerned, Sergeant Davis did not work for me or in my area of the institution at any of the times alleged in the Complaint.

Decisions regarding submitting disciplinary reports are made by captains and not lieutenants. I had no authority to place an inmate in confinement.

Confinement rules require that all of an inmate's personal property is to be impounded until the inmate is released to the general population.

While an inmate is in confinement at RMC, other inmates are present in the same dorm and could witness incidents that take place immediately outside or at the door of an inmate cell.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Clemons' Affidavit.

Plaintiff has concluded that Defendant Clemons' first alleged adverse action occurred as a result of Plaintiff's grievance against Defendant Svir and that Defendant Clemons' second alleged adverse action occurred as a result of Plaintiff's grievance against Sergeant Graham. Defendant Clemons, in his Affidavit, states that he never knew that Plaintiff had any complaints or had filed a grievance against Defendant Svir and that he never knew that Plaintiff had filed a grievance against Sergeant Graham. Id. Further, Defendant Clemons, as an administrative lieutenant at that time, did not have the authority to place an inmate in confinement and did not have any authority over inmate assignment. Id. He served as a lieutenant, not as a captain.Id. Even assuming Plaintiff's version of the facts to be true, there must be a causal relationship between Plaintiff's protected conduct (the filing of grievances against Defendants Svir and Graham) and the alleged adverse actions by Defendant Clemons, which Plaintiff has not shown. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49. Mere conjecture or an assumption based on a chronology of events is not enough to show a retaliatory motive (that any adverse action is the result of his filing of grievances). See Irby v. Siedschlag, No. 05-2985, 2005 WL 3479210, *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 20, 2005) (unpublished order) (citingStagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 995 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 986 (1999)).

As Plaintiff's sixth claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Graham retaliated against him, on September 6, 2001, by issuing a threat of close management confinement if Plaintiff were to write another grievance against him. In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Graham states, in pertinent part:

I have been employed by the Florida Department of Corrections for 23 years. For that past 18 years, I have been a correctional officer sergeant at [the] Reception and Medical Center ("RMC") formerly known as North Florida Reception Center.

On September 6, 2001, I was the confinement supervisor in K dorm. At that time I worked an 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM shift, with no time off for lunch.

I deny eating lunch in the visitors park as alleged by Plaintiff in this lawsuit. I never sat down and ate lunch at that time, because I was not given time off for lunch.

I deny telling Plaintiff "I am going to CM your ass." CM stands for "Close Management." This is an inmate classification which could be determined only by the state classification committee. I was not a member of that committee. A correctional officer sergeant does not have the power or authority to classify any inmate for close management.

On September 6, 2001, I had no idea whether Mr. Pittman had filed a grievance against me. Until reviewing documents when served with Plaintiff's complaint in this lawsuit, I had no knowledge that he ever filed a grievance against me.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Graham's Affidavit.

Defendant Graham states that he did not know on September 6, 2001, that Plaintiff had filed a grievance against him. Id. Without knowledge of the protected activity, there cannot be a retaliatory motive. See Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1005 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Further, Defendant Graham, as a correctional officer sergeant, did not have the authority to classify any inmate. An inmate classification can only be determined by the state classification committee, and Defendant Graham was not a member of that committee. Even assuming Plaintiff's version of the facts to be true, there must be a causal relationship between Plaintiff's protected conduct (i.e., the filing of a grievance against Defendant Graham) and the alleged adverse action by Defendant Graham, which Plaintiff has not shown. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

As Plaintiff's seventh claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Myers, on September 8, 2001, retaliated against him by making racial remarks due to Plaintiff's "knack for submitting grievances against staff." Second Amended Complaint at 13. In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Myers states, in pertinent part:

I have worked for the Florida Department of Corrections for over ten years, the last eight years at [the] Reception and Medical Center ("RMC") formerly known as North Florida Reception Center ("NFRC"). I have been a Sergeant for the past one and one-half years. Prior to that time[,] I was a Correctional Officer I. For the past six years, I have worked the midnight to 8:00 A.M. shift.

In September, 2001, I was a Correctional Officer assigned to the confinement dorm, known as "K" dorm. During that time, the inmates generally were asleep in their cells when I reported to work. Lights were turned on at 5:30 A.M. [,] and the inmates were fed breakfast thereafter. Breakfast in the confinement dorm consisted of orderlies placing a tray of food in the slat of the inmates' [sic] cell so that the inmate could obtain the breakfast and eat it in his cell. I accompanied the orderlies as they distributed the food. Generally, there was no verbal contact with the inmates.

There was no "day room" in the confinement dormitory where I worked in September, 2001. Generally, the inmates were confined to their cells when in the confinement dormitory. I specifically deny each and every allegation made by the Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, in his Second Amended Complaint at page 13.

I have absolutely no recollection of Eddie Pittman. I deny ever making racially insensitive remarks to any inmate.

On September 8, 2001, I had no knowledge that Eddie Pittman had ever submitted a grievance against any staff member at RMC. On September 8, 2001, I knew nothing about Eddie Pittman.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Myers' Affidavit.

