Opinion
2012-10434
12-24-2014
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Turrell QUARLESS, appellant.
Christine Moccia, Chappaqua, N.Y., for appellant. Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Celia M. Curtis and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.
Christine Moccia, Chappaqua, N.Y., for appellant.
Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Celia M. Curtis and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
Opinion Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Neary, J.), rendered October 17, 2012, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress the crack cocaine found in his pocket at the time of his arrest, since the hearing evidence established that the police officers had probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed an offense in their presence (see People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 ). Probable cause arose when the officers, who were trained in narcotics transactions, observed the defendant, in a high-crime area known for drug trafficking, reach into his pocket and extract therefrom a small plastic bag containing a substance that appeared to be cocaine and pass it to a man on a bicycle, who handed the defendant currency and then rode away (see People v. Jones, 90 N.Y.2d 835, 837, 660 N.Y.S.2d 549, 683 N.E.2d 14 ; People v. Washington, 87 N.Y.2d 945, 947, 641 N.Y.S.2d 223, 663 N.E.2d 1253 ; People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594, 435 N.Y.S.2d 679, 416 N.E.2d 1015 ; People v. Williams, 69 A.D.3d 663, 664–665, 893 N.Y.S.2d 130 ; People v. McCants, 67 A.D.3d 821, 822–823, 888 N.Y.S.2d 200 ; People v. Muhammed, 300 A.D.2d 54, 55, 751 N.Y.S.2d 183 ).
In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
At trial, the Supreme Court properly admitted into evidence expert testimony with respect to the quantity and packaging of crack cocaine carried by someone who sells drugs, as opposed to someone who merely uses them, since the expert testimony was beyond the ken of the average juror (see People v. Hicks, 2 N.Y.3d 750, 751, 778 N.Y.S.2d 745, 811 N.E.2d 7 ; People v. Brown, 97 N.Y.2d 500, 505, 743 N.Y.S.2d 374, 769 N.E.2d 1266 ; People v. Hough, 51 A.D.3d 818, 818, 856 N.Y.S.2d 863 ; People v. Hibbert, 27 A.D.3d 662, 663, 813 N.Y.S.2d 443 ; People v. Ray, 272 A.D.2d 203, 203–204, 708 N.Y.S.2d 295 ; People v. James, 266 A.D.2d 236, 236, 699 N.Y.S.2d 418 ).
The defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, as the record reveals that defense counsel provided meaningful representation (see People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 ; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 ).
As the People correctly concede, under the facts of this case, the defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree must be vacated, and that count of the indictment dismissed, as an inclusory concurrent count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (see CPL 300.40[3][b] ; People v. Lee, 39 N.Y.2d 388, 390, 384 N.Y.S.2d 123, 348 N.E.2d 579 ; cf. Penal Law §§ 220.03, 220.16 [1 ]; People v. Anderson, 91 A.D.3d 789, 790, 937 N.Y.S.2d 109 ).
The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.