Michel v. Bridgeport Hospital

Full title: LISA MICHEL v. BRIDGEPORT HOSPITAL

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport

Date published: Mar 7, 2011

2011 Ct. Sup. 6572 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011)

Opinion

No. 116015195

March 7, 2011

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

BRUCE L. LEVIN, Judge of the Superior Court.

The defendants, Bridgeport Hospital ("Hospital") and Yale New Haven Health Services Corporation ("Yale"), have jointly filed a motion to strike. Individually, Yale moves to strike all counts against it on the ground that the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to show that Yale is liable for the acts of Bridgeport Hospital, its subsidiary. Both defendants move to strike counts two, four, five, seven, eight and nine arguing that the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action under each count. The court finds that the complaint fails to allege facts necessary to support the claim that an agency relationship existed between Yale and Bridgeport Hospital. Accordingly, the motion to strike the entire complaint as to Yale is granted. As to Bridgeport Hospital, the motion to strike counts five, seven, eight and nine is granted. The motion to strike count two is denied and the motion to strike count four is denied in part and granted in part.

I

On December 21, 2010, the plaintiff, Lisa Michel, filed a nine-count complaint against the defendants for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, wrongful discharge and defamation as a result of the termination of her employment with Bridgeport Hospital.

The plaintiff was employed by Bridgeport Hospital for approximately thirty-two years, first as a graduate nurse and later as a registered nurse. When the plaintiff was hired in 1978, she signed an employment contract that provided for a disciplinary system prior to a discharge which, according to the plaintiff, was never modified. Throughout her employment with Bridgeport Hospital, the plaintiff consistently received favorable evaluations regarding her work performance, including one on May 12, 2010. Nonetheless, on May 13, 2010, the plaintiff's employment with Bridgeport Hospital was terminated.

According to the plaintiff, during the spring of 2010, a patient, who was a long-time employee of Bridgeport Hospital, was being treated at the Hospital and ultimately died there. The plaintiff alleges that during the course of the patient's treatment, staff members and other employees expressed concern regarding the gravity of the patient's medical condition. Following the death of the patient, there was speculation over whether malpractice had occurred in the patient's care. Thereafter, numerous employees were terminated or otherwise disciplined by Bridgeport Hospital for improperly accessing the chart of the patient and obtaining information relating to the patient's treatment and condition. On May 13, 2010, Bridgeport Hospital terminated the plaintiff's employment accusing the plaintiff of improperly accessing the medical records of patients in violation of HIPAA laws.

The defendants move to strike the complaint. Individually, Yale moves to strike all counts against it on the ground that the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to show that Yale is liable for the acts of Bridgeport Hospital, its subsidiary. Both defendants move to strike counts two (breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing), four (infliction of emotional distress), five (false imprisonment), seven (invasion of privacy), eight (wrongful discharge) and nine (defamation) arguing that the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action under each count. Additional facts will be presented as necessary.

II

"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[The court takes] the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover . . . [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252-53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).

"The exclusive remedy for misjoinder of parties is by motion to strike." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hilton v. New Haven, 233 Conn. 701, 723 n. 23, 661 A.2d 973 (1995); see also Practice Book § 11-3. "Insofar as [a] motion to strike is directed [to] the entire complaint, it must . . . fail if any of the plaintiff's claims are legally sufficient." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Whelan v. Whelan, 41 Conn.Sup. 519, 520, 588 A.2d 251 [ 3 Conn. L. Rptr. 135] (1991).

A.

Yale moves to strike all counts against it on the ground that the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to show that Yale is liable for the acts of Bridgeport Hospital, its subsidiary. Yale argues that a parent corporation and a subsidiary are separate entities and the mere allegation that one entity is a parent corporation is not sufficient to impose liability on the parent for the acts of a subsidiary. Although the complaint alleges that Bridgeport Hospital is part of Yale's network for delivery of medical services, Yale argues that there are no allegations in the complaint that Yale was involved in the employment or termination of the plaintiff's employment.

The plaintiff argues that the complaint refers to Yale not only as the parent company but contains the allegation that Yale is a "managing company," a term that necessarily implies more than mere passive ownership or other hands-off affiliation. The plaintiff also contends that the complaint alleges that Yale operates certain delivery networks for medical services, including Bridgeport Hospital. According to the plaintiff, these allegations of active operation and active delivery of services directly state more than passive ownership and imply a more direct affiliation and control of operations than a mere assertion that Yale is the parent company. Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that the complaint alleges that Yale was involved in her termination because the complaint specifically alleges that the decision to fire the plaintiff was made in order to send a message to all employees that any further discussion or conjecture surrounding the death of the aforementioned patient was entirely off limits. According to the plaintiff, this directly connects her termination to concerns regarding challenges to the adequacy of the medical network operated by Yale. Finally, the plaintiff argues that the complaint not only alleges that Bridgeport Hospital acted in order to protect and advance the interests of Yale but that Bridgeport Hospital acted with the approval of, and as duly authorized agents for, Yale.

"[I]t is a fundamental principle of corporate law that the parent corporation and its subsidiary are treated as separate and distinct legal persons . . . Furthermore, the separate corporate entities or personalities of affiliated corporations will be recognized, absent illegitimate purposes, unless: (a) the business transactions, property, employees, bank and other accounts and records are intermingled; (b) the formalities of separate corporate procedures for each corporation are not observed . . . (c) the corporation is inadequately financed as a separate unit from the point of view of meeting its normal obligations . . . (d) the respective enterprises are not held out to the public as separate enterprises; (e) the policies of the corporation are not directed to its own interests primarily but rather to those of the other corporation." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 217 Conn. 220, 232-33, 585 A.2d 666, 673, cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1223, 111 S.Ct. 2839, 115 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1991); see United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) ("It is a general principle of corporate law deeply `ingrained in our economic and legal systems' that a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries").

