Opinion
No. FA 03-0348725 S
October 6, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The parties were married in New York, New York, on August 27, 1966. Two children were born to the wife during the marriage, Michael and Patrick, both of whom have reached their majority. The parties have been living separate and apart since April 2002. The family home in Ridgefield has been sold, and the proceeds are being held in escrow. The plaintiff wife ("wife") has resided at 4041 Gulf Shore Boulevard North, Naples, Florida, since June 2002, and the defendant husband ("husband") resides at 9009 Whimbrel Watch Lane, Unit #102, Osprey Pointe, Naples, Florida. He purchased the unit in March 2003 during the pendency of the case, with joint funds and with the consent of the wife. The case was tried over the course of three days. Both parties have adopted a remarkably similar approach to the disposition of the case with the exception of how to treat two major assets: (1) the wife's State of Connecticut Teacher's Pension, and (2) the proceeds from a modest inheritance from the husband's Aunt Mary. While there was a degree of emotion displayed, there was no apparent acrimony.
The wife turned sixty years of age on August 1 of this year. She described her health as good. The husband testified that she suffers from depression from time to time, for which she has taken medication. She has a Bachelor's Degree and, during the marriage, earned a Master's as well. Early on during the marriage, she taught school in Arizona for one and one-half years. She also worked part-time as a teacher and in a department store in New Jersey when the children were young. However, her principal job has been in the Ridgefield, Connecticut, school system where she taught from 1978 until her retirement in June 1999. At that time, the parties purchased additional pension credits due to her previous teaching experience in Arizona and New Jersey. After discussing the matter with the husband, she elected the single life option, and currently receives approximately $25,000 per annum from her pension. Her financial affidavit shows that her net income from the pension is $20,796. The pension has a provision for an annual cost of living adjustment. For most of the marriage, the family used her medical plan, which is available to the husband under COBRA.
The husband is sixty-one years of age. The wife also described his health as "good." The husband testified that he has "chronic neck pain," and that he takes Celebrex and Lipitor. At the time of the marriage, he was an Air Force Captain stationed in Arizona. Although he considered a career in the Air Force, the wife did not want him to do so, and he left the service. The husband held a series of jobs and went back to school to earn an MBA in management finance accounting. He began his career as a staff accountant, moved to operations, and ultimately went into the field of mergers and acquisitions. The wife testified that his highest earnings in any one year was about $150,000. However, the evidence shows that for some periods it was actually higher.
In 1992, he and six others founded a firm called American Medical Response, which was later sold for a considerable amount of money. The moneys received for his "founder's shares" formed a substantial part of the basis for the family wealth. The wife wanted the money to be "safe," so the husband invested it with Goldman Sachs in bonds. The principal asset of the parties is that joint investment account at Goldman Sachs, which was valued at the time of trial at between $1,500,000 and $1,600,000. This was accumulated during the marriage and is a marital asset, and it is a source of income for both parties.
During the marriage, the parties purchased a succession of residences, culminating in the home at 58 Long View Drive, Ridgefield, Connecticut. The home was sold in December 2003, and the net proceeds in the amount of approximately $500,000 are being held in escrow. Each party has purchased a condominium. The one currently occupied by the wife had been intended by the parties to be their dream retirement home. The wife testified that the husband, "loved it as much as she did." It has two bed rooms and is 2,300 square feet in area. The wife has spent a considerable amount of money renovating the unit, including walls, kitchen, and bath. It has an agreed-upon value for purposes of equitable distribution of $805,000. The husband later purchased his unit at Osprey Point. He made some modest improvements. The unit has a fair market value of $311,921. According to the testimony of the husband, the unit is furnished with much of the furniture from the Ridgefield home. At the same time, he also purchased a family membership at the Imperial Golf Club, using $50,000 of joint funds. The parties offered differing testimony about the reason for the investment and its ultimate use. The initial nonrefundable membership fee was $30,000, and the bond has an equity value of $20,000. Despite his chronic neck pain, the husband does play golf two to three times per week, and he can convert the family membership to an individual one and save some fees.
In addition to the wife's Connecticut State Teacher's Retirement, the parties have accumulated a number of other retirement vehicles, including individual retirement accounts and a 401k plan totaling approximately $700,000. The parties have both asked the court to divide these assets equally.
There was testimony about the wife's jewelry. The husband testified that it was purchased for around $40,000, but that it was only worth about $20,000 at this time. They also have twelve-place settings of china, crystal, and silverware. The wife testified that she is willing to share the place settings equally with the husband. The parties have three automobiles. There is an investment account at Bear Stearns in the husband's name having a value of $52,549.
