Opinion
C. A. 8:23-cv-05609-TMC-KFM
12-20-2023
Dorothy Pierce, Plaintiff, v. Danny Singleton, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendant. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on November 3, 2023 (doc. 1). By order filed November 21, 2023, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring her case into proper form for judicial screening (doc. 6). The plaintiff complied with the court's order, bringing her case into proper form. On December 4, 2023, the plaintiff's amended complaint was entered on the docket (doc. 9). Nevertheless, upon review of the amended complaint, the instant matter is subject to summary dismissal.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff's claims appear to involve her dissatisfaction with proceedings in the Oconee County Probate Court for the estate of Doyle Pierce at Case Number 2020ES3700532 (“the Estate Proceeding”), over which the defendant is the current presiding judge (see docs. 9; 9-1).
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, Judge Singleton, entered multiple orders in the Estate Proceeding even though the plaintiff has a pending appeal of one of his prior orders in the South Carolina Court of Appeals (doc. 9-1 at 1-2). The plaintiff also contends that the beneficiaries in the Estate Proceeding entered a bad faith settlement agreement to prevent the plaintiff from appealing orders entered by Judge Singleton in the Estate Proceeding (id. at 2). Judge Singleton is also allegedly biased because he grew up with the other beneficiaries in the Estate Proceeding (id.). The plaintiff contends that she was removed as personal representative in the Estate Proceedings by a prior probate judge and that the order was procured by fraud and the plaintiff's motion for a new trial was wrongfully denied (id. at 3-4). The plaintiff filed an appeal, which remains pending at this time in the South Carolina Court of Appeals (id. at 4). A special administrator to the estate was then appointed despite a finding that the plaintiff did nothing wrong as personal representative (id.). The special administrator later resigned due to difficulties with the Estate Proceeding, and the plaintiff contends that Judge Singleton then pressured all of the beneficiaries to settle the estate despite the plaintiff's pending appeals (id. at 4-6). The plaintiff contends that Judge Singleton made it clear during settlement discussions that he was aware of aspects of the plaintiff's personal life that he could only have obtained through ex parte communications with the other beneficiaries (id. at 6-8). The plaintiff contends that counsel for another beneficiary then sent in a proposed order for the settlement agreement that was reached, and Judge Singleton entered the order even though the plaintiff objected to several portions and the order violated Rule 43 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (id. at 8-12). The plaintiff appealed the order, and despite the appeal, Judge Singleton entered an amended order removing one of the clauses (id. at 12). The settlement orders reappointed the plaintiff as personal representative in the Estate Proceedings even though the plaintiff had previously appealed the order removing her as personal representative (id. at 13). The orders also required the plaintiff to withdraw her appeals, but the plaintiff contends that she has the right to appeal (id. at 13-14). After the plaintiff amended her appeal of Judge Singleton's order, Judge Singleton threatened to remove the plaintiff as personal representative and later told a member of the plaintiff's family that they were practicing law without a license (id. at 14-15). Judge Singleton cursed at the plaintiff and the beneficiaries during a hearing to remove the plaintiff as personal representative in November 2023 and ordered the plaintiff to pay sanctions for being in contempt of court because she would not withdraw her appeals and demanded that he follow the law (id. at 15-17). The plaintiff contends that several orders were issued despite her pending appeals, which should have stayed the Estate Proceeding (id. at 18-20).
