Opinion
XXXXX
02-26-2018
People of the State of New York v. William P. Maynes, Defendant.
FOR THE PEOPLE: PAUL CZAJKA, ESQ. Columbia County District Attorney 325 Columbia Street, Suite 260 Hudson, New York 12534 By: Carl G. Whitbeck, Jr., Assistant District Attorney FOR THE DEFENDANT: THOMAS J. O'HERN, ESQ. Attorney for the Defendant 210 Great Oaks Boulevard Albany, New York 12203
FOR THE PEOPLE: PAUL CZAJKA, ESQ. Columbia County District Attorney 325 Columbia Street, Suite 260 Hudson, New York 12534 By: Carl G. Whitbeck, Jr., Assistant District Attorney FOR THE DEFENDANT: THOMAS J. O'HERN, ESQ. Attorney for the Defendant 210 Great Oaks Boulevard Albany, New York 12203 David A. Dellehunt, J.
On or about August 11, 2013 defendant William P. Maynes was charged with Driving While Intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192(2), common law Driving While Intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192(3), Improper/No Turn Signal in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1163(d), Failure to Stop at a Stop Sign in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1172(a) and Driving Across Hazard Markings in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1128(d). It was alleged in the DWI Bill of Particulars that Defendant failed three field sobriety tests and had a blood alcohol level of .09 per cent. A certified breath or blood test was never filed with the Court. Defendant was arraigned on the charges on September 3, 2013. On or about September 10, 2013 the defense filed a Demand to Produce and Omnibus Motion. At the parties' request the motion was held in abeyance while the parties discussed settlement. On December 13, 2013 the People notified the Court that the matter was going to be presented to the Grand Jury on January 13, 2014. The Court received no further information relative to the Grand Jury presentation.
On or about April 7, 2014 the People filed a Prosecutor's Information with the Court accusing the Defendant of Driving While Ability Impaired in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1192(1). The Court accepted the Prosecutor's Information for filing but indicated that the same could not supersede and replace a Simplified Traffic Information. The parties disagreed and were directed to brief the issue and submit motions. Defendant was arraigned on the new charge. Over the course of the next several months no papers were received by the Court, defense counsel asked that the omnibus motion continue to be held in abeyance, and the respective parties continued to argue that the Superseding Prosecutor's Information "replaced" the original charges. The resultant delay was exacerbated by the fact that both parties had a variety of different attorneys appearing on their behalf, sometimes without knowledge of the case or the arguments previously espoused by the parties. The Court by letter order dated July 24, 2015 reiterated that a Prosecutor's Information charging the Defendant with Driving While Ability Impaired cannot legally "replace" the original Simplified Traffic Informations. See, CPL §100.50; People v. Quarles, 168 Misc 2d 638 (1996); People v. Finch, 19 Misc 3d 840 (2008); People v. Baron, 107 Misc 2d 59 (Appellate Term, 2nd Dept. 1980); People v. Pregent, 142 Misc 2d 344 (1988); People v. Flood, 25 Misc 3d 843 (2009). On or about August 18, 2015 the People conceded the aforesaid fact and declared that the Superseding Prosecutor's Information was a nullity.
Thereafter the parties requested adjournments for various reasons including settlement discussions and in contemplation of filing additional motions. A formal consent to change attorneys was filed by the defendant on or about March 14, 2016 changing the attorneys of record from Gerstenzang, O'Hern, Sills, and Gerstenzang to Thomas J. O'Hern, Esq.
In August 2016 the Defendant requested to have the People respond to its Omnibus Motion, previously held in abeyance. After numerous adjournments, on consent, the People responded to Defendant's Omnibus Motion in February 2017. On or about March 24, 2017 the Court issued a Decision/Order relative to the Omnibus Motion granting Huntley, Mapp/Dunaway, and Sandoval/Ventimiglia hearings to Defendant. The hearings were scheduled for August 29, 2017. The hearings were adjourned at the People's request and the parties spent the next seven months trying to reschedule the same. During that time Defendant filed the instant motion seeking a dismissal of the charges in the interests of justice and for "such other and further relief as to the court may seem just and proper". The motion was made returnable December 5, 2017. The People join in Defendant's motion.