Defendant Myers states that he did not know on September 8, 2001, that Plaintiff had submitted grievances against staff members. Id. Plaintiff's mere allegation that Defendant Myers made racial remarks to Plaintiff on this one occasion as a retaliatory measure for "Plaintiff's knack for submitting grievances against staff" is not sufficient to demonstrate Defendant's retaliatory motive. Without Defendant's knowledge of Plaintiff's protected activity, there cannot be a retaliatory motive. See Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d at 1005 (citations omitted). While the remarks, as alleged, were undoubtedly insensitive (assuming Plaintiff's version of the facts to be true), there must be a causal relationship between Plaintiff's protected conduct (i.e., Plaintiff's "knack" for filing grievances against the correctional staff) and the alleged adverse action by Defendant Myers, which Plaintiff has not shown.See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

As Plaintiff's eighth claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Eberhard, on September 14, 2001, retaliated against him by changing his custody level from minimum to medium for Plaintiff's submitting "so many" complaints to Defendant Eberhard while Plaintiff was in administrative confinement from June 28, 2001, until August 31, 2001. Second Amended Complaint at 8. In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Eberhard states, in pertinent part:

I have been employed by the Florida Department of Corrections ("DOC") for the past sixteen years. For the past year, I have been the Regional Health Administrator for Region IV. Prior to that time, I served for eight years as the Assistant Warden at [the] Reception and Medical Center ("RMC") formerly known as North Florida Reception Center ("NFRC").

I have no recollection of the inmate, Eddie Pittman. I categorically deny all of the allegations made against me on page 14 of his Second Amended Complaint.

I am accused of illegally changing Mr. Pittman's custody from minimum to medium as a punishment for him submitting grievances at the institution. First, I am well aware of the policy against such retaliation and would not do so. Most importantly, however, I did not make classification decisions. Because Mr. Pittman previously had received a Disciplinary Report ("DR"), the computer system in operation at the time would have automatically generated an appointment for his classification officer to review the situation. If his classification officer decided to submit a request to change the inmate's custody, that request would have been acted on by a four or five member classification team or committee. I was one member of the committee at that time. If the committee had decided to change Mr. Pittman's custody from minimum to medium (I have no recollection of that) then before such a decision could be finalized, it was reviewed by a state classification officer. The state classification officer had final authority on all custody changes. I never made a decision to change Mr. Pittman's custody level.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Eberhard's Affidavit.

The record clearly reflects the procedure undertaken to change an inmate's custody level and the minimal role that Defendant Eberhard (as one member of a four to five member classification team) would have had in such a decision. Further, the state classification officer had the final authority on all custody changes. Even assuming Plaintiff's version of the facts to be true, Plaintiff has not established a causal relationship between his protected conduct (the "so many" grievances submitted while he was in administrative confinement) and any adverse action taken by Defendant Eberhard. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

As Plaintiff's ninth claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Davis retaliated against him on September 27, 2001, by issuing a false disciplinary report for disorderly conduct in response to Plaintiff's submissions of grievances against the staff. In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Davis states, in pertinent part:

I am a retired Sergeant from the Department of Corrections ("DOC"), where I worked for 19 years. Almost all of that time was spent at [the] Reception and Medical Center ("RMC") formerly known as North Florida Reception Center ("NFRC").I held the rank of Sergeant for the last 14 years I worked for the DOC.

I have absolutely no recollection of the inmate, Eddie Pittman. Even reviewing the disciplinary report attached as Exhibit "A" to this Affidavit does not trigger a recollection. He was one of thousands of inmates with whom I interacted during the course of my career.

On September 27, 2001, part of my routine duties was to assist dormitory officers in conducting searches of the bunk areas. These searches were performed virtually every day.

. . . .

I did not have authority at that time to place Mr. Pittman in administrative confinement, that decision would have been made by the shift officer in charge.

At the time of the incident described in Exhibit "B," I had no idea who Eddie Pittman was. I had no knowledge whether he had ever written grievances against any correctional officers at RMC. I still don't recall who he was, nor do I have any knowledge concerning whether or not he had filed grievances against correctional officers. It is not unusual for inmates to file grievances against correctional officers.

According to official Department of Corrections records annexed hereto as Exhibit "A," Mr. Pittman did file a grievance against me as a result of this incident; however his grievance was denied.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman arose out of the course of my employ with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Davis' Affidavit.

