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holding that when the legislature adds more specific sections to a general section, it may indicate an intent to clarify the existing statute
Summary of this case from People v. TorrezOpinion
No. 90SC116 No. 90SC179
Decided Decided May 20, 1991. Rehearing Denied June 10, 1991. Benito Robles' Petition for Rehearing or Modification Denied June 10, 1991.
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Patrick J. Mulligan, Deputy State Public Defender, Jenine Jensen, Deputy State Public Defender, for Petitioner (90SC116).
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Clement P. Engle, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent (90SC116).
Brega Winters, Pamela A. Shaddock, for Petitioner (90SC179).
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Clement P. Engle, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent (90SC179).
This is a certiorari review of two court of appeals decisions, Benito Robles v. People, No. 88CA163 (Colo.App. Jan. 4, 1990), and Victor Robles v. People, No. 88CA289 (Colo.App. Jan. 4, 1990). Each of the defendants was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of first-degree assault, robbery of the elderly, first-degree burglary, theft, aggravated motor-vehicle theft, and seven counts of crime of violence; each was subsequently sentenced to five consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 112 years. In both decisions the court of appeals upheld the trial court's ruling that the crime-of-violence statute, subsection 16-11-309(1)(a), 8A C.R.S. (1986), mandated the imposition of consecutive sentences whenever a defendant is convicted of more than one crime of violence arising out of the same incident. We disagree and accordingly reverse and remand for resentencing.
Because we granted the defendants' petitions for certiorari on the identical issue, we have consolidated the two cases in this opinion.
From 1985 to 1988, subsection 16-11-309(1)(a) (the 1985 statute), under which the defendants were sentenced, provided in relevant part that "[a] person convicted of two separate crimes of violence arising out of the same incident shall be sentenced for such crimes so that sentences are served consecutively rather than concurrently" ("the consecutive-sentence clause"). The issue in this case is whether the court of appeals correctly held that the 1985 statute required the trial court to impose consecutive sentences for the five crime-of-violence convictions underlying the substantive criminal counts. The court of appeals rejected the defendants' argument that, where a person is convicted of two or more crimes of violence arising out of the same transaction, the 1985 statute required only that the trial court sentence that person to two consecutive terms and that the statute left to the trial court's discretion whether it should impose consecutive sentences on the remaining crime-of-violence convictions.
Under the statute, persons convicted of violent crimes were required to be sentenced to a term of incarceration greater than the maximum in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term, as provided for in section 18-1-105, 8B C.R.S. (1986). See § 16-11-309(1)(a).
During oral argument both counsel for the defendants acknowledged that the 1985 statute required consecutive sentences for at least the first two crime-of-violence convictions arising out of the same transaction. Moreover, both counsel acknowledged that the 1985 statute does not forbid the imposition of more than two consecutive sentences, and that the trial court, on remand, may again impose five consecutive sentences on one or both defendants.
The issue presented requires that we interpret the 1985 statute applying well-settled rules of statutory interpretation. Interpretation of statutes is a question of law, and this court may review interpretations of statutes under a de novo standard of review. See, e.g., People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo. 1990). The legislature's intent is the polestar of statutory construction. Courts look first to the statute's language to determine the legislative intent, and "[i]f the language in the statute is clear and the intent of the General Assembly may be discerned with reasonable certainty, it is not necessary to resort to other rules of statutory interpretation." McKinney v. Kautzky, 801 P.2d 508, 509 (Colo. 1990).
The 1985 statute's provision that "[a] person convicted of two separate crimes of violence arising out of the same incident shall be sentenced for such crimes so that sentences are served consecutively rather than concurrently" is not ambiguous. Under the statute, a defendant convicted of more than one crime of violence arising out of the same incident must be sentenced, at a minimum, to two consecutive terms for "such crimes." However, the statute requires nothing more of the trial court in the imposition of sentences for any remaining crime-of-violence convictions; rather, the statute leaves to the sentencing court's discretion whether additional consecutive sentences should be imposed for other crime-of-violence convictions arising out of the same incident.
