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rejecting government argument that the Southern District of Florida court lacked jurisdiction over petition filed by detainee in the Baker County Detention Center in the Middle District of Florida because the warden of the contract county facility is a non-federal actor, and the federal official most directly responsible for overseeing the contract facility -- the field office director for ICE's Miami field office -- is the appropriate respondent
Summary of this case from Gayle v. MeadeOpinion
Case No. 19-CV-24693-WILLIAMS
2020-01-27
Rachael MASINGENE, Petitioner, v. Jim MARTIN, et. al., Respondents.
Victoria Mesa, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
Victoria Mesa, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
ORDER
KATHLEEN M. WILLIAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus (DE 1-3) ("Petition"), Respondents' response to the Petition (DE 20), and Petitioner's reply (DE 21). On January 9, 2020, the Court ordered Respondents to submit briefing on whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider the Petition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the proper respondent to the Petition is Jim Martin, the Field Office Director for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") Miami Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations and that the Court has jurisdiction to consider the Petition. I. BACKGROUND:
Petitioner, Rachael Masingene, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo, entered the United States in 2000 as a refugee and adjusted her status to lawful permanent resident in 2003. (Petition at ¶¶ 1, 15.) On September 27, 2012, Petitioner pleaded guilty to an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 371, Conspiracy to Transport an Individual Across State Lines for Purposes of Prostitution. (Id. at ¶ 16.) On October 9, 2018, ICE initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner, charging her removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). (Id. at ¶ 17.) Petitioner has been detained by ICE since September 26, 2018 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). (Id. at ¶ 2.)
On April 4, 2019, an immigration judge in Atlanta determined that Petitioner's conviction constitutes an aggravated felony and found her deportable. (DE 1-12.) The immigration judge further denied her application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). (Id. ) On September 26, 2019, the Board of Immigration Appeals granted Petitioner's appeal in part. (DE 1-14.) The BIA affirmed the immigration judge's determination that Petitioner is removable but remanded the proceeding for reconsideration of Petitioner's eligibility for withholding of removal and protection under CAT. (Id. ) Petitioner's proceeding on remand was scheduled to commence on November 14, 2019. (Petition at ¶ 28.)
Petitioner has been detained by ICE for over 480 days. Petitioner is currently detained at Baker County Detention Center ("BCDC") in MacClenny, Florida, a non-federal facility operated by Baker County Department of Correction. (Petition at ¶ 1.) BCDC houses federal immigrant detainees pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement ("IGSA") with ICE. Before she was transferred to BCDC, Petitioner was detained at Irwin County Detention Center, a non-federal facility in Ocilla, Georgia. (Id. at ¶ 85.)
See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Baker County Facility, https://www.ice.gov/detention-facility/baker-county-facility#wcm-survey-target-id.
See TRAC Immigration, Transfers of ICE Detainees from the Baker County Sheriff Department , https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/detention/201509/BAKERFL/tran/.
On November 13, 2019, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 contending that her continued detention by ICE for over a year without an individualized bond hearing "is unreasonable and violates her due process rights." (Petition at ¶ 94.) She has named as respondents Jim Martin, the Director of the Miami Field Office of ICE; Matthew Albence, the Acting Director of ICE; Kevin K. McAleenan, the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; and William Barr, the Attorney General.
II. DISCUSSION:
The Supreme Court has articulated the standard for determining if a court has jurisdiction to consider a habeas corpus petition: "[t]he question whether the [Court] has jurisdiction over [a] habeas petition breaks down into two related subquestions. First, who is the proper respondent to that petition? And second, does the [Court] have jurisdiction over him or her?" Rumsfeld v. Padilla , 542 U.S. 426, 434, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004) ("Padilla").
A. Jim Martin is the Proper Respondent:
"The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who has custody over the petitioner.’ " Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and § 2243 ) (internal brackets omitted). The proper respondent for purposes of a habeas corpus petition is the "immediate custodian," the person "with the ability to produce the prisoner's body before the habeas court." Id. In Padilla , the Supreme Court has announced that where—as here—a petitioner challenges her "present physical confinement, the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held." Id. at 427, 124 S.Ct. 2711. Accordingly, under this default rule, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement. Id. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 2711.
Respondents contend that this Court has no jurisdiction because when applying Padilla 's default rule, the proper respondent to the Petition is the warden of BCDC, Captain Evelyn Blue of the Baker County Sherriff's Office, who is located in MacClenney, Florida. (DE 20 at 3.) Respondents claim that "Captain Blue is located in the Middle District of Florida, and therefore this Court does not have jurisdiction over Captain Blue. As such, this Court does not have jurisdiction over the instant Petition." Id.
In her reply, Petitioner cites to several cases that have held that Padilla 's default rule does not apply when the petitioner is a federal immigration detainee housed in a non-federal facility pursuant to an IGSA contract. (DE 21 at 7.) These cases have reasoned that when an immigrant detainee is housed in a contract facility, the proper respondent is not the warden of the facility—a "non-federal actor who is ‘poorly situated to defend federal interests,’ "—but is instead, "the federal official most directly responsible for overseeing the contract facility." Rodriguez Sanchez v. Decker , No. 18-CV-8798 (AJN), 2019 WL 3840977, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2019) (citation omitted); accord Saravia v. Sessions , 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ("the federal official with most immediate control over the facility holding the petitioner—that is, the federal official tasked with ensuring that Yolo County complies with the requirements of its contract with ORR—is the proper respondent.").