According to the disciplinary report, on September 27, 2001, while assigned as an internal security supervisor, Defendant Davis conducted routine searches of the housing areas. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #74), Exhibit D, Disciplinary Report. Defendant Davis found "several sets of extra clothes" in a bunk assigned to Plaintiff. Id.; Defendant Davis' Affidavit. Possessing extra clothes is a violation of the institution's rules. Defendant Davis' Affidavit. Defendant Davis had discovered extra sets of clothes during routine bunk searches on many occasions with various inmates, and his standard operating procedure in such an instance "was to counsel the inmate and confiscate the clothes." Id. He would not issue a disciplinary report for this particular infraction, and he followed that procedure with respect to Plaintiff Pittman in this instance. Id. Defendant Davis attempted to counsel Plaintiff about the infraction, and Plaintiff stated, "I don't have to answer your questions. I know the rules, I was a permanent here." Exhibit D. Defendant Davis again attempted to counsel Plaintiff, and Plaintiff stated, "I can do my time anywhere, here or confinement." Id. When Plaintiff verbally disrespected Defendant Davis, writing a disciplinary report was "both necessary and appropriate" since verbal disrespect is a violation of the institution's rules. Defendant Davis' Affidavit. Defendant Davis did not have the authority at that time to place Plaintiff Pittman in administrative confinement. Id. That decision would have been made by the shift officer in charge. Id. Therefore, the shift officer in charge at that time was notified and instructed Defendant Davis to write the disciplinary report against Plaintiff. Exhibit D.

Plaintiff Pittman refused to sign all forms and further refused to give a statement. Id. He also declined any staff assistance. Plaintiff was placed in administrative confinement by Captain Sams, the Supervising Officer on duty. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #74), Exhibit E. Plaintiff was given an informal hearing and notified of the reason he was being placed in administrative confinement. Id.

At the time of the incident on September 27, 2001, Defendant Davis "had no idea who Eddie Pittman was." Defendant Davis' Affidavit. Defendant Davis did not know about grievances that Plaintiff had filed against the staff. Id. Defendant Davis later became aware of a grievance that Plaintiff filed against him as a result of the September 27, 2001, disciplinary report.Id. As noted by Defendant Davis, conducting bunk searches was a routine part of his duties; a part of that duty included the confiscation of contraband, which included extra sets of clothes.Id. In this situation, the record reflects that Defendant Davis was performing his routine duties as the internal security supervisor and that his actions were reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in securing the prison and maintaining order and discipline within the prison environment. He issued a disciplinary report against Plaintiff for disorderly conduct only after he attempted twice to counsel Plaintiff for a rule infraction. Plaintiff has not shown a causal relationship between Plaintiff's protected conduct (i.e., the submission of grievances against staff) and the alleged adverse action by Defendant Davis. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

As Plaintiff's tenth claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Roberson retaliated against him on September 27, 2001, by coming to Plaintiff's confinement cell and kicking the cell door to create a disturbance to have him "falsely DR'd" for Plaintiff's writing a grievance against Sergeant Graham. Second Amended Complaint at 15. In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Roberson states, in pertinent part:

I served as a correctional officer employee of the Florida Department of Corrections at Baker CI. I worked the 4:00 PM to 12:00 AM shift.

At all times material, my post was out on the yard, not in the dormitories. As such, I had no occasion to come to Eddie Pittman's cell.

I have no recollections of having any encounter with the Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman. I specifically deny his allegations that I came to his cell and harassed him.

I never had any knowledge that Mr. Pittman wrote grievances on any Department of Corrections Employee. I do not recall ever writing a disciplinary report on him. Every disciplinary report I have ever written was for legitimate reasons and not fabricated.

Any contact I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Roberson's Affidavit.

Defendant Roberson never knew that Plaintiff had written grievances against the staff and did not recall ever writing a disciplinary report against Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff later concedes that he never received a second disciplinary report on September 27, 2001. Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. #83) at 10. Thus, taking Plaintiff's version of the facts to be true, Defendant Roberson merely kicked Plaintiff's cell door, but no disciplinary report was ever written against Plaintiff for the disturbance. Further, Defendant Roberson never entered Plaintiff's cell. And, finally, there are no allegations of physical violence taking place on that day. Plaintiff has not shown a causal relationship between Plaintiff's protected conduct (i.e., his filing a grievance against Sergeant Graham) and any adverse action by Defendant Roberson. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1249.

As Plaintiff's eleventh claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Brady retaliated against him by accompanying Defendant Roberson to Plaintiff's cell on September 27, 2001. Plaintiff states "I personally saw Defendant Brady along with Defendant Roberson and the 3rd unidentified Officer creating a fabricated act in order to justify entering my cell to inflict physical abuse." Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. #81), attached Exhibit J. However, Plaintiff admits that he "did not recognize Brady doing anything though he may have contributed to the kicking on the door." Second Amended Complaint at 15. Thus, taking Plaintiff's version of the facts to be true, Defendant Brady merely accompanied other officers to Plaintiff's cell that day. As previously noted with respect to Defendant Roberson, the officers, on September 27, 2001, never entered Plaintiff's cell and never issued a disciplinary report. Further, there are no allegations of physical violence taking place on that day.

In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Brady states, in pertinent part:

I have been employed by the Department of Corrections for 8 years. I have been a correctional officer sergeant since September, 2004. I have worked my entire career at [the] Reception and Medical Center.

I never even heard of the name, Eddie Pittman, until I was served with a copy of this law suit. I never had any encounter with him while working at RMC.