In 1988 the legislature amended subsection 16-11-309(1)(a) (the 1988 statute), in relevant part as follows: "A person convicted of two or more separate crimes of violence arising out of the same incident shall be sentenced for such crimes so that sentences are served consecutively rather than concurrently." See 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws 679 (codified at § 16-11-309(1)(a), 8A C.R.S. (Supp. 1990)) (emphasis supplied).
In 1988 the legislature also amended the statute to provide that "[a]ny person convicted of a crime of violence shall be sentenced . . . to a term of incarceration . . . OF AT LEAST THE MIDPOINT in the presumptive range, but not more than twice the maximum term." See 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws. 679.
When a statute is amended it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law. E.g., People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 181 (Colo. 1990). This presumption, however, may be rebutted when arguably more specific sections are added to a general section because such legislative action may indicate the legislature's intention to clarify the existing statute. Id.; People v. Hale, 654 P.2d 849, 851 (Colo. 1982). The People argue that the 1988 amendment was not intended to change the statute to increase the severity of punishment for multiple crime-of-violence convictions but rather to "clarif[y] any ambiguity" in the consecutive-sentence clause, and therefore the presumption that the 1988 amendments "changed" the consecutive-sentence clause is rebutted. We disagree.
As we have indicated, the 1985 statute's consecutive-sentence clause contains no ambiguity, and thus there is no ambiguity to "clarify." We reject the People's assertion that "two" in the 1985 statute's consecutive-sentence clause somehow can mean "two or more." We must construe statutes as we find them, and in this case "two" in the 1985 statute can mean no more or less than "two."
Although this court has never considered the issue in this case, the court of appeals has construed the consecutive-sentence clause as requiring consecutive sentences for all convictions for crimes of violence arising out of the same incident in two cases. See People v. Beyer, 793 P.2d 644, 647-48 (Colo.App. 1990), People v. Pena, 794 P.2d 1070, 1072-73 (Colo.App.), cert. denied (1990); see also People v. McGregor, 757 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Colo.App. 1987) (noting, in dictum, that defendant who was convicted of multiple counts of crimes of violence was "required to be sentenced on a consecutive, rather than on a concurrent, basis"), cert. denied (1988). In Pena the court stated:
" [T]he 1988 amendment adding the more specific language, `or more,' is consistent with the General Assembly's intent to punish multiple crimes of violence more severely than individual crimes of violence. We find no legislative history or reasoned support for defendant's interpretation that the General Assembly intended that only one consecutive sentence be imposed when crimes of violence have been committed against multiple victims. Such an interpretation would not render the entirety of the statutes effective and would not achieve a reasonable intent as contemplated by the General Assembly.
" Hence, it is our conclusion that the 1988 amendment was meant to clarify, not to change existing law. Rather, the legislative intent of § 16-11-309(1)(a), as originally enacted, was to impose consecutive sentences on each and every crime of violence of which a person is convicted."
794 P.2d at 1073. The court of appeals analysis, however, suffers from the same flaw evident in the People's argument: the analysis presupposes that the consecutive-sentence clause is ambiguous or is in need of clarification. We are of the view, however, that the clause is not ambiguous, and we construe the 1988 amendment as effecting a change in the law concerning mandatory sentences for violent crimes. Accordingly, to the extent that the court of appeals cases are inconsistent with this opinion, they are overruled.
Beyer, relying on Pena, contains only a brief and conclusory analysis of whether the 1985 statute's consecutive-sentence clause requires consecutive sentences for all multiple crime-of-violence convictions arising out of the same incident. For example, in Beyer the court of appeals analysis was as follows: "As we recently noted [in Pena], the express mandate of [the 1985 statute] is that the defendant's sentences, whatever their length may be, must run consecutively to each other. The imposition of concurrent sentences impermissibly disregards the General Assembly's intent and circumvents the mandatory sentencing scheme." 793 P.2d at 647. Beyer is thus no more persuasive than Pena.
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded to the court of appeals with directions to remand to the trial court for resentencing.
JUSTICE LOHR specially concurs.
JUSTICE VOLLACK dissents, and JUSTICE ERICKSON joins in the dissent.