Opinion
No. CV02-0467452S
May 9, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
INTRODUCTION
This is a defective premises personal injury lawsuit in which the plaintiff, Lynon Milton (Milton), seeks damages for an injury sustained to his finger while closing a door at his place of employment. Having collected workers' compensation benefits, Milton brings the present lawsuit against the defendant, Robert P. Fulmer (Fulmer), as owner of the building where the accident occurred. Fulmer is also the sole stockholder of the corporation that employed Milton. The plaintiff's complaint is in a single count alleging negligence.
The case was tried to this court on February 1, 2005. Thereafter, on March 1, 2005, both sides filed post-trial briefs. The issues raised in these briefs are: (1) whether the exclusivity provisions of the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act bar plaintiff's action; (2) whether Fulmer was sufficiently in possession and control of the premises such that he owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (3) whether plaintiff's injury was caused in whole or in part by his own negligence; and (4) whether or not that portion of the plaintiff's medical bills forgiven by the medical provider should be considered a collateral source payment to the plaintiff.
For the reasons set forth below, this court finds that judgment must enter in favor of the defendant because of the exclusive remedy provisions of our Workers' Compensation Act. General Statutes § 31-284(a).
FACTS
At all relevant times, Fulmer was the sole stockholder of the following corporations: (1) Kentucky Fried Chicken of Meriden, Inc.; (2) Kentucky Fried Chicken of West Haven, Inc.; (3) Kentucky Fried Chicken of Wallingford, Inc.; and (4) Colonel Management, Inc. Fulmer was also the owner of premises known as 722 East Main Street, Meriden, Connecticut.
Fulmer leased the premises at 722 East Main Street, Meriden to Kentucky Fried Chicken of Meriden, Inc. which operated a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant franchise at that location. Milton was employed at this restaurant as its General Manager. The payroll and other administrative aspects of Fulmer's three Kentucky Fried Chicken corporations were handled by Colonel Management, Inc.
Although Fulmer resided out of state, he took an active role in the management of the Meriden KFC. Among other things, he had authority to hire, fire and control the restaurant's employees.
On July 28, 2000 and for at least a year before that date, the rear metal door at the Meriden KFC was missing a doorknob. There was a hole in the door where the doorknob would normally be. In addition, there was a handle attached to the inside of the door. This rear door was regularly used to receive deliveries and take out trash. A technique used to close the door by some employees was to hold the handle of the door with one hand and put the fingers of one's other hand through the hole in the door and pull forcefully to close the door. Employees complained that this was dangerous.
On July 28, 2000 while working as General Manager of the Meriden KFC, Milton closed the rear metal door in the manner described above. The door closed on his left index finger such that the finger became wedged between the door and door jamb. This caused an amputation of the distal phalanx of Milton's left index finger.
Surgery was required to repair Milton's finger. Milton experienced and continues to experience pain and numbness from the injury and has difficulty lifting objects as well as buttoning his shirt or tying his shoes. Robert Dudek, M.D. reports that Milton has a 12 percent permanent partial impairment to his left index finger which imparts a 2 percent impairment to his left hand.
Following the accident, Milton received workers' compensation benefits in the total amount of $5,128.36.
DISCUSSION
The principle issue in this case is whether the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act bar Milton's lawsuit against Fulmer. Stated differently, can an employee who is injured on the job and collects worker compensation benefits from his corporate employer recover damages from an individual landowner when the landowner is the sole stockholder of the corporate employer. The plaintiff asserts that, having sought the benefit of the corporate law and separated himself from the corporation he established, Fulmer cannot claim the benefit of the exclusive remedy provisions that are only applicable to employers. As discussed below, two states, Maine and Florida, have found this argument persuasive. The defendant, on the other hand, asserts that Fulmer's exercise of control over the business brings him within the definition of "employer" under the statute. The defendant also asserts that plaintiff's argument is premised on the so-called dual capacity doctrine that has been rejected in Connecticut. While neither of these arguments are completely satisfactory, the better reasoned cases from other states apply the exclusive remedy bar in situations comparable to the present case. Neither the Connecticut Supreme Court nor the Connecticut Appellate Court have ruled on this precise question.
Connecticut's Workers' Compensation Act provides:
An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section [requiring an employer to provide proof of ability to pay workers' compensation claims) shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of [his or her] employment . . .
General Statutes § 31-284(a).
This so-called exclusivity provision reflects a compromise of the right to common law remedies for workplace injury in exchange for relatively quick and certain compensation. Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc., 47 Conn.Sup. 638, affirmed 263 Conn. 231 (2002). It also advances the purpose of our workers' compensation statute which is to compensate the worker for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault, by imposing a form of strict liability on the employer. Melius v. Federal Express Corp., 76 F.Sup.2d 233, 235 (1999).
It is held with virtual unanimity that an employer cannot be sued as the owner or occupier of land, whether the cause of action is statutory or based on common law obligations of a landowner. Larsen's Workers' Compensation Law, § 113.02. The argument that an employer who owns the premises where the business is located acts in a dual capacity, one as employer and another as landowner, has now been rejected in all states that have considered the question. Id. This so-called dual capacity doctrine has also been rejected by our Supreme Court, although not in this precise landowner context. See Panaro v. Electrolux Corporation, 208 Conn. 589, 600 (1988) (suit against company nurse who allegedly acted in dual capacity of both health care provider and employee barred by exclusivity provisions of Workers' Compensation Act).
The plaintiff's argument that Fulmer is liable does not, however, rest on the disfavored dual capacity doctrine. Instead, the plaintiff asserts that in the present case the employer (Kentucky Fried Chicken-Meriden, Inc.) and the landowner (Fulmer) are two different legal persons such that Fulmer cannot claim the status of "employer" for purposes of the exclusive remedy provisions of § 31-284(a). This argument finds support in cases from Florida and Maine.
In Perkins v. Scott, 554 So.2d 1120 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 1990), the plaintiff sustained an on-the-job injury and collected workers' compensation benefits from his corporate employer. The defendant was the sole shareholder of the corporate employer and also individually owned the building where the accident occurred. The court held that the defendant's liability as a landowner was not eliminated by his status as owner and manager of the corporate employer. The court reasoned that "[h]aving created a separate corporation to employ [the plaintiff] and having leased the building to that corporation, [the defendant] does not have the luxury to now pierce the veil of his own corporation to receive the benefit of its immunity." Id., 1222. The court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant-landowner. Id.
In LaBelle v. Crepeau, 593 A.2d 653 (Me. 1991), on similar facts, the Supreme Court of Maine considered whether an injured employee's negligence action against a landowner was barred because the landowner was an officer and major shareholder of the corporate employer. The trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-landowner. In vacating that order, the court stated that as an individual owner of the premises, the defendant could not claim the benefit of the immunity from civil actions that was only applicable to the corporate employer. Id., 655.
A contrary view, however, has been taken by other states. These cases have resolved this dual persona situation (landowner/corporate owner) in favor of construing the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation statute to protect the landowner from suit arising out of a workplace injury. Three well reasoned opinions come from Michigan, Indiana and New York.
In Bitar v. Wakim, 211 Mich.App. 617, 536 N.W.2d 583 (Mich.App. 1995), a bakery employee brought a negligence action against an individual defendant who was both owner of the premises where the bakery was located and sole shareholder of bakery corporation. The defendant was also the general manager of the bakery and supervised its operations. In affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the court relied on the equitable doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Id., 586. While acknowledging that generally separate entities are respected, the court noted that there was an almost complete identity between the corporation and the defendant who was sole shareholder and. general manager. Id. Moreover, the court noted that "reverse piercing" of the corporate veil advanced the policies underly Michigan's workers' compensation act that was enacted to protect both employees and employers. Id. The court treated the individual defendant as the employer for purposes of the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation act.
In Jackson v. Gibson, 409 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind.App. 1980), the plaintiff sustained an on-the-job injury and collected workers' compensation benefits from his corporate employer, the plaintiff then sued the defendant who owned the building where the injury occurred and who was also the sole shareholder, president and manager of the corporation. Id. 1237. The Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation act that protected both employers and fellow employees from suit. The court observed that the individual defendant was supervising or directing the work for the plaintiff, an employee of the corporation. The court reasoned that the defendant was conducting the business of the employer and therefore plaintiff's exclusive remedy was through the workers' compensation act. The court further rejected plaintiff's claim that the defendants status as a landowner made him liable as a separate entity. The court ruled that the workers' compensation act did not permit such imposition of liability. Id. 1239. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant was affirmed. Id.
New York has a clear line of cases that prevent a worker injured in the course of employment from maintaining a personal injury action against the owner of premises where the accident occurred when the owner is also an officer of the corporation that employed the worker. Druiett v. Brenner, 598 N.Y.S.2d 3 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1993); Heritage v. Van Patton, 59 N.Y.2d 1017, 466 N.Y.S.2d 958, 453 N.E.2d 1247 (1983); Ozarowski v. Yaloz Realty Corp., 581 N.Y.S.2d 248 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1992). The New York analysis treats the corporate officer/landowner as a co-employee who is immune from suit under the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation act.
Neither our Supreme Court nor our Appellate Court have spoken on the application of the exclusive remedy provisions of Connecticut's Workers' Compensation Act to a defendant who is both landowner and sole shareholder of a corporate employer. In Velardi v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 178 Conn. 371 (1979), the owner of a sole proprietorship was sued by a worker who had sustained a work related injury and collected workers' compensation benefits. The plaintiff's theory was that at the time of the injury, the owner was a fellow employee whose negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle caused the injury. Our Supreme Court rejected that theory and ruled that the owner was an employer and not a fellow employee. The court, however, stated, "[t]he issue of the plaintiff's rights if the defendant had been incorporated is not presently before us" Id., 376.
One superior court case has squarely confronted the issue raised in the present case and ruled that a landowner who was also president and stockholder of the plaintiff's corporate employer was the plaintiff's employer for purposes of the application of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Sullivan v. Conniff, Docket CV02-0463372, Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven (Aug. 17, 2004, Arnold, J.) ( 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 704).
As a general matter, our Supreme Court has interpreted the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act as a "total bar to common-law actions brought by employees against employers for job related injuries, with one narrow exception that exists when the employer has committed an intentional tort or where the employer has engaged in wilful or serious misconduct." Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 106 (1994). The court has also refused to carve out a dual capacity exception to the exclusive remedy provisions. Panaro v. Electrolux Corp., supra, 208 Conn. 600; Bouley v. Norwich, 222 Conn. 744, 759-60 (1992).
In Bouley, the court stated that the legislature had worked out a "complex statutory scheme," an "integral part" of which was the "accepted proposition that an employee surrenders other claims for the certainty of the exclusive workers' compensation remedy." Id., 760. "Such a comprehensive well thought out scheme should not be tinkered with by the courts." Id.
In the present case, Fulmer is the sole stockholder of the corporation that employed the plaintiff. He took an active role in the business and had the authority to hire, fire and direct plaintiff's job activities. If viewed in terms of reverse piercing of the corporate veil, Fulmer is appropriately considered plaintiff's employer for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. If viewed as a co-employee, Fulmer is also immune from suit. See General Statutes § 31-293a (no right of action allowed against fellow employee unless injury caused by either wilful misconduct or the negligent operation of a motor vehicle). Either way, plaintiff's remedy is limited to workers' compensation benefits. To rule otherwise would amount to the sort of "tinkering" that our Supreme Court has proscribed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, judgment is entered in favor of the defendant.
DEVLIN, J.