A significant bone of contention is the inheritance from the husband's Aunt Mary which has a value of approximately $150,000. The evidence supports a finding that Aunt Mary wanted the husband and his siblings to share in the estate rather than losing it all to taxes. The testimony further supports a finding that the husband's elderly Aunt Mary placed the bulk of her $380,000 to $400,000 estate in a joint bond fund with him. He managed these funds for her. For the balance of her life, the husband used the income from the funds for his aunt's benefit, via a checking account to pay her expenses, including those at Glen Crest through September 1999. The husband argues, that because the check from his aunt was initially written to him alone, that, in and of itself, is evidence that the wife was not to share in any fashion. That argument fails, since it addresses only one point. The testimony is clear that, as the aunt's health failed, other family members, including the wife, took a direct part in her care. The husband testified that he looked in on her on weekends. However, the wife testified that she also had a good relationship with Aunt Mary, was in regular contact with her, and, in fact, moved in with the aunt one summer, at which time she ran errands and took her to doctors' appointments. The aunt moved to her niece's home on Cape Cod and was there at the time of her death in September 2000.
After paying two modest legacies, the husband divided the balance of the estate in sixths (not thirds) and gifted two sixths each to his brother and his wife and his sister and her husband. Each of these shares was worth about $60,000. In addition, the husband received $30,000 from a life insurance policy on his aunt's life. This was not divided. The court found the testimony of the wife credible on this issue, and accords significant weight to the manner of the division of the estate by the husband, as corroborating the wife's contention that it was the aunt's intent that the siblings and their spouses share equally as to the bulk of the estate. The life insurance policy was treated differently by the husband, and the proceeds were not within his control until after the death of Aunt Mary.
The court heard considerable testimony from both Barry Kaplan and Kenneth J. Pia, Jr., who were called upon to place a present value on the husband's Social Security benefits. Both experts filed reports (Exhibit #8 and Exhibit A). Each testified that their respective calculations regarding the present value of the income stream from the wife's pension and the husband's Social Security benefit are very close. Both seem to agree that the value of the Connecticut Teacher's Retirement (before tax considerations) is $461,394. Mr. Pia found the present value of the husband's income stream from Social Security to be either $232,376 or $233,376 depending upon whether he elects to receive the benefits at age sixty-two or age sixty-six. Mr. Kaplan made similar calculations arriving at $232,376 and $233,285 for ages sixty-two and sixty-six, respectively. The base numbers are therefore virtually identical. The difference lies in the conclusion of Mr. Pia, that it is appropriate to take into account the tax consequences to each party, as well as the effects of reinvestment of the property division. Each expert clearly articulated the opinion of the writer. Mr. Pia is of the opinion that a lump sum of $53,516 or $56,412 would place the parties in parity, again at ages sixty-two and sixty-six, respectively. He even outlines possible monthly payouts of this sum. The husband does not want periodic alimony, but rather a lump sum payment to equalize the value of the respective retirement vehicles. The wife, on the other hand, would like to equalize the income streams of the parties. For reasons discussed below, the court has taken a position that differs from both.
As to the breakdown of the marriage, the wife testified that she left the husband in April 2002, because she was "afraid of him." She said that the last ten years of the marriage had been particularly bad because of the husband's alcoholism, adding that he was an "angry alcoholic" and had threatened her life. Every discussion, she said, "turned into an argument." As his drinking got worse, her husband "cursed, belittled, and degraded her." She felt intimidated. The wife told the court that she had enabled him, since the problem was more or less kept within the family. There was even testimony by the husband's sister, that the wife went so far as to tell people when they asked, that "he [her husband] treats me like a princess." She said that she was so ashamed that she even went to Al-Anon meetings. The court found her sometimes emotional testimony to be credible.
For his part, the husband said that he did not want to be divorced, and that he "would reconcile today." He told the court that, even after the separation, the wife told him that she loved him and would reconcile, if he sought counseling for his alcohol problem and attended family counseling, but that she reneged. He acknowledged that he was a "heavy drinker" who cut back periodically, and that his drinking had an impact upon the marriage. He said that he stopped drinking six months before the separation, but has reverted to "social drinking." The court believes that he has made an effort to deal with his problem, but it is apparently a case of "too little, too late." The husband attributes part of the problem to the wife's emotional difficulties in dealing with the deaths of her two brothers and her estrangement from the parties' older son, Michael. He told the court that the wife was "always insecure about finances." After hearing the testimony of both parties and observing their demeanor, the court finds the husband's testimony on this point to be credible.
