Opinion
Case No. 02-536 ADM/AJB
May 8, 2003
William L. French, Esq., Rochester, MN, on behalf of Plaintiff.
Thomas E. Marshall, Esq., and Paul A. Egtvedt, Esq., Jackson Lewis, L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN, on behalf of Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Allie F. McEachern ("McEachern") brought the above-entitled action against Prime Hospitality Corp. ("Prime"), alleging violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and disability and gender discrimination, as prohibited by Section 363.03(1) of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). On March 19, 2003, Prime's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 10] was taken under advisement by the undersigned United States District Judge on the basis of written memoranda only, as neither party requested oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, Prime's Summary Judgment Motion is granted.
II. BACKGROUND
For purposes of the instant Motion, the facts, though drawn from a very limited documentary record, are viewed in the light most favorable to McEachern, the nonmovant. See Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995).
McEachern was hired by Prime on March 30, 2000. McEachern Dep. at 196 (Egtvedt Aff. Ex. C). Before working at Prime, McEachern worked at several different property management companies in the Rochester, Minnesota, area. Id. at 18-39. In early 2000, McEachern applied for a management position at the Rochester Ramada, a hotel managed by Prime, and interviewed with Prime's Regional Vice President, Thomas Blum ("Blum"), who hired her as general manager. Her duties included managing all facets of the hotel. Id. at 51.
Prime asserts McEachern violated company policy by allowing her husband and hotel employees and their friends to stay at the hotel free of charge. Blum Aff. ¶ 4; McEachern Dep. at 80. McEachern admits she permitted her husband to stay without paying on occasion, but states she was not instructed this was inappropriate. Prime also asserts that while McEachern was general manager, she caused a strain on outside business because she had poor relations with certain vendors, and that Blum discussed these performance issues with McEachern prior to her leave of absence. Blum Aff. 66 4, 11. McEachern argues, however, that the problems with vendors and service provides were attributable solely to Prime's failure to pay them. McEachern Dep. at 57-58. She claims she tried to discuss these problems with Blum, but that he would not return her calls. Id. at 58-59.
McEachern has suffered from depression for most of her adult life. While at work at the Ramada on February 2, 2001, McEachern attempted suicide. She was taken to St. Mary's Hospital, where she remained until February 23, 2001. Shortly after being admitted to the hospital, McEachern spoke to Blum and told him she would need some time to recover. Blum told her to take care of herself, and, according to McEachern, promised her job would be there for her when she returned. Id. at 82.
Blum states he advised McEachern to call Prime's human resource department to inquire about taking a personal leave. Blum. Aff. ¶ 6. According to internal Prime records, during the week of February 9, 2001, McEachern spoke to Susan Hale ("Hale"), benefits administrator for Prime, and requested time off for medical reasons. See McEachern Dep. Ex. 4 (E-mail from Hale to Welch of 2/16/01). Hale related this conversation with McEachern in writing to Judieth Welch ("Welch"), Vice President of Associate Relations for Prime. Id. Welch then spoke to McEachern and told her she did not qualify for FMLA leave, since she had been with Prime for less than a year, but that she could take personal leave pursuant to company policy. Welch Aff. ¶¶ 4-6. McEachern, however, asserts that she has no recollection of ever speaking to anyone at Prime other than Blum regarding her request for leave. McEachern Dep. at 91-93.
McEachern has stated that she remembers very little that occurred during this time because of undergoing electroshock treatment while hospitalized. See McEachern Dep. Ex. 7 at 3 (Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories) (taken as part of different lawsuit).
Welch submits that she explained to McEachern that because McEachern had been at Prime for over six months she would be allowed an unpaid leave of absence for up to 90 days under Prime's personal leave policy. Welch Aff. ¶¶ 5-6. Welch states that she further informed McEachern that her benefits would remain during her leave as long as she continued to make the necessary contributions, but that when she returned to work she would not be entitled to resume her former job. Id. ¶ 6. The employee handbook McEachern received when she began working at Prime included this information and provided that if, upon her return, McEachern did not accept an offer of a position selected by Prime, she would be deemed to have voluntarily resigned. McEachern Dep. Ex. 2 at 22 (Handbook for Prime Associates); Egtvedt Aff. Ex. D (Receipt to be Signed by Associate). On February 21, 2002, Welch filled out a "Non Active Associate Report" for McEachern. McEachern Dep. Ex. 4; Welch Aff. ¶ 7. The report explains that McEachern did not qualify for FMLA leave, and notes the reason for suspension of pay as "personal leave" for 90 days. McEachern Dep. Ex. 4.