I deny ever kicking the door of his cell, or contributing to harassment or physical abuse of Mr. Pittman. Had I so acted in front of his cell, several inmates easily could have witnesses my actions.

Any contact I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Brady's Affidavit.

Plaintiff concedes that "he did not recognize Defendant Brady doing anything," but that Defendant Brady "may have contributed to the kicking on the door." Second Amended Complaint at 15. Defendant Brady, in his Affidavit, clarifies that he did not kick Plaintiff's cell door. Thus, the record reflects that Defendant Brady did not take any adverse action against Plaintiff Pittman. Plaintiff has not shown a causal relationship between Plaintiff's protected conduct (i.e., his filing a grievance against Sergeant Graham) and any adverse action by Defendant Brady. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

As Plaintiff's twelfth claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Jerry retaliated against him on November 1, 2001, by threatening him for writing a grievance against Officer Meyers. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jerry stated, "Take this grievance and wipe your ass or go to lock-up." Second Amended Complaint at 16; Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. #81), Exhibit L. Plaintiff further states that Sergeant McDowell "showed sensitivity towards the issue" [the grievance Plaintiff had written concerning the alleged racial remarks made by Officer Meyers] and then recommended that Robinson review Meyers' misconduct. Second Amended Complaint at 16; In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Jerry states, in pertinent part:

I have been retired from the Florida Department of Corrections since December 31, 2003. I was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections for twenty-nine (29) years. My rank upon retirement was Correctional Officer Sergeant. At all times material, I was a Correctional Officer Sergeant at [the] Reception and Medical Center.

I have absolutely no recollection of an inmate named Eddie Pittman. I deny that I ever said to any inmate at any time "Take this grievance and wipe your ass or go to lock-up."

At no time did I ever have any knowledge that inmate Eddie Pittman filed grievances against any other officer.

I categorically deny all allegations by Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, against me in his Complaint.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Jerry's Affidavit.

Taking Plaintiff's version of the facts to be true, Defendant Jerry threatened Plaintiff; however, at that same time, Sergeant McDowell was sensitive to the grievance issue and concluded that the grievance concerning Meyers' alleged misconduct was serious enough to investigate. Second Amended Complaint at 16. According to Plaintiff, Sergeant McDowell recommended that Officer Robinson interview Meyers. Id. Thus, Plaintiff's grievance concerning Officer Meyers' alleged misconduct was investigated, and Plaintiff did not suffer negatively for the filing of the grievance in this instance. Plaintiff has not shown a causal relationship between his protected conduct (i.e., his filing a grievance against Officer Meyers) and any adverse action. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

As Plaintiff's thirteenth claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Foust (as the library technician assistant at Columbia Correctional Institution) retaliated against him on September 14, 2002, September 26, 2002, and December 7, 2002, by harassing him and depriving him of services in response to Plaintiff's filing of grievances and using the institution's legal services. Second Amended Complaint at 16-17; Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. #83), Exhibit Q. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Foust is arrogant and obnoxiously retaliated against Plaintiff by making unprofessional and sarcastic comments, such as: "You're a case"; "I can see if you were paying for the photocopies but you're not because you're indigent"; and, "The Courts are looking at your [sic] as the little boy that cried Wolf!" Second Amended Complaint at 16-17. Further, Plaintiff states that Defendant Foust told Plaintiff that he is too serious when he visits the library. Id. at 16. In sum, Plaintiff concludes that Defendant Foust "tried to make the Plaintiff feel as though he were doing something wrong by attempting to get photocopies made for legal correspondence with the courts." Id.

In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Foust states, in pertinent part:

I have been employed by the Florida Department of Corrections ("DOC") for the past three years. Presently, I am a correctional officer at Union Correctional Institution. Previously, I worked as a library tech assistant, at Columbia Correctional Institution (CCI), for a period of five months in 2002.

I remember the Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, very well. During the five months that I was library tech assistant at CCI, Eddie Pittman requested making copies of "legal documents" far more than any other inmate of the over 1100 inmates at that institution. He literally made thousands of copies of documents, more than any other inmate during that time.

Because Mr. Pittman was such a frequent visitor to the library, I attempted to get along with him. I tried being straight-laced and professional. I tried levity. I am sure I made the statement "You're a case," which has been attributed to me. I also tried to be helpful and counsel Mr. Pittman. As part of such counseling, I did state "The Courts are looking at you as the little boy who cried wolf." No matter which approach I took to try to help and get along with Mr. Pittman, he complained about my demeanor and filed grievances against me.

The incidents which Mr. Pittman refers to in his Complaint took place late on Saturday afternoons. The fact that the library at CCI was closed on Sunday and Monday was well-known to Mr. Pittman. Mr. Pittman would come into the library on Saturdays and request that literally hundreds or thousands of copies be made that day. If he could not prove to me that he had a legal deadline which required the copies to be made that day, I might not complete his request until the following Tuesday. Also, there were other copy requests ahead of him. I never refused to make him copies. Whenever he showed me that he was under a legal deadline to provide such information to the Court, I made sure he received his copies in time to comply with that deadline.

