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holding that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a warrantless parole search to be conducted in furtherance of the purposes of parole rather than for general law enforcement purposes
Summary of this case from United States v. MathewsOpinion
No. 99SA317
July 3, 2000
Interlocutory Appeal from the Adams County District Court, Honorable Harlan R. Bockman, Judge
EN BANC. ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
Robert S. Grant, District Attorney Seventeenth Judicial District, Michael J. Milne, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Brighton, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.
David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Paul Crane, Deputy State Public Defender, Brighton, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.
JUSTICE MARTINEZ specially concurs, and JUSTICE HOBBS and JUSTICE BENDER join in the special concurrence.
The People bring this interlocutory appeal pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1, appealing the trial court's order suppressing evidence obtained by parole officers during a routine, unannounced home visit to the defendant's residence. The defendant moved for suppression of the evidence on the basis that the parole officers' warrantless search of his belongings was conducted in violation of his constitutional rights because the officers lacked reasonable grounds to believe that he had committed a parole violation. The trial court agreed that the parole officers lacked reasonable grounds to conduct the search and suppressed the evidence discovered by the officers during the search of the defendant's belongings. We hold that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard to the parole search by requiring the parole officers to have reasonable grounds to perform the search. Furthermore, we find that the search was conducted in compliance with constitutional standards governing parole searches. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The defendant, Andre McCullough, was released from the Department of Corrections on September 19, 1998, to serve a three-year term of parole. Upon his release, Mr. McCullough signed a standard "Parole Agreement" containing several mandatory conditions, one of which provided, "Parolee further agrees to allow the Parole Officer to search his person, or his residence, or any premises under his control, or any vehicle under his control." After completing a ninety-day intensive supervision period, Mr. McCullough was transferred to the case load of parole officer Margaret Heckenbach in January 1999.
In section 17-2-201(5)(f)(I), 6 C.R.S. (1999), the legislature has set out mandatory conditions to be included in every parole agreement.
On March 10, 1999, at approximately 5:00 p.m., parole officers Heckenbach and Kelly Messamore, Ms. Heckenbach's supervisor, proceeded to the residence of the defendant for the purpose of conducting an unannounced home visit. Mr. McCullough opened the door, and Ms. Heckenbach and Ms. Messamore entered the apartment and immediately saw several open containers of alcohol. Ms. Heckenbach testified at the suppression hearing that she believed it was Mr. McCullough's roommate, Kevin Hartwell, who was drinking and not Mr. McCullough. Ms. Heckenbach asked Mr. McCullough which room was his and he responded that he slept on the couch but that he kept all of his belongings in a bedroom closet. Mr. McCullough showed Ms. Heckenbach the location of the closet with his belongings. After verifying with Mr. McCullough that all of the belongings in the closet were his, Ms. Heckenbach proceeded to search the belongings in the closet. In the pocket of a jacket in the closet, Ms. Heckenbach discovered a baggie of cocaine. Mr. McCullough was subsequently arrested and charged with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance.
Ms. Heckenbach testified at the suppression hearing that, as part of her duties as a parole officer, she routinely conducts unannounced home visits to her parolees.
Mr. McCullough's conditions of parole included the requirement that he have "no alcohol intake or possession" and that he not "possess and/or use illegal drugs."
§ 18-18-405, 6 C.R.S. (1999).
Mr. McCullough moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that it was seized in violation of his rights under the United States and Colorado Constitutions. Mr. McCullough argued that the parole officers did not have reasonable grounds to believe he had committed a parole violation when they searched his belongings. The trial court considered Mr. McCullough's motion at a suppression hearing and found that the fact that someone else in the apartment may have been drinking did not provide reasonable grounds to search the pocket of the jacket where the cocaine was found. The court considered the subjective view of the parole officers when it analyzed the question of whether reasonable grounds existed and found that the officers conducted the search not because they believed they had reasonable grounds to suspect there was a parole violation, but because they believed they had the authority to do so based on the parole agreement. Therefore, the trial court suppressed the cocaine found by the officers as well as the statements made by the defendant to the officers concerning ownership of the clothing in the closet.
II. ANALYSIS
This case raises important issues concerning the extent of a parolee's Fourth Amendment protections. The task for us in this case is to determine the legal standard that governs a parole officer's search of a parolee or his belongings. To determine the appropriate legal standard, we first review our precedent governing parole searches. We then examine the parole statute presently in force in Colorado and conclude that the legislature intended to change the existing legal standard when it amended the statute. Accordingly, the next component of our analysis involves a determination of the constitutionality of the parole statute as amended. Finally, we apply this legal standard for parole searches to the undisputed facts before us to determine if the search in the instant case comported with constitutional requirements.