During McEachern's personal leave, Blum had Carl Chupp ("Chupp"), a management employee at the Comfort Inn, another property managed by Prime, assume the general manager position at the Ramada. Blum Aff. ¶ 9. McEachern was released from the hospital on February 23, 2001, and notified Blum on February 28, 2001, that she was ready to return to work. According to McEachern, Blum did not respond to her initial requests to return to work, but eventually met with her in early March. Id. at 98-101. When they met, Blum told McEachern that Chupp was doing a good job as general manager and that he intended for Chupp to remain in that position. Blum Aff. ¶ 12. Blum claims Chupp was successful at following company policies, improving vendor relationships, and managing the staff, and thus a better fit for the job than McEachern. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Blum offered McEachern a position as Sales Manager for the Rochester hotels. Blum Aff. ¶ 13; McEachern Dep. at 105. McEachern claims she was never given any details about this position, such as whether it was permanent or temporary, or how much she would be paid. McEachern Dep. at 105-06. Blum wrote to McEachern on March 21, 2001, informing her he needed a decision from her on the new position by March 27, 2001. Letter from Blum to McEachern of 3/21/01.
Chupp continued as general manager of the Ramada until Prime ceased managing the property in April 2001. Blum Aff. ¶¶ 10-11.
Prime subsequently received a letter dated March 19, 2001, from William French, McEachern's attorney. The letter averred that by failing to return McEachern to the position of general manager she had been constructively discharged. McEachern Dep. Ex. 5 (Letter from French to Blum of 3/19/01). The letter also threatened legal action if Prime did not comply with her demand for money damages. Id. Prime kept the offer of the Sales Manager position open until March 27, 2001, but McEachern did not accept. As of April 2001, National Lodging took over management of the Ramada and Prime no longer employed anyone at the Ramada. Welch Dep. at 33.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall issue "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party may not "rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial." Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). Further, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between parties is not sufficient by itself to deny summary judgment. . . . Instead, `the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.'" Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
B. Family and Medical Leave Act
To qualify as an "eligible employee" under the FMLA, an employee must show that at the time the leave began she: (1) had been employed "for at least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested," and (2) had been employed for "at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A). McEachern has not established that she was entitled to FMLA leave. To be an "eligible employee" McEachern must have been employed for an aggregate of at least 12 months prior to "the date the leave commences." 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) (emphasis added); see also Walker v. Elmore County Bd. of Educ., 223 F. Supp.2d 1255, 1257-58 (M.D.Ala. 2002). McEachern was hired on March 30, 2000. She requested and took leave in February 2001. McEachern was therefore not employed at Prime for 12 months as of the date she commenced her leave. McEachern argues, however, that she remained an employee while on leave, since she continued to receive benefits and her employment had not been terminated. Regardless of whether or not she was considered an employee during her period of leave, by her own admissions, McEachern began her leave of absence before she had attained a year of employment and therefore cannot qualify as an "eligible employee." See 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d). Thus, McEachern was not entitled to FMLA leave. Prime's motion for summary judgment on the FMLA claim is granted.
C. Discrimination
McEachern also asserts disability and gender discrimination in violation of MHRA § 363.03(1), which prohibits unfair discriminatory practices in employment. McEachern contends Blum preferred Chupp to her because he is a male and that Prime's failure to reinstate her in the general manager position was unlawful discrimination based on her female gender and her disabled status as the result of her depression.
When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial, as opposed to direct, evidence of intentional discrimination, the Court applies the three-stage burden shifting approach developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and later refined by the Court in Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Dammen v. UniMed Med. Ctr., 236 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 2001). Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of discrimination. Dammen, 236 F.3d at 980. If the prima facie case is established, a legal presumption arises that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff. Id. This rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of production to the employer to provide evidence that the plaintiff was rejected (or someone else was preferred) for a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Id. If the employer articulates such a reason, the presumption disappears and the McDonnell Douglas framework becomes irrelevant. The sole remaining issue is whether the employer discriminated. Id. The plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove, by preponderance of the evidence, that "the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Id. Proof that a defendant's proffered reason is unpersuasive or contrived does not, however, establish that plaintiff's assertion of discrimination is correct. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000). That is, it is not enough to disbelieve the employer, but rather the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination must be believed. Id. at 147.
Though these cases dealt with discrimination under federal statutes, Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Minnesota courts apply this same analysis to discrimination claims made pursuant to the MHRA. Dietrich v. Canadian Pac., 536 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Minn. 1995).
1. Disability Discrimination
To obtain relief for disability discrimination, an aggrieved employee must establish that she has a disability, that she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation, and that she has suffered adverse employment action because of her disability. Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995). Disability discrimination claims under the MHRA are analyzed in the same manner and by the same standards as claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Reiff v. Interim Personnel, 906 F. Supp. 1280, 1292 (D. Minn. 1995). Under the MHRA:
"Disability" means any condition or characteristic that renders a person a disabled person. A disabled person is any person who (1) has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment which materially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment."
Minn. Stat. § 363.01(13); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (ADA definition of disability).
Determining whether an impairment materially limits a major life activity is a threshold question that is guided by the relevant ADA regulations. Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1997) (evaluating MHRA disability claim by reference to definitions provided in federal regulations). A person is materially or substantially limited in a major life activity if such individual is:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which [the] individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). This inquiry requires an individualized assessment, based on the effect of the asserted impairment on the particular plaintiff. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).
Major life activities are those "that are of central importance to daily life," and include working. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). An individual is materially limited with regard to the life activity of working if the impairment prevents him or her from performing a class or broad range of jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). "The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." Id.