In applying this principle, Petitioner contends that the proper respondent is Jim Martin, the Field Office Director for ICE's Miami Field Office, which is "tasked with supervising and carrying out day-to-day activities for BCDC." (DE 21 at 3.) Petitioner further asserts that the warden of BCDC does not have independent authority to release Petitioner from detention and "may not move, transport, transfer, or release Petitioner without ICE's directive or consent." (Id. at 2.) Petitioner explains that because Jim Martin's office is in the Southern District of Florida, this Court has jurisdiction. Id.
In Padilla , "the Supreme Court explicitly declined to address the application of the [default] immediate custodian rule to alien detainees." Rodriguez Sanchez , 2019 WL 3840977, at *2 ; Saravia , 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1184 (" Padilla refused to decide who the proper respondent is in the immigration detention context, and no controlling authority since has resolved the issue."). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has not weighed in on the application of Padilla 's default rule in an immigration detention case. Accordingly, courts have taken espoused divergent views for determining the proper respondent when an immigrant detainee challenges his or her detention in a non-federal facility. Some courts have applied the default "immediate custodian" rule in a straightforward fashion. See, e.g. , Kholyavskiy v. Achim , 443 F.3d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 2006) (warden of the county facility holding an immigration detainee was the proper respondent); Nken v. Napolitano , 607 F.Supp.2d 149, 159–61 (D.D.C. 2009) (correct respondent was the warden of the facility holding an individual subject to a final order of removal); Zhen Yi Guo v. Napolitano , No. 09 CIV 3023 PGG, 2009 WL 2840400, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2009) (warden of county prison was the appropriate respondent). Other courts have concluded that the federal agent charged with overseeing the non-federal detention facility where the noncitizen is held is the appropriate respondent. See, e.g. , Khodr v. Adduci , 697 F.Supp.2d 774, 776 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (proper respondent was the ICE District Director, not the warden of county jail); Abner v. Sec'y of Dep't of Homeland Security , No. 06CV308(JBA), 2006 WL 1699607, at *3–4 (D. Conn. June 19, 2006) (ICE field office director, not warden of county facility, was the correct respondent); Zabadi v. Chertoff , No. C 05-01796 WHA, 2005 WL 1514122, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2005) (ICE district director, also known as the field office director, who could direct the county warden to release the petitioner was the proper respondent).
This Court joins those courts adopting the latter approach that have recognized that "where a petitioner is held in a facility pursuant to a contract, rather than by the state or federal government itself, application of the [default] immediate custodian rule must take account of that fact." Saravia , 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1185. The Court is persuaded that the warden of BCDC is not the proper respondent to the Petition. For one, BCDC's warden—a non-federal official "who is not represented by the Department of Justice" and who would "be the sole defender of the federal government's interests"—would be ill-equipped to respond to the merits of the claims underlying the Petition. Id. at 1186. "The warden simply does not have any information to answer for federal authorities, nor does the warden have any reason to litigate these claims." Calderon v. Sessions , 330 F. Supp. 3d 944, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Moreover, when a federal immigrant detainee is housed in a contract facility, the federal official charged with overseeing the detainees in that facility is more akin to the "immediate custodian"—the individual with the power to produce the body of the petitioner before the court—than a non-federal warden. Padilla , 542 U.S. at 434, 124 S.Ct. 2711. Federal immigration detainees are detained "pursuant to the power and authority of the federal government" and not the warden of the non-federal facility where they are detained. Saravia , 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1186. A local warden's custody over the detainee is limited "only to the extent provided by the facility's contract with the federal government." Id. The local warden cannot release ICE detainees without ICE's express authorization. Rather, "ICE is in complete control of detainees' admission and release," while the IGSA "places the warden in the role of a mere functionary." Calderon , 330 F. Supp. 3d at 952.
The Court is persuaded that "when the warden of the detention facility has no literal power to produce the petitioner, and cannot provide meaningful answers to important factual and legal questions, there is no reason to apply the [default] immediate custodian rule." Id. at 953. The Court therefore joins those courts that have held that the proper respondent in this context is the director of the ICE field office responsible for overseeing the contract facility where the petitioner is detained. See supra at 1301–02 (listing cases).
This approach remains "faithful to the Supreme Court's dictates in Padilla that the immediate custodian is the person with the ability to produce the party's body before the habeas court, while at the same time recognizing the reality that non-federal actors are poorly situated to defend federal interest in these situations." Rodriguez Sanchez , 2019 WL 3840977, at *3. Accordingly, the Court finds that the proper respondent to the Petition is Jim Martin, the Director of the Miami Field Office for ICE. This office is responsible for supervising the federal immigrant detainees at BCDC and possesses the authority to direct Petitioner's release. (DE 21 at 2-3.)
B. The Court has Jurisdiction Over the Petition:
"[A] district court acts within its respective jurisdiction within the meaning of § 2241 as long as the custodian can be reached by service of process." Rasul v. Bush , 542 U.S. 466, 478–79, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 159 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004). Thus, as long as Jim Martin can be reached by service of process, this Court has jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. § 4(e)(1). The Miami Field Office for ICE is located in the Southern District of Florida, subjecting Respondent to service of process. Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over this habeas corpus petition.
See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Miami Field Office, https://www.ice.gov/field-office/miami-field-office.
III. CONCLUSION:
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Jim Martin, the Field Office Director for ICE's Miami Field Office, is the proper respondent to the Petition and that the Court has jurisdiction to consider the Petition. Respondents Matthew Albence, Kevin McAleenan, and William Barr are DISMISSED from this case.
On or before February 7, 2020, the Respondent shall submit briefing to show cause why the Petition should not be granted. Petitioner shall file a reply brief no later than February 21, 2020.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, this 27th day of January, 2020.