Opinion
G059991 G060187
11-30-2021
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.W., Defendant and Appellant; In re G.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D.C., et al., Objectors and Respondents.
Law Offices of Arthur J. LaCilento and Arthur J. LaCilento, for Defendant and Appellant. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Law Office of Cara L. Bender and Donna P. Chirco, for Objectors and Respondents D.C. et al. Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the Minor.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeals from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 20DP0539, Robert Gerard and Katherine E. Lewis, Judges. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Arthur J. LaCilento and Arthur J. LaCilento, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Law Office of Cara L. Bender and Donna P. Chirco, for Objectors and Respondents D.C. et al. Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the Minor.
OPINION
MOORE, J. 1
This dependency case involves two caring families that each seek to adopt G.R., who is 18 months old. On one side of this appeal is appellant, G.R.'s maternal great aunt (the great aunt) who has already adopted two of G.R.'s half siblings and is in the process of adopting G.R.'s two other half siblings (collectively, the siblings). On the other is G.R.'s foster parents (de facto parents), respondents in this case, who have cared for her since she was 12 days old.
For the purposes of our analysis, the differences between half siblings and full siblings is immaterial.
After G.R. was born, her mother provided a false name and abandoned G.R. at the hospital. G.R. was placed with de facto parents who have cared for her since then. Due to the mother's deception, Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) was unable to contact any of G.R.'s relatives. Months after G.R. was placed in de facto parents' care, the great aunt learned of the dependency proceeding and contacted SSA. SSA then sought to place G.R. with the great aunt, but de facto parents filed a petition blocking the move, which the juvenile court granted. The great aunt then petitioned for a court order to have G.R. placed with her. The court again denied the change in placement, ruling it was in G.R.'s best interest to remain with de facto parents. The biological parents' parental rights were later terminated, severing the familial relationship between G.R. and her great aunt and siblings.
The heart of this appeal asks whether the juvenile court erred by finding it was in G.R.'s best interest to remain with de facto parents rather than changing her placement so she could live with her great aunt and four siblings. Both families have 2 demonstrated the ability to provide a loving and caring home for G.R, but, unfortunately, only one of them can do so. The great aunt and siblings, while near strangers to G.R. at this point, offer her a chance to grow up with her biological family. On the other hand, de facto parents are the only family G.R. has ever known since birth. Ultimately, reasonable minds could differ as to which placement would be in G.R.'s best interests. As such, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion by denying the great aunt's request for placement and having G.R. remain with de facto parents. For these reasons, we affirm the orders of the juvenile court.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. G.R.'s Birth and Placement
The material facts of this case are undisputed. G.R. was born in early May 2020. She and her mother both tested positive for methamphetamine, and the mother admitted to a history of drug abuse. The mother further reported she was homeless and did not have the essential items to care for a newborn. As to the alleged father, the mother did not know where he was and did not have his contact information. The mother informed SSA she had two other children who were living with the great aunt and stated the great aunt lived in Washington. This was untrue. She lived in Riverside County. The mother also refused to provide the great aunt's contact information. Further complicating matters, the mother identified herself with a false name and provided an incorrect phone number. She later abandoned G.R. at the hospital.
On May 5, 2020, SSA filed a petition seeking to have G.R. declared a dependent of the Orange County Juvenile Court. The case was initially assigned to Judge Katherine E. Lewis. The juvenile court sustained the petition the next month. G.R.'s biological parents could not be located prior to the hearing on the petition, and they did not appear. In their absence, the court denied them any reunification services. 3
G.R. was placed in the care of de facto parents when she was only 12 days old. After placement, they provided for all of G.R.'s basic needs and gave her "a loving, safe, secure, and nurturing home." G.R. appeared happy and content with them, and they expressed a desire to adopt her early in the placement.
They were appointed G.R.'s de facto parents by order of the juvenile court on September 17, 2020.