Moreover, "[t]here is a strong presumption that a parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary's employees, and the courts have found otherwise only in extraordinary circumstances . . . A parent company may employ its subsidiary's employees if (a) the parent company so dominates the subsidiary's operations that the two are one entity and therefore one employer . . . or (b) the parent company is linked to the alleged discriminatory action because it controls individual employment decisions." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) West v. Royal Bank of Canada, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 4023999 (February 23, 2009, Domnarski, J.).

The plaintiff alleges that Yale is liable for the acts of Bridgeport Hospital under a theory of agency. "A parent corporation can be held vicariously liable for the acts of a subsidiary corporation if an agency relationship exists between the parent and the subsidiary." Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F.Sup.2d 1229, 1238 (N.D.Cal. 2004); see Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14M (1958) (discussing agency relationship between parent and subsidiary). "[A]gency is defined as the fiduciary relationship which results from manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act . . . Thus, the three elements required to show the existence of an agency relationship include: (1) a manifestation by the principal that the agent will act for him; (2) acceptance by the agent of the undertaking; and (3) an understanding between the parties that the principal will be in control of the undertaking . . . The existence of an agency relationship is a question of fact . . . Some of the factors listed by the Second Restatement of Agency in assessing whether such a relationship exists include: whether the alleged principal has the right to direct and control the work of the agent; whether the agent is engaged in a distinct occupation; whether the principal or the agent supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work; and the method of paying the agent . . . In addition, [a]n essential ingredient of agency is that the agent is doing something at the behest and for the benefit of the principal . . . Finally, the labels used by the parties in referring to their relationship are not determinative; rather, a court must look to the operative terms of their agreement or understanding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wesley v. Schaller Subaru, Inc., 277 Conn. 526, 543-44, 893 A.2d 389 (2006).

In Hollister v. Thomas, 110 Conn.App. 692, 695, 955 A.2d 1212, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 956, 961 A.2d 419 (2008), a condominium unit owner, Thomas, hired Brown to remodel her bathroom. Brown was a licensed plumbing contractor and subcontracted the tile work and other remodeling aspects of the project to Janesky. Id. Janesky negligently started a fire at the scene of which the plaintiff, a firefighter, was injured. Id., 696. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Brown was vicariously liable for Janesky's negligence. Id., 696, 698. The trial court granted Brown's motion to strike the relevant count and the Appellate Court affirmed, holding that "the complaint failed to allege the facts necessary to prove the existence of such [an] [agency] relationship." Id., 696-97, 706. The court explained: "For example, there was no allegation that Brown had the right to control the work of Thomas Janesky. Rather, the fourth amended complaint alleged that Brown instructed Thomas Janesky that the work was not that difficult for him to proceed with and directed him to carry out certain plumbing and piping installation responsibilities in accordance with that instruction. A mere direction to perform a task does not imply control over the performance of that task. Likewise, the plaintiff's allegation that Brown maintained control and responsibility for the plumbing and piping installation work does not allege a right to control the work of Thomas Janesky. Further, there were scant facts alleged that elaborate on the relationship between Thomas Janesky and Brown other than the use of the labels `agent' and `subcontractor.'" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 706-07.

To survive a motion to strike, a complaint must allege more than a conclusory allegation of agency; it must allege facts supporting that legal conclusion of agency. Notarino v. Hospital of Saint Raphael, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 97 0400666 (April 5, 2001, Lager, J.). The plaintiff's complaint alleges that Yale is the "parent company and/or Managing Company of Bridgeport Hospital . . . [that Yale] operates delivery networks for medical services, including . . . Bridgeport Hospital . . . [and that] the administration and supervisors of Bridgeport Hospital were acting with the approval of, and as duly authorized agents for, Yale." The complaint also alleges that the plaintiff was employed by Bridgeport Hospital but later alleges that the "defendants" breached their employment contract with the plaintiff. Similar to Hollister v. Thomas, supra, 110 Conn.App. 692, the complaint is devoid of an allegation that Yale had a right to control the decisions and actions of Bridgeport Hospital. Consequently, the complaint fails to allege facts necessary to support the claim that an agency relationship existed between Yale and Bridgeport Hospital.

Accordingly, the motion to strike the entire complaint as to Yale is granted.

B.

The defendants move to strike count two of the complaint, which asserts a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, on the ground that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to show that the defendants exercised a contract right in bad faith for a dishonest purpose. The defendants argue that the second count alleges only that Bridgeport Hospital did not have just cause for the plaintiff's discharge but does not allege sufficient facts to support the breach of the covenant of good faith. Moreover, the defendants argue that the second count merely repeats the claim of breach of contract (count one) under a different label. According to the defendants, if Bridgeport Hospital did not have just cause to discharge the plaintiff, then the alleged contract was breached. However, if Bridgeport Hospital did have just cause to discharge the plaintiff, then the claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to achieve a result contrary to the express terms of the contract, i.e., to make Bridgeport Hospital liable for discharging the plaintiff when it had just cause to do so.

