Opinion
C080862
05-31-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN DAVID MATTA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 14F03376)
A jury found defendant John David Matta guilty of the first degree murder of his mother. On appeal, he argues two instances of instructional error, erroneous exclusion of evidence, and cumulative error. We find defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's instruction regarding voluntary intoxication and that defendant's remaining contentions lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant lived with his 75-year-old mother, Janet Matta, in her Sacramento County home until her death on May 18, 2014. The relationship included several instances of elder abuse, in which defendant physically and verbally abused his mother in the years before her death. During the month leading up to Matta's murder, defendant exhibited signs of paranoia. For instance, on April 14, 2014, defendant called the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department to report that a man had come to his door holding a stick, or a bush, or a gun, and that he had pepper sprayed the man. Defendant could not provide a description of the man but reported that the man was standing around the corner from his home. Defendant called the sheriff's department again two hours later to report seeing five prowlers around his home who would not communicate with him. Deputies who responded to the call noted that defendant appeared agitated and paranoid but was not aggressive. On April 18, 2014, defendant again called the sheriff's department, claiming he saw a female posing in weird positions across the street from his house. He also said the female was sitting in a green plastic bucket. The weekend before Matta's death defendant told his neighbor he was seeing things on her front lawn and thought her family was "pranking" him. He told her that he was about to snap. Defendant also told her he had video cameras set up outside his home and saw people outside his home all the time.
On May 18, 2014, at 4:45 p.m., defendant called 911 to report that his mother was dead after she attacked him in his bedroom. When the deputies arrived, they detained defendant after a brief struggle and placed him in the back of a patrol car with the in-car camera running. For the next several hours, while defendant was sitting in the patrol car, he made many spontaneous profanity-laced outbursts. His outbursts included, "You fucked that shit up again, you fucked it all up, didn't ya, fucking cunt. (long pause) (banging) Stupid cunt. You see the fuckin' problems you got me into you fuckin' stupid cunt, fuckin' douche cock, piece of fuckin' shit," and "I told you to shut your fuckin' mouth, mom, shut your fuckin' mouth. I kicked you to fuckin' death and I don't feel sorry about it." He also complained multiple times that his handcuffs were too tight and that he was being treated worse than a prisoner of war. When asked what his mental health issues were, defendant responded posttraumatic stress disorder and his mother.
Matta's body was found on the floor in the family room. There was blood on a blanket thrown on a recliner chair and several blood stains on a couch. The rest of the house appeared neat and orderly. Also on the recliner were tortilla chips and smeared salsa or refried beans. A bowl of tortilla chips was on the table next to the recliner. A candlestick holder had hair on it matching Matta's hair color. An autopsy revealed bruises and abrasions all over Matta's body. She also had a circular contusion on the back of her head. This blunt force trauma did not cause Matta's death, which was actually the product of asphyxiation. Defendant had no apparent injuries.
In the office of the house, there was an empty pint-sized bottle of vodka in the trash can and half of an empty pint-sized bottle of vodka on a table. Defendant's blood was drawn at 8:12 p.m. and showed that he had a blood-alcohol content of 0.24. Defendant moved to have his blood-alcohol content admitted into evidence. The trial court denied the request, citing Evidence Code section 352, because no expert testimony or evidence of defendant's drinking pattern was presented to assist the jury in determining what his blood-alcohol content would have been at the time of the murder. Instead, the parties stipulated that defendant's blood draw at 8:12 p.m. showed the presence of alcohol.
Among other instructions, the jury was instructed on the principles of self-defense and voluntary manslaughter based on a sudden quarrel or the heat of passion. The jury was also instructed that it could use evidence of defendant's voluntary intoxication when determining whether defendant acted with the intent to kill or with premeditation and deliberation. The trial court denied defendant's request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense.
DISCUSSION
I
The Trial Court Properly Denied Defendant's Request
To Instruct The Jury On Imperfect Self-Defense
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense (CALCRIM No. 571) because the evidence showed that he might have "misperceived something his mother did as an attack that required him to defend himself with deadly force." The evidence defendant points to in support of this inference consists of his 911 call, his mother's age, manifestations of his mental illness, and his intoxication. The People argue the trial court was precluded from instructing the jury on imperfect self-defense pursuant to People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121 (Elmore), because defendant's unreasonable belief that he was in imminent danger was a product of his delusional mental state. We agree with the People.
CALCRIM No. 571 provides as follows:
"A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed a person because (he/she) acted in (imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another). [¶] If you conclude the defendant acted in complete (self-defense/ [or] defense of another), (his/her) action was lawful and you must find (him/her) not guilty of any crime. The difference between complete (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) and (imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another) depends on whether the defendant's belief in the need to use deadly force was reasonable. [¶] The defendant acted in (imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another) if: [¶] 1. The defendant actually believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/ __________ <insert name of third party>) was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant actually believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger; [¶] BUT [¶] 3. At least one of those beliefs was unreasonable. [¶] Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. [¶] In evaluating the defendant's beliefs, consider all the circumstances as they were known and appeared to the defendant. [¶] <The following definition may be given if requested> [¶] [A danger is imminent if, when the fatal wound occurred, the danger actually existed or the defendant believed it existed. The danger must seem immediate and present, so that it must be instantly dealt with. It may not be merely prospective or in the near future.] [¶] [Imperfect self-defense does not apply when the defendant, through (his/her) own wrongful conduct, has created circumstances that justify (his/her) adversary's use of force.] [¶] [If you find that __________<insert name of decedent/victim> threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that information in evaluating the defendant's beliefs.] [¶] [If you find that the defendant knew that __________ <insert name of decedent/victim> had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider that information in evaluating the defendant's beliefs.] [¶] [If you find that the defendant received a threat from someone else that (he/she) associated with __________ <insert name of decedent/victim>, you may consider that threat in evaluating the defendant's beliefs.] [¶] [Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.] [¶] The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in (imperfect self-defense/ [or] imperfect defense of another). If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder."
"Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when the trier of fact finds that a defendant killed another person because the defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and thus can be convicted of no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter." (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771.) The trial court must instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense when there is substantial evidence of an actual but unreasonable belief in the need to defend oneself. The court need not instruct on imperfect self-defense if the evidence is minimal and insubstantial. (See People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201.) We review claims of instructional error under a de novo standard of review. (People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1089, disapproved on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.)
In Elmore, the defendant "by all accounts, [was] mentally ill," and "had repeatedly been institutionalized and diagnosed as psychotic." "On the day of the killing . . . he became fidgety and anxious" and "[a]t one point . . . began to crawl under cars as his family and a friend tried to speak with him." (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 130.) He then went out on the street with a paint brush sharpened into a weapon-like object, and, without warning or provocation, suddenly accosted an unsuspecting passerby on the sidewalk who did not know the defendant and never said a word to him. The defendant stabbed the passerby to death with the paint-brush handle. (Ibid.) At trial, he gave an incoherent and confused account of his actions, explaining that " '[s]omebody [said] something violent' " to him on the street, but he could not say who it was or whether it was a man or woman. (Id. at p. 131.)
The question in Elmore was "whether the doctrine of unreasonable self-defense is available when belief in the need to defend oneself is entirely delusional." (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 130.) The court said no, explaining that "defendant claims his request for an instruction on unreasonable self-defense should have been granted, even though his perception of a threat was entirely delusional." (Id. at p. 134.) The court explained that "[t]he line between mere misperception and delusion is drawn at the absence of an objective correlate. A person who sees a stick and thinks it is a snake is mistaken, but that misinterpretation is not delusional. One who sees a snake where there is nothing snakelike, however, is deluded. Unreasonable self-defense was never intended to encompass reactions to threats that exist only in the defendant's mind." (Id. at p. 137.) Although the mental state required for unreasonable self-defense has been described as an " 'unreasonable but good faith belief' in the need for self-defense . . . it is most accurately characterized as an actual but unreasonable belief." (Id. at p. 134.) Elmore involved an "entirely delusional" belief, "divorced from the circumstances," and not grounded on an "objective correlate." (Id. at pp. 136-137.)
Defendant's case is exactly like Elmore. During closing argument, defense counsel argued defendant's mental illness made him act rashly and without deliberate thought. Although defense counsel argued for the jury to find defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, she did not point to any of Matta's actions that defendant might have misinterpreted when he killed her. The only evidence defendant now points to establish he had an actual belief his mother tried to attack him is his mental illness. Defendant argues his history of misinterpreting objects as prowlers holding guns, his claim he had posttraumatic stress disorder, his mother's belief that he was bipolar, and the fact that he did not take his prescribed psychiatric medications support a finding he "misperceived something his mother did as an attack that required him to defend himself with deadly force." (Italics added.) However, there is no evidence of what that something was that defendant misperceived requiring him to respond with deadly force. The evidence showed that Matta was sitting in a recliner chair eating chips and salsa right before she died. The record is devoid of evidence establishing any objective circumstances that might have led to defendant having an actual but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense, besides the fact that he had a history of mental illness.
In People v. Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1409-1410, the appellate court found the jury was properly instructed on imperfect self-defense where the defendant claimed he saw the victim pull a metal object out of his waistband that the defendant believed was a gun. The court rejected the People's argument that the defendant's belief was purely delusional because of the defendant's claim of seeing a weapon-like object. (Ibid.) This type of evidence was not present in defendant's case. The only evidence that Matta attacked defendant was defendant's statement to the 911 operator that his mother attacked him in his room. Defendant did not make statements about, nor was there evidence showing, the objective circumstances constituting the attack. Thus, the only evidence supporting defendant's claim of imperfect self-defense was his delusions. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant's request to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense.
II
Defendant Was Not Harmed By The Voluntary Intoxication Instruction
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that evidence of his voluntary intoxication could be considered in determining not just whether he acted with intent to kill or premeditation and deliberation, but also in determining whether he acted with express malice or in the heat of passion. Defendant did not raise this instructional error argument in the trial court. The People do not argue forfeiture and instead address defendant's argument on its merits. We will do the same; however, we need not decide whether the instruction was erroneous because even if it was, any error was harmless. There was no evidence of provocation, thus the jury could not find defendant guilty of only voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion.
Citing People v. Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630, 633, defendant argues the failure to instruct the jury that provocation can negate malice was federal constitutional error. Here, however, the court did instruct the jury that provocation could negate malice and reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. Instead, the court did not deliver a pinpoint instruction on the issue of voluntary intoxication and its relationship to the express malice element of the crime. (See People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1120.) This error requires review under the state law Watson standard of harmless error. (See People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 830-831.)
Had the court instructed the jury voluntary intoxication was relevant to its determination of heat of passion, it is not reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a more favorable result. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) A person acts upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion if he or she "acts without reflection in response to adequate provocation." (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942.) Provocation is legally adequate if it " ' "would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and . . . from . . . passion rather than from judgment." ' " (Ibid.)
Defendant did not present any evidence that he was provoked at the time of the murder, let alone evidence of adequate provocation. During defendant's 911 call, he claimed his 75-year-old mother attacked him in his bedroom; however, no evidence corroborating that claim was admitted at trial. Defendant's room was neat and orderly, as was the rest of the house, except for the living room where Matta's body was found. Defendant had no injuries, whereas Matta had bruises all over her body, a gash to the back of her head, and was asphyxiated. In addition to the lack of evidence establishing defendant was provoked by an attack, no evidence established the two were in a verbal argument at the time of the murder. In fact, the evidence showed that Matta was sitting in a recliner chair eating chips and salsa right before she died. Further, defense counsel did not point to any acts of provocation during closing argument. Defense counsel argued defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter because of a sudden quarrel or the heat of passion; however, she never argued defendant was actually provoked, only that he acted rashly and his rashness negated the intent required for first degree murder. Because there was no evidence of provocation, the jury could not have found defendant guilty of manslaughter and any instructional error was harmless.
III
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
When Excluding Defendant's Blood-Alcohol Content
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excluded evidence his blood-alcohol content was 0.24 at 8:12 p.m., three and one-half hours after the murder. The evidence showed defendant did not drink alcohol after police arrived at his home at 4:49 p.m. and detained him. At trial, defendant did not present any evidence of his drinking pattern before Matta's murder or expert testimony about his blood-alcohol content at the time of the murder. Because this evidence was lacking, the trial court excluded defendant's blood-alcohol content reasoning that defendant's blood-alcohol content of 0.24 three and one-half hours after the murder would confuse the jury about the purpose for which it could consider evidence of his voluntary intoxication. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when making this ruling.
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 351.) Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (Evid. Code, § 210.) Pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, trial courts have discretion to exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." A trial court's exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 will be disturbed only " 'when the prejudicial effect of the evidence clearly outweighed its probative value.' " (People v. Hollie (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274.)
In People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of the victim's alcohol intoxication to establish her inhibitions had been lowered such that she consented to intercourse. (Id. at p. 549.) The Supreme Court rejected the evidence on both Evidence Code sections 210 and 352 grounds. "Nothing in the offer of proof showed how [the victim's] blood-alcohol content and intoxication affected her judgment and behavior the night she was killed, or increased the chance that she did, in fact, consent to vaginal and anal intercourse. Defendant essentially wanted jurors to speculate on intoxication, inhibition, and impulse. Speculative inferences are, of course, irrelevant." (Stitely, at pp. 549-550.)
In People v. Daniels (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 304, the defendant was charged with kidnapping for purposes of rape. His expert offered lengthy testimony on alcoholic blackouts to establish that the victim, who was intoxicated, consented to accompany him to a motel room. (Id. at pp. 318-319.) Daniels found the evidence properly excluded on relevance grounds and under Evidence Code section 352 because it was too speculative. While there was evidence the victim was intoxicated, there was little evidence the victim was actually experiencing an alcoholic blackout such that she might have agreed to accompany defendant. Further, admission of the lengthy evidence would be unduly time consuming and confusing to the jury. (Daniels, at p. 321.)
Here, evidence of defendant's blood-alcohol content three and one-half hours after the crime similarly invited the jury "to speculate on [the level of defendant's] intoxication, inhibition, and impulse" at the time of the murder. (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 549-550.) Defendant was not prepared to offer evidence of his drinking pattern or expert testimony concerning his blood-alcohol content at the time of the murder. Further, there was no evidence that defendant's blood-alcohol content at the time of the murder actually affected his judgment. Because this evidence was lacking, the jury could only speculate about defendant's level of intoxication at the time of the murder and whether he lacked the specific intent required for first degree murder.
Defendant's claim that the trial court applied the wrong standard when excluding evidence of his blood-alcohol content is also unavailing. Defendant argues the trial court "stated that it was weighing the probative value of the evidence to prove diminished capacity," which defendant notes is a legal standard that is both an improper consideration and not the purpose for which he offered the evidence. Although the trial court stated defendant sought to prove "some kind of diminished capacity at the time he committed the offense," it is clear from the whole of the court's statements that it understood defendant sought to prove he lacked the required specific intent at the time of the murder. The court ruled that without evidence of defendant's drinking pattern and expert testimony about defendant's blood-alcohol content at the time of the murder, the jury was left to speculate about defendant's intoxication level and whether defendant had the capacity to form premeditation and deliberation, instead of grounding their conclusions in actual evidence. Because the jury could only speculate about defendant's intoxication at the time of the murder and how it may have affected his judgment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding defendant's blood-alcohol content pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.
IV
There Was No Cumulative Error
Defendant seeks reversal based on cumulative error. "Under the 'cumulative error' doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial." (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 772, fn. 32.) Here, we found defendant was not harmed by the trial court's instruction on voluntary intoxication and that no other error occurred. Accordingly, there was no cumulative error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Robie, J. We concur: /s/_________
Nicholson, Acting P. J. /s/_________
Mauro, J.