In arriving at its orders regarding alimony and equitable distribution, the court was presented with an issue regarding the treatment of the husband's Social Security benefit, in particular, whether or not the husband's Social Security benefit is a marital asset capable of division or to be considered as an offset, and whether or not it is appropriate for the court to make a finding as to its present value. The court considered the following facts in making the decision: (1) The wife is currently receiving a monthly pension payment from the Connecticut Teacher's Retirement System, and that by prior agreement of the parties, there are no present or survivor benefits due to the husband; (2) that due to her employment with the Board of Education for the Town of Ridgefield, Connecticut, the wife was exempt from participation in the Social Security System, and that she made no contributions thereto as a result of said service; (3) that the husband will be eligible to receive Social Security benefits commencing with his sixty-second birthday, and maximum benefits as of his sixty-sixth birthday.
The court makes no finding that the wife will not be eligible to receive any derivative Social Security benefit following the decree of dissolution or upon the death of the husband, even a nominal benefit.
LAW
Since the case of Thompson v. Thompson, 183 Conn. 96 (1981), the Connecticut Supreme Court has gone to great lengths defining and expanding upon the concept that pensions, both vested and unvested, as well as other retirement vehicles, are marital assets subject to equitable distribution. Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783 (1995); Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733 (2001). Prior to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") pensions were not divisible. With the effective date of that law, pensions became divisible by means of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO"). In many instances, whether by agreement, or by court decision, marital assets are divided by what is referred to as the "offset" method. Basically, different assets of equivalent value are awarded to each party. In other words, one asset of equivalent value offsets another asset of equivalent value. Inherent in the process is the necessity of determining the present value of any given asset, not only to determine fairness, but also to comply with General Statutes § 46b-81, which mandates that property be divided as of the date of the decree dissolving the marriage.
The first question to be considered by the court is: Is an anticipated Social Security benefit marital property within the context of a marital dissolution, and in particular, the provisions of General Statutes § 46b-81? In the case of Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608-11 (1960), the United States Supreme Court held that the termination of a deported individual's Social Security benefit did not amount to the deprivation of property without due process. In writing for the majority, Justice Harlan held that Social Security benefits are not "accrued property rights," but rather Social Security is a "form of social insurance" in which beneficiaries have a "noncontractual interest." The court specifically distinguished this interest from that of a pension, stating: "that the noncontractual interest of an employee covered by the Act cannot be soundly analogized to that of the holder of an annuity, whose right to benefits is bottomed on his contractual premium payments." Accordingly, this court finds that the husband's anticipated Social Security benefit is not marital property within the meaning of General Statutes § 46b-81.
The next question for this court to consider is: Given the fact that it is not marital property, nevertheless can the trial court take into account the husband's anticipated Social Security benefit in its division of marital assets? On the face of it, the answer would appear simple. The Appellate Court has recently held that: "The power to act equitably is the keystone to the court's ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circumstances that arise out of the dissolution of a marriage [citation omitted]. These equitable powers give the court the authority to consider all the circumstances that may be appropriate for a just and equitable resolution of the marital dispute." Porter v. Porter, 61 Conn.App. 791, 797 (2001). Thus to merely turn a blind eye and to ignore the obvious would seem unfair. However, equity is not without its limits, and any decision must be made in light of the power vested in the court by statute, as well as by any limitations imposed by state or federal law. Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 729-30 (1999).
During the trial, each party called upon an expert to place a present value upon the husband's anticipated Social Security benefit. Each testified at some length; each came remarkably close in their basic opinion of value. Moreover, each treated the benefit much as they would a defined benefit pension plan. The same was said for the valuation of the wife's pension. It then became a mathematical exercise to compare the values and to calculate the difference in order to come up with a monetary figure to be used as an offset. This was the approach taken by another Superior Court in the case of Hvizdak v. Hvizdak, Superior Court, Judicial District of New London, FA01-0122163, 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 692, 2003 Ct.Sup. 11513 (October 9, 2003). In that case, the wife (age forty-nine) was also vested in a Connecticut Teacher's Pension, and the husband (age fifty-one) had an interest in two pensions and was eligible to receive future Social Security benefits. There, the court found that: "It is proper to consider the defendant's Social Security benefits as a fixed source of income and it is equitable and appropriate in this case to consider these benefits as offsetting the plaintiff's teacher's retirement benefits." The court then went on to use the present value method to value the various pensions as well as the husband's Social Security benefit, in arriving at the offset figure. From a purely equitable standpoint, the logic of the trial court in Hvizdak is flawless, however, this court concludes that it must follow a different path.