The plaintiff argues that the second count incorporates all twenty-one paragraphs of count one alleging breach of contract, which include allegations of the existence of an employment contract that prohibited her from being discharged except for just cause. The complaint also alleges that the defendants acted in bad faith, although the phrase "bad faith" is not specifically alleged. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the complaint alleges that the plaintiff's employment contract required a system of oral and written warnings preceding any termination, that employees be treated consistently and equitably with regard to termination, and, in the case of involuntary termination, the termination documents be placed in the employee's file. The complaint then alleges that Bridgeport Hospital engaged in a series of disciplinary actions and terminations with other employees who had allegedly improperly accessed patient charts. Additionally, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff was falsely told that she was being suspended as opposed to terminated, that the plaintiff was fired to curtail discussions or conjecture concerning circumstances surrounding the death of a patient, that the plaintiff was never notified in writing of her discharge, that the plaintiff's personnel file does not contain termination documents due to a purge, that the plaintiff has been blacklisted from obtaining employment elsewhere, that the plaintiff received only favorable evaluations during her thirty-two years of employment, and that one day prior to her termination the plaintiff received a favorable written evaluation and an oral commendation regarding her exemplary service. The plaintiff argues that these allegations, taken as a whole, clearly and necessarily imply a dishonest purpose on the part of the defendants, not prompted by honest mistake but by an interested or sinister motive.

"[E]very contract carries an implied duty requiring that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. Chung Family Realty Partnership, LLC, 125 Conn.App. 678, 693, 10 A.3d 61, 75 (2010). "A claim of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a separate cause of action." Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown Brown of Connecticut, Inc., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Hartford, Docket No. X04 CV 08 5023532 (May 11, 2010, Shapiro, J.); see Lund v. Stern Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docker No. CV 94 0463413 (November 3, 1994, Stengel, J.) ( 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 77, 78 n. 1) ("To the extent that the plaintiff may be alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a separate cause of action, rather than in support of his tortious breach of contract claim, courts have allowed plaintiffs to allege breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing").

"To constitute a breach of [the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing], the acts by which a defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff's right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected to receive under the contract must have been taken in bad faith . . . Bad faith in general implies both actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. Chung Family Realty Partnership, LLC, supra, 125 Conn.App. 693. "Absent allegations and evidence of a dishonest purpose or sinister motive, a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is legally insufficient." Alexandru v. Strong, 81 Conn.App. 68, 81, 837 A.2d 875, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 906, 845 A.2d 406 (2004).

Broadly construed, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff's employment contract provided that she could be discharged only for just cause, that she was not discharged for just cause, and that she was terminated to send a clear message to discourage other employees from discussing the circumstances surrounding the death of a patient. The complaint also alleges that the plaintiff was terminated for fiscal reasons. Additionally, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff was not given the benefit of the gradual discipline to which her employment contract entitled her. The facts alleged are sufficient to imply a dishonest purpose on behalf of Bridgeport Hospital, not prompted by honest mistake but by an interested or sinister motive.

Because the second count adequately alleges that Bridgeport Hospital breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.

C.

The defendants move to strike the fourth count, which purports to allege infliction of emotional distress, on the grounds that (1) the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot arise out of conduct occurring in the continuing employment context; and (2) the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The plaintiff objects arguing that negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context can arise based on the unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process and that the complaint contains allegations from which it can be inferred that the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous to sustain the claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In summary, the plaintiff alleged that "[s]he was an exemplary employee for thirty two years. The day immediately preceding her termination, [her] employer delivered to her a favorable written evaluation and orally told her that she was an exemplary employee. She was permitted to work a 40 hour work week immediately preceding her termination, during which she had unfettered access to patient's charts. A patient who was well known to hospital personnel died in the hospital and there were rumors and conjecture amongst staff members regarding malpractice in connection with the death. Following the patient's death, the hospital disciplined and/or terminated a number of employees who had gained access to his chart. The plaintiff was confined to a room, questioned, and falsely told that she was being suspended when in fact the decision to terminate her had already occurred, and she was thereafter physically escorted from the premises. She was fired in order to stifle further inquiry into the death of the patient. The procedural safeguards to which she was entitled were not adhered to in connection with her termination. The termination documents are not in her personnel file and her personnel file has been purged to remove any reference to her employment contracts or termination from employment. She has been blacklisted as a result of her termination. She was given insufficient training regarding the use of computers and was therefore unable to avoid sharing terminals or files with other employees. The allegations concerning invasion of patient's privacy relate directly to her integrity and moral standing as a nurse. She has sustained emotional distress and is seeking reimbursement for medical costs, including psychiatrists and psychologists."¹

1 Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Strike, p. 7-8.

Count four alleges that the defendants acted intentionally, recklessly and negligently in inflicting emotional distress on the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court will address both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

1.

The defendants argue that the plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed because it is based on facts related to the plaintiff's continuing employment with Bridgeport Hospital. In contrast, the plaintiff argues that this claim relates to the termination process and that the facts alleged are sufficient to sustain the cause of action.

To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) the defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's distress was foreseeable; (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress." Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 444, 815 A.2d 119, 127 (2003).

A claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot arise "out of conduct occurring within a continuing employment context, as distinguished from conduct occurring in the termination of employment." CT Page 6581 Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 762-63, 792 A.2d 752, 765 (2002). "[I]n order to state . . . a claim [for negligent infliction of emotional distress], the plaintiff has the burden of pleading that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm . . . [N]egligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process . . . The mere termination of employment, even where it is wrongful, is therefore not, by itself, enough to sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The mere act of firing an employee, even if wrongfully motivated, does not transgress the bounds of socially tolerable behavior." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 88-89, 700 A.2d 655, 667 (1997); see Perodeau v. Hartford, supra, 259 Conn. 751 ("[W]here the employee has been terminated, a finding of a wrongful termination is neither a necessary nor a sufficient predicate for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The dispositive issue . . . [is] whether the defendant's conduct during the termination process was sufficiently wrongful that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that [that] distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted)).