A. COLORADO CASE LAW
We have considered the constitutionality of a warrantless parole search on only one prior occasion. In People v. Anderson, 189 Colo. 34, 536 P.2d 302 (1975), we considered whether a parole officer's warrantless search of the apartment of his parolee, Alvin Lee Anderson, violated the Fourth Amendment. In that case, a parole officer learned of a potential parole violation when Anderson's wife told the parole officer that Anderson was living with her. The officer knew that Anderson had not reported a change of address to him, as required by his parole agreement. The parole officer proceeded to the apartment of Anderson's wife, who was also on parole, to determine if Anderson had established his residence there and had violated his parole. The apartment manager admitted the parole officer into the apartment and, during the search of the apartment, the officer discovered evidence implicating Anderson in a felony theft, for which Anderson was subsequently charged and convicted.
In our analysis of the constitutionality of the search, we first recognized that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on "unreasonable" searches and seizures applies to searches of parolees but we stated that "what may be a reasonable search when a parolee is the subject of the investigation may be unreasonable when directed against another person." Id. at 36, 536 P.2d at 304. Although the parole officer lacked a search warrant, we stated that, in the context of a parole search, "the need for a search warrant is eliminated." Id. at 37, 536 P.2d at 305. After reviewing case law from other jurisdictions, we declared that "Colorado will adopt the middle ground. This requires a parole officer who is investigating a parole violation to have reasonable grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred." Id. Applying our holding to the facts in that case, we determined that the search was lawful because the parole officer had "reasonable grounds to enter the apartment to determine whether it was Anderson's established residence." Id. at 38, 536 P.2d at 305.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
In the instant case, the trial court applied this "reasonable grounds" legal standard in its resolution of the motion to suppress. However, subsequent to Anderson, the legislature amended the parole statute with the intention of removing the requirement for "reasonable grounds." Therefore, we find that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard to this search. Our analysis of this issue therefore encompasses an examination of the amended parole statute.
B. THE PAROLE STATUTE
Twelve years after our decision in Anderson, the legislature amended the parole statute by adding a section containing a list of mandatory conditions to be included in every parole agreement. One of these conditions, section 17-2-201(5)(f)(I)(D), provides that a parolee shall "allow the parole officer to make searches of his person, residence, or vehicle."
See ch. 125, sec. 8, § 17-2-201(5)(f)(I), 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 650, 653-54.
This section was embodied in Condition 4(b) of Mr. McCullough's Parole Agreement, to wit: "Parolee further agrees to allow the Parole Officer to search his person, or his residence, or any premises under his control, or any vehicle under his control."
Our first task in interpreting this statute is determining whether the legislature intended to alter the Anderson requirement of "reasonable grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred" when it amended the statute. In interpreting the meaning or scope of any statutory term, our goal is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. See Regional Transp. Dist. v. Lopez, 916 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Colo. 1996); Lakeview Assocs. v. Maes, 907 P.2d 580, 584 (Colo. 1995). To do so, we look first to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. See Lopez, 916 P.2d at 1192; Maes, 907 P.2d at 584. If the statutory language is unambiguous, it is unnecessary to resort to rules of statutory construction. See Lopez, 916 P.2d at 1192;Maes, 907 P.2d at 584.
In the instant case, we are examining a section of the parole statute that was added by amendment in 1987. When interpreting legislative amendments, we assume that the General Assembly was apprised of existing case law. See People v. Williams, 984 P.2d 56, 62 (Colo. 1999). Thus, in the instant case, we presume that the legislature was fully aware of the "reasonable grounds" standard annunciated in Anderson when it amended the parole statute. Furthermore, when a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law. See Robles v. People, 811 P.2d 804, 806 (Colo. 1991);People v. Hale, 654 P.2d 849, 851 (Colo. 1982).
With these guidelines in mind, we look now to the statute in question. As noted above, section 17-2-201(5)(f)(I)(D) was added to the parole statute by amendment of the General Assembly in 1987. We note that at the time that we decided Anderson and adopted the "reasonable grounds" standard, the parole statute did not contain a section requiring a parolee to submit to searches by his parole officer. The language of the new section added by the General Assembly states directly that all parolees shall allow a parole officer to "make searches of his person, residence, or vehicle." Notably absent from the language of the statute is a requirement for a parole officer to have "reasonable grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred" before he may conduct a search. Accordingly, the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. By amending the parole statute to add this search provision subsequent to our decision in Anderson, we find that the legislature intended to change the existing law in Colorado by removing the requirement that a parole officer have "reasonable grounds" before he may conduct a search of a parolee or his possessions. We conclude that the legislature intended to give parole officers authority to conduct routine searches of a parolee and his possessions as part of their supervisory authority and without requiring that they first possess "reasonable grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred."
C. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PAROLE STATUTE
Having concluded that the legislature intended to remove the "reasonable grounds" requirement with the 1987 amendment, we now must consider whether the amendment as enacted violates constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures. In reviewing the actions of the General Assembly, we presume that a statute comports with constitutional standards. See People v. Martinez, 970 P.2d 469, 472 (Colo. 1998); People v. Holmes, 959 P.2d 406, 410 (Colo. 1998).
We note that the applicable state and federal constitutional provisions share the same analytical framework in the instant case.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution proscribe all unreasonable searches and seizures. We have recognized that "the Fourth Amendment is not to be totally ignored merely because of parole status." Anderson, 189 Colo. at 37, 536 P.2d at 304. However, as noted above, we also recognized in Anderson that "what may be a reasonable search when a parolee is the subject of the investigation may be unreasonable when directed against another person." Id. at 36, 536 P.2d at 304. The question for us to answer in the instant case is whether the General Assembly's removal of the requirement for "reasonable grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred" before a parole search may be conducted violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on "unreasonable" searches and seizures. In answering this question, we look to relevant United States Supreme Court case law discussing the minimum requirements for a "reasonable" search and seizure.
See supra note 5 for the text of the Fourth Amendment. Article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place or seize any person or things shall issue without describing the place to be searched, as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.
Colo. Const. art. II, § 7.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that whether or not a search is "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment "depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search itself." United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). Thus, the "permissibility of a particular practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has recognized exceptions to standard Fourth Amendment requirements when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In Griffin v. Wisconsin the Court recognized that a "State's operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents `special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements." 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987).
Although Griffin is a probation case, its reasoning applies with equal, if not greater, force to the parole system.See United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902, 909 (3d Cir. 1992). As the Hill court recognized, both parole and probation are a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after a verdict, finding, or plea of guilty. Moreover, parole may be an even more severe restriction on liberty because the parolee has already been adjudged in need of incarceration. Therefore, the "special needs" of probation discussed in Griffin would appear to be heightened for parole.
We find that the State of Colorado's operation of its parole system presents the type of "special needs" that the Supreme Court has recognized as justifying a departure from the usual Fourth Amendment mandates. The parole system serves a very important function in the correctional process. As the Supreme Court has recognized, parole is designed to "help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined for the full term of the sentence imposed."Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). To accomplish the purpose of parole, "those who are allowed to leave prison early are subjected to specified conditions for the duration of their terms. These conditions restrict their activities substantially beyond the ordinary restrictions imposed by law on an individual citizen."Id. at 478. The Griffin Court noted that "[t]hese restrictions are meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer's being at large. These same goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
The parole officer plays a unique role in assisting the parolee in his quest to reintegrate into society. The Morrissey Court discussed the role of the parole officer as such:
The parole officers are part of the administrative system designed to assist parolees and to offer them guidance. The conditions of parole serve a dual purpose; they prohibit, either absolutely or conditionally, behavior that is deemed dangerous to the restoration of the individual into normal society. And through the requirement of reporting to the parole officer and seeking guidance and permission before doing many things, the officer is provided with information about the parole[e] and an opportunity to advise him. The combination puts the parole officer into the position in which he can try to guide the parolee into constructive development.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478. In order to successfully perform their job and fulfill their role in the correctional system, parole officers must have the ability to effectively supervise their parolees. This supervision is essential to the rehabilitation of the parolee. The ability to conduct surprise searches of parolees, even without specific reason to believe that the parolee has committed a violation, serves as a powerful deterrent to parole violations and as an invaluable aid in the parole officer's efforts to assist in the parolee's rehabilitation.
In addition to the importance of supervision to the rehabilitation of the parolee, supervision is also vitally important to the State's interest in protecting the community during the parolee's completion of his sentence. We recognized inAnderson that "parolees, as a class, pose a greater threat of criminal activity to law enforcement authorities than ordinary citizens." Anderson, 189 Colo. at 37, 536 P.2d at 304. The Supreme Court in Morrissey acknowledged that "[r]elease of the parolee before the end of his prison sentence is made with the recognition that with many prisoners there is a risk that they will not be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483. In Pennsylvania Board of Probation Parole v. Scott the Court noted the State's "overwhelming interest" in ensuring that a parolee complies with the conditions of his release. 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998). The Court pointed out that "parolees . . . are more likely to commit future criminal offenses than are average citizens. Indeed, this is the very premise behind the system of close parole supervision." Id. (citation omitted). In Griffin the Court upheld a probation officer's warrantless search of a probationer's apartment, recognizing that "[s]upervision, then, is a `special need' of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875.