The plaintiff's first, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action are violations of her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (id. at 20-21,22-25). The plaintiff's second cause of action is conspiracy to violate her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (id. at 21). The plaintiff's third cause of action is deprivation of rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (id. at 22). The plaintiff contends that Judge Singleton has caused her irreparable harm and damage to her reputation (id. at 25-27). For relief, the plaintiff seeks a stay preventing Judge Singleton from issuing any orders in the Estate Proceeding, recusal of Judge Singleton in the Estate Proceeding, review of any orders entered by Judge Singleton in the Estate Proceeding, and money damages (docs. 9 at 5; 9-1 at 27-28).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them.” Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Since federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337 (1895)). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action seeking damages and injunctive relief from the defendant. For the reasons that follow, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
Younger Abstention
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger abstention may apply in noncriminal proceedings when three elements are met: (1) ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Brown-Thomas v. Hynie, 441 F.Supp.3d 180, 219 (D.S.C. 2019) (citing Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Hum. Rels., 28 F.3d 1392, 1398 (4th Cir. 1994)). Here, the plaintiff's amended complaint, as noted above, arises out of her dissatisfaction with matters in the Estate Proceeding, with the plaintiff seeking an order from this court preventing actions in the Estate Proceeding (which remains pending at this time) (see docs. 9 at 5; 9-1 at 27-28). As such, the first criterion is met as the Estate Proceeding remains pending at this time. With respect to the second criterion, probate and estate administration proceedings implicate important state interests; thus, the second criterion is met. See Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W.Va., 396 F.3d 348, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2005); Eveland v. Maryland, C/A No. 1:16-cv-00762-CCB, 2016 WL 6780207, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 16, 2016), aff'd, 691 Fed.Appx. 111 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[Resolution of state probate matters is a vital state interest”). Third, the plaintiff has the ability to raise her objections to orders entered in the Estate Proceedings in her pending appeals in the state courts (including the Oconee County Court of Common Pleas and the South Carolina Court of Appeals). Further, the plaintiff has failed to alleged “extraordinary circumstances” justifying federal interference with the state proceedings. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where ‘extraordinary circumstances' exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm.”). As such, Younger abstention applies, and this action should be dismissed.
Failure to State a Claim
In addition to Younger abstention, this action is also subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
A. 18 U.S.C. § 242 Claim
To the extent the plaintiff purports to bring claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242, her claim is subject to summary dismissal. This is a federal criminal statute that does not create a private right of action. See Pinckney v. U.S. Government, C/A No. 2:19-cv-00939-BHH-BM, 2019 WL 4171117, at *2 (D.S.C. June 20, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 4168753 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2019). The plaintiff, as a private citizen, may not enforce federal criminal law. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). As such, the plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to this statute is subject to summary dismissal.
B. Section 1983 Claims
The plaintiff's § 1983 claims are likewise subject to summary dismissal. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albrightv. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, the plaintiff's § 1983 claims fail because Judge Singleton has judicial immunity. As noted, the plaintiff alleges that Judge Singleton - the current probate judge presiding over the Estate Proceeding - has violated her rights by ruling against her in the Estate Proceeding and removing her as personal representative in the Estate Proceeding (docs. 9; 9-1). It is well-settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-64 (1978); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of their authority. Id. at 12-13. Absolute immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff's allegations in this action all involve Judge Singleton acting as the presiding judge in the Estate Proceeding, including making determinations regarding who should serve as personal representative, engaging in discussions with all parties regarding resolution of the Estate Proceeding, and entering orders in the Estate Proceeding (see docs. 9; 9-1). Thus, the plaintiff's bare assertions of bias and retaliation are insufficient to overcome the judicial immunity afforded to Judge Singleton and do not involve him stepping out of his judicial role. See Gibson v. Goldston, 85 F.4th 218, 223-26 (4th Cir. 2023) (noting that judicial immunity did not apply where a family court judge engaged in a law enforcement capacity in engaging in a search of a litigant's home as part of property division proceedings in a divorce). As such, judicial immunity squarely applies and the plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Judge Singleton should be dismissed.
C. Section 1985 Claim
The plaintiff's claim asserting a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is also subject to summary dismissal. First, the Fourth Circuit has “specifically rejected section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner,” absent concrete supporting facts. See Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir. 1995). Here, the plaintiff's amended complaint contains only vague and conclusory allegations of a conspiracy based on Judge Singleton knowing the other beneficiaries - not concrete facts (see doc. 9-1 at 2). Further, the plaintiff's amended complaint asserts a conspiracy under § 1985(3), which applies to conspiracies to engage in “class-based” discrimination to “deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law.” A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff, however, has not alleged membership to a class contemplated by the statute - indeed, her conspiracy allegations appear to allege a personal animus by Judge Singleton, not a class based one. See Batiste v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, C/A No. 5:13-cv-13565, 2013 WL 6589878, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 16, 2013) (noting that a plaintiff in a § 1985 action must allege that the conspiracy to discriminate is based upon race, gender, or national origin). As such, the plaintiff has failed to allege a claim under § 1985.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the amended complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the last page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.