"Unreasonable conduct [for the purposes of pleading negligent infliction of emotional distress] has been interpreted by the [S]uperior [C]ourts as conduct performed in an inconsiderate, humiliating or embarrassing manner . . . Courts have found that unreasonable conduct in the employment termination context could be based on knowingly making false claims about the plaintiff's intentional conduct in connection with the firing . . . interrogating a plaintiff for several hours on three separate occasions, escorting him off the premises by armed security guards in view of his coworkers and publicly announcing that he was terminated for a breach of business ethics . . . and falsely accusing the plaintiff of using the defendant's property to have a liaison with a female friend during working hours . . . [Moreover], falsely accusing a plaintiff of misconduct or publicizing false reasons for a plaintiff's termination to other employees may be sufficiently unreasonable conduct to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Battistoni v. Lakeridge Tax District, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 07 5002223 (June 17, 2008, Marano, J.).

The court will not consider any allegations in the fourth count of the plaintiff's complaint related to acts that allegedly occurred outside the termination process but will review those that relate to the plaintiff's termination. See Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 243 Conn. 88-89. The allegations that relate to the plaintiff's termination are that Bridgeport Hospital had the plaintiff escorted to a private conference room where, she alleges, she was not free to leave, was questioned in a menacing manner, accused of improperly accessing patient files, and escorted from the premises. The court finds that these allegations are not so unreasonable as to support a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. "[I]t is not patently unreasonable for an employer to remove a discharged employee from its premises under a security escort." Id., 89. Moreover, it is not unreasonable for the plaintiff to be questioned in privacy, outside the presence of other employees. See Pavliscak v. Bridgeport Hospital, 48 Conn.App. 580, 598, 711 A.2d 747, 756, cert. denied, 245 Conn. 911, 718 A.2d 17 (1998) ("There was no evidence that the defendant humiliated the plaintiff publicly. She was told in a private meeting with her supervisors that she was being terminated effective immediately . . . While there was undoubtedly some indignity involved with being involuntarily terminated, we cannot say that this rises to the level of unreasonable conduct that would justify liability based on negligent infliction of emotional distress"). Finally, the remaining allegations that the plaintiff's supervisor confronted the plaintiff in a menacing manner, spoke to her in an aggressive tone and accused the plaintiff of improperly accessing patient files do not rise to the level of unreasonable conduct that would justify liability based on negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Wilk v. Abbott Terrace Health Center, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 06 5001328 (August 15, 2007, Upson, J.) (plaintiff stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress where the complaint alleged that the employer screamed at, berated and leaned over the plaintiff in a threatening manner).

Count four fails to sufficiently allege facts to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the motion to strike the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim contained in count four is granted.

2.

The defendants argue that the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed because the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous. The plaintiff disagrees but provides no citations to case law in support of her position.

"In order for the plaintiff to prevail in a case for liability under . . . [intentional infliction of emotional distress], four elements must be established. It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe . . . Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous! . . . Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 262 Conn. 442-43.

"Whether a defendant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine . . . Only where reasonable minds disagree does it become an issue for the jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Benton v. Simpson, 78 Conn.App. 746, 753, 829 A.2d 68, 73 (2003). "[T]here is no bright line rule to determine what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to maintain this action. The court looks to the specific facts and circumstances of each case in making its decisions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Craddock v. Church Community Supported Living Assn., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 99 0592711 (November 13, 2000, Hennessey, J.).

"In the workplace context, the threshold [for extreme and outrageous conduct] is even higher: [I]t is clear that individuals in the workplace reasonably should expect to experience some level of emotional distress, even significant emotional distress, as a result of conduct in the workplace." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilk v. Abbott Terrace Health Center, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 06 5001328, quoting Perodeau v. Hartford, supra, 259 Conn. 757. "Nevertheless, it has also been held that [t]he extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may [also] arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests . . . Such position or relation may be that of an employer or supervisor at work . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilk v. Abbott Terrace Health Center, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 06 5001328.

In Wilk, the motion to strike was denied where "[t]he plaintiff . . . alleged that [her supervisor] had a history of abusive conduct towards her, culminating in her termination during which he screamed at and berated her, stood over her chair threateningly, thereby preventing her from getting up, and falsely declared that she was terminated for insubordination. Coming from her supervisor, reasonable minds could differ over whether this constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct. See Benton v. Simpson, [ supra], 78 Conn.App. 746 . . . (supervisor told employee plaintiffs they were a cancer and constantly berated and swore at them, banging on file cabinets; court upheld finding of emotional distress) . . . Ferraro v. The Stop Shop Supermarket Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 96 0388031 (May 24, 2000, Silbert, J.) (`[a] job supervisor's false accusation of lying, made in the presence of one of the plaintiff's fellow employees, is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to warrant submitting the case to the jury') . . . Centi v. Lexington Health Care Center, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 96 0383535 (May 1, 1997, Licari, J.) (defendant supervisor set unrealistic goals for plaintiff, came to her house unannounced one day, changed her assignments, and gave her a pretextual reason for termination)." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilk v. Abbott Terrace Health Center, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 06 5001328.