I never retaliated against Mr. Pittman for filing grievances against me. Replying to inmate grievances was simply part of the job.

I had no knowledge at the time in question that Mr. Pittman was writing grievances about correctional officers at CCI or elsewhere.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Foust's Affidavit.

Based on the record, it is evident that Plaintiff extensively used the resources available at the library at Columbia Correctional Institution. As noted by Defendant Foust, Plaintiff Pittman was a "frequent visitor to the library" who requested a multitude of copies, and therefore Defendant Foust remembers him very well. Id. Plaintiff does not claim that Defendant Foust denied him use of the library's resources. Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant Foust made comments to make Plaintiff feel as though he was doing something wrong.

The record reflects that Plaintiff had a voluminous amount of photocopying work. However, Plaintiff only cites to one instance in which his photocopying work was delayed for two days due to the hours of operation of the library. As Defendant Foust explained, Plaintiff was well aware of the library's hours of operation, but would arrive in the library on a Saturday afternoon to request a large number of copies be made. Id. Since the library was closed on Sunday and Monday and since there were other photocopying requests ahead of Plaintiff, Defendant Foust informed Plaintiff that he would have to wait until Tuesday (when the library reopened) for his copies. Reasonable limitations, such as the ones cited by Defendant Foust, may be placed upon an inmate's access to legal resources and photocopying services. Further, Plaintiff concedes that he persuaded the Leon County Clerk of Court to make the photocopies for the defendants involved in that particular case. Second Amended Complaint at 17.

The undisputed facts reflect that Defendant Foust attempted to amicably work with Plaintiff Pittman and satisfied Plaintiff's extensive photocopying needs within the confines of the resources that were available to Defendant Foust at the times of Plaintiff's requests. It is noteworthy that Defendant Foust, with limited resources, had an obligation to insure that all the inmates, not just Plaintiff Pittman, had access to the photocopying services to meet their court deadlines; however, the constitutional concept of an inmate's right of access to the courts does not require that prison officials provide inmates with free or unlimited access to photocopying services. See Wanninger v. Davenport, 697 F.2d 992, 994 (11th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff, too, like all litigants, must plan; it was his responsibility to schedule his library visits around the hours of operation so that he could insure there was sufficient time for voluminous photocopying. Here, with respect to Defendant Foust, Plaintiff has not shown a causal relationship between Plaintiff's protected conduct (i.e., his filing of grievances and using the library's services) and any adverse action taken by Defendant Foust. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

As Plaintiff's fourteenth claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Arora retaliated against him by transferring him to Columbia Correctional Center on November 22, 2002, from the Lake City Work Release Center. In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Arora states:

I am Anil K. Arora, M.D. My curriculum vitae is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "A." I am a medical doctor licen[s]ed to practice medicine in the state of Florida and have been so licen[s]ed since October 19, 1988.

I have been employed by the Florida Department of Corrections ("DOC") as a senior physician at the Columbia Correctional Institution since May, 2001. In the course of my employment there, I have observed and treated an inmate, Eddie Lareece Pittman.

During the time that I treated Mr. Pittman, he was classified as a "Psych.3" patient, which means he is under the care of a Psychiatrist.

I first saw Mr. Pittman on February 22, 2002. My initial diagnosis "rule out Psychotic Disorder, NOS 298.90."⁴ This remained my diagnosis throughout the time that I treated him. For that diagnosis, the following treatment was prescribed: Zyprexa 10 mg po at P.M.

At some point in 2002, Mr. Pittman was transferred to the Lake City Work Release Center, without my knowledge. On November 22, 2002, I was informed that Mr. Pittman was having psychiatric problems at the Lake City Work Release Center. As a result of my evaluation on that date, I determined that Mr. Pittman was not amenable to working in an open environment. My note is attached as Exhibit "C."

During observation of Mr. Pittman on December 1 and 2, 2002, no objective signs of psychiatric symptoms were observed. At that time, Mr. Pittman stated that he had been without his medication, Zyprexa, for approximately two weeks. However, we did not observe any adverse side effects from his being without medication during that time. The medication was restarted after December 1, 2002.

Prior to December 1, 2002, I had no knowledge that Mr. Pittman was without his medication.

Following my November 22 evaluation and Mr. Pittman's hospitalization on December 1, 2002, it was my medical opinion, within reasonable medical probability, that Mr. Pittman was not an appropriate candidate for the Work Release Center. The medical reasons for this opinion are that Mr. Pittman showed an inability to function because of paranoid ideas.

Based solely upon this medical opinion, I recommended that Mr. Pittman be retained at Columbia CI, where medical attention would be available. There is no medical facility at the Lake City Work Release Center. I had no specific knowledge of Mr. Pittman's filing grievances against other employees at Columbia CI at the time I recommended that he be retained there. I did not confer or conspire with any other DOC employees of Columbia CI to have Mr. Pittman returned there. I acted solely in my medical judgment as to what was best for Mr. Pittman.

At no time that I saw Mr. Pittman did he ever have objective signs of a serious medical condition.

At all times that I saw Mr. Pittman, I treated him in a professional manner and provided medical care for all of his complaints. I never was indifferent to his complaints.

Throughout the time that I saw Mr. Pittman, I never purposely ignored or failed to respond to his complaints or requests for medical treatment.

Throughout my treatment of Mr. Pittman, I never intended to inflict unnecessary pain upon him.

Throughout my treatment of Mr. Pittman, I always listened attentively to his complaints, prescribed medication and treatment as I believed necessary and ordered all diagnostic tests I believed necessary in order to properly diagnose complaints.

Throughout my treatment of Mr. Pittman, I never knew of an excessive risk to his health or safety, nor would I ever deliberately disregard such a risk. Defendant Arora's Affidavit.

4 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is used by mental health professionals for an accurate diagnosis and appropriate treatment and care. Each psychiatric disorder has a corresponding diagnostic code (DSM code). The diagnostic code of "298.90" is for psychotic disorder not otherwise specified.See http://www.allpsych.com/disorders.

Based on the medical records (attached to Defendant Arora's Affidavit), Defendant Arora's Affidavit and Defendant Arora's November 22, 2002, letter to the institutional classification team, the record reflects that Plaintiff was classified as an "S-3" and was in need of mental health treatment and management. Plaintiff concedes that, while at the Lake City Work Release Center, he had psychological problems and as a result of those problems was taken back to Columbia Correctional Institution on November 22, 2002, to see Defendant Arora. Second Amended Complaint at 20.

Defendant Arora informed the classification team, on November 22, 2002, that "Mr. Pittman during this course of the meeting today expressed thoughts and ideas regarding his adjustment to Lake City Work Release Center [and] [i]t is my opinion that I/M Pittman currently is not amenable for working in a[n] open environment." Defendant Arora's Affidavit, Exhibit C. Defendant Arora noted that the "medical reasons for this opinion are that [he] showed an inability to function because of paranoid ideas." Defendant Arora's Affidavit. He concluded that he recommended that Plaintiff Pittman be retained at Columbia Correctional Institution based solely upon this medical opinion since medical attention would be available at Columbia Correctional Institution. Id. The Mental Health Nursing Assessments, attached to Defendant Arora's Affidavit, document that, on December 1, 2002, Plaintiff was hearing voices and was paranoid. Id., Exhibit B. Based on the medical staff's assessment of Plaintiff's condition, it was determined that Plaintiff Pittman should be placed in an isolation cell/infirmary isolation management room to prevent self-injury and to provide protection and observation. Id.

Medical personnel have an obligation to insure that an inmate's physical and mental health are monitored and protected. Following the November 22, 2002, evaluation of Plaintiff by Defendant Arora and after Plaintiff's December 1, 2002, mental health assessments, Defendant Arora, as a medical doctor, had a responsibility to insure that Plaintiff Pittman had appropriate and accessible follow-up care for his ongoing mental health needs. It is noteworthy that, while Plaintiff was at the Lake City Work Release Center, he was responsible for obtaining refills of medication prescriptions on his own; however, when Plaintiff returned to Columbia Correctional Institution on November 15, 2002, for evaluation, he admitted to a psychological specialist that he did not follow up on his refills. See Notice of Filing (Doc. #76), Affidavit of Helen Roberson, Psychiatric Specialist. There was no medical facility at the Lake City Work Release Center, and it was evident at that time that Plaintiff needed mental health attention and treatment. Thus, Defendant Arora's actions were motivated by his responsibility, as a medical doctor, to evaluate, monitor and treat Plaintiff for his mental health needs. Based on the record, Plaintiff has not shown a causal relationship between his protected conduct (i.e., his filing of grievances against the staff) and any adverse action by Defendant Arora. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

As Plaintiff's fifteenth claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Moultrie retaliated against him, on November 8, 2002, by confronting Plaintiff about grievances he had submitted to Tallahassee (concerning staff at the Lake City Work Release Center) and by conspiring with Defendant Arora to transfer Plaintiff back to Columbia Correctional Institution. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Moultrie told Plaintiff that he "felt disrespected" because Plaintiff had bypassed the institutional level and submitted grievances directly to Tallahassee. Plaintiff notes that Defendant Moultrie stated, "When you are in someone else's house, you should abide by the rules of the house" and then "hinted" that Plaintiff may be looking for a new work release center if he kept complaining. Second Amended Complaint at 19; Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. #82), Exhibit B.

In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Moultrie stated, in pertinent part:

I presently am retired after having worked for the Florida Department of Corrections for over 32 years. I last was employed as a major, overseeing the Lake City Work Release Center from 2000 until May, 2003. I was the highest ranking officer in that facility.

I recall Eddie Pittman. I first learned of him when the central office of the Department of Corrections in Tallahassee called me and asked me to investigate a complaint against a member of my staff which Mr. Pittman had made directly to the central office.