The court is unaware of any case directly on point decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court or by the Appellate Court, which would allow a trial court to make a finding of a present value of the anticipated Social Security benefit of one party and offset it against other marital assets. In a long and well-reasoned analysis, in the case of In re Marriage of Crook, 211 Ill.2d 437 (2004), a case of first impression, the Illinois Supreme Court did address that very issue. In dissolving the thirty-three-year marriage of Robert L. Crook and Patricia J. Crook, the trial court took into consideration the various retirement accounts of the parties, including the wife's State University Retirement System benefits as well as her Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund benefits. The evidence before the trial court indicated that while the husband was eligible, the wife was ineligible to receive Social Security benefits. However, in the event of the husband's death, she would be eligible for a small survivor benefit as his widow, if she did not remarry. The trial court specifically did not include the husband's anticipated Social Security benefit in dividing the marital assets, including the wife's pensions. The Appellate Court reversed on this issue, and it remanded the case to the trial court, with instructions to, "consider [the husband's] anticipated Social Security benefits in `striving to arrive at a division of property that is equitable to both parties and places each party in similar economic circumstances.'" (Emphasis added.) The specific question to be decided by the Illinois Supreme Court was whether or not the use of the anticipated Social Security benefit of the husband as an offset would amount to an impermissible assignment of that benefit.
42 U.S.C § 407(a) Assignment. The right of any person to any future payment under this title [ 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et. seq.] shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this title [ 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et. seq.] shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court, relying chiefly upon the case of Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 59 L.Ed.2d 1, 99 S.Ct. 802 (1979). There, the issue was whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to offset one spouse's anticipated benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 ( 45 U.S.C. § 231 et seq.). The answer in that case was an emphatic no. The ground for the decision was based upon the supremacy clause of the federal constitution. The court found that to allow an offset or an assignment of the husband's anticipated benefit would undermine the purposes of the act. In reaching this conclusion, the United States Supreme Court considered Section 659 of the Social Security Act ( 42 U.S.C. § 659(i)(3)(B)(ii)) as analogous. That section states that federal retirement benefits may not be used to satisfy a "community property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or other division of property between spouses or former spouses."
While acknowledging a split of authority among the states that have considered the issue, and the "potential inequities," nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded at page 459 of its opinion, that, in this case federal law clearly preempts state law regarding this issue, and that therefore, "Social Security benefits may not be divided directly or used as an offset during state dissolution proceedings." This court agrees. As to the issue of inequity, where one spouse participates in a pension in lieu of Social Security, the court left its resolution to another day, whether that party "must be placed in a position similar to the other spouse whose Social Security benefits will be statutorily exempt from equitable distribution."
In the recent case involving the transfer of an interest in a United States Postal Service pension to the children of the parties to a dissolution of marriage, Rosato v. Rosato, 77 Conn.App. 9, 19, (2003), the Appellate Court held that, in the absence of a clear showing that the federal law preempts our state law, state domestic relations law prevails.
The facts in the present case can be distinguished somewhat, in that the pension benefit currently received by the wife, by prior agreement of the parties, is higher due to fact that it is a single life annuity, without any survivorship benefit for the husband. In the Crook case, the Illinois trial court divided both of the wife's pensions, but declined to offset other assets against the present value of the husband's anticipated Social Security benefit. Nevertheless, the principle is the same. The Supreme Court of Oregon (an equitable division state) came to the same conclusion in Swan v. Swan, 301 Or. 167, 720 P.2d 747 (1986). It pointed out that as of 1975, Congress carved out an exception to the anti-assignment provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), for "legal process" to collect child support and alimony. 42 U.S.C. § 659(a). Specifically excluded from its definition of "alimony" is, inter alia, "the equitable distribution of property" between spouses or former spouses. 42 U.S.C. § 662(c). Congress could have extended the exception to property division; it did not.
42 U.S.C. § 659(a) Consent to support enforcement. Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including section 207 of this Act [ 42 USCS § 407] . . . effective January 1, 1975, moneys (the entitlement to which is based upon remuneration from employment) due from or payable by, the United States or the District of Columbia (including any agency, subdivision, or instrumentality thereof) to an individual . . . shall be subject to any other legal process brought . . . by an individual obligee, to enforce the legal obligation of the individual to provide child support or alimony.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this court declines to adopt the argument of the parties, to the effect that the present value of the husband's anticipated Social Security benefit be treated as an offset for purposes of equitable division of the marital property.