In contrast, most of the allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint do not reach the high threshold necessary to maintain an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The allegations previously discussed relating to the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim are relevant to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim: that Bridgeport Hospital had the plaintiff escorted to a private conference room where, she alleges, she was not free to leave, was questioned in a menacing manner, accused of improperly accessing patient files, and escorted from the premises. As the court previously found that these allegations did not rise to the level of unreasonable, it follows that they cannot rise to the level of extreme or outrageous to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

However, the fourth count also alleges that "[s]ince the date of her discharge, the plaintiff has diligently applied for employment with other hospitals but, despite 32 years of exemplary service and stellar evaluations, she has been unable to secure substitute employment. Upon information and belief, she is being blacklisted." At oral argument, the plaintiff clarified that "blacklisted" meant that the defendant communicated improper reasons for firing the plaintiff to third persons. Thus, the remaining issue is whether it was extreme and outrageous conduct for the defendants to allegedly disseminate defamatory information to other potential employers that were considering hiring the plaintiff. See Watt v. Ford Consumer Finance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 95 323572 (July 31, 1996, Hauser, J.).

In Watt v. Ford Consumer Finance Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 95 323572, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant made "false, fraudulent and unprivileged defamatory statements" to prospective employers. The court denied the motion to strike the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding that "[b]ased upon the relation of employer/employee and the pecuniary interests involved . . . reasonable minds may differ" as to whether that conduct was extreme and outrageous. Id. The court explained: "The relationship of employer/employee does not necessarily cease with the termination of the employee's job. Employment applications more often than not request an applicant's employment history, along with the name or names of former supervisors that may be contacted to collect job performance information. Therefore, a former employer maintains a trusted position in relation to the former employee, to convey only truthful information concerning the former employee's job performance. Defaming the former employee, and thus, abusing this trusted relationship, may cause the former employee difficulties in gaining new employment, which may further result in grave financial consequences.

"Therefore, since the extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests . . . reasonable minds could differ as to whether the defendants' conduct rose to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Watt v. Ford Consumer Finance Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 95 323572.

Likewise, here reasonable minds could differ as to whether the defendant's conduct, i.e., blacklisting the plaintiff by communicating improper reasons for her termination to third persons, rises to the level of extreme and outrageous. The court finds that count four sufficiently alleges facts to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the motion to strike the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim contained in count four is denied.

D.

The defendants move to strike count five, which purports to allege a cause of action for false imprisonment, on the ground that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to show that her liberty was restrained or that she protested the alleged confinement. The plaintiff disagrees arguing that the complaint specifically alleges that "she was escorted into a private conference room, from which she was not free to leave, that two security guards were positioned in an adjoining waiting area, and that, following a confrontational discussion, she was then escorted from the hospital premises by two security guards and her supervisor." According to the plaintiff, a detention, no matter how brief, is sufficient to impose liability for false imprisonment.

False imprisonment is defined as "the intentional, unlawful restraint or confinement of a person's physical liberty through the exercise of force . . . express or implied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 821, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). "False imprisonment can only be based upon circumstances that include actual restraint, threat of force or the assertion of legal authority." Richardson v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 169 F.Sup.2d 56, 61 (D.Conn. 2001). "More specifically it is any act directly or indirectly confining another within boundaries fixed by the defendant for any time whatever, however short, irrespective of whether harm is caused, if: a. The act is designed to confine the other; b. The other is conscious of the confinement; [and] c. The confinement is not consented to or is otherwise not privileged . . . In the case of false imprisonment there usually must be more than mental compulsion." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nisa v. Dairy Mart, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV 92 039678 (March 29, 1993, Hartmere, J.). "Any period of such restraint, however brief in duration, is sufficient to constitute a basis for liability." Green v. Donroe, 186 Conn. 265, 267, 440 A.2d 973 (1982). "A person is not liable for false imprisonment unless his act is done for the purpose of imposing a confinement, or with knowledge that such confinement will, to a substantial certainty, result from it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 268.

Pleadings are to be construed "broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beaudoin v. Town Oil Co., 207 Conn. 575, 588, 542 A.2d 1124 (1988). A complaint, moreover, must be read as a whole. Horak v. State, 171 Conn. 257, 262, 370 A.2d 959 (1976). And, "[a]lthough a motion to strike admits facts well pleaded . . . it does not admit legal conclusions." (Citation omitted.) Verdon v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 187 Conn. 363, 365, 446 A.2d 3 (1982). "Although the line between a fact and a legal conclusion can be razor-thin;" Tele Atlas N.V. v. NAVTEQ Corp., 397 F.Sup.2d 1184, 1190 (N.D.Cal. 2005); the court is convinced here that the allegation, pleaded in the passive voice, that the plaintiff "was not free to leave" the conference room into which she was escorted, is a legal conclusion unsupported by facts. Reading the complaint liberally but "realistically" and in context, what is alleged is nothing more than the unfortunate scenario that is regularly played out when an employee is suspected of wrongdoing and asked by a supervisor to accompany her to a room where the employee is confronted and questioned in a hostile manner. Notably, the plaintiff was not confronted by a uniformed officer of the law but, rather, "by her supervisor in the presence of the head nurse."