The Supreme Court has also indicated that the Fourth Amendment does not require a showing of individualized suspicion before a search may comport with its "reasonableness" requirement.
[W]e have usually required some quantum of individualized suspicion before concluding that a search is reasonable. We made it clear, however, that a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable. In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important government interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (internal quotation marks omitted, citations omitted, emphasis added). As section 17-2-201(5)(f)(I)(D) requires all parolees to sign a written agreement indicating they will allow a parole officer to search his person, residence, or vehicle, we observe that the privacy interests of a parolee, while not nonexistent, are certainly minimal. In addition, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the State maintains an overwhelming interest in ensuring that a parolee complies with the conditions of his parole. See Scott, 524 U.S. at 365. Requiring individualized suspicion would eliminate a powerful deterrent to parole violations and, consequently, would place in jeopardy the State's overwhelming interest in ensuring that a parolee complies with the conditions of his parole.
Upon review of the relevant case law, we conclude that the amended statute passes constitutional scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although we conclude that the statute is constitutional, we also recognize that the mere fact that a person is on parole does not automatically justify any warrantless search by a parole officer. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873. Accordingly, it follows that there are limits on what may constitute a permissible parole search. We hold that a warrantless parole search is constitutional, even in the absence of "reasonable grounds," if the search meets the following requirements: (1) it is conducted pursuant to any applicable statute; (2) it is conducted in furtherance of the purposes of parole, i.e., related to the rehabilitation and supervision of the parolee; and (3) it is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. In reaching our holding today, we join other jurisdictions that have reached similar holdings for parole and probation searches. See, e.g.,Owens v. Kelly, 681 F.2d 1362, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding warrantless search provision in probation agreement is valid under Fourth Amendment without reasonable suspicion as long as search is in furtherance of purposes of probation and not harassing); People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 451 (Cal. 1998) (holding particularized suspicion is not required to conduct a parole search when search is based on a search provision and is not arbitrary or oppressive); State v. Morgan, 295 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Neb. 1980) (holding warrantless search provision in probation agreement is constitutionally valid when it contributes to rehabilitation process and search is conducted in a reasonable manner); State v. Davis, 577 N.W.2d 763, 770-71 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998) (holding warrantless search of parolee is valid under "special needs" of parole system); State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530, 540-41 (N.H. 1997) (holding search provision in probation agreement authorizing random warrantless searches is constitutional if related to the rehabilitation or supervision of probationer and search is reasonable in time, scope, and frequency); State v. Smith, 589 N.W.2d 546, 548 (N.D. 1999) (holding reasonable suspicion is not constitutionally required for a warrantless probation search when conducted in a reasonable manner).
Although both the probation and parole systems present similar "special needs," we note that the probation system is operated under a different statutory scheme than the parole system. We therefore limit our holding today to parole searches and express no opinion on the constitutionality of a warrantless probation search.
We turn now to a discussion of these requirements. The first requirement is that the search be conducted pursuant to any applicable statute. Our statute currently requires a search provision to be contained in a written agreement signed by the parolee. See § 17-2-201(5)(f)(I). The search provision must contain language putting the parolee on notice that he is required to submit to searches of his person, residence, or vehicle as a condition of his parole.
The second requirement is that the search must be conducted in furtherance of the purposes of parole. In order to satisfy this requirement, the search must be carried out under the authority of a parole officer. This is not to say that a parole officer may not request that police officers accompany her during the search. To the contrary, we recognize that for the parole officer's safety it may sometimes be necessary to enlist the assistance of police officers. The presence of police officers during a parole search does not, in and of itself, indicate that the search was not conducted in furtherance of the purposes of parole. However, these searches may not be conducted simply as a subterfuge for criminal investigations. "[They] may not be done for the prime purpose of circumventing the ordinary constitutional processes for the convenience of law enforcement officers in the course of their investigation." People v. Way, 319 N.Y.S.2d 16, 21 (Nassau County Ct. 1971). A parole officer must authorize the search and will normally be present during the search, and the search itself must be related to the rehabilitation and supervision of the parolee.
In Way, police contacted the parole officer and told him that his parolee was a suspect in a robbery. The parole officer took no steps to visit or interview his parolee until the police contacted the parole officer again two weeks later and requested that he accompany them on a search of the parolee's house for the purpose of investigating the robbery. The court found that the parole officer had become "nothing more than the alter ego of the detectives," stating, "This case does not present the usual situation where a parole officer may engage the services of the local policeman on the beat to protect him while he is engaged in searching a parolee or his home. Reference to the facts found herein demonstrate that the police were not mere bystanders but that they inspired, initiated, arranged and actively participated in every phase of the search and seizure." Way, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 23, 24.