Meanwhile, SSA attempted to identify relatives of G.R. for potential placement. In mid-May, G.R.'s maternal grandfather contacted SSA about her. On multiple occasions, SSA attempted to return his call and also attempted to contact a maternal uncle of G.R. but was unsuccessful. While the record is unclear, it appears there was confusion because SSA identified the mother to these relatives as Vanessa G., the false name provided by the mother (her real name was Valerie L.). So, the grandfather and uncle may not have understood that SSA was inquiring about their relative. The grandfather did not return SSA's messages, while the maternal uncle stated he did "not have a sister named Vanessa [G.]" and did not know her.
The great aunt learned of G.R.'s birth the day after it occurred from another relative. But the relative incorrectly informed the great aunt that G.R. had gone home with the mother. At that time, the great aunt had already adopted the mother's two oldest children, who were teenagers, and was in the process of adopting the mother's two youngest children, who were toddlers. It was not until August 2020 that the great aunt learned G.R. had been abandoned at the hospital, and she began searching for G.R. The great aunt contacted SSA in September 2020. She informed SSA of her identity, the status of G.R.'s siblings, and requested that G.R. be placed with her. SSA had not located the great aunt earlier due to the mother's deception and refusal to provide the great aunt's contact information. Due to the misinformation, SSA began searching for the great aunt in Washington. These circumstances made it difficult for SSA to locate and link the adoption cases of the siblings, which were all filed in Los Angeles County. 4
B. De Facto Parent's Petition
After being contacted by the great aunt, SSA implemented an emergency placement referral for her. In response, de facto parents filed a motion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 on September 18, 2020, asking the court to suspend SSA's authority to remove G.R. from their home to place her with the great aunt. Judge Lewis heard their petition on October 9 (the October 9 hearing). Neither the great aunt nor any of G.R.'s siblings were given formal notice of the hearing, nor did they attend.
"Section 388 [of the Welfare and Institutions Code] allows a parent or other person having an interest in a dependent child to petition the juvenile court to change, modify, or set aside any prior order because of changed circumstance or new evidence." (In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 711.) All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Though the great aunt was not present at the hearing, SSA recommended that G.R. be placed with her and asked the court to deny de facto parents' petition. SSA advised "it is in [G.R.'s] best interest for her to be placed with the Maternal Great Aunt who is the adoptive mother and the prospective adoptive mother of [G.R.'s] four siblings. [G.R.] is adoptable and has been presented with an opportunity to be placed [in] a safe and permanent adoptive home with her extended biological family and her siblings where she can develop and maintain the sibling relationships." SSA also noted the great aunt "is a Resource Family Approval (RFA) approved home by RFA Riverside County . . . . [S]he has demonstrated the ability and commitment to provide for her adopted children's basic needs, as well as medical, emotional and protective needs. Additionally, the Maternal Great Aunt has a support system where her family is living close by to help care for the children when she is at work."
Following oral argument, the juvenile court granted de facto parents' petition, leaving G.R. placed with them. While the court believed the great aunt could provide a caring and supportive environment for G.R., it recognized that G.R. had spent "a hundred percent of her life in the care of the current de facto parents. She is clearly 5 very bonded with them. She loves them very much." The court also discussed section 361.3, which provides relatives with preferential consideration when a child is removed from parental custody. The purpose of this statute, the court stated, was "to avoid children being bounced around in foster care." The legislature recognized "that relatives might be more inclined to be supportive of reunification as opposed to . . . a non-relative caregiver." Since no reunification services had been offered, the court noted the focus of the proceedings was now on G.R.'s "best interests," which were "permanency and stability." The court observed G.R. was fortunate to not have been bounced around to different caregivers, and it concluded "mov[ing] her at this point would actually achieve the [harm] that the legislature sought to prevent by creating this relative preference." Based on these factors, the court found placement with the great aunt was not appropriate.
C. The Great Aunt's Petitions
After the October 9 hearing, the great aunt retained counsel and filed a section 388 petition seeking custody of G.R. She claimed SSA did not give her proper notice of G.R.'s dependency case and that she had been deprived of the opportunity to be heard in this matter. She further argued that granting her custody would give G.R. the opportunity to be with her biological family and grow up with her siblings. The great aunt then filed a separate motion seeking standing in this proceeding, which also requested that G.R. be placed with the great aunt under section 361.3. These petitions were initially heard on November 2, 2020, again by Judge Lewis. The court found the great aunt had made a prima facie case and granted an evidentiary hearing on both petitions. After several continuances, the evidentiary hearing occurred on February 19, 2021 (the February 19 hearing). At some point before this hearing, the case was reassigned to Judge Robert Gerard. 6
From November 2020 to the February 19 hearing, G.R. had four or five virtual visits with her great aunt and siblings. She had not met them prior to these visits. The first two visits lasted for 45 minutes, while the remaining visits were 15 minutes in length. The visits were positive, and the siblings enjoyed seeing G.R. Prior to the February 19 hearing, SSA submitted another report recommending that G.R. be placed with the great aunt.
The February 19 hearing took place in front of Judge Gerard. The great aunt was the only witness. Following her examination, counsel for the great aunt and SSA presented closing arguments, in which they both advocated for G.R. to be placed in the great aunt's custody. Then, counsel for de facto parents and G.R. gave closing arguments, in which they both maintained that G.R. should remain with de facto parents.
The court provided an oral ruling to the parties on February 24. At the outset, the court noted, "[i]n essence and at a fundamental level, the issue before the court is an issue of relative placement." First, the court found there was a change in circumstances warranting the great aunt's petition under section 388. Specifically, it noted that even though the great aunt had advised SSA that "she would like to be present and be heard at any hearing," she had not been invited to do so. The court found it "troubling . . . that nobody at the [October 9] hearing addressed [why] the great aunt was not there or participating . . ., although, the great aunt had made her desire to participate clear to [SSA]."
The court also addressed SSA's initial failure to provide the great aunt with notice of G.R.'s dependency proceeding. It found SSA was not at fault for failing to provide earlier notice to the great aunt. Rather, its failure was "the direct result of [the] mother's dishonesty and misrepresentation at the outset at the detention phase of this case . . . ."
As to the issue of placement, the court found the great aunt was a credible witness and performed an analysis of the relative preference factors under section 361.3, 7 subdivision (a). The court went through all the factors, noting that many of them weighed in the great aunt's favor. Of particular relevance here, the court noted "the placement of siblings and half-siblings" and "[t]he good moral character of the relative" favored the great aunt. It also found the great aunt was able to provide a safe and secure environment for G.R.
However, the court noted "the number one factor of the considerations [under section 361.3] is the best interest of the child." It balanced the above factors against the fact that G.R. had been with de facto parents for basically all her life and was "almost ten months old and [was] probably talking and intellectually engaged with [them]." The court found it was in the best interests of G.R. to remain in de facto parent's custody and kept intact the prior ruling from the October 9 hearing. The court concluded this prior ruling considered all the relative placement factors and "nothing that this court saw . . . would have changed the previous court's ruling."
A hearing to terminate the biological parents' parental rights occurred on April 26, 2021. The great aunt appeared and objected to G.R. not being placed with her siblings. She also objected to termination of parental rights, which would sever the familial relationship between G.R. and her great aunt and siblings. The court overruled the objections. It terminated parental rights and ordered that G.R. be freed for adoption.
The great aunt filed two appeals in response to these rulings. In the first (G059991), she appeals the juvenile court's denial of her petitions under sections 388 and 361.3. In the second (G060187), she appeals the court's termination of parental rights. In both appeals, the great aunt contends the court erred in denying her placement request for G.R. and that she suffered a due process violation because SSA failed to provide formal notice of the October 9 hearing. After both appeals were fully briefed, we consolidated them since they contain nearly identical arguments. As explained below, we find no error and affirm the court's orders. 8
II
DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Great Aunt's Petitions
Primarily, the great aunt contends the court abused its discretion by denying her petitions under sections 361.3 and 388. We find the court's ruling was within the bounds of reason. As such, the court did not err.