In Nisa v. Dairy Mart, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 92 039678, the court found that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a cause of action for false imprisonment where "the plaintiff . . . alleged more than mental compulsion by stating that the defendant's agent stood directly over and exercised his dominion over [her]. In addition, the plaintiff . . . alleged that the defendant's agent coerced her to move the barrels by telling her that if she did not do so he would have her franchise terminated . . . This threat could be construed to be force directed against valuable property." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In contrast, in Hanssler v. New Country Motor Cars of Greenwich, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV 02 0192755 (October 19, 2005, Wilson, J.), the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment finding that "the evidence [was] insufficient to establish a cause of action for false imprisonment by implied force . . ." The court explained: "The evidence submitted shows that the plaintiff was taken into a conference room where the doors were closed but remained unlocked. The plaintiff was left alone in the conference room with Christ, a man the plaintiff describes to be two to three inches taller than himself, a few pounds heavier and about the same age. The plaintiff alleges that Christ told him that if he did not sign the restitution agreement that he would have the plaintiff arrested immediately, but the plaintiff admits that Christ never claimed to be a police officer and admits to never having seen any police in the vicinity. The plaintiff admits that he was never told that he couldn't leave the room and was never physically prevented from doing so. In fact, the plaintiff admits that the reason he never stopped and left the room to get a lawyer was because he just wasn't thinking clearly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Here, in the absence of any facts expressly alleged or necessarily implied that the supervisor or head nurse exercised express or implied force, the fifth count fails to allege a legally sufficient cause of action for false imprisonment. See Eden Park Management, Inc. v. Schrull, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 06 5000731 (February 14, 2007, Pickard, J.) (Defendant "does not . . . allege that the plaintiff used any force or threat, actual or implied, to restrain her from leaving the rehabilitation center. Thus, the motion to strike as to the counterclaim for false imprisonment is granted"); Cartwright Limited Partnership v. Chasse, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV 03 0071269 (March 18, 2004, Foley, J.) (complaint legally insufficient because the defendant "does not allege she was physically restrained, locked or threatened to be restrained or locked in Cartwright's premises").

Accordingly, the motion to strike count five is granted.

E.

The defendants move to strike count seven purporting to allege a cause of action for the tort of invasion of privacy. The plaintiff has consented to the court striking this count.

F.

Count Eight: Wrongful Discharge

The defendants move to strike count eight, which purports to allege a cause of action for wrongful discharge, on the ground that the plaintiff's complaint does not allege that her termination was in violation of a public policy established by statutory or constitutional provisions. The plaintiff disagrees arguing that she is not required to plead the specific public policy violated. Rather, according to the plaintiff, in pleading that the defendants discharged her as part of an attempt to preclude inquiry into the defendants' potential malpractice which resulted in the death of a patient, the plaintiff has adequately alleged a public policy violated by the defendants.

"In Connecticut, an employer and employee have an at-will employment relationship in the absence of a contract to the contrary. Employment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability. Beginning in the late 1950s, however, courts began to carve out certain exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine, thereby giving rise to tort claims for wrongful discharge. Certain employer practices provoked public disfavor, and unlimited employer discretion to fire employees eventually yielded to a more limited rule." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 697-98, 802 A.2d 731, 735 (2002). Following that trend, "[o]ur Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the general rule regarding at-will employment in which an at-will employee may have a cause of action when the employee alleges a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy . . . The public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, however, is to be construed narrowly . . . Under that narrow exception, the employee has the burden of pleading and proving that his dismissal occurred for a reason violating public policy . . . In evaluating such claims, our Supreme Court has looked to see whether the plaintiff has . . . alleged that his discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision . . . or whether he alleged that his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy . . . A cognizable claim for wrongful discharge requires the plaintiff to establish that the employer's conduct surrounding the termination of the plaintiff's employment violated an important public policy." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 844, 888 A.2d 104, 112 (2006).

"Although [our Supreme Court has] been willing to recognize . . . a claim for wrongful termination in appropriate cases, [it has] repeatedly . . . underscored [its] adherence to the principle that the public policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is a narrow one . . . Consequently, [the Supreme Court] [has] rejected claims of wrongful discharge that have not been predicated upon an employer's violation of an important and clearly articulated public policy. See, e.g., Burnham v. Karl Gelb, P.C., [ 252 Conn. 153, 161, 745 A.2d 178 (2000)] (plaintiff failed to state claim because allegations of retaliatory discharge did not satisfy requirements of statute upon which claim was based); Daley v. Aetna Life Casualty Co., [ 249 Conn. 766, 804, 734 A.2d 112 (1999)] (plaintiff could not prevail on claim that public policy required employers to provide flexible work schedules for working parents because no statute mandates such accommodation); Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 204 Conn. 460, 468-70, 528 A.2d 1137 (1987) (oil company employee, who had been terminated for failing to obtain accurate information regarding competitors' pricing practices, did not allege facts sufficient to support claim that termination violated public policy); Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., [ 200 Conn. 676, 680, 513 A.2d 66 (1986)] (`[a] false but negligently made accusation of criminal conduct as a basis for dismissal is not a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal when employer not statutorily obligated to investigate veracity of allegation'). In each such instance, [the Supreme Court] found no statutorily based expression of public policy sufficient to warrant an exception to the at-will employment doctrine." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 260 Conn. 700-01.

"The public policy can emanate from statutes, both state and federal, as well as constitutional provisions . . . A plaintiff does not have to show that her discharge violated one of those statutes or constitutional provisions, but only that her discharge violated the public policy reflected in that legislation." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, supra, 260 Conn. 728.

1.

Wage Protection Statutes

The plaintiff alleges: "Upon information and belief, the decision to fire the plaintiff was . . . motivated by fiscal concerns in that the Hospital was, at that time, trying to cut costs and the plaintiff was one of the highest paid employees of the hospital, was second in seniority, was entitled to 5 weeks of vacation each year, and was on the verge of accruing an additional 1,000 hours of pension benefits." In construing the plaintiff's complaint "broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically;" (internal quotation marks omitted) Beaudoin v. Town Oil Co., supra, 207 Conn. 588; the court interprets the plaintiff's complaint to allege that her discharge violated Connecticut's wage protection statutes, General Statutes §§ 31-71c and 31-71e, or the public policy reflected in that legislation.