In order to investigate that complaint, I invited Mr. Pittman into my office. I advised him to make sure he knew the rules of the institution, because those rules required that he first submit a grievances [sic] at the institution before appealing them to Tallahassee. I did make the statement that his failure to complain at the work release center indicated a disrespect for me. I had no problem with Mr. Pittman[`s] filing grievances. My only problem was that he did not follow institutional rules by filing the grievance locally before filing it in Tallahassee.

Whether or not an inmate is assigned to the Lake City Work Release Center was not a decision I made as the major. That was up to the department's classification officer or office. I had no authority to decide whether or not Mr. Pittman initially would be placed at the Lake City Work Release Center or whether or not he would remain there.

My speaking with Mr. Pittman on this one occasion was meant only to impart friendly advice.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Moultrie's Affidavit.

Thus, the record clearly reflects that Defendant Moultrie, after the central office called to request that he investigate a grievance which had been filed against a member of his staff, did invite Plaintiff Pittman into his office on November 8, 2002, to discuss the grievance. Id.; Second Amended Complaint at 19. Since the central office had called Defendant Moultrie to investigate the grievance that had been submitted by Plaintiff, Defendant Moultrie was merely acting pursuant to the instructions of the central office. Defendant Moultrie, as part of the investigation into the grievance and as "friendly advice" to Plaintiff, did advise Plaintiff that it was disrespectful for Plaintiff to bypass the institutional level by filing the grievance directly with the central office in Tallahassee. Id. Defendant Moultrie further advised Plaintiff that the department's rules require that inmates first submit grievances to the institution before appealing to Tallahassee. Defendant Moultrie's Affidavit. Defendant Moultrie was concerned that Plaintiff Pittman had not followed the department's rules, but "had no problem with Mr. Pittman filing grievances." Id.

Finally, with respect to Defendant Moultrie's involvement in the decision to transfer Plaintiff back to Columbia Correctional Institution, Defendant Moultrie did not have the authority to decide who was assigned to the work release center or whether or not an inmate would remain at the work release center. Id. As previously explained with respect to Defendant Arora, the decision to transfer Plaintiff back to Columbia Correctional Institution was based on Defendant Arora's medical diagnosis and the final decision would be made by the department's classification officer. Thus, taking Plaintiff's version of the facts to be true, Plaintiff has not shown an adverse action by Defendant Moultrie. Plaintiff has not shown a causal relationship between his protected conduct (i.e., his filing of grievances) and any adverse action by Defendant Moultrie. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

As Plaintiff's sixteenth claim of retaliation, he contends that Defendant Allen retaliated against him, on November 18, 2002, when he "rudely intervened" while Plaintiff was conversing with Nurse Carcama about Plaintiff's medical and psychiatric needs. Second Amended Complaint at 19. Accordingly to Plaintiff, Nurse Carcama failed to listen to Plaintiff's whole story and yelled at Plaintiff and then, when Plaintiff defended himself, Defendant Allen "rudely intervened." Id. In response to Plaintiff's allegations, Defendant Allen states, in pertinent part:

I have been employed by the Florida Department of Corrections for 15 years. I have worked at Columbia Correctional Institution since 2001 and have been a correctional officer sergeant since 2003. I have worked on the 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 A.M. shift.

At no time did I ever know that Eddie Pittman filed grievances against other employees of Columbia Correctional Institution. I never retaliated against Mr. Pittman for filing any grievances.

Part of my duties was to provide security when inmates were seen by the institution nurse. Part of those duties required me to keep inmates quiet when the nurse was talking to them.

I never spoke with Dr. Arora about Eddie Pittman. I have no knowledge or involvement with Plaintiff's transfer to Lake City Work Release Center or from the work release center back to Columbia CI.

At the time alleged, 2002, I was working in the medical department. My job was to ensure inmates showed up for their medical appointments and did not get out of line with the medical staff. My job was to protect the staff from inmates.

If there was an occasion when Mr. Pittman was talking when a nurse wished to be speaking to him, I likely told him to be quiet. That was my job and was done in routine performance of that job: not for any other reason.

Any dealings I may have had with Plaintiff, Eddie Pittman, arose out of the course of my employment with the Florida Department of Corrections.

I did not intentionally violate any of Plaintiff's Civil Rights, First Amendment or otherwise.

Defendant Allen's Affidavit.

The record clearly reflects that Plaintiff was involved in a somewhat heated verbal discussion with Nurse Carcama concerning his medical and psychiatric needs on November 18, 2002. Even taking Plaintiff's version of the facts to be true that Defendant Allen "rudely intervened," it was part of the routine duties of his job to protect the medical staff from inmates, and his verbal intervention was reasonable under the circumstances described by Plaintiff.

