Opinion
1:22-CV-1372 (GTS/ML)
03-28-2023
QUINCY PITTMAN, Plaintiff, v. JOANNA JOHNSON, Supervisor B; LAWRENCE T. DAHLLEE, Lawyer; CHILD FAMILY SERVICE, Over Seer; and MARLE W. BLANCHFIELD, Judge, Defendants.
QUINCY PITTMAN Plaintiff, Pro Se
QUINCY PITTMAN
Plaintiff, Pro Se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Clerk has sent a pro se complaint in the above captioned action together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis, filed by Quincy Pittman (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.) For the reasons discussed below, I grant Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application, and recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed in its entirety without prejudice but without leave to replead. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.)
I. BACKGROUND
Construed as liberally as possible, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that his civil rights were violated by defendants Joanna Johnson, Lawrence T. Dahllee, Child Family Service, and Marle W. Blanchfield (collectively “Defendants”). (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that in October 2022, the mother of his child was found to have neglected their child. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Johnson asked Plaintiff to take custody of his child but, at the time, he was unable to. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges his child was then placed in a home where Plaintiff was only permitted to text to determine how his child was doing and was not granted any visits. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that his child was then placed in a second home and he was not permitted to contact his child at all. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to contact his child in the second home but did not receive a response. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his child was then moved to a third home. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he went to family court and Defendant Johnson lied to Defendant Blanchfield-who was presiding over the family court matter-stating that Plaintiff was doing something he was not supposed to on November 9 (of an unspecified year). (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his rights as a father have been mistreated. (Id.)
The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiff does not appear to assert any causes of action. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) As relief, Plaintiff requests that Defendants Johnson and Blanchfield “be taken off [his family court] case because they have been mistreating it since Oct[ober 20]22.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.)
Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 2.)
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
“When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $402, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 2), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard.
The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of in forma pauperis status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making in forma pauperis status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
Plaintiff is reminded that, although his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted, he is still required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In addition, the Court shall dismiss any action where the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1988) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction is a “threshold question that must be resolved . . . before proceeding to the merits.”); Humphrey v. Syracuse Police Dep't, 758 Fed.Appx. 205, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Bond, 762 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 2014)) (“[b]efore deciding any case on the merits, a district court must determine that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.”); Koziel v. City of Yonkers, 352 Fed.Appx. 470, 471 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint on initial review for lack of subject matter); Talley v. LoanCare Serv., Div. of FNF, 15-CV-5017, 2018 WL 4185705, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2018) (dismissing on initial review, action challenging state court mortgage foreclosure judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction); Eckert v. Schroeder, Joseph & Assoc., 364 F.Supp.2d 326, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Hughes v. Patrolmen=s Benevolent Ass=n of the City of N.Y., Inc., 850 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988)) (“[a] court shall, sua sponte, dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as soon as it is apparent that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.@).
“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that all causes of action be dismissed.
A. Claims Against Defendant Blanchfield
I recommend that Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Blanchfield be dismissed based on the doctrine of judicial immunity. “Judicial immunity protects conduct taken as part of all judicial acts except those performed in the clear absence of jurisdiction.” Walker v. Family Ct. Judge Catherine Cholakis, 19-CV-1288, 2020 WL 3503158, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020) (Kahn, J.) (quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Blanchfield stem from alleged actions taken in connection with the child neglect proceedings. As a result, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Blanchfield should be dismissed on this basis. See Walker, 2020 WL 3503158, at *7 (explaining that the defendant judge had “absolute judicial immunity for all judicial actions that occurred within her judicial capacity” of determining the proper custody for the plaintiff's children, and noting that immunity applies “even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly” (citation omitted)).
B. Plaintiff's Claims Regarding the State Court Neglect Proceedings
Plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief in this matter relating to the state family court proceedings, which is barred by the abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “Younger abstention is required when three conditions are met: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest is implicated in that proceeding; and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of the federal constitutional claims.” Morpurgo v. Incorp. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 327 Fed.Appx. 284, 285 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
As to the first condition, “Younger applies if the federal action involves ongoing: (1) ‘state criminal prosecutions'; (2) ‘civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions'; or (3) civil proceedings that ‘implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.'” Torres v. Gaines, 130 F.Supp.3d 630, 636-37 (D. Conn. 2015) (quoting Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013)). “Both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have observed that a ‘state-initiated proceeding to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents' falls within the second category.” Torres, 130 F.Supp.3d at 636-37 . (citing Davis v. Baldwin, 594 Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (2d Cir. 2015)). “If the federal action falls into one of these three categories, a Court may then consider . . . whether the state interest is vital and whether the state proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims.” Id. (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Turning to the additional conditions for application of the Younger abstention doctrine, it is well-settled that “a custody dispute . . . raises important state interests.” Amato v. McGinty, 17-CV-0593, 2017 WL 9487185, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. June 6, 2017) (Baxter, M.J.) (citation and quotations omitted), report and recommendation adopted by, 2017 WL 4083575 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2017) (D'Agostino, J.); Reinhardt v. Commonwealth of Mass. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 715 F.Supp. 1253, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (explaining that “there can be no doubt that a custody dispute that involves allegations of sexual abuse raises important state interests,” and noting that “[q]uestions of family relations, especially when issues of custody and abuse are involved, are traditionally an area of state concern”).