FINDINGS
The Court, having heard the testimony of both parties, and having considered the evidence presented at hearing, as well as the factors enumerated in General Statutes §§ 46b-40, 46b-51, 46b-62, 46b-63, 46b-81, and 46b-82, hereby makes the following findings:
1. That it has jurisdiction.
2. That the allegations of the complaint are proven and true.
3. That the marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably, and that ample evidence exists that the husband is primarily at fault for said breakdown.
4. That during the marriage, neither party has received any aid or assistance from the State of Connecticut or any town or political subdivision thereof.
5. That at the time of the marriage, neither party had any significant assets or inheritances; that throughout the marriage, except as set forth in Article 13 of these findings, until their separation, both parties made significant contributions to the acquisition, maintenance, and preservation of the family assets, including the real estate; and that during the marriage the earnings of both parties were deposited into joint checking and savings accounts.
6. That based upon the statutory factors, including: the division of marital assets, in particular the retirement and other income-producing assets, and taking into consideration the education, earnings, net income, and work experience of the parties, a time-limited award of alimony is appropriate. Ippolito v. Ippolito, 28 Conn.App. 745, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 905 (1992); Milbauer v. Milbauer, 54 Conn.App. 304, 312-15 (1999).
7. That the value of the husband's interest in the condominium occupied by him at 9009 Whimbrel Watch Lane, Unit #102, Osprey Pointe, Naples, Florida, is $311,921.
8. That the parties stipulated and agreed that the value of the condominium occupied by the wife at 4041 Gulf Shore Boulevard North, Naples, Florida, is $805,000, and that there is no mortgage thereon.
9. That the testimony supports a finding that it was the intention of the husband's Aunt Mary that all three siblings and their wives share equally in her approximately $360,000 estate; that the $120,000 payable to the husband therefrom was a marital asset and should be divided equally by the parties; that the proceeds from the life insurance amounting to $30,000 was not a marital asset; and that in the equitable division of assets, the court has taken this into account, in particular, as to the real estate escrow account.
10. That the Court finds each party has sufficient liquid assets and each party shall be responsible for their respective attorneys fees and costs incurred in connection with this action. Maguire v. Maguire, 222 Conn. 32 (1992).
11. That the court may, but is not obligated to take into consideration the federal tax consequences of its financial award. Rolla v. Rolla, 48 Conn.App. 732, 745-47 (1998).
12. That the anticipated Social Security benefit of the husband is not marital property; that Congress intended that the anti-assignment provisions regarding benefits received pursuant to the Social Security Act preempt the equitable division law of the individual states regarding the division of marital property; that the use of the present value of the husband's anticipated Social Security benefit as an offset against other marital assets would be contrary to federal law; that Congress created an exception to the anti-assignment rules with respect to alimony and child support; and that the court is not precluded from considering the husband's actual and/or anticipated Social Security benefit in reaching its decision concerning the term and amount of periodic alimony awarded to either party.
13. That the wife is currently receiving benefits from the State of Connecticut Teacher's Retirement Fund; that by agreement of the parties, they elected a single life annuity, payable for the lifetime of the wife with no survivorship benefit to the husband; that it is the principal source of income for the wife during her retirement, outside of investment income; that she is not eligible for Social Security benefits; that the parties paid approximately $15,000 in joint funds as a "catch up" to enhance her benefit; that, other than the "catch up" payment, the court considers the contribution to the acquisition, preservation, and appreciation of this asset to be principally that of the wife; that the court considered the fact that the husband was the principal cause of the breakdown of the marriage to be significant; and that it is equitable and appropriate for the court to award this asset to the wife free and clear of any claims by the husband, except for a credit in the amount of $7,500 to the husband to be taken into account in the division of other assets.
ORDERS
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The marriage of the parties is hereby dissolved, and they are each hereby declared to be single and unmarried.
2. Commencing November 1, 2004, and monthly thereafter, the wife shall pay to the husband the sum of $850 as and for periodic alimony, until the death of either party, the remarriage of the husband, or October 31, 2005, whichever shall sooner occur.
3. Commencing November 1, 2004, the husband shall pay to the wife the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) per year as and for periodic alimony, until the death of either party, the remarriage of the wife, or October 31, 2005, whichever shall sooner occur.
