Opinion
No. CV07-5003402-S
August 3, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS LANERI AND BROWNELL'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is a quiet title action in which the plaintiff Charles D. Mierzejewski alleges that there is a dispute concerning the location of the boundary separating his property from that of the defendant Robert Laneri. Defendant Crary Brownell is a party to this action because an easement granted to him runs over a portion of the disputed property.
This is the latest installment in a dispute concerning the existence and location of Brownell's easement over the plaintiff's property. This litigation has its genesis in the 1993 action Mierzejewski v. Brownell, CV-07-5003402; aff'd 102 Conn.App. 413 (2007). In that matter, Mierzejewski alleged that Brownell's easement over a portion of his property was erased either by prescription or adverse possession. The easement in question is a 20-foot wide road that provides access to Brownell's property. Judge Aurigemma determined in her 2005 decision that the "deeded right of way in question still exists and has not been adversely possessed or otherwise extinguished by the plaintiff . . ."
In addition, in a finding that gives rise, in part, to the present litigation, Judge Aurigemma concluded, with respect to its location, that the "right of way runs along the northern property line of the Mierzejewski Property and is 20 feet in width, with the entire right of way being located on that property." The trial court's decision was affirmed on appeal, Mierzejewski v. Brownell, 102 Conn.App. 413 (2007). In a passage relied on by both parties in the current litigation, the Appellate Court noted, with respect to the question of the location of the right of way: "A reading of the court's memorandum of decision, however, reveals that the court did not determine the exact location of the right-of-way. More specifically, the court did not decide whether the northern boundary of the right-of-way was a stone wall or was the centerline of the old highway. Rather, the court merely concluded that the entire twenty-foot right-of-way, which `runs along the northern property line of [the plaintiff's property],' was located on the plaintiff's property. This finding, however, is not inconsistent with its conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to extinguish the right-of-way by prescription." Id. at 417 n. 6.
In the present action the plaintiff seeks to quiet title, alleging that there is a dispute as to the precise location of the boundary between his property and that of the defendant Laneri. Both defendants now move for summary judgment arguing that the doctrine of res judicata prohibits Mierzejewski from relitigating in this action the same issue that they claim was raised in the 1993 action and decided by Judge Aurigemma. In addition, the defendants argue that the survey maps submitted by the plaintiff and adopted by the defendant Brownell in the earlier proceeding conclusively establish, as judicial admissions, the boundary between the Mierzejewski and Laneri properties. The plaintiff objects to the defendants' motions, arguing that res judicata does not bar the present action because both Judge Aurigemma and the Appellate Court specifically concluded that the boundary of the easement was not established in the earlier action. Plaintiff also insists that whatever the probative force of the survey maps admitted in the prior proceeding, they do not constitute binding admissions that control the disposition of this action.
I. Res Judicata
The legal analysis governing application of res judicata is well established. "[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim. A judgment is final not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain the claim, but also as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose . . . The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim regardless of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Milford v. Andresakis, 52 Conn.App. 454, 462-63, 726 A.2d 1170, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 922, 722 A.2d 845 (1999).
"[W]e recognize that a decision whether to apply the doctrine of res judicata to claims that have not actually been litigated should be made based upon a consideration of the doctrine's underlying policies, namely, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close . . . and the competing interest of [a party] in the vindication of a just claim . . . The doctrines of preclusion, however, should be flexible and must give way when their mechanical application would frustrate other social policies based on values equally or more important than the convenience afforded by finality in legal controversies . . . We review the doctrine of res judicata to emphasize that its purposes must inform the decision to foreclose future litigation . . . [T]he scope of matters precluded necessarily depends on what has occurred in the former adjudication." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 463. Cadle Co. v. Gabel, 69 Conn.App. 279, 295-96 (2002). See also, Listenes v. Listenes, 102 Conn.App. 642 (2007).