On a motion to dismiss in the interests of justice pursuant to CPL §170.40 the defendant bears the initial burden of setting forth compelling factors to justify a dismissal. See, CPL §210.40. If this burden is not met, the Court may summarily deny the motion. See People v. Schlessel, 104 AD2d 501, 502 (2nd Dept. 1984). A trial court's discretion to dismiss in the interest of justice is an undertaking to be sparingly exercised. People v. Litman, 99 AD2d 573, 574 (3rd Dept. 1984). The Court must strike a sensitive balance between the interests of the individual and those of the State. See, People v. Gragert, 1 Misc 3d 646, 648 (2003). There must be a compelling factor, consideration, or circumstance clearly demonstrating that the conviction or prosecution of the defendant would constitute an injustice. See, CPL § 170.40; People v. Clayton, 41 AD2d 204, 206 (2nd Dept. 1973). The reasons for a dismissal in the interests of the justice must be real and compelling and fall within one of the enumerated factors set forth in CPL § 170.40. Soares v. Carter, 113 AD3d 993, 997 (3rd Dept. 2014), citing People v. Rickert, 58 NY2d 122, 128 (1983). A motion to dismiss in the interests of justice should be granted only in that rare and unusual case where it cries out for fundamental justice beyond the confines of conventional considerations. People v. Berrios, 160 Misc 2d 612, 614 (1994).
CPL § 170.40(1) sets forth the factors that must be considered by the Court, to wit: (a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; (b) the extent of harm caused by the offense; (c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial; (d) the history, character and condition of the defendant; (e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant; (f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the offense; (g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community; (h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system; (i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant or victim with respect to the motion; and (j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction would serve no useful purpose. The Court has considered each of the above criteria both individually and collectively in relation to arguments presented by the Defendant.
Defendant argues that while the offenses are serious, it has been more than four years since the date of arrest. He argues further that no injury or harm was caused to anyone but the Defendant himself, and that he has expended great expense in having counsel appear multiple times during the pendency of the case. Defendant avers that the evidence of guilt is weak as demonstrated by the People's attempt to file a Superseding Prosecutor's Information reducing the charge. Defendant contends that the history, character and condition of the Defendant warrants a dismissal since the Defendant has no prior offenses, has not had any offenses during the pendency of the case and "it is extremely unlikely that he will ever re-offend". Defendant argues that since the Defendant has had the charges hanging over his head for more than four years, with no further arrests or issues with law enforcement during that time, a dismissal would not negatively impact the confidence of the public in the judicial system.
The People responded to the motion by stating that "the evidence is not sufficient for the People to successfully prosecute this matter", and "the defense's claim of a 44 month delay since the arrest is hard to discredit". The Court finds that the motion, while couched in terms of a motion to dismiss in the "interests of justice" is obstensively a motion to dismiss upon constitutional speedy trial grounds. Each of the reasons set forth by the Defendant for a dismissal in the interests of justice relate to the substantial delay in the prosecution of the Defendant and Defendant's motion requests that the Court provide such other and further relief as is just and proper. The People concede that the forty-four month delay since the date of arrest is hard to discredit.
Under the circumstances herein presented, it would be just and proper for Defendant's motion to dismiss to be granted on constitutional speedy trial grounds. See, CPL §30.20; US Const. Amend. VI and XIV. The speedy trial guarantee established by the Constitution is intended to ensure fair and humane treatment of an accused person by protecting him against prolonged imprisonment while awaiting trial, providing relief from the anxiety and public suspicion that accompanies a criminal accusation which remains untried, and reducing the possibility that through the loss of witnesses or dulling of memory the means of proving his innocence may be lost. People v. Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 534-535 (1985) [citations omitted]. The Court must consider the duration of the delay against the factors espoused in People v. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 (1975).
In Taranovich, supra. the Court examined the following factors in determining whether there has been a denial of the defendant's speedy trial rights: (1) the extent of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the nature of the underlying charge, (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration, and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay. Id. at 445. There is no per se period beyond which a criminal prosecution may not be pursued. Id. at 445, citing People v. Prosser, 309 NY 353, 360 (1955).
Here the period of delay is more than four years from the date of arrest. The Court scheduled more than thirty-five appearances during that time. The Court cannot ascertain whether the extensive delay was occasioned by the parties' apparent belief that the case was weak or whether it was strategic in nature. Either way it is not for the Court to assess blame, but rather to insure that justice is done. The People now state that the evidence is not sufficient for them to successfully prosecute this matter. Although there was no pre-trial incarceration, it is clear that Defendant has been under a cloud of anxiety and public suspicion far too long and it is likely that the substantial delay has prejudiced the Defendant's rights and his ability to defend himself. People v. Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442 (1975). Accordingly, the Court finds that the substantial delay in the instant case was not justified and Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted upon the grounds that his Constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. CPL §30.20; US Const. Amend. VI and XIV.
All motions not granted herein are hereby denied. This opinion shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court. ENTER SO ORDERED. February 26, 2018 Kinderhook, New York David A. Dellehunt Kinderhook Town Justice