Opinion
No. 3:04-CV-0828-G.
January 27, 2005
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Texas prison system, filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. at 2, 5.) He sues State Trooper Kevin Cauley; Police Officer Sergio Reyes; and Deputy Hank Havens (collectively "the officers") for excessive force and defamation related to his arrest on April 14, 2002. ( Id. at 3, Statement of Claim attached to Compl.) Plaintiff also sues the Rockwall County Sheriff's Department for not properly training the officers with respect to the use of force. (Compl. at 3, Statement of Claim at 2.) In addition, plaintiff sues Nurse Carolyn Myrick of Lake Pointe Hospital for violation of his right to privacy and sexual assault when she illegally and painfully obtained a urine sample from him without his consent while he was handcuffed to a hospital bed. (Statement of Claim at 2.) He also sues Lake Pointe Hospital for a failure to properly train Nurse Myrick. ( Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from each defendant. ( See Prayer for Relief, attached to Compl.)
Plaintiff also sued the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Rockwall Police Department for failure to train. The District Court entered separate judgments in favor of these entities on July 19, 2004, and dismissed them from the case.
On May 10, 2004, the Court granted plaintiff permission to proceed with this action in forma pauperis; on May 17, 2004, it ordered that the case be served on defendants. On November 19, 2004, the District Court entered a Show Cause Order requiring the submission of briefs concerning the applicability of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) by December 9, 2004, and allowing plaintiff until December 27, 2004, to file a response to any submitted brief.
The events leading to this litigation resulted in plaintiff's conviction for "two counts of aggravated assault of a public servant and one count of tampering with evidence." See Nelson v. State, Nos. 05-02-01917-CR, 05-02-01918-CR, 05-02-01919-CR, 2004 WL 26862, at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas Jan. 6, 2004, pet. ref'd).
Defendants Cauley, Reyes, Havens, and Rockwall County Sheriff's Department filed briefs in which they assert that plaintiff's excessive force claims are barred by Heck and that the defamation claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Nurse Myrick and Lake Pointe Hospital (collectively "the Lake Pointe defendants") filed a brief and a motion to dismiss in which they assert that the claims against them are barred by Heck and for failure to state a claim because they are not "state actors" as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants Reyes, Havens, and Rockwall County Sheriff's Department filed their brief on December 10, 2004, one day after the court-established deadline. Plaintiff does not argue that the Court should not consider the untimely brief. Moreover, the Court may consider the brief despite its untimeliness because the Court may "at any time" sua sponte determine whether a complaint filed in forma pauperis should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e) (2). Further, the brief essentially reiterates information and arguments provided in Cauley's brief.
Plaintiff filed a response to each brief filed by defendants. He contends that success on the instant action will not necessarily invalidate any of his convictions and relies upon Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1996) to support his position. He does not address the alleged untimeliness of his defamation claims. As for the assertion that the Lake Pointe defendants are not state actors, plaintiff contends that their actions are attributable to the State.
On January 12, 2005, the Lake Pointe defendants filed objections and a reply to plaintiff's response to their brief and motion to dismiss.
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. Scope of Recommendation
Because the Show Cause Order of November 19, 2004, refers only the issue of whether Heck applies to bar any of plaintiff's claims, all other bases for dismissal of plaintiff's claims are outside the scope of the referral. Accordingly, the Court does not address the officers' claim that the defamation claims are barred by the statute of limitations or the Lake Pointe defendants' claims that they are not state actors.
B. Objections of Lake Pointe Defendants to Plaintiff's Responses to the Heck Briefs
The Lake Pointe defendants object to plaintiff's responses on three grounds: (1) plaintiff failed to timely file his response, (2) plaintiff filed three responses when the Show Cause Ordered directed him to file only one, and (3) plaintiff failed to properly serve them with his response.
The Lake Pointe defendants assert that plaintiff filed his response to their brief one day late. However, under the prison mailbox rule, an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is deemed filed when the prisoner delivers the pleadings to prison authorities for mailing to the court. See Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1995). The mailbox rule generally applies to all prisoner district court filings. See Edwards v. United States, 266 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2001). Although the record does not precisely reflect when plaintiff gave his response to the prison authorities for mailing, it was certainly "filed" sometime between December 22, 2004, when he signed the certificate of service, and December 28, 2004, when this Court received it. By virtue of the prison mailbox rule, it was timely filed. The Court finds no reason to exclude the response to the Show Cause Order from the prison mailbox rule.
The Lake Pointe defendants also object to the individual responses filed by plaintiff to the three briefs filed by the various defendants. However, by stating that "plaintiff may file a single response to the briefs submitted by the defendants", the Court granted plaintiff permission to file one response rather than requiring a response to each filed brief. The Court did not require that plaintiff file a single response. This objection has no merit.
The Lake Pointe defendants lastly object that plaintiff failed to properly serve them with his response. Indeed, the certificate of service reflects that plaintiff only mailed his response to the Court. Although this objection may have some merit, it is also clear that the Lake Pointe defendants obtained a copy of the response and filed their reply. The Show Cause Order commenced a truth-finding process to determine the applicability of Heck to the claims raised in the instant action. Under these facts, it appears more appropriate to deem the deficiency of service harmless rather than to disregard the response, and the Court will therefore consider it.
The Court notes that its recommendation regarding the applicability of Heck remains the same whether or not it considers the response.
III. APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) provides a basis for dismissal when the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. However, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) must be made before the defendant files a responsive pleading. "After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) provides that "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous or malicious . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief."Whether the Court considers the Heck issue under § 1915(e)(2) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or (c), the standard for determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted is the same. See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312-13 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the standards under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) are the same); Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002) (recognizing the standards are the same under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Rule 12(b)(6)); Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the standards are the same under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A; Rule 12(b)(6); and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Smith v. Winter, 782 F.2d 508, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1986); Henrise v. Horvath, 94 F.Supp. 2d 768, 769 (N.D. Tex. 2000). When Heck applies to bar relief on a particular claim, such claim "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." See Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000).
Although Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and (c) require the federal courts to convert a motion filed under those rules to one for summary judgment when documents outside of the pleadings are placed before the court and not excluded, such requirement does not apply when the submitted documents are matters of public record. See Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 372 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1995). In this case, the defendants have provided various public records relating to plaintiff's state trial and convictions. Because the Court has only considered the pleadings and matters of public record, there is no need to consider dismissal under summary judgment standards.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF HECK
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for alleged excessive force, defamation, illegal search, violation of his right to privacy, sexual violation, and failures to train. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides a federal cause of action and affords redress for the "deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's `rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999).
In light of plaintiff's convictions for aggravated assault of a public servant and tampering with evidence, the Court must determine whether Heck applies to bar one or more of plaintiff's claims. In Heck, the Supreme Court ruled that:
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, when state law claims are based on the same premise as constitutional claims under § 1983, Heck may also bar relief on such claims. See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000). Under Heck, courts must consider "whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." 512 U.S. at 486-87. When success in a civil "action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence." Muhammad v. Close, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 1304 (2004).
To determine whether Heck bars relief on a particular claim raised by plaintiff, the Court must consider the nature of plaintiff's convictions and the nature of the civil claims asserted. Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, No. 03-30941, 2004 WL 1336637, at *2 (5th Cir. June 14, 2004) (citing Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 429 (2004). The Court will thus examine the nature of the offenses for which plaintiff was convicted before turning to the particular claims raised in this action.
A. Nature of Offenses
Plaintiff was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault of a public servant and one count of tampering with evidence. See Nelson v. State, Nos. 05-02-01917-CR, 05-02-01918-CR, 05-02-01919-CR, 2004 WL 26862, at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas Jan. 6, 2004, pet. ref'd). Defendants Rockwall Country Sheriff's Department, Sergio Reyes, and Hank Havens provide a copy of that appellate decision, as well as the transcript of plaintiff's criminal trial testimony, in an appendix to their brief in response to the Show Cause Order. ( See App. at 1-81.) Both the appellate decision and plaintiff's trial testimony are matters of public record which shed valuable light on the events leading to plaintiff's arrest and convictions.
1. Appellate Summary of Events
The Court of Appeals set forth the following background information related to plaintiff's convictions:
Appellant [(plaintiff in the instant civil action)] and his wife were driving slowly through a residential community in the early morning hours of April 14, 2002. At the same time, several police officers were concluding a manhunt that they had conducted in the area nearby. Officer Kevin Cauley saw appellant's car, was suspicious and signaled for him to stop. Once the car stopped, the officer tapped on Mrs. Nelson's window with his flash light and asked her to roll down the window. As she did, Officer Cauley looked in the car and saw appellant pick up a small plastic bag from the car's console area and attempt to swallow it. Officer Cauley yelled to his fellow officers that appellant was swallowing "rocks" of crack cocaine. He jumped into the car through the passenger's side window, throwing his body across appellant's wife in the passenger seat. He grabbed appellant by the throat and hit appellant repeatedly in an effort to keep him from swallowing drugs.
Officer Sergio Reyes, an officer with the Rockwall County Sheriff's Department, opened the driver's side car door and tried to pull appellant out of the car. Three more officers came to the driver's side of the car to help Officer Reyes pull appellant out of the car. Officer Cauley testified at trial that while he and the other officers were trying to keep appellant from swallowing drugs and trying to pull him out of the car, he saw someone's hand reach for the vehicle's gearshift and shift the vehicle's transmission into gear. The car then lunged backward, stopped momentarily, and accelerated quickly in reverse again for approximately fifty feet, dragging three officers along with it. Four of the officers and appellant were injured in the incident. Three of the officers, along with appellant, were transported to various hospitals for treatment.
Appellant was arrested and charged with two counts of aggravated assault of a public officer and one count of tampering with evidence. Appellant pled not guilty to all charges. Appellant admitted at trial that he had swallowed the baggie and that it contained the residue from drugs he had purchased and taken earlier in the evening. Appellant also testified that he passed out after Officer Reyes grabbed his throat and that he did not know what had happened to cause the car to accelerate in reverse.Nelson, 2004 WL 26862, at *1.
2. Plaintiff's Trial Testimony
At his criminal trial, Plaintiff testified to his version of the background facts. ( See App. at 4-81.) In the early morning hours of April 14, 2002, Officer Cauley stopped plaintiff and his wife while they were driving through an apartment parking lot. ( Id. at 13-14.) Plaintiff placed a "plastic baggie" in his mouth and swallowed it because he was afraid that the officer would see cocaine residue on it. ( Id. at 14, 28.) Cauley tried to stop plaintiff from swallowing the baggie by jumping through an open passenger-side car window, grabbing him, and putting his hands in plaintiff's mouth. ( Id. at 14-15, 42.) A different officer then came at plaintiff through the driver's side door. ( Id. at 16, 41.) That officer choked plaintiff until plaintiff passed out. ( Id. at 16, 41-43.) Plaintiff saw no guns displayed in the vehicle. ( Id. at 23.)
When plaintiff regained consciousness, he was half out of the car with his head bouncing on the pavement, as the car moved backwards. ( Id. at 18-20, 46.) He regained consciousness long enough to raise himself off the ground and feel the vehicle stop. ( Id. at 18-20, 47, 58-59, 64.) The vehicle stopped when it hit a pole. ( Id. at 23.) After the vehicle stopped, plaintiff was "immediately . . . rampaged by cops" and he quickly lost consciousness again. ( Id.)
Plaintiff also testified that he recalled that Deputy Havens testified that he had tried to pull plaintiff from the vehicle before it started moving backwards. (App. at 44.)
When he regained consciousness a second time, he was "not in handcuffs", but was lying on the ground near the rear tire with an officer's gun underneath his arm. ( Id. at 18.) Because the officers threatened to shoot him, plaintiff remained "limp" and "was saying his prayers." ( Id. at 54.) Shortly thereafter, the officers "jumped on" him, "kneed" him in the back, "handcuffed" him, and moved him away from the rear tire. ( Id. at 23, 54.) When the officer jumped on his back, plaintiff tried to keep himself from getting hurt by trying to turn over, but did not hit or grab the officer. ( Id. at 55.) Officers thereafter sprayed him with mace and threatened to shoot him if he moved. ( Id. at 25.) While two officers sat on plaintiff for five or six minutes while waiting for backups to arrive, plaintiff squirmed on his belly and tried to turn over. ( Id. at 55-56.)
Based on the appellate summary and plaintiff's testimony, it appears that plaintiff's tampering with evidence offense relates to his ingestion of the "baggie" and its contents when stopped by law enforcement personnel. It further appears that the aggravated assault offenses relate to the use of the motor vehicle during the events that led to plaintiff's arrest. It is within this factual background the plaintiff brings his current claims against the various defendants.
B. Nature of Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff asserts claims of (1) excessive force and defamation against three officers; (2) illegal search, violation of his right to privacy, and sexual violation against a nurse; and (3) failure to train against a hospital and a law enforcement entity. It is undisputed that plaintiff's convictions have not been reversed, invalidated, or expunged prior to bringing the instant action. The Court must determine whether granting plaintiff damages for such claims will necessarily implicate the validity of his convictions for tampering with evidence or aggravated assault of a public servant. If a particular claim necessarily implies the invalidity of one of those convictions, then Heck bars relief on such claim. See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102-03 (5th Cir. 1996).
1. Claims Against Officers
a. Excessive Force
Plaintiff asserts excessive force claims against defendants Cauley, Reyes, and Havens. He claims that defendant Cauley jumped into his vehicle and choked and beat him until he became unconscious. (Statement of Claim at 1.) He claims that Officer Reyes grabbed him by the throat and beat him. ( Id.) He claims that Deputy Havens attempted to pull him out of the vehicle while other law enforcement personnel beat and choked him. ( Id. at 2.) He also claims that Deputy Havens beat him with his pistol. ( Id.) He further claims that Deputy Havens used mace on him while he was handcuffed on the ground. ( Id.)
As noted by the Fifth Circuit, it is "not always clear" how Heck applies to claims of excessive force. See Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, No. 03-30941, 2004 WL 1336637, at *2 (5th Cir. June 14, 2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 429 (2004). Further, "a plaintiff will not invariably invalidate his conviction" by succeeding on a claim of excessive force. Id. (citing Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996)). Nevertheless, where a plaintiff has been convicted of assaulting the arresting officers, success on an excessive force claim will necessarily implicate the validity of the particular conviction and thus invoke Heck's bar to relief. See, e.g., Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that excessive force claims under § 1983 are "barred as a matter of law if brought by an individual convicted of aggravated assault related to the same events"); Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a claim of excessive force is necessarily inconsistent with a criminal conviction for aggravated assault of a public servant because the conviction necessarily means that the assaulter had no self-defense justification for the assault and holding that a conviction for aggravated assault premised on the infliction of "serious bodily injury" bars an excessive force claim under § 1983 stemming from the events of the aggravated assault because, as a matter of law, the force exerted to protect oneself against an aggravated assault "cannot, under Heck, be deemed excessive"); Hudson, 98 F.3d at 873 (holding that Heck bars claims of excessive force when the plaintiff has been convicted of "battery of an officer" because self-defense is a justification defense to such conviction under Louisiana law); Polk v. Dickens, No. 3:00-CV-2818-G, 2001 WL 184229, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2001) (accepting findings and recommendation that claim of excessive force was barred by Heck when the plaintiff had been convicted of "resisting arrest" and "assaulting a public servant" and was necessarily unsuccessful in showing a self-defense justification for the assault); Singer v. Roberts, No. 3:99-CV-0296-G, 2000 WL 233291, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2000) (holding that Heck bars claims of excessive force when plaintiff has been convicted of "assault on a public servant" and was necessarily unsuccessful in showing a self-defense justification for the assault).
Plaintiff relies on Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1996) to support his position that success on his claims of excessive force will not imply the invalidity of his convictions for aggravated assault on a public servant. In Smithart, the plaintiff pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon after driving his truck at two law enforcement personnel. See 79 F.3d at 952. In his subsequent § 1983 action, Smithart claimed that after he exited from the truck, the defendants "provoked him into a confrontation which they escalated beyond any necessary measure." Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a finding that excessive force had been used during the arrest following the vehicular assault would not undermine the fact that the plaintiff had tried to run over the officers. 73 F.3d at 952-53. The Ninth Circuit thus held that Heck presented no bar to Smithart's claims of excessive force. Id. at 953.
In Arnold, the Fifth Circuit stated that Smithart was consistent with Fifth Circuit case law. See Arnold, 2004 WL 1336637, at *2-3. The Fifth Circuit noted that as in Smithart, where the actions which constituted the offense for which the plaintiff was convicted were finished and complete before the complained-of excessive force was exerted, the "plaintiff could proceed with a claim that did not contradict the criminal jury's fact finding" that the plaintiff drove his truck at police officers. Arnold, 2004 WL 1336637, at *3. However, because such circumstances were not present under the facts in Arnold, the Fifth Circuit found that Heck barred Arnold's excessive force claim consistent with Hudson, Sappington, and Hainze. Id.
In Hudson, the Fifth Circuit also distinguished Smithart from the facts before it. See 98 F.3d at 873.
This Court has also previously followed Smithart under a "similar" factual scenario. See Rivera v. City of Irving, No. 3:99-CV-0310-P, 2000 WL 370668, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2000). In Rivera, the plaintiff pled nolo contendere to physically assaulting a public servant. Id. at *4-5 (noting that the assault consisted of pushing an officer and running into him). Rivera alleged that after such assault, the officers "responded by unreasonable force to subdue her by choking her and striking her with a baton numerous times." Id. at *5. The undisputed facts showed "that Rivera did not attack either of the officers once they began to place her under arrest." Id. Rivera, furthermore, did "not allege that her actions were justified by self-defense or by any other theory." Id. As in Smithart, "all of the alleged excessive force happened after [the plaintiff] had already committed the offense of assault." Id. Thus, the Court found no Heck bar for the claim of excessive force presented to it. Id.
The Fifth Circuit has already found that Smithart is consistent with Fifth Circuit jurisprudence. This Court must thus consider the specific facts of plaintiff's convictions and the claims of excessive force in order to determine whether Heck bars relief. In plaintiff's case, a jury convicted him of two counts of aggravated assault of a public servant. Because plaintiff had "a defense to prosecution" if his conduct was justified under Chapter 9 of the Texas Penal Code, see TEX.PEN. CODE § 9.02, the jury necessarily found no justification for plaintiff's conduct. See Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 1996) (addressing self-defense justification under Louisiana law). Section 9.31(c)(1) of the Texas Penal Code provides a justification defense for "[t]he use of force to resist an arrest or search . . . if, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace officer (or person acting at his direction) uses or attempts to use greater force than necessary to make the arrest or search." By finding plaintiff guilty of aggravated assault of a public servant despite the availability of the justification defense of § 9.31(c)(1), the jury necessarily found plaintiff was not justified in his use of force to resist the arrest or search that occurred on April 14, 2002. See Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1999).
A finding of excessive force in this civil action would be inconsistent with the jury's finding that plaintiff had no justification to use force against the officers. Such finding would therefore necessarily imply the invalidity of plaintiff's convictions for aggravated assault of a public servant. As noted in Hudson, Smithart does not help plaintiff avoid the applicability of Heck under the facts of this case. See 98 F.3d at 873. Consequently, Heck bars relief on plaintiff's claims of excessive force. b. Defamation
With respect to his defamation claims, plaintiff asserts that each of the three defendant law enforcement officers stated for the media that "a drug bust was occurring at the time of the event." (Statement of Claims at 1-2.) He claims that such statements labeled him as a drug dealer and user, proclaimed him guilty prior to trial, and "made a tremendous impression on the jury's mind prior to his conviction." ( Id.) He further claims that "[b]ut for this unprofessional behavior and false information there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different." ( Id.)
The officer defendants do not contend that plaintiff's defamation claims are barred by Heck. Moreover, the Court does not find that success on such claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of any of plaintiff's convictions. Consequently, Heck does not present a bar to plaintiff's pursuit of such claims.
2. Claims Against Law Enforcement Entities
Plaintiff also claims that the Rockwall County Sheriff's Department did not properly train its officers in the use of force. Because Heck bars plaintiff's excessive force claims against the individual officers, Heck also bars claims against these entities based upon the same allegations. Cf. Singer v. Roberts, No. 3:99-CV-0296-G, 2000 WL 233291, at *6 n. 3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2000) (holding that a municipality cannot be held liable for a failure to train when the claims against the individual defendants have been dismissed). To succeed on a failure to train claim related to the alleged excessive force, plaintiff would have to show that the officers exerted excessive force. For reasons already stated, such a showing would necessarily imply the invalidity of plaintiff's convictions for aggravated assault. Consequently, Heck bars plaintiff's claims against the Rockwall County Sheriff's Department for failure to properly train its officers.
As previously mentioned, the Court has already dismissed the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Rockwall Police Department from this case.
3. Claims Against Nurse Myrick
Plaintiff claims that Nurse Myrick of Lake Pointe Hospital conducted an illegal search to unlawfully obtain a urine sample used to convict him. He further alleges that the nurse violated his right to privacy and sexually violated him. Defendant Myrick argues that Heck bars these claims because success on them would necessarily imply the invalidity of plaintiff's conviction for tampering with evidence.
Success on an illegal-search claim does not necessarily invoke the Heck bar, due to "doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery" and the potential that any error would be deemed harmless as to the validity of the conviction. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n. 7 (1994). In this case, plaintiff alleges that defendant Myrick illegally obtained a urine sample from him that the State used to secure his conviction for tampering with evidence.
A jury found that plaintiff had tampered with evidence. A person commits such an offense under Texas law when he, "knowing that an offense has been committed, alters, destroys, or conceals any record, document, or thing with intent to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in any subsequent investigation of or official proceeding related to the offense." See TEX. PEN. CODE § 37.09(d)(1) (Vernon 2003). Although the State presented evidence that testing of the urine sample showed the presence of drugs in plaintiff's system, such evidence was unnecessary to secure his conviction for tampering with evidence. Undisputed evidence at trial showed that plaintiff swallowed some sort of "baggie" once he and his wife were stopped by law enforcement personnel. A reasonable inference from such conduct (perhaps the only reasonable inference) is that plaintiff knew that an offense had been committed, and thus concealed the "baggie" and its contents with intent to impair its availability as evidence.
If the Court were to grant plaintiff relief on his illegal search claim under the facts of this case, such judgment would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his tampering-with-evidence conviction. Likewise, if the Court were to grant plaintiff relief on his claims that Nurse Myrick violated his right to privacy and sexually violated him, such judgment would not necessarily imply the invalidity of his tampering-with-evidence conviction. Heck presents no bar to the claims asserted against Nurse Myrick.
4. Claims Against Hospital
Plaintiff also claims that Lake Pointe Hospital failed to properly train Nurse Myrick. Because Heck does not bar any claims against Nurse Myrick, it presents no bar to plaintiff's claim against the hospital.
C. Conclusion Heck bars plaintiff's claims of excessive force. Heck also bars his failures-to-train claims that rest upon alleged excessive force. Consequently, those claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000). The Court should dismiss such claims "with prejudice to their being asserted again until the Heck conditions are met." Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996); accord Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1994) (upholding dismissal with prejudice); Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27-28 (5th Cir. 1994) (same). Heck does not otherwise bar the claims raised by plaintiff, including the defamation claims against the individual officers and the claims against the Lake Pointe defendants.
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the District Court find that Heck bars relief on plaintiff's excessive force claims and his failure-to-train claims premised on the claims of excessive force. The Court should summarily DISMISS such claims with prejudice until such time as plaintiff can satisfy the conditions set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Because such dismissal will dispose of all claims against the Rockwall County Sheriff's Department, such entity should be terminated as a party to this action.