Pursuant to this framework, the analysis is twofold. First, is the claim raised in the present action the same as presented in the former one? If not, is the claim in this action one that arises out of the same transaction that gave rise to the first proceeding and therefore could have been raised in the earlier case? Each inquiry is considered in turn. A comparison of the complaint, pleadings and memoranda in both actions discloses that the claim asserted in this action was not in fact raised or decided in the 1993 action. As previously noted, the 1993 case was between Mierzejewski and Brownell only; Laneri was not a party to that action. That action raised and resolved the specific issue of whether Brownell's deeded easement was extinguished by prescription or adverse possession. By its terms it did not raise, nor did Judge Aurigemma or the Appellate Court determine, the precise location of the boundary between the Mierzejewski and Laneri properties. In fact, the Appellate Court specifically found in footnote 6 of its opinion that the "[trial] court's memorandum of decision did not determine the exact location of the right-of-way" noting that "the court's disposition of the extinguishment claim would be the same, regardless of the exact location of the northern boundary." Mierzejewski v. Brownell, supra, 102 Conn.App. at 413 n. 6.
Even if Judge Aurigemma had determined the exact location of the right-of-way, such finding would not be dispositive of the precise location of the boundary between the two parties absent a finding or stipulation, not present in this or the earlier case, that the location of the right-of-way and the boundary are co-extensive.
It is clear that the location of the boundary between the Mierzejewski and Laneri properties was neither raised nor decided in the earlier litigation. That prong of the res judicata doctrine that bars the assertion of claims in a subsequent proceeding that have previously been adjudicated, therefore, cannot be successfully invoked in this action by the defendants Laneri and Brownell. There remains, however, the issue of whether the boundary issue could and should have been raised in the earlier proceeding. Resolution of that issue requires consideration of the "transactional test." "We have adopted a transactional test as a guide to determining whether an action involves the same claim as an earlier action so as to trigger operation of the doctrine of res judicata. [T]he claim [that is] extinguished [by the judgment in the first action] includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose." Cadle Co. v. Gabel, supra, 69 Conn.App. at 296. Application of this test is informed by the general rule that "[a] judgment is final not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain the claim, but also as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose." Id. at 295 (emphasis in original).
This matter, as previously noted, is a quiet title action in which the plaintiff seeks a determination of the boundary line between his and the Laneri property while the previous matter sought a declaration that Brownell's easement had been extinguished. The present action, although involving much of the same evidence as presented in the first proceeding, does not arise out of the "same factual grouping" that formed the basis of the claims in the first action. Accordingly, the claim in this case is not barred by res judicata.
II. Evidentiary Admissions
Defendants argue that the evidence submitted by the plaintiff in the first proceeding conclusively establishes the boundary line between the Mierzejewski and Laneri properties. Specifically, defendants point out that the maps prepared by plaintiff's expert and admitted in the first action identify the precise boundary between northern edge of the Mierzejewski property and southern edge of the Laneri property. Under these circumstances, defendants argue that those maps constitute admissions binding on the plaintiff prohibiting him from now contradicting the boundary established by his expert's survey. Assuming that the maps admitted in the first proceeding constitute an admission by the plaintiff; see, Falker v. Semper, 190 Conn. 412 (1983); and they are deemed to be judicial not merely evidentiary admissions, "[j]udicial admissions are conclusive only in the judicial proceeding in which made. In subsequent proceedings such prior judicial admissions are merely evidentiary admissions, to be used as evidence to prove a matter in dispute in the subsequent trial" (quotations and citations omitted). Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence, 3d Ed. § 8.16.3. Accordingly, the evidentiary force of the maps utilized at the first proceeding are not conclusive in the present case.
Although the maps prepared and offered by the plaintiff in the first proceeding are not conclusive in the present case, it seems apparent that the plaintiff faces a significant if not overwhelming evidentiary burden in proving that border between the two properties is different than that located by his own expert and identified by him in the Brownell case. See, e.g., General Statutes § 7-31 and McBurney v. Cirillo, 276 Conn. 782 (2006).
Because the plaintiff's claim in this action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata or by evidentiary admissions made in the prior proceeding, the defendants Brownell and Laneri's motions for summary judgment are denied.
SO ORDERED.