Put simply, Plaintiff appears to ask the Court to recuse Defendants Johnson and Blanchfield from the state family court neglect and custody proceedings because Plaintiff believes that he has been mistreated by them. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff does not allege that he cannot vindicate his claims in state court. As a result, I recommend that his claims be dismissed. See, e.g., Curcio v. Grossman, 22-CV-1648, 2022 WL 767167, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022) (“to the extent that Plaintiff asks this Court to intervene in [her pending statecourt child-custody] . . . proceeding, the Court also dismisses those claims under the Younger abstention doctrine”); Walker v. Family Court Judge Catherine Cholakis, 19-CV-1288, 2020 WL 3503158, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020) (Kahn, J.) (where the plaintiff challenged a temporary order in an ongoing child custody dispute, alleging that the temporary custody order was gained under “lies and false pretenses and therefore should be considered invalid,” finding application of Younger abstention barred the plaintiff's federal claims for injunctive relief); Herbert v. Cattaraugus Cnty., 17-CV-248S, 2017 WL 5300009, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2017) (applying Younger abstention to the plaintiff's claims arising from ongoing Family Court proceedings, and noting that “[s]everal courts in this Circuit have held that Younger abstention applies in similar circumstances”).
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims for relief be dismissed without prejudice-and without leave to replead-because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint.
The Court also notes that “[a]lthough a municipality is subject to suit pursuant to section 1983, see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), a municipal . . . department does not have the capacity to be sued as an entity separate from the municipality in which it is located.” White v. Syracuse Police Dep't, 18-CV-1471, 2019 WL 981850, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2019) (Peebles, M.J.) (citing Krug v. Cnty. of Rennselaer, 559 F.Supp.2d 223, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J.); Turczyn ex rel. McGregor v. City of Utica, 13-CV-1357, 2014 WL 6685476, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2014) (Sharpe, J.); Hoisington v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 55 F.Supp.2d 212, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“Under New York law, a department of a municipal entity is merely a subdivision of the municipality and has no separate legal existence. Therefore, municipal departments like the Department of Social Services are not amenable to suit and no claims lie directly against the Department.”)), report and recommendation adopted by, 2019 WL 974824 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2019) (Suddaby, C.J.). Thus, Defendant Child Family Service is not a proper party amenable to suit. In the alternative to the reasons discussed supra, I recommend that any claims against Defendant Dahllee be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendant Dahllee is listed in the Complaint as a defendant (Dkt. No. 1 at 2) but the body of the Complaint does not contain any factual allegations against him. See Johnson v. Gonzalez, 14-CV-0745, 2015 WL 1179384, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2015) (Kahn, J.) (dismissing the claims against a defendant where the complaint lists the defendant's “name in the caption, but fails to again name or assert allegations against him.”); Serrano v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 12-CV-1592, 2013 WL 6816787, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (D'Agostino, J.) (citing Jaffer v. Chemical Bank, 93-CV-8459, 1994 WL 392260, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1994) (holding that “[w]hen a complaint's caption names a defendant but the complaint does not indicate that the named party injured the plaintiff or violated the law, the motion to dismiss must be granted”)) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims against two defendants who were listed as parties in the complaint and in the caption, but not elsewhere in the complaint).
V. OPPORTUNITY TO REPLEAD
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).
See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.
Here, leave to replead would be futile because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review Plaintiff's claims. As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed without leave to replead. See Oliver v. Punter, 22-CV-3580, 2022 WL 3228272, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2022) (holding that “leave to amend would be futile given that the domestic relations exception divests this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.”); Henrich v. Fowler, 20-CV-0021, 2022 WL 2816287, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July 19, 2022) (dismissing without leave to amend the plaintiff's claim seeking to revert a custody order to its prior terms, because any amendment would be futile).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED only for purposes of filing and any appeal unless the trial court certifies in writing that the appeal is not taken in good faith; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE BUT WITHOUT LEAVE TO REPLEAD Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted therein; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this order, report, and recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules.
The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).