Opinion
C.A. No. 03C-04-294 SCD.
Submitted: May 25, 2004.
Decided: May 27, 2004.
Robert Pasquale, Esquire, Cynthia H. Pruitt, Esquire Doroshow, Pasquale, Krawitz, Siegel Bhaya, LLC Wilmington, DE.
Douglass Lee Mowrey, Esquire, Bouchelle Palmer, Christiana Executive Campus, Newark, DE.
Dear Counsel:
I have read the defendants' motion for reargument of my decision of May 13, 2004, and the plaintiff's response.
In the initial motion, the plaintiff argued that the defendant-landlord's position in filing the Debt and Summary Possession action in the Justice of the Peace Court was a judicial admission. As noted in my decision, judicial admissions are recognized in Delaware. But, as noted by the defendant in reargument, a judicial admission does not apply to positions taken in different cases.
The moment we leave the sphere of the same cause, we leave behind all questions of judicial admissions. A judicial admission is a waiver of proof and a pleading is, for the purpose of the very cause itself, a defining of the lines of controversy and a waiver of proof of all matters outside these lines of dispute. But this effect ceases with that litigation itself. But, when we arrive at other litigations and seek to resort to the parties [ sic] statements as embodied in the pleadings of prior litigations, we resort to them merely as quasi admissions; that is ordinary statements which now appear to tell against the party who then made them.
Rudnick v. Shoenberg, 122 A. 902, 903 (Del. 1923). (citation omitted)
I did not decided the case on the basis of a judicial admission. The discussion of that concept was in deference to the fact that it was the basis for the plaintiff's argument. It would have been clearer had I explained that judicial admission was not pertinent, but that a similar concept, judicial estoppel, does apply. As stated in the decision, judicial estoppel was the basis for the ruling I made.
Pesta v. Warren, Del. Super., C.A. No. 03C-04-294, Del Pesco, J. (May 13, 2004) (Letter Op.) at 2.
Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, "a party may be precluded from asserting in a legal proceeding, a position inconsistent with a position previously taken by him in the same or in an earlier legal proceeding." The purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings. Judicial estoppel will apply if the statement in the other action is clear so that "nothing will be left to be explained by argument or to be taken by inference." In filing his petition in the Justice of the Peace Court, the defendant made the conscious decision to check-off "Landlord/Tenant" as the type of action even though another choice listed was "Trespass". It is clear from this pleading that defendant regarded Regina Sheetz' status as tenant and that assertion cannot now be repudiated.
Siegman v. Palomar Medical Technologies, Inc., et al., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 15894, Jacobs, V.C. (July 13, 1998) (Mem. Op.) 1998 WL 409352 at *4, quoting Coates In ternation al, Ltd v. De Mott, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 12346, Jacobs, V.C. (Feb. 4, 1998) (Mem. Op.) 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20 at *14.
Coates, 1994 Del. Ch. LEX IS 20 at *14. See also Steinman v. Levine, et al., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 19107, Lamb, V.C. (Nov. 27, 2002), 2002 Del.Ch. LEXIS 132 at *37-39 (holding that judicial estoppel precluded plaintiff from arguing that no Event of Default occurred where he argued that an Event of Default occurred in a earlier proceeding).
Rudnick, 122 A. at 903.
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the Defendants' Motion for Reagument is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.