It is noteworthy that Plaintiff has submitted over two-hundred (200) pages of grievances, appeals and responses to show exhaustion of the issues he has presented to this Court. See Complaint (Doc. #1), attached exhibits. In one of the grievances submitted with respect to his allegations against Defendant Allen, Plaintiff states that he was defending himself after Nurse Carcama "got slick." Id., Exhibit W. He claims that Defendant Allen displayed unprofessional conduct when he told Plaintiff he had no right telling Nurse Carcama how to do her job. Id. Based on the record before this Court, it is clear that Defendant Allen was performing his job function, which was to maintain order in the medical department and protect the staff from inmates. It was certainly within the realm of his job responsibilities to insure that the conversation between Plaintiff and Nurse Carcama remained professional, dignified and focused on the medical issues.

Additionally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Allen retaliated against him by telling him to report to C dormitory in his white work release uniform when the standard uniform at Columbia Correctional Institution is blue. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of Defendant Allen's instructions, Plaintiff was stopped at the gate by a sergeant who told him to go to the laundry to be issued a blue uniform before reporting to the housing area. According to the response to Plaintiff's grievance, Defendant Allen did order Plaintiff, while clothed in a white uniform, to check in with C dormitory to get his housing assignment. Id. Defendant Allen also advised that the dormitory would call the laundry department so that he would be issued his blue uniform.Id. Plaintiff has not shown adverse action by Defendant Allen. At most, there was a misunderstanding among the officers and Plaintiff with respect to how and when the blue uniform would be issued. Not every inconvenience experienced by Plaintiff Pittman within the institution can be declared a retaliatory measure merely because Plaintiff is litigious. Such a causal relationship cannot be assumed.

Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Allen played a part in making the decision to transfer him back to Columbia Correctional Institution; however, the record reflects that the transfer was made by classification based on Defendant Arora's medical opinion that Plaintiff Pittman was not amenable to working in an open environment such as the work release center due to his mental health needs and his adjustment issues. Plaintiff has not shown a causal relationship between his protected conduct (i.e., his filing of grievances) and any adverse action by Defendant Allen.See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d at 1248-49.

Finally, with respect to Defendants Arora, Moultrie and Allen, Plaintiff claims they conspired to transfer him back to Columbia Correctional Institution. The Eleventh Circuit has addressed factors needed to establish a prima facie case of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy.

Conspiring to violate another person's constitutional rights violates section 1983. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27[,] 101 S.Ct. 183, 186 (1980); Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 425 (11th Cir. 1988), overruled in part on other grounds by Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1996). To establish a prima facie case of section 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the defendants "reached an understanding to violate [his] rights." Strength, 854 F.2d at 425 (quotation omitted). The plaintiff does not have to produce a "smoking gun" to establish the "understanding" or "willful participation" required to show a conspiracy, Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 469 (11th Cir. 1990), but must show some evidence of agreement between the defendants. Bailey v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Alachua County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992) ("The linchpin for conspiracy is agreement, which presupposes communication."). For a conspiracy claim to survive a motion for summary judgment "[a] mere `scintilla' of evidence . . . will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990).

Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2002). Based on the record before this Court, no conspiracy has been shown. A mere discussion concerning the fact that Plaintiff had filed numerous grievances against the staff followed by a transfer back to Columbia Correctional Institution by the classification office, based on the medical opinion of Defendant Arora that Plaintiff was not amenable for working in an open environment due to paranoid thoughts, is not enough to conclude that the Defendants conspired to transfer him back to Columbia Correctional Institution as retaliation for his filing of grievances. Plaintiff has failed to set forth specific operative facts to establish the existence of a conspiracy among the three Defendants to violate his constitutional rights. The Defendants did not reach an understanding to violate Plaintiff's rights.See Defendant Arora's Affidavit; Defendant Moultrie's Affidavit; Defendant Allen's Affidavit.

In sum, in viewing the record as a whole and all inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact because the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff has merely assumed that the Defendants retaliated against him without alleging supporting facts that would justify such a conclusion. And, without knowledge of the protected activity, there cannot be a retaliatory motive. See Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d at 1005 (citations omitted). Clearly, no fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the Plaintiff on the evidence presented to this Court. The existence of "a mere scintilla of evidence" in support of Plaintiff's position is insufficient to preclude the granting of Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Bartes v. School Bd. of Alachua County, No. 04-15459, 2005 WL 2764744, *3 (11th Cir. Oct. 26, 2005) (not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter); Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d at 860; Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1321 (11th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 948 (1999).

Therefore, for the above-stated reasons, Defendants' motions for summary judgment will be granted and judgment will be entered in Defendants' favor.

Therefore, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendants' Dispositive Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. #73, #74, #75) are GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff's Motion to Be Heard (Doc. #84) is GRANTED only to the extent that his responses to Defendants' motions for summary judgment are accepted as timely filed.

3. Plaintiff's Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Foust (Doc. #85) is DENIED.

4. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the Defendants.

5. The Clerk shall change the docket to reflect Defendants' counsel as "Jeffrey Allen Cramer, Esquire, with the Law Office of Jeffrey A. Cramer." See Stipulation for Substitution of Counsel (Doc. #87).

6. The Clerk shall close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED.