Summary
recognizing that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not satisfy plaintiff's burden to supply evidence of defendant's knowledge of dangerous condition in premises-liability case
Summary of this case from Silas v. St. Luke'sOpinion
No. 01-04-00080-CV
Opinion issued January 12, 2006.
On Appeal from the 151st District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2002-37621.
Panel consists of Justices NUCHIA, JENNINGS, and ALCALA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal of a summary judgment in favor of appellee, Steak Ale of Texas, Inc. (Steak Ale), and against appellant, Mitchell Parks, on appellant's claims of negligence and strict products liability for injuries allegedly resulting from a defective chair. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In his petition, appellant alleged the following: on November 29, 2001, he and his son ate at a Steak Ale restaurant; he returned to his table from the restroom after eating his meal; he sat down in his chair, which collapsed forward; and he fell forward, hit his chin on the table, and jammed his right wrist into the wall. Appellant further alleged that he sustained severe injuries to his neck and wrist that required surgical intervention. There were no witnesses to this incident other than appellant's ten-year-old son.
The restaurant manager, Greg Lacy, inspected the chair and noted that the front right leg of the chair had broken off where the leg connects to the frame. This type of chair, according to Lacy's testimony, is approximately five feet high, measured from the floor to the top of the back of the chair, and weighs about seventy-five pounds. Lacy stated in his deposition testimony that this type of chair is sturdy. He further testified that if the fabric of a chair tears or becomes loose, he has it repaired, but that if anything happens to the chair' structure, he destroys it. He stated that he had approximately 22 of these high-backed chairs in the restaurant and that he had not had to replace any of them in the two years he had been general manager of the restaurant.
Appellant testified at his deposition that a friend took him to the Cy-Fair Hospital emergency room the day after the incident at Steak Ale because appellant was experiencing pain and a severe headache. Appellant's CAT scan results were normal, and the examining physician found no broken bones. Appellant was instructed to go home and rest. Appellant testified that, although the doctor told him nothing had been broken, appellant continued to experience discomfort and pain and was not able to work. A few weeks later, appellant visited his family practitioner and a hand specialist. Approximately eight months later, appellant filed this suit against Steak Ale. Steak Ale filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment to challenge appellant's claims of negligence and strict products liability. The trial court granted Steak Ale's motion. In two issues, appellant appeals the judgment on both of his causes of action.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Under Rule 166a(i), a party is entitled to summary judgment if, after adequate time for discovery, there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Thus, a no-evidence summary judgment is similar to a directed verdict. Flameout Design Fabrication, Inc. v. Pennzoil Caspian Corp., 994 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no. pet). The motion for summary judgment may not be general, but must state the elements on which there is no evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant produces more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Macias v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). The party with the burden of proof at trial has the same burden of proof in the summary judgment proceeding. Galveston Newspapers, Inc. v. Norris, 981 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). That is, under Rule 166a(i), the burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact shifts to the nonmovant upon the filing of the motion. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i). In reviewing a summary judgment, we must indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolve any doubts in its favor. Flameout Design, 994 S.W.2d at 834. We will affirm the judgment if any of the theories advanced in the motion is meritorious. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996).
II. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Appellant relies on res ipsa loquitur to establish a presumption of negligence and to provide a presumption that the chair was unreasonably dangerous. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not a cause of action separate from negligence. Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990). Rather, the doctrine is a rule of evidence that permits the jury to infer negligence in the absence of direct proof. Jones v. Tarrant Util. Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982).
Although the plaintiff carries the burden of proof to affirmatively establish negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving that the defendant committed a specific act of negligence when it is impossible for the plaintiff to determine the sequence of events, or when the defendant has superior knowledge or means of information to determine the accident's cause. Jones, 638 S.W.2d at 865; Turbines, Inc. v. Dardis, 1 S.W.3d 726, 740 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. denied). Therefore, a plaintiff who successfully invokes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can survive a no-evidence challenge on the issue of negligence because some evidence of negligence has been presented to the jury. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Tex. 1974). To rely on res ipsa loquitur to establish negligence, a plaintiff must show (1) that the character of the injury is such that it would not have ordinarily occurred without negligence and (2) that the instrumentality causing the injury was under the management and control of the defendant. Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner, 632 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1982).
III. Premises Liability
In his first issue, appellant contends that "the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment for the reason that there was summary judgment evidence that the chair was unreasonably dangerous, when the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed favorably to Plaintiff." We construe this issue to challenge the take-nothing judgment on appellant's premises-liability claim because premises liability is the first issue addressed in appellant's brief. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1. Appellant relies on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish a rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of appellee.
To establish a claim under a premises-liability theory, a plaintiff must show (1) that the owner-operator of the premises had actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the premises, (2) that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm, (3) that the owner-operator did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk, and (4) that the owner-operator's failure to use such care proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998). Appellant is apparently invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish the third element — the failure to exercise reasonable care.
The chair at issue in this case was in the dining room of a restaurant. It was undoubtedly used by many people each day and was therefore not under the sole control of the restaurant. Thus, it is possible that the chair was broken or damaged by someone not employed by the restaurant. See Lucas v. Titus County Hosp. Dist./Titus Mem'l Hosp., 964 S.W.2d 144, 156 (Tex.App.-Texarkana), pet. denied, 988 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. 1998) (rejecting use of res ipsa loquitur presumptions in part because chair in public waiting area could have been broken by someone other than hospital). However, even if res ipsa loquitur applies to appellant's claim, to defeat the no-evidence motion for summary judgment, appellant has the burden to produce some evidence of the other three elements of his cause of action.
In its motion for summary judgment, Steak Ale asserted, "Plaintiff has no evidence that Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that there was a condition that posed an unreasonable risk of harm in this case." In his response to the motion for summary judgment, appellant relied entirely on Steak Ale's summary judgment evidence, which consisted of the depositions of appellant and Lacy, the manager of the Steak Ale. Appellant does not direct us to anything in either deposition that would create an issue of material fact regarding whether Lacy or anyone else at Steak Ale knew or should have known that the chair at issue created an unreasonable risk of harm. Therefore, appellant has not carried his burden to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding Steak Ale's actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition.
Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first issue.
IV. Strict Products Liability
Appellant frames his second issue as follows: "Whether the trial court erred in granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment for the reason that there was summary judgment evidence that Defendant acted negligently in providing an unreasonably dangerous chair to Plaintiff when the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed favorably to Plaintiff." Because appellant's argument under this issue addresses strict products liability, we construe his second issue to complain that the trial court erred in rendering a take-nothing judgment on appellant's strict products-liability claim. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(e).
A seller of a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user is subject to liability for injuries caused to the user by the product if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and it reaches the user without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965); Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Tex. 1975). The Texas Supreme Court has applied the strict products-liability rule to those who lease as well as those who sell products. See Rourke, 530 S.W.2d at 797 (holding that theory of strict liability applies to leased products).
Appellant alleged in his original and his third amended petitions, "Defendant is a seller as that term is defined in Chapter 82, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code." Chapter 82 defines a seller as "a person who is engaged in the business of distributing or otherwise placing, for any commercial purpose, in the stream of commerce for use or consumption a product or any component part thereof." Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 82.001(3) (Vernon 2005).
In its motion for summary judgment, Steak Ale asserted that the plaintiff could provide no evidence that the defendant was either a manufacturer or seller of the chair in question. Steak Ale further stated that, because the plaintiff could not prove this essential element of his products-liability claim, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment. In his response, appellant did not produce any evidence to establish that Steak Ale was a manufacturer or seller of the chair. Rather, appellant argued for the first time that Steak Ale had bailed the chair to appellant and that strict products liability had been extended to bailment claims.
Steak Ale's motion for summary judgment challenged a specific element of appellant's pleaded cause of action. Appellant then had the burden of producing some evidence that Steak Ale was a seller or manufacturer of the allegedly dangerous product. Instead of producing such evidence, appellant attempted to introduce a new basis for his complaint against Steak Ale. Therefore, appellant did not carry his burden under rule 166a(i) to raise an issue of material fact to defeat Steak Ale's motion for summary judgment.
We overrule appellant's second issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment.