Opinion
Civil Action 4:21-CV-00038
10-02-2023
MIGUEL MOLINA, Plaintiff, v. K. KAUFFMAN, et al., Defendants.
BRANN, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Kevin Kauffman, former Superintendent of SCI-Huntingdon; Jill Spyker, Deputy Superintendent for Decentralized Services at SCI-Huntingdon; Scott Walters, former Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services at SCI-Huntingdon; G. Ralston, Unit Manager of certain housing units (B and C Blocks) at SCI-Huntingdon; John E. Wetzel, former Secretary of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and Tabb Bickell, Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations for the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) (collectively, the “Defendants”). (Doc. 244). On January 8, 2021, pro se-prisoner Plaintiffs Vann L. Bailey, Jason Cisne, Angel Irizarry, Alexis Maldanado, and Miguel Molina (“Molina”), representative members of a proposed class of inmates incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon, initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). On December 1, 2022, the Court ordered Molina's case to proceed in this action and directed the Clerk of Court to open new civil actions for each of the remaining Plaintiffs. (Doc. 223). Molina, an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest”), filed the fourth amended complaint on August 24, 2022. (Doc. 212).
Molina does not assert claims against Eric Brown in the fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 212). Molina's fourth amended complaint is a stand-alone complaint, not a supplement to his original complaint, and any defendant that was not included in his amended complaint must be terminated from this action. (Doc. 212). Accordingly, it is recommended that Eric Brown be TERMINATED from this action.
On February 16, 2022, Plaintiff Cisne filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice, informing the Court that matters between Defendants and Cisne have been adjusted, compromised, and settled. (Doc. 169). On February 24, 2022, the Court dismissed Cisne's action with prejudice as to Defendants. (Doc. 177).
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. (Doc. 244).
I. Background and Procedural History
This factual background is taken from Defendants' statement of material facts and accompanying exhibits. (Doc. 245; Doc. 244-2). Molina has filed his answer to Defendants' statement of material facts and has provided accompanying exhibits. (Doc. 250; Doc. 251). Where Molina disputes facts and supports those disputes in the record, as required by Local Rule 56.1, those disputes are noted. As Molina is proceeding pro se, the Court will liberally construe his pleadings to accurately reflect what the record provides. Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the Court accepts as true all undisputed material facts supported by the record. Where the record evinces a disputed fact, the Court will take notice. In addition, the facts have been taken in the light most favorable to Molina as the non-moving party, with all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor.
On December 30, 2020, Miguel Molina, Alexis Maldanado, Vann L. Bailey, Angel Irizarry and Jason Cisne, representative members of a proposed class of inmates incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon, initiated a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 245, ¶ 2; Doc. 1). Through counsel, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, as well as a motion to certify the class and appoint counsel. (Doc. 245, ¶ 3; Doc. 35; Doc. 43; Doc. 44). The motion to certify the class was denied, following which counsel withdrew from the case. (Doc. 245, ¶ 4; Doc. 67; Doc. 84; Doc. 86; Doc. 88). Plaintiffs were granted leave to file amended complaints. (Doc. 245, ¶ 4; Doc. 91; Doc. 100). On November 22, 2021, Molina filed a third amended complaint, to which Defendants responded with a partial motion to dismiss. (Doc. 245, ¶ 5; Doc. 108; Doc. 120; Doc. 121). On July 25, 2022, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation that Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted. (Doc. 245, ¶ 6; Doc. 202). Judge Brann adopted the recommendation; the claims asserted against Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman in their official capacities were dismissed with prejudice and the remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice. Molina was granted leave to file a fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 245, ¶ 7; Doc. 202; Doc. 213). On August 24, 2022, Molina filed a fourth amended complaint, to which the Defendants responded with an answer and affirmative defenses. (Doc. 245, ¶ 8; Doc. 212; Doc. 218).
During all times relevant to the allegations presented in the fourth amended complaint, Molina was incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon-namely, he was housed there from March 12, 2019, through July 5, 2022. (Doc. 245, ¶ 9; Doc. 212; Doc. 244-2, at 271-273). Throughout the fourth amended complaint, Molina avers that “at times,” “regularly,” or “often,” he was exposed to various unconstitutional conditions, the totality of which “individually and through their mutually reinforcing effect, poses an unreasonable and serious, ongoing threat of imminent risk of substantial harm.” (Doc. 245, ¶ 10; Doc. 212, ¶ 103). More specifically, Molina asserts the Defendants “knew of the decrepit and life-threatening state of the edifice” of SCI-Huntingdon, unstable structures, the lack of ventilation, broken pipes, faulty electrical wiring, fire safety deficiencies, rust, black mold, asbestos, fungus, rodents, cracked and leaking toilets, and the overcrowded conditions that caused inmates to live “in each others filth and waste.” (Doc. 245, ¶ 11; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 128-132). In his former role as Superintendent at SCI-Huntingdon, Molina avers Defendant Kauffman had a duty to provide for the “humane care, custody, and control of inmates,” yet failed “to maintain the physical plant of the prison.” (Doc. 245, ¶ 12; Doc. 212, ¶ 128). Further, Molina asserts that Defendant Kauffman, along with Defendants Spyker and Walters, during their respective terms as the SCI-Huntingdon Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services, allegedly observed the above-indicated conditions daily and “reviewed reports of various breakdowns,” and that they “tolerated, encouraged, or acquiesced” in conduct by “staff who routinely disobeyed Department directives for humane care,” and “acted without regards to the obvious risk.” (Doc. 245, ¶ 13; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 128-129). Defendant Ralston, the unit manager for B and C Blocks at SCI-Huntingdon, also allegedly observed the above-indicated conditions daily and had a duty to “report information up the chain of command,” yet failed to take any action. (Doc. 245, ¶ 14; Doc. 212, ¶ 130). Molina alleges Defendant Wetzel, as the former Secretary for the DOC, was aware of the above-indicated conditions because he regularly toured the institution and received reports of “the breakdowns of its systems,” as well as correspondence from inmates; that although Wetzel issued directives regarding the humane care of inmates, he failed to enforce them at SCI-Huntingdon; and that Wetzel declined to exercise his “power and authority to allocate DOC budgetary funds and staff resources to bring the antiquated SCI Huntingdon up to legal State and Federal codes, and up to constitutionally acceptable standards.” (Doc. 245, ¶ 15; Doc. 212, ¶ 131). Defendant Tabb Bickell, the former Executive Deputy Secretary, was allegedly aware of the above-described conditions because he regularly toured the institution, received reports of such “breakdowns” and had observed these conditions during his prior tenure as the Superintendent at SCI-Huntingdon; Bickell allegedly had the power to rectify these issues, yet declined to do so; and Bickell had “oversight of the OPM” and was responsible for busing inmates between institutions. (Doc. 245, ¶ 16; Doc. 212, I 132).
At counts one through three of the fourth amended complaint, which are directed to all Defendants, Molina asserts claims for deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and the due process clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, respectively. (Doc. 245, ¶ 17; Doc. 212). At count four, Molina asserts state tort claims for negligence and ministerial negligence against Defendants Wetzel, Bickell and Kauffman. (Doc. 245, ¶ 18; Doc. 212). Lastly, at count five, Molina presents claims for negligent infliction and ministerial infliction of mental and emotional distress, against all Defendants. (Doc. 245, ¶ 18; Doc. 212). Molina contends the Defendants were “acting under the color of law and in their individual capacities” with respect to all claims, for which he seeks declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. (Doc. 245, ¶ 19; Doc. 212).
First, Molina avers the institution is structurally unstable and in danger of collapse, citing to visible cracks and foundational issues. (Doc. 245, ¶ 20; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 4, 83-86). SCI-Huntingdon was built utilizing basic, proven fundamental engineering and building techniques, steel, cast iron, and reinforced concrete. The block tiers and catwalks are supported at regular intervals. (Doc. 245, ¶ 21; Doc. 244-2, at 5). The institution maintains an annual permit from the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry. (Doc. 245, ¶ 22; Doc. 244-2, at 6, 11-18). Annual inspections for safety and maintenance are conducted at each DOC institution. (Doc. 245, ¶ 23; Doc. 244-2, at 6, 19-35). Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, annual inspections were not completed in any institutions in 2020, and virtual records reviews were conducted in 2021. (Doc. 245, ¶ 24; Doc. 244-2, at 6). The following areas are subject to annual inspection: power house, auto shop, water plan, bar screen, outside warehouse, building trades, carpenter, welding and machine shop, plumbers and HVAC shop, kitchen, medical, A, B, C, D, F and G blocks, drug dormitory, and outside freezers. (Doc. 245, ¶ 25; 244-2, at 6).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that the block tiers and catwalks are supported at regular intervals.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 21). However, Molina does not cite or proffer any support in his response. Where record support for opposition is lacking, facts are deemed undisputed. See Goode v. Nash, 241 Fed.Appx. 868, 869 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A]lthough the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to ‘the benefit of all factual inferences in the court's consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must point to some evidence in the record that creates a genuine issue of material fact,' and ‘cannot rest solely on.
Next, Molina avers that due to the “lack of adequate and meaningful ventilation” at the institution, the temperature on the blocks is not regulated. The lack of heat caused him to experience nosebleeds and respiratory issues. (Doc. 245, ¶ 26; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 3, 50, 53). Along these lines, Molina claims the cells do not have windows and most of the windows on the walls outside the cells are sealed or cannot be opened. (Doc. 245, ¶ 27; Doc. 212, ¶ 20). The housing units at SCI-Huntingdon are properly ventilated and heated with return air ducts in the back of the cells and return fans in the attic. (Doc. 245, ¶ 28; Doc. 244-1, at 7). Each assertions made in the pleading, legal memoranda or oral argument.'”) (internal citations omitted). month, the system is inspected and the air filters are replaced as needed. (Doc. 245, ¶ 29; Doc. 244-1, at 7). The large windows in the common areas on A, B, C and D blocks, are frequently opened to allow fresh air to circulate on the units. (Doc. 245, ¶ 30; Doc. 244-2, at 7; Doc. 51-12). In the event of a fire, the ventilation system shuts off, triggering an exhaust fan that removes air from the institution. (Doc. 245, ¶ 31; Doc. 244-2, at 8). The annual inspection reports from 2019-2021, reflect that no HVAC issues were reported at SCI-Huntingdon during this time. Likewise, the 2022 annual inspection report did not reveal any significant deviations from policy or ACA Standards. The recommended preventative HVAC maintenance measures noted in the 2022 report were addressed and no deficiencies or other cleanliness issues were noted in the recent 2023 report. (Doc. 245, ¶ 32; Doc. 244-2, at 6).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that the lack of heat caused [Molina] to experience nosebleeds and respiratory issues.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 26). Molina states: “Nowhere within Document No. 212 ¶¶ 3, 50, 53, states that the lack of heat caused him to experience nosebleeds and respiratory issues[. I]nstead it states that due to the lack of adequate and meaningful ventilation at SCI Huntingdon caused him extreme discomfort and that the extreme heat temperatures caused him to experience nosebleeds, respiratory issues, inter alia.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 26; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 3, 50, 53).
Molina disputes this assertion to the extent “that the housing units at SCI Huntingdon are properly ventilated pertaining to the cells where inmates are housed.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 28). In support of his statement, Molina attaches five (5) declarations by inmates Kent.
Molina disputes this assertion, stating “[t]his statement only pertains to the employees[‘] work areas and dining hall, not the inmates[‘] cells given the fact that there is no ventilation system inside the cells.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 29). Molina does not cite or proffer an exhibit to support this allegation.
Molina disputes this assertion to the extent “that the windows in the common areas on A, B, C, and D block, are frequently opened to allow fresh air to circulate on the units.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 30). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmate Michael Bohannon. (Doc. 251-7).
Molina disputes this assertion to the extent “that in the event of a fire, the ventilation system shuts off, triggering an exhaust fan that removes air from the institution. This statement do[es] not pertain to the cell blocks.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 31). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmate Antoine Bennett. (Doc. 251-8).
Additionally, Molina claims he was not provided with clean drinking water at SCI-Huntingdon, alleging the tap water is delivered through “lead-based” pipes and is “regularly Jones, Andre Valdez, Joseph Hess, Troy Vincent, and John Hightower. (Doc. 251-1; Doc. 251-2; Doc. 251-3; Doc. 251-4; Doc. 251-5). In addition, Molina disputes Defendants' assertion that the inmate cells are properly ventilated. (Doc. 250, ¶ 28). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the response by Dr. Parson in the Psychological Department to Grievance No. 865575, which complains of ventilation inside inmate cells. (Doc. 251-6). grayish, brownish, or yellowish in color, contains particles of unidentified sediment, tastes metallic, and smells like a cesspool.” (Doc. 245, ¶ 33; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 2, 65-71). As a result of drinking this water, Molina claims he suffered from “stomach aches and cramps, nausea, head-aches, vomiting and diarrhea.” (Doc. 245, ¶ 34; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 65-71). The drinking water at SCI-Huntingdon is tested on a monthly basis. The most recent publicly available Consumer Confidence Report reflects compliance with the applicable DEP regulations; these reports are posted on the housing units at the institutions. (Doc. 245, ¶ 35; Doc. 244-3, at 39, 93-118). All institutions also conduct further water testing in addition to the DEP requirements. (Doc. 245, ¶ 36; Doc. 244-2, at 39, 119-20).
Molina disputes this assertion to the extent “SCI Huntingdon reports reflects compliance with the applicable DEP regulations.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 35). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmate Scott Wilson. (Doc. 251-9).
Next, Molina avers the food at the institution was “unsafe and inadequate” and he “suffered stomach cramps and vomited after eating various food served.” The food, which was delivered on “filthy and contaminated” carts and often served cold or at room temperature, at times also contained “flakes of rust and paint chips, and rodent.” (Doc. 245, ¶ 37; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 47, 72-74, 76-78). Molina further alleges that various insects and rodents “roam freely” in the cells, showers and food preparation areas at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 245, ¶ 38; Doc. 212, ¶ 48). The DOC maintains a standing service contract with an exterminator, who provides periodic pest control at regular intervals and upon request. (Doc. 245, ¶ 38; Doc. 244-2, at 9). When the maintenance department receives reports of insects or rodents in the institution, staff is promptly dispatched to address the issue. (Doc. 245, ¶ 40; Doc. 2442, at 9).
Molina disputes this assertion to the extent “that maintenance or staff receives reports of insects and promptly dispatched to address the issue. SCI Huntingdon cell blocks are infested with bugs, rats, and other vermin.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 40). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmate Carlos Jiminez. (Doc. 251-11).
Further, Molina contends the inmates are housed in overcrowded conditions and double-celled in cells that are designed for single occupancy. (Doc. 245, ¶ 41; Doc. 212, ¶ 22). The occupancy permit issued by the Pennsylvania Labor and Industry dictates the permissible occupancy for housing units. The DOC houses inmates in conformity with this occupancy rate, which does not preclude double occupancy of the cells at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 245, ¶ 42; Doc. 244-2, at 8-9). Molina has been continuously assigned to a single-cell throughout his incarceration within the DOC, commencing on November 30, 2012. (Doc. 245, ¶ 43; Doc. 244-2, at 272).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that SCI Huntingdon houses inmates in conformity with this occupancy rate.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 42). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmate Kent Jones. (Doc. 251-1).
In addition, Molina avers that black mold, asbestos and mildew are present in the sink areas, showers, and “on just about every wall and ceiling throughout” SCI-Huntingdon; exposure to such elements caused him to suffer from “chronic respiratory distress and nose bleeds.” (Doc. 245, ¶ 44; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 5, 42-44). Mold is not present and unchecked throughout the facility at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 245, ¶ 45; Doc. 244-2, at 37). If mold is discovered in a facility, appropriate remedial action is taken. (Doc. 245, ¶ 46; Doc. 244-2, at 37). Asbestos is present in some of the DOC's institutions, including SCI-Huntingdon. When asbestos is discovered, the appropriate remedial action is promptly undertaken. (Doc. 245, ¶ 47; Doc. 244-2, at 37-38). Specifically, pursuant to DOC policy 15.1.1, Section 15 “Safety Standards for Asbestos Materials,” all facilities are required to identify and document the location of all asbestos. (Doc. 245, ¶ 48; Doc. 244-2, at 37-38, 40-62). DOC policy 15.1.1, Section 15, outlines the measures that must be taken if amounts of friable asbestos are found, the requirements for the abatement of asbestos, and the associated reporting requirements. (Doc. 245, ¶ 49; Doc. 244-2, at 37-38, 40-62). Moreover, all institutions are subject to biannual asbestos inspections. (Doc. 245, ¶ 50; Doc. 244-2, at 38, 40-62; 63-92). No records exist to support Molina's claims that he was exposed to asbestos at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 245, ¶ 51; Doc. 244-2, at 38, 63-92).
Molina disputes this assertion to the extent “that mold is not present and unchecked throughout the facility at SCI Huntingdon. The cells where inmates are housed are polluted with mold.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 45). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmates Rakeish R. Cotton and Miguel Martinez. (Doc. 251-12; Doc. 251-13).
Molina disputes this assertion to the extent “that if mold is discovered in a facility, appropriate remedial action is taken.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 46). In support of his statement, Molina attaches Ralston's responses three grievance submissions regarding the condition of Molina's cell. (Doc. 251-14; Doc. 215-15; Doc. 215-16).
Molina disputes this assertion to the extent “that when asbestos is discovered, the appropriate remedial action is promptly undertaken. The cells are polluted with asbestos.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 47). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmates Gregory Middleton and Maurice Layton. (Doc. 251-17; Doc. 251-18).
Molina disputes this assertion to the extent “that those procedures outline[d] in the above policy are not being carried out according to said policy.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 48). In support of his statement, Molina directs the Court's attention to the declaration by inmates Rakeish R. Cotton, Miguel Martinez, Gregory Middleton, and Maurice Layton, and Ralston's responses three grievance submissions regarding the condition of Molina's cell. (Doc. 251-12; Doc. 251-13; Doc. 251-14; Doc. 251-15; Doc. 251-16; Doc. 261-17; Doc. 251-18).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that no records exist to support [Molina]'s claims that he was exposed to asbestos at SCI Huntingdon.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 51). In support of his statement, Molina attaches Ralston's responses three grievance submissions regarding the condition of Molina's cell. (Doc. 251-16; Doc. 251-16; Doc. 251-19).
Molina also presents issues regarding the condition of the showers at SCI-Huntingdon. Namely, he claims the showers are often out of order or in a state of disrepair, which causes sewage to regularly collect in the shower drains. (Doc. 245, ¶ 52; Doc. 212, ¶ 25). Exposure to “mold, rust, mildew, sewage, and brown water in the showers,” allegedly caused Molina to suffer from skin conditions and fungal infections. (Doc. 245, ¶ 52; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 36-40). Along these lines, Molina avers that many of the toilets are cracked and leaking, exposing inmates to “human waste and obnoxious fumes.” The pipes often burst, resulting sewage flowing into adjoining cells, which the inmates are responsible for cleaning. Molina claims this caused him to “regularly vomit, cough, and suffer from nausea and severe headaches.” (Doc. 245, ¶ 53; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 28-32). An inmate cleaning crew, under the supervision of corrections staff, cleans the showers after each use with an aqueous chlorine solution to control pathogens and mold. (Doc. 245, ¶ 54; Doc. 244-2, at 9; Doc. 51-11). When clogged drains and toilets are reported, the maintenance department promptly dispatches an on-duty plumber. (Doc. 245, ¶ 55; Doc. 244-2, at 9; Doc. 51-14).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that an inmate cleaning crew, under the supervision of corrections staff, cleans the showers after each use with an aqueous chlorine solution to control pathogens and mold.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 54). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmates Rafael Rojas, Kevin Souffrant, and Carlos Jiminez. (Doc. 251-20; Doc. 251-21; Doc. 251-22).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that when clogged drains and toilets are reported, the maintenance department promptly dispatches an on-duty plumber.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 55). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmate Carlos Jiminez. (Doc. 251-22).
Concerning the institution's electrical wiring, Molina contends it is outdated and not in compliance with state and federal codes. (Doc. 245, ¶ 56; Doc. 212, ¶ 90). All of the service wiring, panel boards, and lighting to the cells have been replaced at SCI-Huntingdon on A, B, C and D blocks, within the last seven years and comply with the applicable codes. (Doc. 245, ¶ 57; Doc. 244-2, at 8). Breakers for lighting and power to the cells are often tripped due to inappropriate actions by the inmates. When this occurs, the breakers are performing in conformity with the intended safety purpose. (Doc. 245, ¶ 58; Doc. 244-2, at 8). When electrical outages are reported, the on-duty electrician is promptly dispatched. (Doc. 245, ¶ 59; Doc. 244-2, at 8).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that all of the service wiring, panel boards, and lighting to the cells have been replaced at SCI Huntingdon on A, B, C, and D blocks.” (Doc. 250, ¶¶ 57, 58). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmates Michael Bohannon and Scott Wilson. (Doc. 251-7; Doc. 251-9).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that when electrical outages are reported, the on-duty electrician is promptly dispatched.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 59; Doc. 251-16). Molina states that “[i]t took the Maintenance Department Supervisor nearly a month to fix a electrical wire shortage that was throwing sparks.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 59). Molina does not cite or proffer an exhibit to support this allegation.
With respect to fire safety, Molina claims the institution does not have any precautions in place. Relatedly, he argues the “antiquated locking mechanisms” on the cells pose an added danger in emergency situations. (Doc. 245, ¶ 60; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 4, 93, 95). Further, Molina avers that “[i]n the last few months, several electrical fires” occurred that required evacuation of the housing units, citing to “a recent fire on ‘C-Block' caused by the faulty electrical wiring,” at which time it took staff 36 minutes to manually unlock the cell doors and evacuate the inmates. (Doc. 245, ¶ 61; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 94, 96). SCI-Huntingdon has a documented fire evacuation and floor plan to ensure the safety of staff and inmates in the event of a fire.(Doc. 245, ¶ 62; Doc. 244-2, at 123, 253-54). Every housing unit at SCI-Huntingdon has a functioning fire detection system, which is subject to annual inspection by an outside contractor in accordance with the applicable safety standards. (Doc. 245, ¶ 63; Doc. 244-2, at 122, 127-252). Furthermore, 500 fire extinguishers are located throughout the facility, along with other safety devices, such as fire alarms, sprinklers and kitchen specific fire suppression systems. (Doc. 245, ¶ 64; Doc. 244-2, at 122). The sprinkler systems at SCI-Huntingdon are inspected monthly, quarterly and annually, in accordance with NFPA Standard 25. (Doc. 245, ¶ 65; Doc. 244-2, at 122). In addition to the annual fire, safety and sanitation inspection completed by Central Office Safety Staff Fire, inspections are also completed at the institutions on a weekly and monthly basis by trained inspectors. (Doc. 245, ¶ 66; Doc. 2442, at 123). The SCI-Huntingdon Fire Emergency Response Team (“F.E.R.T.”) is responsible for responding to fire emergencies. At least one team member, all of whom are required to complete 40 hours of training with the Pennsylvania State Fire Academy, is present in the institution at all times. (Doc. 245, ¶ 67; Doc. 244-2, at 122). All corrections staff members also receive annual fire safety training. (Doc. 245, ¶ 68; Doc. 244-2, at 123). Extraordinary occurrence reports are generated at the institutions for a variety of reasons, including fire incidents. (Doc. 245, ¶ 69; Doc. 244-2, at 124). During the two years preceding Molina's submission of the fourth amended complaint, only three extraordinary occurrence reports were generated at SCI-Huntingdon regarding fire-related incidents, none of which correspond with his allegations. (Doc. 245, ¶ 70; Doc. 244-2, at 123-24). First, on August 30, 2020, an inmate caused a fire on CA block when he left his “stinger” (an unauthorized contraband heating coil device) plugged in when he left his cell. Staff responded, attempted to extinguish the fire, and called 911 for assistance. All inmates on the unit were evacuated within 3 minutes and the unit was cleared within 6 minutes of the fire starting, with no injuries reported. The smoke was removed from the unit by the exhaust fan, following which the unit was cleaned and the sprinkler heads were replaced. (Doc. 245, ¶ 71; Doc. 244-2, at 123-24). Second, on January 9, 2021, an inmate on CA block caused an electrical fire by improperly charging his e-cigarette. All inmates on CA and CB units were evacuated within 10 minutes of the fire starting. The sprinkler system and exhaust fans activated properly to assist with controlling the fire. (Doc. 245, ¶ 72; Doc. 244-2, at 124). Third, on November 11, 2021, an inmate caused a fire on CA block, after illegally modifying an e-cigarette. A corrections officer noticed the fire and acted immediately to extinguish it. (Doc. 245, ¶ 73; Doc. 244-2, at 124).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that it asserts that Defendants ensure the safety of inmates in the event of a fire.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 62). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmates Maurice Wilkins and Angelo Romero. (Doc. 25123; Doc. 251-24).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that it asserts that SCI Huntingdon cell blocks A through D have sprinklers.” (Doc. 250, ¶¶ 64, 65; Doc. 251-25).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that only three extraordinary occurrence reports were generated at SCI Huntingdon regarding fire-related incidents, and that none of which correspond with [Molina]'s allegations. There were a few serious fires where smoke traveled to B block, and all inmates, including [Molina] were located in th[eir] cell despite the.
While incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon, Molina was housed on B-Block when he was in general population, and on G-Block in the Restricted Housing Unit. He was never housed on C unit. (Doc. 245, ¶ 74; Doc. 244-2, at 125, 272). The cells at SCI-Huntingdon are locked in two fashions. First, there is a tier bar that spans numerous cells and unlocks these cells at the same time. Secondly, after 9:00 p.m., the cell doors are also locked with a key and lock.fact that prison officials knew that the smoke could [have] kill[ed] the inmates that were locked in the[ir] cells.” (Doc. 250, ¶¶ 70-72). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmate Maurice Wilkins. (Doc. 251-23). (Doc. 245, ¶ 75; Doc. 244-2, at 125). Corrections officers are trained regarding the procedures for unlocking cells in a timely fashion in the event of a fire or other emergency. (Doc. 245, ¶ 76; Doc. 244-2, at 125, 255-270).
Molina disputes this assertion. Molina states: “There is a serious faire-safety problem at SCI Huntingdon. The problem emanates from the fact that the locking mechanism is defective. In lieu of repairs to the locking mechanism, the Defendants utilize padlocks on the doors. In the event of a fire, staff members would have to unlock over 200 doors by hand all these padlocks and locks, and then crank open the cell doors before the inmates could be release[d] to safety. Having said that there are time when the Maintenance Staff is called to fix the locks before releasing the inmates.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 75). In support of his statement, Molina attaches the declaration by inmates Antoine Bennett, Miguel Martinez, Gregory Middleton, Maurice Layton, Carlos Jiminez, and Angelo Romero. (Doc. 251-8; Doc. 25113; Doc. 251-17; Doc. 251-18; Doc. 251-22; Doc. 251-24; Doc. 251-25).
As a result of his confinement in the above-described conditions, Molina avers he experienced “bouts of respiratory disease, allergic reactions, nosebleeds, excruciating headaches, episodes of choking and coughing, and that of tumor-like cysts on his body,” as well as “clinical depression and other serious mental illness.” Additionally, he endured “constant fear and anxiety” related to the alleged structural and electrical deficiencies. (Doc. 245, ¶ 77; Doc. 212, ¶¶ 134-41). Molina's medical records contain references to “epistaxis due to allergic rhinitis,” for which he was prescribed saline spray and allergy medications at various times; however, the medical provider noted the cause thereof was unspecified. (Doc. 245, ¶ 78; Doc. 244-2, at 376, 379-420). Further, Molina's medical records reflect that he was enrolled in a cardiac chronic care clinic-no indication as to the cause of this condition is noted. According to the clinical assessments, Molina experienced “[e]xertional dyspnea” “mostly because of weight,” as he was “markedly obese” at 5'6” and 313 pounds. (Doc. 245, ¶ 79; Doc. 244-2, at 379-420). A benign lipoma was discovered on Molina's left bicep during a preventative health risk assessment on May 10, 2021. The records do not contain any notes regarding treatment for or complaints of “tumor-like cysts on his body” due to exposure to any elements at the institution. (Doc. 245, ¶ 80; Doc. 244-2, at 376, 379-420). Nor do Molina's medical records contain any indication that he reported suffering from stomach aches, cramps, nausea, headaches, vomiting or diarrhea, resulting from drinking the tap water or consuming unsafe food. (Doc. 245, ¶ 81; Doc. 244-2, at 376, 379-420). Only three references to digestive issues appear in Molina's medical records, none of which are germane to the allegations in the fourth amended complaint-namely, complaints of cramping of an indeterminate cause, distress associated with the consumption of spicy foods, and cramping resulting from failure to experience a bowel movement. (Doc. 245, ¶ 82; Doc. 244-2, at 377, 379-420). Molina does not have a diagnosis for depression. He was diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder on January 4, 2018 and is designated as a B roster inmate-signaling that although he has a mental health history, he is not currently in need of mental health services or prescribed any psychotropic medication. (Doc. 245, ¶ 83; Doc. 244-2, at 377-78, 379-420).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that [Molina]'s medical provider noted that his allergic rhinitis was unspecified. [Molina] medical files clearly shows that upon his arrival at SCI Huntingdon he started experiencing nosebleeds inter alia, caused by the deplorable conditions at SCI Huntingdon.” (Doc. 250, ¶¶ 78-79; Doc. 251-7; Doc. 251-8; Doc. 251-9; Doc. 251-12; Doc. 251-13; Doc. 251-15; Doc. 251-16; Doc. 251-17; Doc. 251-18; Doc. 251-19; Doc. 251-21; Doc. 251-22; Doc. 251-24; Doc. 251-26).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that the records do not contain any notes regarding treatment for or complaints of ‘tumor-like cysts on his body' due to exposure to any elements at the institution. [Molina] was housed in a highly toxic communicable disease carrying filthy and denigrating environment detrimental to his health and physical well-being. Such conditions did in fact cause[ Molina] health issues.” (Doc. 250, ¶¶ 80-82; Doc. 251-26).
Molina disputes this assertion stating: “This statement is contradicted by the Court's mental health evaluation report in reference to [Molina's] mental health.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 83; Doc. 251-27).
The DOC has an inmate grievance system, established by policy DC-ADM 804, that provides an administrative procedure by which inmates may seek resolution of issues. (Doc. 245, ¶ 84; Doc. 244-2, at 421). The grievance policy provides a three-step process for resolution of inmate grievances: (1) the initial grievance at the institutional level; (2) an appeal to the Facility Manager (Superintendent); and (3) an appeal for final review to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances (“SOIGA”). (Doc. 245, ¶ 85; Doc. 244-2, at 421-22). If an inmate's appeal to final review does not comply with the requirements set forth in DC-ADM 804, it will be dismissed. (Doc. 245, ¶ 86; Doc. 244-2, at 422). The grievance process requirements are fully outlined in the current version of DC-ADM 804, which has been in effect since May 1, 2015. (Doc. 245, ¶ 87; Doc. 244-2, at 422). The inmate handbook also provides all inmates with notice of the grievance policy and requirements. (Doc. 245, ¶ 88; Doc. 244-2, at 422). The DOC's grievance procedure was available to and utilized by Molina, as evidenced by his extensive grievance history and submission of various grievances to final review. (Doc. 245, ¶ 89; Doc. 244-2, at 272, 274-78, 279-373). SOIGA maintains a record of inmates' appeals to Final Review and SOIGA's responses. (Doc. 245, ¶ 90; Doc. 244-2, at 423). SOIGA's records reflect that the only grievances submitted to final review by Molina regarding the issues raised in the fourth amended complaint, were Nos. 797877, 865575, 869640, 872694, 967468, 978033 and 969753. (Doc. 245, ¶ 91; Doc. 244-2, at 275-78, 279373, 423).
In Grievance No. 797877, Molina named Corrections Officer Billick and alleged he was housed in a cell with mold, rust, no ventilation, a leaking ceiling, and a nonfunctional cable jack. The subsequent investigation yielded no evidence of mildew/moisture related issues, rust, or any other health/safety issues; the grievance was denied and ultimately upheld on final review. (Doc. 245, ¶ 92; Doc. 244-2, at 279-88). Grievance No. 865575, in which Defendants Wetzel, Kauffman, Walters, Ralston and Spyker were named, contains allegations that SCI-Huntingdon does not have an infirmary or a ventilation system. According to the grievance response, all housing units have a functioning ventilation system that is subject to annual inspection. The applicable safety standards require “at least 10 cubic feet per minute (CFM) of fresh air circulation;” the most recent inspection readings reflected an average of 19 CFM, “well above the metric required by the standard.” The denial of the grievance was upheld on final review. (Doc. 245, ¶ 93; Doc. 244-2, at 289-310). Next, Grievance No. 869640 concerned the fire safety protocols on B-Block. Molina cited to the lack of sprinklers and the electronic cell locking system, about which he previously expressed his concerns to the Safety Manager, as well as Defendants Kauffman and Ralston. The response reflects that the institution is equipped with adequate fire protection, and is subject to an annual fire, safety and sanitation inspection, as well as regular inspections in accordance with National Fire Protection Association (“NFPA”) standards. Fire drills are conducted on quarterly basis and the average evacuation time on B Block was approximately 7 minutes. Lastly, the cells are not required to have electronic controls. The denial of the grievance was upheld on final review. (Doc. 245, ¶ 94; Doc. 244-2, at 311-24). Grievance No. 872694 named Officer Kauffman and Sgt. Nicklow, and alleged that during the COVID pandemic, food was not served at the proper temperature and was delivered on carts that were also used to transport garbage bags. Molina stated that Defendant Walters was not “directly involved,” but “knew” of these conditions and failed to act. The investigation confirmed that the food trays were not delivered on trash carts and the food was served in a sanitary manner and at a safe temperature. The denial of the grievance was upheld on final review. (Doc. 245, ¶ 95; Doc. 244-2, at 325-41). In Grievance No. 967468, Molina requested to be moved to a different cell, alleging Officer Snook and Defendant Ralston conspired to place him in a cell that was contaminated with mold, rust, asbestos, corrosion and vermin, in retaliation for filing a civil complaint. The investigation revealed that no mold or asbestos was present. Although there was evidence of mildew, it was noted that is the inmate's responsibility to clean. Further, when staff had asked Molina if he wished to move another cell, he declined. The denial of the grievance was upheld on final review. (Doc. 245, ¶ 96; Doc. 244-2, at 342-55). Upon final review, Grievance No. 969753 was dismissed pursuant to policy because the issues presented were already under review in Grievance No. 967468. (Doc. 245, ¶ 97; Doc. 244-2, at 356-64). Grievance No. 978033, concerning unsanitary food service, was also dismissed upon final review because policy prohibits the filing of group grievances. (Doc. 245, ¶ 98; Doc. 244-2, at 365-73).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that the food was served in a sanitary manner and at a safe temperature.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 95; Doc. 251-28).
Molina disputes this assertion “to the extent that the investigation revealed that no mold or asbestos was present.” (Doc. 250, ¶ 96; Doc. 251-29; Doc. 251-30).
Defendants presented the affirmative defense of exhaustion in their answer to the fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 245, ¶ 99; Doc. 218).
II. Standard of Review
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).
A federal court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the court must simply “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits or declarations, answers to interrogatories, or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case, which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Furthermore, mere conclusory allegations and selfserving testimony, whether made in the complaint or a sworn statement, cannot be used to obtain or avoid summary judgment when uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence of record. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Thomas v. Delaware State Univ., 626 Fed.Appx. 384, 389 n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential) (“[U]nsupported deposition testimony, which is contradicted by the record, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); Nat'l Labor Rel. Bd. v. FES, 301 F.3d 83, 95 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[The plaintiff's] testimony . . . amounts to an unsupported, conclusory assertion, which we have held is inadequate to satisfy the movant's burden of proof on summary judgment.”).
III. Discussion
A. PLRA Exhaustion
Defendants argue that Molina failed to properly exhaust his claims. (Doc. 246, at 1316). The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) requires that prisoners exhaust all prison grievance procedures before suing in court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The “exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is a question of law to be determined by the judge.” Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 782 (3d Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit has explained that exhaustion requires “substantial compliance with the prison's grievance procedures.” Small v. Camden Cty., 728 F.3d 265, 272 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation and citations omitted). “If there is no genuine dispute of material fact, then the exhaustion defense may be evaluated as a matter of law at summary judgment. If there is a genuine dispute of material fact related to exhaustion, then summary judgment is inappropriate[.]”West v. Emig, 787 Fed.Appx. 812, 814 (3d Cir. 2019).
Defendants argue that Molina's purported grievances concerning the conditions of his confinement were defective because his complaints of mold, rust, asbestos, and vermin were confined to the particular cell in which he was housed rather than alleging that these issues were pervasive throughout the entire institution; the food service and temperature issues are limited to the food service procedures employed during the COVID-19 pandemic; and the fire safety issues are limited to procedures employed on B-Block. (Doc. 246, at 14-16). Defendants also submit that Molina failed to name all Defendants in each of the applicable grievance filings. (Doc. 146, at 15).
While it is undisputed that Molina's grievances did not name every Defendant in each grievance, the undersigned concludes that this failure does not amount to a procedural default barring Molina's claims. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) does not impose a name-all-defendants requirement, and “exhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217, 219 (2007). Rather, the inmate is required to comply the requirements of the prison's grievance system. Jones, 549 U.S. at 219. DC-ADM 804 provides that “[t]he inmate must include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim” in his grievance. DC-ADM 804(1)(A)(11).
In Spruill v. Gillis, the Third Circuit considered the issue of exhaustion where the inmate-plaintiff did not name a party who he later tried to bring a civil rights action against. 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004). The Spruill Court analyzed a prior version of DC-ADM 804, which provided, in pertinent part: “The inmate shall include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim .... The inmate should identify any persons who may have information that could be helpful in resolving the grievance.” Spruill, 372 F.3d at 233. The court “recognized that a grievance under the DOC's administrative review system should identify specific persons, if practicable.” Chimenti v. Mohadjerin, No. 3:01-CV-0273, 2008 WL 2551603, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 24, 2008) (quoting Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234). “It held that an unexplained failure to identify a responsible prison official in a grievance may constitute a procedural default of the claim.” Chimenti, 2008 WL 2551603, at *4 (quoting Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234). Thus, “in the absence of any justifiable excuse, a Pennsylvania inmate's failure to properly identify a defendant constitute[s] a failure to properly exhaust his administrative remedies[.]” Williams v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Corr., 146 Fed.Appx. 554, 557 (3d Cir. 2005).
Molina suggests that it is not practicable for him to identify Defendants in each grievance because Defendants “conspired to use false misconduct to confine him in the RHU as retaliation for filing grievances and civil rights complaint against them.” (Doc. 249, at 13). Molina avers that the grievances the reference claims set forth in the fourth amended complaint “supplied content sufficient to give the [DOC] notice of the problem and an opportunity to correct it, which is the purpose of the exhaustion requirement.” (Doc. 249, at 14). The undersigned finds that Molina's grievances alerted prison officials to the alleged conditions of confinement, and he should not be deemed to have procedurally defaulted on his claims by failing to identify Defendants. The “‘primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued.'” Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 219). Molina failed to name any Defendants in Grievance Nos. 797877 or 872694 (apart from mentioning Walters, but saying he was not directly involved in the alleged incident), but he named Ralston in Grievance No. 967468, Kauffman and Ralston in Grievance No. 869640, and Wetzel, Kauffman, Walters, Ralston, and Spyker in Grievance No. 865575. (Doc. 146, at 15). Thus, the prison officials were on notice of the persons who were claimed to be doing wrong. SeeSpruill, 372 F.3d at 234 (finding that “[t]he purpose of the regulation here is to put the prison officials on notice of the persons claimed to be guilty of wrongdoing. As such, the prison can excuse an inmate's failure to do so by identifying the unidentified persons and acknowledging that they were fairly within the compass of the prisoner's grievance.”).
Defendants further argue that because Molina did not mention the presence of mold, rust, asbestos, and vermin throughout SCI-Huntingdon, the problems with food service outside the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the lack of fire safety outside of B-Block, he failed to exhausted the available administrative remedies to these claims. (Doc. 246, at 15). The undersigned finds that where the grievances could have been more specific, it served the purpose of the exhaustion requirement of alerting prison officials to the problem and giving them the opportunity to correct it before being brought to Court. See Martin v. Sec'y of Corr., No. 3:16-CV-2060, 2018 WL 1158250, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2018) (finding plaintiff's failure to specifically mention a failure to intervene claim in his grievance was not procedural default).
Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants motion for summary judgment DENIED as to exhaustion.
B. Personal Involvement Requirement for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
Defendants submit that the record is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude they were personally involved in any alleged constitutional violation. (Doc. 246, at 11-13). Specifically, with respect to Kauffman, Spyker, Walters, and Ralston, Defendants contend Molina's “unsubstantiated allegations that the Defendants ‘knew of the decrepit and life threatening' conditions present at SCI-Huntingdon,” and “claims that the Defendants ‘tolerated, encouraged, or acquiesced' in any such violations,” fail to establish their personal involvement. (Doc. 246, at 12-13; Doc. 245, ¶¶ 11-16). With respect to Wetzel and Bickell, Defendants assert that Molina's claims fail to establish their personal involvement in any alleged constitutional violations because his claims are premised upon a theory of respondeat superior by virtue of their supervisory roles. (Doc. 246, at 13-14; Doc. 245, ¶¶ 15-16).
Molina argues in response to the motion for summary judgment that the complaint “provides detailed and troubling allegations regarding the conditions of his confinement, which sufficiently approximate the unsanitary and stressful conditions found to be unconstitutional in Tillery v. Owen, 907 F.2d 418, 426 (3d Cir. 1990).” (Doc. 249, at 12). Molina asserts that the exhibits, affidavits, and declarations from fellow inmate witnesses attached to his responsive statement of material facts establishes the inhuman conditions and Defendants' personal involvement, actual knowledge, or awareness of the risk. (Doc. 249, at 13).
Section 1983 provides that persons acting under color of state law may be held liable if they deprive an individual of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). Individual liability can be imposed under Section 1983 only if the state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct, and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Evancho v. Fishser, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). However, “liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. In other words, a defendant “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs . . . shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence[.]” See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).
A defendant in a § 1983 action “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.” Saisi v. Murray, 822 Fed.Appx. 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations removed)). Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. Such allegations, however, must be made with appropriate particularity in that the complaint must allege the particulars of conduct, time, place, and personal responsibility. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. Subsequent knowledge of an incident is insufficient to demonstrate that a state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct. SeeRode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08 (the after-the-fact submission of a grievance is “simply insufficient” to establish a defendant's knowledge of an underlying constitutional violation at the time it occurred); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (Grievance Coordinator and Superintendent's involvement in review and denial of grievance insufficient to establish personal involvement). It is the plaintiff's burden to “show that each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]' in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, No. 1:04-CV-1990, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2006) (quoting Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353). Allegations that broadly implicate multiple defendants without delineating individual conduct are legally insufficient. See Van Tassel v. Piccione, 608 Fed.Appx. 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 2015).
In the instant matter, Molina's fourth amended complaint alleges Defendants Kauffman, Spyker, Walters, and Ralston were “responsible for protecting and preserving the health and welfare,” and “charged with the enforcement of laws, regulations, and DOC policies designed to preserve the health and welfare of [Molina] and the inmates confined at SCI Huntingdon prison.” (Doc. 212, ¶¶ 107-10, 121-22). Molina avers that Defendants “knew or should have known of the fact that the conditions at SCI Huntingdon prison had been deteriorating over the better part of the last decade and would only become worse without appropriate remedial efforts.” (Doc. 212, ¶ 125). Molina contends Kauffman “failed to implement directives from the Department that, if followed would have remedy the unconstitutional conditions which he knew to be deadly. He tolerated, encouraged, or acquiesced in the conduct of staff who routinely disobeyed Department directives for humane care.” (Doc. 212, ¶ 128). Molina further contends Spyker, Walter, and Ralston “failed to take any action to curb” the alleged wrongdoing, thereby tolerating, encouraging, and/or acquiescing in the conduct. (Doc. 212, ¶¶ 129-30).
Regarding Defendants Wetzel Bickell, Molina avers that they were aware of the deficiencies at SCI-Huntingdon and had the power to rectify such issued, but failed to do so. (Doc. 212). Specifically, Molina contends they “regularly ‘toured' the prison cell Blocks, he received and reviewed past official reports and other data concerning the deteriorating conditions at SCI Huntingdon prison's antiquated infrastructure,” and “decline[d] to commit he available resources necessary to maintain, repair, retrofit, or replace the said prison.” (Doc. 212, ¶¶ 112-13, 115, 131-32). Molina also asserts that Bickell colluded and/or acquiesced with other Defendants. (Doc. 212, ¶ 114).
The undersigned finds that Molina has not alleged in the complaint, much less demonstrated to the Court by pointing to evidence in the summary judgment record, that Defendants Kauffman, Spyker, Walters, Ralston, Wetzel, and Bickell had any personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. For instance, Molina does not provide any basis to show how Defendants were responsible for the deteriorating conditions at SCI-Huntingdon or that they were involved in the decision not to improve such conditions. SeeMolina v. Harry, No. 3:18-CV-1391, 2019 WL 3958422, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2019) (plaintiff failed to allege any defendants were personally responsible for or had any control over cell conditions are SCI-Camp Hill); see alsoBaraka, 481 F.3d at 210 (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). While Molina proffers affidavits from several inmates regarding their perception of the conditions of confinement at SCI-Huntingdon, absent from the pleadings is any supporting evidence or expert opinion to substantiate Molina's claims regarding the structural integrity, ventilation system, electrical wiring, or presence of mold and asbestos. (Doc. 251). As noted above, mere conclusory allegations and self-serving testimony, whether made in the complaint or a sworn statement, cannot be used to obtain or avoid summary judgment when uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence of record. SeeLujan, 497 U.S. at 888; see also Thomas, 626 Fed.Appx. at 389 n.6 (not precedential) (“[U]nsupported deposition testimony, which is contradicted by the record, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); Nat'l Labor Rel. Bd., 301 F.3d at 95 (“[The plaintiff's] testimony . . . amounts to an unsupported, conclusory assertion, which we have held is inadequate to satisfy the movant's burden of proof on summary judgment.”).
Molina fails to present any factual basis to establish they were responsible for the conditions of SCI-Huntingdon, involved in decisions regarding improvements, or that they had the power to act to rectify the alleged deficiencies. See Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; Molina, 2019 WL 3958422, at *2. The record is devoid of evidence to suggest Defendants created the allegedly adverse conditions at SCI-Huntingdon or that they had the power to remedy the conditions. SeeRode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (noting that supervisory liability cannot be based solely on respondeat superior and must be based on personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence); Cook v. Condo, No. 1:21-CV-361, 2021 WL 5585914, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2021). Moreover, to the extent that any of the named Defendants are sued based on the fact that Molina or other inmates may have complained to them of these conditions, either orally or in writing, such allegations fail to establish their personal involvement in the underlying alleged unconstitutional conduct. SeeRode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (concluding that where a defendant, after being informed of the violation through the filing of grievances, reports, or appeals, failed to act to remedy the alleged wrong is not enough to show that the defendant had the necessary personal involvement); Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed.Appx. 99 (3d Cir. 2013); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App'x. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006).
The mere fact that Defendants were “supervisors” or had supervisory authority, standing alone, cannot support liability under § 1983. Hepler v. Wetzel, No. 18-CV-446, 2019 WL 1923004, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2019) (citing Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 106 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989)). This is because “[l]iability may not be imposed under § 1983 on the traditional standards of respondeat superior.” Hepler, 2019 WL 1923004, at *5. Thus, Defendants cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (“In a § 1983 suit . . . [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”).
“[T]wo theories of supervisory liability” are available under § 1983 upon a proper factual showing. Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). First, “supervisors can be liable if they ‘established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.'” Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129 n.5 (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)). “[T]o establish a claim against a policymaker under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege and prove that the official established or enforced policies and practices directly causing the constitutional violation.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1114 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Thus, when a policymaking official establishes a constitutionally inadequate state procedure for depriving people of a protected interest and someone is thereafter deprived of such an interest, the official has ‘subjected' that person to a due process violation.”)); see also Berlanti v. Bodman, 780 F.2d 296, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1985). Under the second theory, a supervisor may be held liable when “he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates' violations.” Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129 n.5 (quoting A.M., 372 F.3d at 586).
Molina's complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show that Defendants “established a policy, practice or custom” that caused the constitutional harm. Further, Molina does not allege that Defendants adopted a policy or custom that approved their subordinates' alleged violation of DOC or SCI-Huntingdon policies. See, e.g.,Davis v. Wetzel, 2021 WL 4892098, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2021). Instead, Molina's claims against Defendants concerning the alleged conditions of SCI-Huntingdon are only based upon their supervisory roles as former superintendent, former Deputy Superintendent, former Unit Manager, former Secretary, and Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations of the DOC. (Doc. 212, ¶¶ 128-32). Such claims are impermissibly predicated on a theory of respondeat superior. See Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986) (although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, he has “no affirmative constitutional duty to train, supervise or discipline so as to prevent such conduct.”); Molina, 2019 WL 3958422, at *2. Additionally, “[t]o presume that the [ ] practices arose from [Kauffman and Wetzel]'s policies merely because of their position as [former superintendent and secretary] is to rely on respondeat superior,” a theory of liability unavailable in § 1983 actions. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 331 (3d Cir. 2016). Absent such allegations, the fourth amended complaint fails to state a supervisory liability claim based on a policy, practice, custom against Defendants. See, e.g., Rainey v. Link, No. 3:20-CV-58, 2021 WL 666968, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2021) (liability premised upon a defendant's responsibilities as a prison supervisor, fail to establish his personal involvement) (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207); Walsh v. Wetzel, No. 1:20-CV-00118, 2021 WL 4993005, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2021).
Nor has Molina alleged facts to support a plausible inference that the supervisory defendants had “knowledge of and acquiesced in” the constitutional violations of their subordinates. To establish that Defendants had knowledge of and acquiesced in the decision to subject inmates to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must show “(1) contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents, and (2) circumstances under which the supervisor's inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval.” Bernard v. E. Stroudsburg Univ., 700 Fed.Appx. 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2000)). Moreover, “a plaintiff cannot resist a properly supported motion for summary judgment merely by restating the allegations of his complaint, but must point to concrete evidence in the record that supports each and every essential element of his case.” Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
Here, Molina has only pointed to evidence supporting his assertion that Defendants knew about the inhuman or unsanitary conditions of SCI-Huntingdon, or that they had knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents. (Doc. 212, ¶¶ 128-32; Doc. 249, at 11-20). Therefore, to the extent that Molina is relying on this theory of supervisory liability, Defendants “are entitled to summary judgement as a matter of law for Plaintiff's failure to establish their personal involvement in the denial of a constitutional right.” Acosta v. DeParlos, No. 3-141564, 2017 WL 4340955, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2017).
Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED and Molina's constitutional claims at Counts I and II be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Whether the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within its discretion. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). That decision should be based on “the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). As both parties have presented evidence on this issue and argued their sides, the factors weigh in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction.
Lastly, Defendants assert that summary judgment should be granted at Counts IV and V because Molina's state law negligence claims are barred by sovereign immunity. (Doc. 246, at 36-37). Under Pennsylvania law, the Commonwealth, its agencies and employees enjoy broad immunity from most state-law tort claims, as the General Assembly has by statute provided that “the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.” 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2310; see alsoMoore v. Commonwealth, 538 A.2d 111, 115 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (“In other words, if the Commonwealth is entitled to sovereign immunity under Act 152, then its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties are likewise immune”). This grant of immunity “applies to Commonwealth employees in both their official and individual capacities, so long as the employees are ‘acting within the scope of their duties.'” Larsen v. State Employees' Ret. Sys., 553 F.Supp.2d 403, 420 (M.D. Pa. 2008). Conduct of an employee is within the scope of employment if “‘it is of a kind and nature that the employee is employed to perform; [and] it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits ....'” Brautigan v. Fraley, 684 F.Supp.2d 589, 593-94 (M.D. Pa. 2010); see alsoFaust v. Dep't of Revenue, 592 A.2d 835 (1991) (holding that a Commonwealth employee was protected under sovereign immunity from liability from intentional acts which caused emotional distress when he was acting within the scope of his duties). Thus, so long as the agent or employee is acting within the scope of his employment, and none of the nine recognized statutory exceptions apply, sovereign immunity will bar any state law claims against him.
Molina's claim at Count III asserts a deliberate indifference claim against Defendants for “past, current, and ongoing unconstitutional conditions at SCI Huntingdon prison in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Pennsylvania State Constitution.” (Doc. 212, at 43). “The prevailing view in this circuit is that ‘Pennsylvania does not recognize a private right of action for damages in a suit alleging violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.'” See Banks v. Trotta, 1:20-CV-1438, 2022 WL 2932047, at *7 (M.D. Pa. April 18, 2022) (quoting Hamilton v. Spriggle, 965 F.Supp.2d 550, 577 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 207 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008))). Accordingly, it is recommended that Molina's claim at Count III be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522(b), the General Assembly defined nine separate, narrow exceptions to the broad grant of sovereign immunity. These exceptions include: (1) vehicle liability; (2) medical-professional liability; (3) care, custody or control of personal property; (4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody or control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines. “Because of the clear intent to insulate government from exposure to tort liability, the exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed.” Lockwood v. City of Pittsburgh, 751 A.2d 1136, 1139 (Pa. 2000) (citation omitted).
In particular, as this court has noted in the past:
Pennsylvania courts have consistently found sovereign immunity applies to intentional torts. See La Frankie, 618 A.2d at 1149; see alsoStone v. Felsman, No. 3:10-CV-0442, 2011 WL 5320738 at *11 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2011) (finding state law claims of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution are barred by sovereign immunity); Fischer v. Pa. State Police, No. 4:07-CV-1653, 2009 WL 650251 at *12 (M.D. Pa. March 10, 2009) (holding claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Pennsylvania State Police is barred by sovereign immunity).Luck v. Asbury, No. 3:12CV0887, 2013 WL 433536, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2013).
Therefore:
As a general matter, subject only to nine specific statutory exceptions, this sovereign immunity bars state law tort claims like those alleged here, since Commonwealth employees are immune from liability for either negligence or intentional torts. McGrath, 67 F.Supp.2d at 511, aff'd, 35 Fed.Appx. 357 (3d Cir. 2002). In fact, courts have repeatedly concluded that claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress brought against Commonwealth employees arising out of actions taken by those employees within the scope of their official duties are barred by sovereign immunity. See e.g.,Ray v. Pennsylvania State Police, 654 A.2d 140, 141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995), aff'd, 676 A.2d 194 (1996) (citing Pickering v. Sacavage, 642 A.2d 555, appeal denied, 652 A.2d 841 (No. 275 M.D. Alloc. Dkt., filed December 5, 1994) (holding that a state trooper acting within the scope of his duties is protected by sovereign immunity from intentional infliction of emotional distress claims)).Colon v. Kenwall, No. 1:18-CV-840, 2018 WL 5809863, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2018).
Conduct of an employee is within the scope of employment if “it is of a kind and nature that the employee is employed to perform; [and] it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits ....” Brautigan, 684 F.Supp.2d at 593-94 (internal quotations omitted).
However, courts have held that conduct falls outside of the scope of employment if such conduct is “done in a[n] . . . outrageous manner.” Haas v. Barto, 829 F.Supp. 729, 734 (M.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd sub nomHaas v. United States, 27 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1994). Specifically, courts in this circuit have held that a correctional officer is not acting within the scope of his or her employment, and thus not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity, when they assault an inmate without justification. See R.B. v. Hollibaugh, No. 1:16-CV-01075, 2017 WL 663735, at *16 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 661577 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2017) (Kane, J.); Robus v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., No. 04-CV-2175, 2006 WL 2060615, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2006) (Pollak, J.) (finding that correctional staff who beat an inmate were acting outside the scope of their employment and were not entitled to sovereign immunity).
The undersigned finds that Defendants, as Pennsylvania DOC employees, are Commonwealth employees and, at all relevant times, were acting within the scope of their duties as DOC employees. In fact, Molina's fourth amended complaint is premised on the fact that Defendants abdicated their duties as DOC employees while acting within the scope of their employment. (Doc. 212, ¶¶ 149-50, 152-53). Moreover, immunity has been previously upheld for DOC employees by this Court. See Quinn v. Tritt, No. 3:18-CV-00632, 2021 WL 1621294, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:18-632, 2021 WL 1193868 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2021) (granting DOC Defendants immune from plaintiff's claim of negligence in both their individual and official capacities); see also 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522; Brautigam, 684 F.Supp.2d at 593 (noting that sovereign immunity applies to Commonwealth employees in both their official and individual capacities).
Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED as to Counts IV and V.
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (Doc. 244). In addition, it is recommended that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this action.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated October 2, 2023. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.