"General Statutes §§ 31-71c(b) and 31-71e state, in pertinent part, respectively, that: Whenever an employer discharges an employee, the employer shall pay the employee's wages in full not later than the business day next succeeding the date of such discharge, and [n]o employer may withhold or divert any portion of an employee's wages . . . Wages is defined in General Statutes § 31-71a(3) as compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis of calculation . . . These statutes represent a public policy against the withholding of wages by employers." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cook v. Alexander Alexander of Connecticut, Inc., 40 Conn.Sup. 246, 248, 488 A.2d 1295 (1985).

"[A] plaintiff may plead a wrongful discharge claim by alleging that the plaintiff was discharged so as to avoid the payment of other compensation that, if vested, would have accrued." Leue v. Computer Sciences Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 01 811784 (March 15, 2002, Wagner, J.) ( 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 528). See Cook v. Alexander Alexander of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 40 Conn.Sup. 248. However, the right to the other compensation must be enforceable under the wage protection statute. See Cook v. Alexander Alexander of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 40 Conn.Sup. 248. In Cook, the complaint alleged that plaintiff's employment was terminated "to avoid paying the plaintiff substantial bonuses and to prevent the plaintiff from attaining his vested thrift plan rights." Id., 247. The court explained that the "the plaintiff's alleged unpaid bonuses and vested thrift plan constitute unpaid wages within the meaning of the statute." Id., 248. Thus, "a complaint alleging that . . . employment was terminated in order to prevent the vesting of certain rights to compensation which, if vested, would be enforceable rights under Connecticut's wage protection statutes states a cause of action for wrongful termination." Okon v. Medical Marketing Group, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 93 306032 (August 18, 1994, Pittman, J.) ( 12 Conn. L. Rptr. 228, 229). "[T]he term `wages' . . . does not include pension . . . benefits." Morales v. Pentec, Inc., 57 Conn.App. 419, 429, 749 A.2d 47, 54 (2000). Moreover, "the term `wages' . . . does not include vacation pay." Fulco v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 27 Conn.App. 800, 805, 609 A.2d 1034, 1037 (1992), appeal dismissed, 226 Conn. 404, 627 A.2d 931 (1993).

In essence, the plaintiff alleges that she was discharged in order to avoid the accrual of additional vacation time and pension benefits. Since neither constitutes unpaid wages within the meaning of the statute, they are not enforceable rights under the statutes. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to plead that her discharge violated the wage protection statutes or the public policy against the withholding of wages by employers embodied in that legislation.

2.

The plaintiff alleges: "Upon information and belief, the decision to fire the plaintiff was made in order to send a clear message to all past, present and future employees that any further discussion or conjecture concerning the circumstances surrounding the death of the patient referred to above were entirely off limits." In construing the plaintiff's complaint "broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically;" (internal quotation marks omitted) Beaudoin v. Town Oil Co., supra, 207 Conn. 588; the court interprets the plaintiff's complaint to allege that her discharge violated General Statutes § 31-51q, or the public policy reflected in that statute.² General Statutes 31-51q prohibits the retaliatory discharge of employees who exercise constitutionally guaranteed free speech rights addressing a matter of public concern.

2 In the memorandum in support of the motion to strike, the defendants argue that the plaintiff claims to have been discharged because she allegedly violated a patient's privacy rights. In her memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike, the plaintiff argues that "the defendants' effort to confine the plaintiff's claim to having been discharged solely as a result of being `falsely accused of a violation of a patient's privacy rights' ignores the plaintiff's claim that she was discharged as part of a broader effort on the part of the defendants to preclude inquiry into any possible improprieties on the part of the defendants relative to the death of the patients and to use her termination as a means of deterring past, present, or future employees from discussing or considering the manner of his death any further."

"General Statutes 31-51q states: Any Employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political subdivision thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state, provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere with the employee's bona fide job performance or the working relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge . . . section 31-51q protects from retaliatory discharge an employee who invokes constitutionally guaranteed free speech rights that, in turn, protect statements that address a matter of public concern . . . [W]hether the subject matter addressed by a particular statement is of public concern involves a question of law for the court . . . [W]hether a particular statement addresses such a matter depends on its content, its form and the context in which it is made. The later inquiry necessarily involves a question of fact . . ."

"In order to plead a violation of Section 31-51q, the plaintiff must allege: (1) that [she] was exercising rights protected by the first Amendment to the United States Constitution or by an equivalent provision of the Connecticut Constitution; (2) that [she] was fired on account of [her] exercise of such rights; and (3) that [her] exercise of first amendment or equivalent state constitutional rights did not subsequently or materially interfere with [her] bona fide job performance or with [her] working relationship with [her] employer . . . In order to show that constitutionally protected rights are at issue under Sec. 31-51q, a plaintiff must allege that [she] was exercising [her] free speech rights as a citizen with respect to a matter of public concern. The issue to be addressed is not simply whether the subject matter of the employee's complaint touches on a matter of public concern generally; the issue is whether . . . an employee was acting as a citizen attempting to speak out on a public issue, or whether the employee was instead attempting to resolve a private dilemma relating to employment." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Raible v. Essex Yacht Club, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 03 0564783 (August 19, 2003, Hurley, J.T.R.) ( 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 295, 296).