4. The husband shall retain title to the condominium unit located at Building 2, Unit 102, Osprey Pointe, 9009 Whimbrel Watch Lane, Naples, Florida, together with his percentage interest in any common areas and any appurtenances thereto, subject to any existing mortgage or other indebtedness, including any assessments, special assessments, taxes, and commons charges, free and clear of any further claims by the wife.
5. The wife shall retain title to the condominium unit located at 4041 Gulf Shore Boulevard North, Naples, Florida, together with her percentage interest in any common areas and any appurtenances thereto, subject to any existing mortgage or other indebtedness, including any assessments, special assessments, taxes, and commons charges, free and clear of any further claims by the husband.
6. Personal property shall be divided as follows:
A. Except as otherwise provided herein, the personal property and home furnishings currently in their respective dwellings shall belong to that party, free and clear of any claims by the other.
B. Each party shall be entitled to keep the automobile which they are currently driving free and clear of any claims by the other, and each party shall cooperate with the other regarding the execution of any documentation necessary to transfer and/or register same. Specifically, the husband shall be entitled to the 1997 Cadillac DeVille and the 200 BMW Z3, and the wife shall be entitled to the 2000 Buick LeSabre.
C. Except as otherwise set forth herein, each party shall be entitled to keep their respective savings, checking, and money market accounts free and clear of any claims by the other.
D. The husband shall be entitled to retain the following assets free and clear of any claims by the wife:
1. $20,000.00 Bond — Imperial Golf Club, Naples, Florida;
2. ING Life insurance policy having a cash value of approximately $15,000;
3. Bear Stearns Acct. #420-28566 DN5 having a value of $52,549; and,
4. Deutsche Bank investment account having a value of approximately $7,700.
E. The wife shall be entitled to retain the following assets free and clear of any claims by the husband:
1. Her jewelry (valued at approximately $20,000).
F. Within two (2) weeks from the date of this order, the parties shall divide the joint assets set forth below as follows:
1. Escrow from the sale of Ridgefield, CT property: 94 percent to the husband and 6 percent to the wife.
2. Goldman-Sachs Investment Account: 50 percent to the husband and 50 percent to the wife. CT Page 15559
3. USAA Joint Investment Accounts: 50 percent to the husband and 50 percent to the wife.
4. Place settings of silverware, china, and crystal: 50 percent to the husband and 50 percent to the wife.
5. American Express Co. bonus points: 50 percent to the husband and 50 percent to the wife.
6. Family Loans: Proceeds from any repayment to be divided equally.
7. The wife is covered by Anthem Blue Cross/Blue Shield and shall promptly notify her former employer as to the change of marital status and shall cooperate with the husband in obtaining continuation health insurance coverage as provided by state and federal law. The husband shall be responsible for the payment of any premiums due for such coverage.
8. The Retirement Assets of the parties are hereby divided as follows:
AS TO THE USAA TSA:
The wife shall retain her interest in the USAA TSA free and clear of any claims by the husband.
AS TO THE USAA INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT:
The wife shall retain her interest in the USAA Individual Retirement Account standing in her name, free and clear of any claims by the husband.
AS TO THE USAA INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT:
Within thirty (30) days from the date of this order, the husband shall transfer to the wife, by way of a tax-free spousal transfer $20,000 from the Individual Retirement Account standing in his name, to such account or accounts as wife may direct, and he shall be entitled to the balance of the account free and clear of any claims by the wife.
AS TO THE USAA SEP:
The husband shall retain his interest in the USAA SEP free and clear of any claims by the wife.
AS TO THE USAA SEP (Aggressive Growth):
The husband shall retain his interest in the USAA SEP (aggressive growth) free and clear of any claims by the wife.
AS TO THE PUTNAM 401K PLAN:
The husband shall retain his interest in the Putnam 401K Plan free and clear of any claims by the wife.
AS TO THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT TEACHER'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM PLAN:
The wife shall be entitled to retain her interest in the State of Connecticut Teacher's Retirement System Plan free and clear of any claims by the husband. The foregoing notwithstanding, the husband shall be entitled to a credit in the amount of $7,500 in the division of the escrowed real estate funds.
9. Except as otherwise set forth herein, the parties shall each be responsible for the debts as shown on their respective financial affidavits, and they shall indemnify and hold each other harmless from any further liability thereon.
10. Each party shall be responsible for their respective attorneys fees, expenses, and costs, including expert fees, incurred in connection with this action.
11. There having been a contested hearing at which the financial orders were in dispute, the financial affidavits of the parties are hereby unsealed per P.B. § 25-59A(h).
The Court
Shay, J.