"Placement decisions in dependency proceedings are 'committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and the trial court's ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established.'" (In re A.S. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1340.) "'The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.'" (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) "'Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge. The reviewing court should interfere only "'if we find that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court's action, no judge could reasonably have made the order that he did.'"'" (Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 863.) In other words, we must "'uphold a ruling which a reasonable judge might have made, even though we would not have ruled the same and a contrary ruling would also be sustainable. We cannot substitute our own judgment.'" (Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 427-428.)
In evaluating both petitions, the guiding inquiry is the best interests of G.R. As our Supreme Court has explained, when a request for relative placement under section 361.3 is made alongside a "section 388 [motion] for change of placement after the termination of reunification services, the predominant task of the court [is] to determine the child's best interest." (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 320.) Once reunification is off the table, the focus of dependency proceedings "'shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability' . . . . A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in 9 determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interest of the child." (Id. at p. 317.) Consequently, "regardless of the relative placement preference," once reunification services have been terminated, "the fundamental duty of the court is to assure the best interests of the child, whose bond with a foster parent may require that placement with a relative be rejected." (Id. at p. 321.)
In considering G.R.'s best interests, it is important to note that children have a fundamental right to "'a placement that is stable [and] permanent.'" (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 419.) "A child has a constitutional interest in stability." (In re Manolito L. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 753, 762.) "[D]isruption of an existing psychological bond between dependent children and their caretakers is an extremely important factor" to consider when evaluating a motion for a change of placement. (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531.)
Here, the juvenile court considered all the relevant factors set forth in section 361.3, including placement of G.R. with her siblings, before finding it was in G.R.'s best interests to remain with de facto parents. While we may not have reached the same conclusion as the juvenile court, we cannot say its ruling was unreasonable. De facto parents had cared for G.R. since she was 12 days old. They were the only family she had ever known. At the time of the February 19 hearing, she had been in their care for nearly 10 months. The record shows de facto parents had provided G.R. "with a loving, safe, secure, and nurturing home" and "demonstrated the ability and commitment to provide for [her] basic needs." And G.R. appeared "happy and content with her caregivers." In contrast, at the time of the February 19 hearing, the only contact G.R. had ever had with the great aunt and the siblings was limited to four or five video calls that were 15 to 45 minutes long. While these virtual visits went well, nothing in the record shows G.R. had formed a meaningful bond with them.
The great aunt credibly argues that any short-term discomfort G.R. may have suffered by a change in placement would be outweighed by the long-term benefit of 10 growing up with her great aunt, siblings, and other biological family members. However, G.R. also has a fundamental right to permanency and stability. It could also be reasonably inferred that removing G.R. from the only home she had ever known and placing her with practical strangers could have lasting deleterious effects that outweighed the potential benefits. Under the abuse of discretion standard, "'[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.'" (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.) Moreover, finding the juvenile court improperly balanced these competing factors would amount to an improper substitution of our own judgment for that of the trial court. (Harman v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 427-428.)
The great aunt also claims the court failed to properly consider sibling placement under section 361.2, subdivision (j), which states, "If the court has ordered removal of the child from the physical custody of the child's parents . . ., the court shall consider whether there are any siblings under the court's jurisdiction, or any nondependent siblings in the physical custody of a parent subject to the court's jurisdiction, the nature of the relationship between the child and their siblings, the appropriateness of developing or maintaining the sibling relationships . . ., and the impact of the sibling relationships on the child's placement and planning for legal permanence." Specifically, the great aunt claims the court did not properly weigh the long-term interests of G.R. to be placed with her siblings.