We emphasize that the purpose of the search, not the presence or absence of a parole officer during the search, is the dispositive factor in determining whether a search was conducted in furtherance of the purposes of parole. See United States v. Coleman, 22 F.3d 126, 129-30 (7th Cir. 1994); People v. Kanos, 92 Cal.Rptr. 614, 617 (Cal.Ct.App. 1971). The presence or absence of a parole officer during a parole search is one factor a court may consider in determining whether the search was, in fact, conducted in furtherance of the purposes of parole.
The third requirement that the search not be arbitrary, capricious, or harassing is designed to prevent abuses of the parole officer's authority to search. Some examples of what may constitute abuse include searches conducted at an unreasonable hour, searches that are unreasonably prolonged, or frequent and repeated searches that are intended only to harass. Any evidence indicating arbitrary or oppressive conduct by a parole officer should be considered in determining whether the officer has exceeded constitutional limitations.
We note that the second and third requirements should be evaluated objectively from the perspective of a reasonable parole officer. See People v. Woods, 981 P.2d 1019, 1027 (Cal. 1999) (holding that objective standard applies to parole searches to discourage disparate results resulting from validity of searches turning on officer's subjective intent).
D. THE SEARCH IN THE INSTANT CASE
Having determined the appropriate legal standard to be applied, our final task is to apply this standard to the search conducted in this case. We accord deference to the trial court's findings of fact and will not overturn them provided they are supported by competent evidence in the record. See People v. Thomas, 853 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Colo. 1993). An ultimate conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent with or unsupported by evidentiary findings, however, is subject to correction by a reviewing court, as is a court's application of an erroneous legal standard to the facts of the case. See People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Colo. 1987). When the controlling facts are undisputed, the legal effect of those facts constitutes a question of law which is subject to de novo review. See People v. D.F., 933 P.2d 9, 15 (Colo. 1997). Although the trial court did not have the benefit of our holding today when ruling on the suppression motion, we find it appropriate to apply our holding to the undisputed facts before us. As we stated in D.F., "In exercising our appellate function in the context of an interlocutory appeal, we are conscious that the liberty interests of defendant and the public interest in the prosecution of criminal offenses are to be addressed in a manner which does not unnecessarily delay the ultimate disposition of the case." Id. at 15 n. 5.
Applying our holding to the undisputed facts before us, we find that the parole officers' search of Mr. McCullough's belongings was constitutional. The search was conducted by Mr. McCullough's parole officers as part of their routine supervisory duties and complied with the three requirements for parole searches discussed above. First, the search was conducted pursuant to the applicable parole statute, section 17-2-201(5)(f)(I), as Mr. McCullough's signed parole agreement contained a provision authorizing his parole officer to "search his person, or his residence, or any premises under his control, or any vehicle under his control." Second, Ms. Heckenbach's purpose in searching Mr. McCullough's belongings was to determine whether Mr. McCullough was in violation of any of his parole conditions. As noted above, one of Mr. McCullough's parole conditions prohibited him from possessing or using illegal drugs. Ms. Heckenbach's search of Mr. McCullough's jacket pocket was reasonably aimed at determining if Mr. McCullough was in possession of any illegal drugs; thus, the search was conducted in furtherance of the purposes of parole. Finally, there is undisputed evidence that the search was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. The search was conducted at a reasonable time, 5:00 p.m. in the afternoon, was reasonable in its scope, and was not unnecessarily prolonged. Additionally, the evidence is undisputed that Ms. Heckenbach and Ms. Messamore conducted the search in a professional manner. Therefore, we find that the search of Mr. McCullough's belongings complied with constitutional requirements.
As we stated in Anderson, evidence seized within the scope of a reasonable parole search, even though unrelated to the parole violation, is admissible in the prosecution of another crime.See 189 Colo. at 38, 536 P.2d at 305.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, we conclude that the legislature altered the Anderson "reasonable grounds" requirement when it enacted the 1987 amendment to the parole statute. Accordingly, we find that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard to the search in the instant case. We hold that a warrantless parole search is constitutional if it is conducted pursuant to any applicable statute, is in furtherance of the purposes of parole, and is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. Upon de novo review of the undisputed facts, we conclude that the search in this case comported with these constitutional requirements. As such, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUSTICE MARTINEZ specially concurs, and JUSTICE HOBBS and JUSTICE BENDER join in the special concurrence.