Summary
In Malone v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, 45 Ohio St. 2d 245 (1976), the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio courts can neither sue or be sued in their own right.
Summary of this case from Leisure v. Franklin County Court of Common PleasOpinion
No. 75-245
Decided March 17, 1976.
Court of Common Pleas — Juvenile division — Employment agreement with court employees — Administrative judge not authorized to enter into.
An administrative judge of the juvenile division of a Court of Common Pleas is not authorized to enter into an employment agreement with employees of the court.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County.
Plaintiff-appellee, Charlie Mae Malone, an employee of the Juvenile Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County and member of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, for herself and others similarly situated, filed an action in July 1973 in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County to enjoin the administrative judge and other judges of the juvenile division of the court, defendants-appellants, "* * * from administering the terms and conditions of its employees, except in accordance with the terms and conditions * * *" provided in an employment agreement executed in March 1972.
The "Statement of Policy" and "Purpose" clauses of that agreement read as follows:
"I. STATEMENT OF POLICY"This Statement of Policy is between Walter G. Whitlatch, Senior Judge acting under Ohio Rev. Code Sections 2151.13, 2151.17, 2153.03, 2153.08 and 2153.09 on behalf of the Juvenile Court, county of Cuyahoga hereinafter referred to as the Court and Local Union No. 1746 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO and the Greater Cleveland District Council No. 78, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO hereinafter referred to as the Union.
"II. PURPOSE"It is the intent of the parties to set forth certain policy statements pertaining to wages, hours, and working conditions to be observed between the parties and to provide procedures for the prompt and equitable adjustment of grievances. The purposes of this Statement of Policy shall be to (1) avoid interruptions to and interferences with the Court's services to the public as governed by the Ohio Revised Code; (2) establish a fair and peaceful procedure for the resolution of differences; and (3) set forth rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other conditions of employment for employees covered by this statement but subject to the federal and state of Ohio laws."
As stated in the Statement of Policy, the agreement was executed "on behalf of the Juvenile Court, county of Cuyahoga" by the then senior judge of that court, Judge Whitlatch. At the time of execution of the agreement, R.C. 2153.08 empowered the juvenile judge "senior in point of service" to "appoint and employ such deputies, clerks, stenographers, and other assistants and attaches as are reasonably necessary in connection with the work of said court," and also gave that judge authority to dismiss such employees. R.C. 2153.09 provided that compensation of the employees of the Juvenile Court was to be fixed by the judge "senior in point of service."
Am. H.B. No. 574, which became effective June 29, 1972, made the Juvenile Court of Cuyahoga County a separate division of the Court of Common Pleas of that county and amended R.C. 2153.08 and 2153.09 by placing the authority held by the judge "senior in point of service" over court employees in the administrative judge of the juvenile division of a Court of Common Pleas.
Pursuant to the Rules of Superintendence, Judge Toner was elected administrative judge of the juvenile division on June 29, 1972. Judge Toner, in a notice to the staff, issued that day, stated that the Statement of Policy entered into by his predecessor did not "bind his successors" and that he would "consider adopting such features [of the Statement of Policy] as would be legal and appropriate to the proper administration of the court * * *."
In addition to the prayer for injunction mentioned above, plaintiffs requested that defendants "be compelled fully to perform each and every term of the employment agreement from its effective date, February 1, 1972, and that the plaintiffs be awarded damages in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) * * *."
The trial court denied plaintiffs' demand for monetary damages, but enjoined "the Juvenile Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, its administrative judge and associate judges * * * from administering the terms and conditions of its employees except in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Statement of Policy entered into between the plaintiff unions and the defendants on March 17, 1972 * * *."
Defendants appealed the judgment of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. That court affirmed the judgment and the cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Messrs. Berkman, Gordon Kancelbaum, Mr. Bernard A. Berkman and Mr. Harold L. Levey, for appellees.
Mr. John T. Corrigan, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. Richard A. Goulder, for appellants.
The question presented is whether the statutes giving the administrative judge of a juvenile division of a Court of Common Pleas general authority over the employment, discharge and regulation of court employees, clothe the administrative judge with authority to enter into an employment agreement with those employees.
In Dayton Teachers Assn. v. Dayton Bd. of Edn. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 127, the court held:
"A board of education is vested with discretionary authority to negotiate and to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees, so long as such agreement does not conflict with or purport to abrogate the duties and responsibilities imposed upon the board of education by law."
The authority to so contract was found in statutes granting boards of education status as "a body politic and corporate, and, as such, capable of * * * contracting and being contracted with * * *" (R.C. 3313.17), and requiring boards of education to "enter into written contracts for the employment and reemployment of all teachers." (R.C. 3319.08.)
Unlike a board of education, a court "* * * is not sui juris. `"A court is defined to be a place in which justice is judicially administered. It is the exercise of judicial power, by the proper officer or officers, at a time and place appointed by law."' Todd v. United States (1895), 158 U.S. 278, 284. Absent express statutory authority, a court can neither sue nor be sued in its own right." State, ex rel. Cleveland Municipal Court, v. Cleveland City Council (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 121.
R.C. 2151.13 specifically provides that employees of the Juvenile Court "* * * shall serve during the pleasure of the judge." These court employees do not stand in the same contractual relationship to their employer as do school teachers. Court employees who serve at the pleasure of a court are in the position of a public officer or employee to which the principle stated in Fuldauer v. Cleveland (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 114, applies. Paragraph three of the syllabus in that case reads:
"A public officer or employee holds his office as a matter of law and not of contract, nor has such officer or employee a vested interest or private right of property in his office or employment. (Paragraph one of the syllabus in State, ex rel. Gordon, v. Barthalow, 150 Ohio St. 499, approved and followed.)"
It is the conclusion of this court that an administrative judge of a juvenile division of a Court of Common Pleas is not authorized to enter into an employment agreement with employees of the court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed.
Judgment reversed.
HERBERT, COLE, STERN, W. BROWN and P. BROWN, JJ., concur.
CELEBREZZE, J., dissents.
COLE, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting for CORRIGAN, J.