Summary
In Matter of Nicole JJ. (265 A.D.2d 29,supra), the Appellate Division, Third Department affirmed a Family Court order which directed the Commissioner of Social Services to reimburse the foster parent for day-care expenses they had previously incurred for a foster child and to provide funds for future day-care expenses.
Summary of this case from In re L.P.Opinion
April 6, 2000.
Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Otsego County (Coccoma, J.), entered June 12, 1998, which, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, granted the request by respondent Darlene "T" to direct petitioner to pay and reimburse her for all day care expenses for the children.
Fictitious names.
Steven E. Ratner, Department of Social Services, Cooperstown, for appellant.
Roland, Fogel, Koblenz Petroccione LLP (Keith J. Roland of counsel), Albany, for Darlene "T", respondent.
John A. Lindauer, Law Guardian, Manlius, for Nicole "JJ" and others.
BEFORE: MERCURE, J.P., PETERS, SPAIN, CARPINELLO AND GRAFFEO, JJ.
OPINION AND ORDER
Respondent Darlene "T" lives in Kings County and is the maternal aunt of Kristen "JJ" and Nicole "JJ", currently ages 8 and 10, respectively. As a result of March 1995 neglect petitions filed in Suffolk County against their mother, respondent Barbara "KK" (hereinafter respondent), the children were placed in the aunt's custody by interim order dated May 16, 1995. By order dated August 17, 1995, the children were adjudicated neglected and the case was transferred to petitioner because respondent had since moved to Otsego County. The August 1995 order, which expired on August 16, 1996, also directed petitioner "to provide or arrange for appropriate services or assistance to the family pursuant to Family Court Act section 1015 Fam. Ct. Act-a".
The children have since remained in the custody of the aunt, placement having been extended on numerous occasions. On the January 1998 extension petition, the aunt was granted intervenor status and appeared at the hearing primarily, it appears, to request that petitioner pay for the day care expenses she has incurred and will continue to incur for the children. According to the aunt's testimony, when the children were first placed in her care in 1995 she was assured that foster care funds would be forthcoming and that these funds would cover day care expenses. At that time, the children needed day care on a full-time basis because the aunt was working full time. Although foster care funds never came through, the Suffolk County Department of Social Services paid for the children's day care expenses from February 1995 until the case was transferred to Otsego County. With the exception of a four-month period in 1996, these expenses have not been paid by any agency since October 1995. While the aunt now receives a public assistance allowance for the children, it does not include expenses for day care which they currently attend on a part-time basis.
In its June 4, 1998 order extending placement, Family Court ordered that petitioner reimburse the aunt for the children's day care expenses and to pay for all future expenses. While no party takes issue with the extension of placement, petitioner appeals from that part of the order directing it to pay for the children's day care expenses on the ground that the court did not have authority to order same. The narrow argument presented by petitioner is that because respondent's children do not reside within Otsego County, it is not obligated to pay for their day care expenses. We are unpersuaded.
The purpose of neglect proceedings is "to establish procedures to help protect children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional well-being" (Family Ct Act § 1011) while offering rehabilitative services to the family (see, Family Ct Act § 1015-a). Moreover, Social Services Law § 410 (1) authorizes petitioner "to provide day care at public expense for children residing in [its] territory who are eligible therefor pursuant to provisions of this title". Here, a suitable relative has agreed to care for respondent's children while petitioner works with this family in an effort to reunite them. The children's placement with their aunt, however, is temporary in that Family Court Act § 1055 Fam. Ct. Act limits the initial placement and all subsequent extensions to a one-year period (see, Family Ct Act § 1055 [b] [i]; see also, Matter of H./M. Children [Gina H.], 217 A.D.2d 164, 169-170). For these reasons, we conclude that the children's temporary removal from respondent's home to a relative outside Otsego County via petitioner's successive extension petitions does not constitute a change of residence for them outside the county for the purposes of Social Services Law § 410 (1) (see generally,Matter of Thorne, 240 N.Y. 444; Matter of Billy, 7 A.D.2d 614; Matter of Chrystol B., 104 Misc.2d 888, 891-892; Matter of Cathy C., 89 Misc.2d 539, 541; Matter of Stange, 38 Misc.2d 170; 49 N Y Jur 2d, Domicile and Residence, § 36).
Moreover, by ordering petitioner to cover the day care expenses of the children, which, in turn, permits them to remain in the nurturing environment of a close relative, Family Court was facilitating the protection of these children as well as the overall rehabilitation of the family consistent with applicable laws, namely, Social Services Law § 410 and Family Court Act § 1015-a (see generally, Matter of Daniel M., 166 Misc.2d 135,appeal dismissed 244 A.D.2d 1011; Matter of Edward M., 76 Misc.2d 781,affd 45 A.D.2d 906).
We also conclude that the order is compatible with Family Court Act § 255 Fam. Ct. Act, which endows Family Court with sweeping powers. Pursuant to this statute, Family Court "may order any * * * county * * * officer and employee to render such assistance and cooperation as shall be within his [or her] legal authority, as may be required, to further the objects of this act" (Family Ct Act § 255). Notably, this statute "was designed as a specific remedy to enable [Family Court] to cut through the bureaucracy, fragmentation and lack of co-ordination which so inhibits the provision of services for families and children before the court" (Matter of Edward M., supra, at 785;accord, New York City Hous. Auth. v. Miller, 89 Misc.2d 141, 143). The instant scenario — the temporary placement of children with a suitable relative outside the county where the parent resides and the frustration faced by that relative in gaining financial assistance to so care for them — is an appropriate invocation of the statute.
Petitioner's remaining contentions have been reviewed and rejected.
Mercure, J.P., Peters, Spain and Graffeo, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs to respondent Darlene "T".