McEachern has not met the requirements necessary to substantiate a claim of disability discrimination. She first must prove that she has a disability, a "physical, sensory, or mental impairment which materially limits one or more major life activities." Minn. Stat. § 363.01(13). McEachern asserts that her depression is a recognized mental impairment. Although depression can give rise to a mental impairment pursuant to the above definition, McEachern has provided the Court with no evidence to support her position. A medical diagnosis or a one-time hospitalization do not, standing alone, establish a disability. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 ("It is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability status . . . to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment."). "[T]he determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). There is no evidence before this Court regarding the ongoing impact McEachern's depression has had on her life.
McEachern claims her depression substantially limited her ability to work. She argues that the limitations imposed by an impairment should be assessed without regard to mitigating treatment, such as medication, and that episodic conditions may be substantially limiting if they are extremely debilitating when they occur. This assertion, however, is directly contrary to established ADA case law. When assessing whether or not an impairment substantially limits an individual's ability to perform a life function, courts must take into consideration mitigating measures like medication. See, e.g. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 ("A `disability' exists only where an impairment `substantially limits' a major life activity, not where it `might,' `could,' or `would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken."). McEachern testified that she is able to function normally while on medication. McEachern Dep. at 87-88. Additionally, there is no evidence to support McEachern's allegation that her depression limited her ability to perform her job, except on this occasion. McEachern testified in deposition that she consistently performed well and received several awards in past employment. Id. at 40-43, 141-43, 166. Therefore, although McEachern claims her depression has limited her ability to work, insufficient evidence exists to support this assertion. "[M]ere allegations which are not supported with specific facts are not enough to withstand" summary judgment. Klein v. McGowan, 198 F.3d 705, 709 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
Even assuming McEachern states a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Prime has set forth a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See Dammen, 236 F.3d at 980. During McEachern's hospitalization Prime needed to fill the general manager position at the Ramada. Since McEachern was not entitled to FMLA leave, she took leave under Prime's personal leave policy, which grants an employee time away, but does not necessarily grant the employee his or her former job upon return. McEachern Dep. Ex. 2 at 22 (Handbook for Prime Associates) ("Being granted a personal leave of absence does not assure you the right to return to work for Prime or to return to the specific job you held before you left."); Welch Aff. ¶ 6. Indeed, while McEachern was on leave Blum hired Chupp to fill the position, and Chupp was effective at the job. Blum Aff. ¶¶ 9-12. Needing to fill a vacant position, and deciding that the replacement employee performed satisfactorily, are legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for Prime's actions. McEachern has not shown that Prime's asserted justification is unpersuasive and that her "proffered reason of discrimination is correct." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-7.
McEachern alleges that in addition to circumstantial evidence, direct evidence also exists that proves she suffered disability discrimination. McEachern claims Blum told her that when he saw her in the hospital, "he thought she looked as though she would never be able to return to work." Pl. Mem. at 6. According to McEachern, this comment was a discriminatory reaction to her depression and caused Blum to replace her with Chupp. Id. This alleged comment, even if made, does not rise to the level of intentional discrimination. Neither does it show that Prime regarded her as disabled. To establish that an employer considered an employee disabled "requires more than a mere awareness of the employee's condition." Johnson v. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc., 83 F. Supp.2d 1007, 1012 (D.Minn. 2000). McEachern must present some evidence that a reasonable juror could rely upon to find that Prime considered her materially limited in a major life function. Conant v. City of Hibbing, 131 F. Supp.2d 1129, 1136 (D.Minn. 2000). To the contrary, it is undisputed that Prime offered McEachern a job when she was released from the hospital. Blum Aff. ¶ 13; McEachern Dep. at 105. McEachern has provided no direct proof of discrimination and no evidence to support an inference that Prime regarded her as disabled. See Johnson, 83 F. Supp.2d at 1012-13. Therefore, McEachern's disability discrimination claim cannot survive summary judgment.
2. Gender Discrimination
To establish her claim of gender discrimination, McEachern must prove: 1) she is a member of a protected class, 2) she was qualified to perform her position, 3) she was subject to an adverse employment action, and 4) that a similarly situated male was treated differently. See LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 240 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 2000); Pullar v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 701, Hibbing, 582 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Minn.Ct.App. 1998).
Other than her statement that she is a woman and therefore a member of a statutorily protected class, McEachern offers no evidence to support any of the elements of a prima facie discrimination case. Particularly, she fails to explain in what way she suffered an adverse employment action. McEachern was not entitled to reinstatement to her former position and was offered an alternative job when she became able to resume work. Secondly, McEachern made no showing to counter Prime's evidence that the male worker McEachern identifies as a similarly situated employee worked at a different property, in a different position, and never took personal leave after his surgery. As such, McEachern has not met her burden of proof to establish the existence of a similarly situated male, and cannot sustain a claim of gender discrimination. See LaCroix, 240 F.3d at 694 (finding employee in different department with different job was not similarly situated to plaintiff). Summary judgment on this issue is granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 10] is GRANTED, and
2. Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.