First, this statute does not apply here. None of G.R.'s siblings were subject to the Orange County Superior Court's jurisdiction. Rather, all of the siblings' adoption cases were filed in Los Angeles County. Further, none of the siblings were in the physical custody of a parent subject to the court's jurisdiction. And even if this statute did apply, section 361.3 similarly requires the court to consider "[p]lacement of siblings and half siblings in the same home . . . ." (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(4).) The juvenile court 11 considered sibling placement. As we explained above, rebalancing this factor against G.R.'s right to stability on appeal would be an improper substitution of our own judgment.
B. Violation of Due Process
The great aunt also asserts she and G.R.'s siblings suffered a procedural due process violation under the 14th Amendment because they were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard at the October 9 hearing. This lack of notice, she claims, caused her to lose all rights to G.R.'s placement. We disagree.
This argument is reviewed de novo. (In re Jonathan V. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 236, 241.) "The procedural component of the due process clause ensures a fair adjudicatory process before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property. [Citations.] Not every denial of a fair hearing for which a remedy may be available under state law implicates constitutional due process. [Citation.] 'The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.' [Citation.] The range of interests protected by procedural due process is limited." (Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837, 852, italics added.)
Generally, procedural due process guarantees apply to dependency proceedings. (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1006.) But this is because such proceedings typically involve the interests of parents. "'A parent's interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children is a fundamental civil right.' [Citation.] Statutory procedures used for termination of parental rights satisfy due process requirements only because of the demanding requirements and multiple safeguards built into the dependency scheme at the early stages of the process. [Citations.] 'If a parent is denied those safeguards through no fault of her own, her due process rights are compromised.'" (Ibid., italics added; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 412 12 ["[P]arenting is a fundamental right the impairment of which requires strict adherence to procedural due process"].)
The great aunt has not cited any authority or made any argument showing that either she or the siblings have a constitutionally protected right in G.R.'s placement that required due process protection. It was her burden to do so. (Starcevic v. Pentech Financial Services, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 365, 374.) Nor can we presume such a right exists simply based on their familial relationship. (See In re H.K. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1435 ["H.K. cites no case that acknowledges a fundamental right to placement with a relative with whom the child has no quasi-parental relationship"]; cf. R.H. v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 364, 373 [grandparents did not have a due process right as prospective adoptive parents to appointment of counsel for dispositional hearing]; In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1508 ["a noncustodial grandparent of dependents of the juvenile court . . . has no substantive due process right to free association with the minors, or to maintain a relationship with them"].) Since the great aunt has not provided any argument showing she was entitled to due process, we need not consider this argument. (Starcevic v. Pentech Financial Services, Inc., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 374; Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277-278.)
Even if the great aunt and the siblings were entitled to procedural due process protections, no constitutional violation occurred. First, the great aunt - who was also the siblings' caretaker - had actual notice of the October 9 hearing. SSA informed her of the October 9 hearing on September 18, 2020. In response, the great aunt "stated that she would like to attend the hearing if allowed by the Court." Further, on October 6, 2020, the great aunt sent a text message to an SSA social worker stating, "I was just about to text you to ask about [G.R.] and tell you we haven't changed our mind and in hopes Friday [(October 9, 2020)] all siblings will be together." The great aunt has not 13 cited anything in the record showing she was prevented from attending the October 9 hearing.
Second, though they were not in attendance, the interests of the great aunt and siblings were advanced at the October 9 hearing. SSA advocated on their behalf and sought for G.R. to be placed with the great aunt. It told the court the great aunt was already "the adoptive mother and the prospective adoptive mother of [G.R.'s] four siblings." It assured the court that "she ha[d] demonstrated the ability and commitment to provide for her adopted children's basic needs, as well as medical, emotional and protective needs." SSA further recommended that G.R. "be placed [in] a safe and permanent adoptive home with her extended biological family and her siblings where she can develop and maintain the sibling relationships." Likewise, it stated that "[g]iven the short time period of the current placement [with de facto parents], maintaining the sibling and familial relationships would appear to be in the child's best interests at this time."
Third, "[i]n juvenile dependency litigation, due process focuses on the right to notice and the right to be heard." (In re Matthew P. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 841, 851.) The great aunt testified and presented argument regarding G.R.'s placement at the February 19 hearing. She fails to explain why this opportunity to be heard was constitutionally deficient. Given the above facts, we conclude the great aunt and G.R.'s siblings were afforded sufficient due process to the extent they were entitled to any such protection.
The great aunt also argues SSA's failure to give her notice under section 309 constitutes a due process violation. This statute provides that "[i]f the child is removed, the social worker shall conduct, within 30 days, an investigation in order to identify and locate all grandparents, parents of a sibling of the child, if the parent has legal custody of the sibling, . . ., [and] other adult relatives of the child . . . ." (§ 309, subd. (e)(1).) Within 30 days of the child's removal, SSA shall provide a written notice 14 containing certain information "to all adult relatives who are located." (§ 309, subd. (e)(1), italics added.)
The great aunt has failed to explain how a violation of this statute constitutes a violation of due process, so we need not consider this argument. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 277-278.) Besides, there is no dispute SSA conducted the required investigation. But, as set forth above, the mother's deception interfered with its ability to identify G.R.'s relatives. The great aunt was not given the required notice because she could not be located in SSA's investigation. Further, she has not identified any material flaws in the investigation that caused SSA to miss her. Given these facts, we cannot find SSA violated section 309.
C. Legal Notice to Siblings
Finally, the great aunt argues SSA failed to give G.R.'s siblings notice under section 294. This statute requires social workers to provide at least 45 days' notice of a section 366.26 hearing to "[a]ny known sibling of the child who is the subject of the hearing if that sibling either is the subject of a dependency proceeding or has been adjudged to be a dependent child of the juvenile court. . . . If the sibling is under 10 years of age, [notice shall be given to] the sibling's caregiver and the sibling's attorney." (§ 294, subds. (a)(6) & (c)(1).)
This argument was only made in the appeal of the orders from the section 366.26 hearing (G060187).
G.R.'s two older siblings had been adopted and were no longer dependents of the juvenile court. (Teresa J. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 366, 375 ["A juvenile court retains jurisdiction over a dependent child . . . until the adoption is final"].) As such, they were not entitled to notice. Her two younger siblings, whose adoptions had not yet been finalized, were both under the age of 10. Thus, section 294 required SSA to give notice of G.R.'s 366.26 hearing to the great aunt (their caregiver) and their counsel. 15
SSA did not give formal notice of the hearing to either. However, we find the lack of notice had no effect on the outcome of the proceeding and was harmless. (See In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 918-919.)
Significantly, the great aunt had more than 45 days' actual notice of the 366.26 hearing. She and her counsel were present at the February 24 hearing, in which the court ruled on the great aunt's petitions. At this hearing, the court orally announced it was continuing the 366.26 hearing for 60 days to April 26, 2021. Indeed, the great aunt and her counsel appeared at the 366.26 hearing on April 26, showing she had actual notice of this proceeding. Further, at the 366.26 hearing her counsel again objected to the court's decision not to place G.R. with her siblings, which the court overruled.
The great aunt also requested a visitation order for her and the siblings. Prior to the hearing, the great aunt and de facto parents had arranged informal visitation. The court denied her request for a visitation order. But it expressed a desire for the great aunt and de facto parents to work out visitation and encouraged the parties to utilize the court's mediation services if they were unable to do so.
Although it does not appear that counsel for the younger siblings had any form of notice, the great aunt has not explained how this error affected the outcome of the 366.26 hearing. Nor does anything in the record suggest the outcome would have been different had counsel received notice. The court considered sibling placement before denying the great aunt's petitions under sections 388 and 361.3. Sibling placement was again raised by the aunt and rejected by the court at the 366.26 hearing. Nothing suggests the court would have reached a different outcome had the younger siblings' counsel appeared at the 366.26 hearing and argued for a change in G.R.'s placement. 16
III
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P.J., MARKS, J. [*] 17
[*] Judge of the Orange Super. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.