The plaintiff has failed to plead that her discharge violated her constitutionally protected free speech rights or that it violated the public policy reflected in that constitutional provision. The plaintiff did not plead any facts from which it can be inferred that she actually exercised her free speech rights by making a statement concerning alleged malpractice in the care of a patient, that her exercise of free speech was stifled, or that any statements that she might have made related to a matter of public concern. Rather, the plaintiff pleads that "there was great concern expressed by staff members and co-employees regarding the gravity of the patient's medical condition. Following the death of the patient, questions and/or rumors were circulating amongst staff members and co-employees concerning the adequacy of care rendered to the patient and whether malpractice had occurred. After the patient died, numerous employees were terminated or otherwise disciplined . . . and . . . these terminations or other acts of discipline related to a claim . . . that these employees had improperly accessed the chart of the patient and had obtained information relating to his treatment and condition . . . The supervisor accused the plaintiff of improperly accessing medical records of patients on more than one occasion . . . [T]he decision to fire the plaintiff was made in order to send a clear message to all past, present and future employees that any further discussion or conjecture concerning the circumstances surrounding the death of the patient referred to above were entirely off limits."

The plaintiff has not satisfied her burden of pleading and proving that her dismissal occurred for a reason violating public policy. Accordingly, the motion to strike count eight is granted.

G.

The defendants move to strike the ninth count, which purports to allege a cause of action for defamation, on the grounds that the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show the essential element of publication. In contrast, the plaintiff argues that the allegation that she was blacklisted satisfies the publication requirement. The plaintiff relies on Miron v. University of New Haven Police Department, 284 Conn. 35, 931 A.2d 847 (2007) for the proposition that communications, when made by a former employer to a new prospective employer, are sufficient to satisfy the publication requirement for a claim of defamation. However, the plaintiff notes that if the employee consents to the employment references then there is a qualified or conditional privilege which the defendants can plead as a special defense.

"A defamatory statement is defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him . . . To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., 291 Conn. 620, 627-28, 969 A.2d 736 (2009).

"A claim of [defamation] must be pled with specificity, as the precise meaning and choice of words employed is a crucial factor in any evaluation of falsity. The allegations should set forth facts . . . sufficient to apprise the defendant of the claim made against him . . . [A] complaint for defamation must, on its face, specifically identify what allegedly defamatory statements were made, by whom, and to whom . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 98 0486346 (July 12, 2002, Berger, J.), aff'd, 76 Conn.App. 907, 822 A.2d 372 (2003); see Financial Consulting, LLC v. Illinois Mutual Life Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 09 5013143 (October 28, 2010, Cosgrove, J.) ("Although our appellate courts have not addressed this issue, several trial courts . . . have required that claims of defamation be pleaded with specificity, identifying what allegedly defamatory statements were made, by whom and to whom . . . Moreover, Judge Berger, in Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., [ supra], Superior Court . . . Docket No. CV 98 0486346 . . . held that `a complaint for defamation must, on its face, specifically identify what allegedly defamatory statements were made, by whom, and to whom.' His decision was affirmed by the Appellate Court." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)).

"A complaint is insufficient to withstand dismissal for failure to state a cause of action where, other than the bare allegation that the defendant's actions caused injury to plaintiff's reputation, the complaint sets forth no facts of any kind indicating what defamatory statements, if any, were made, when they were made, or to whom they might have been made." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 2500 SS Limited Partnership v. White, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. 328934 (August 19, 1996, Levin, J.) ( 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 449, 450). As I wrote in 2500 SS Limited Partnership fifteen years ago: "In defamation actions especially, words count, and a premium is placed on the precise words employed. In addition, requiring the plaintiff to specifically plead the precise defamation facilitates the use and disposition of pretrial dispositive motions and a determination of whether the alleged defamation is privileged." Id., 450-51.

The complaint alleges: "Since the date of her discharge, the plaintiff has diligently applied for employment with other hospitals but, despite 32 years of exemplary service and stellar evaluations, she has been unable to secure substitute employment. Upon information and belief, she is being blacklisted.³ . . . The statements made and published by the defendants concerning the plaintiff were false and were made in reckless disregard for the truth." The plaintiff does not allege who made the allegedly defamatory statements, the content of any statements allegedly published or to whom publication was allegedly made. As such, the plaintiff's claim of defamation is far too conclusory to survive a motion to strike. Cf. Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Electronic Transactions, Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. CV 09-4567 (RBK/KMW) (D.N.J. May 4, 2010) (allegation that plaintiff was defamed by being blacklisted too conclusory to survive motion to dismiss).

3 Blacklisting occurs when an employer "publishes or causes to be published the name of any . . . employee . . . with the intent and for the purpose of preventing such employee . . . from engaging in or securing employment from any other person, corporation, company, firm, or the state . . . or, in any manner, conspires or contrives, by correspondence or otherwise, to prevent such employee . . . from procuring employment . . ." General Statutes § 31-51; see Miron v. University of New Haven Police Department, supra, 284 Conn. 49 (blacklisting requires employer to act "with an improper motive, namely, the intent to prevent an employee from securing employment"); see also Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) ("Blacklist" means: "[t]o put the name of (a person) on a list of those who are to be boycotted or punished the firm blacklisted the former employee"). However, blacklisting does not occur when an employer gives "a truthful statement of any facts concerning a present or former employee . . . on the application of such employee or of any person, or any officer or agent of any corporation, company, firm, or the state or any political subdivision thereof, who may be considering the employment of such employee." General Statutes § 31-51.

Accordingly, the motion to strike count nine is granted.