Opinion
CASE NO. 5:96 CV 2687
September 25, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This case, just three months shy of seven years old, is before the Court on remand from the Sixth Circuit. It is presently set for trial during the two-week period beginning October 20, 2003. The Court now has before it the parties' briefs on the remand issues. See Doc. Nos. 158, 163. As a result of the directives of the Sixth Circuit in its opinion of June 2, 2003, see Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802 (6th Cir. 2003), this case is herein significantly narrowed.
II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 16, 1996, plaintiff Lloyd D. Alkire filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Judge Jane Irving, Holmes County Court, Holmes County and Sheriff Timothy Zimmerly alleging that their policies and customs had resulted in violation of his rights under various constitutional amendments.
On Saturday, August 19, 1995 at 9:40 a.m., Alkire was arrested for DWI and taken to the Holmes County Jail where he was detained all weekend. According to the Sixth Circuit, the parties disagree on whether Alkire was held on the DWI arrest or on an outstanding warrant from another jurisdiction. Alkire was finally arraigned by Judge Irving in Holmes County Court on Tuesday, August 22, 1995-almost 72 hours after his arrest. He asserted that this delay violated his Fourth Amendment rights not to be detained without probable cause.
The parties obviously do, and did before this Court, disagree on this point. This Court credited the Sheriffs sworn affidavit in support of his argument that Alkire was held on an outstanding warrant. The Circuit opinion, on the other hand, credits unsworn, uncertified records, purportedly jail records, to set up a material factual dispute on this point. Therefore, the parties will now be given an opportunity at trial to prove their respective positions.
On September 1, 1995, Alkire entered a no-contest plea to the DWI charge. He was sentenced to fifteen days in jail, fined $575 and assessed court costs of $45. Although, he voluntarily signed a payment contract agreeing to pay this debt in $50 monthly installments, Alkire never made any payments. Subsequently, on three occasions, the Holmes County Court issued show cause orders directing Alkire to appear and advising that failure to do so would result in issuance of a bench warrant for his arrest. Each time he failed to appear; each time he was arrested on a bench warrant; and each time he was found in contempt and jailed for 30 days. While he was serving his last 30-day sentence, another show cause letter was issued demanding payment of $173 or an appearance on November 20, 1996. The hearing, which had been continued to December 18, 1996, was further continued when this action was filed. At no time during any of the contempt proceedings held in the Holmes County Court by Judge Irving was there an attempt to ascertain whether Alkire had the ability to pay the fines imposed on him, although Alkire had written to the court indicating his inability to pay and asking for some sort of relief.
On November 9, 2000, after the declaratory relief portions of the complaint had been settled by stipulation of the parties and without upsetting this settlement, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion granting summary judgment to the defendants on plaintiffs claims for money damages arising from alleged constitutional violations. The Court expressly declined, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the fifth and sixth claims for relief in the amended complaint, which were state law claims.
Plaintiff timely appealed and, on September 18, 2002, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion which, upon reconsideration by the panel, was replaced by the opinion of June 2, 2003.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Sixth Circuit's Opinion and the Issues on Remand
In its opinion of June 2, 2003, the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, but also reversed and remanded Alkire's claims that defendants are liable "(1) under the Fourth Amendment for the policies and customs that resulted in [his] warrantless detention for nearly seventy-two hours;"Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003); and "(2) under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments for the policies and customs that resulted in [his] being arrested three times and jailed for sixty days in connection with non-payment of fines and court costs without any inquiry into his ability to pay[.]" Id. 1. Preliminary Questions of Liability and/or Immunity
Analysis of this case is rendered problematic by the fact that the plaintiff sued not just individuals in their official capacities, but also two entities, Holmes County and Holmes County Court. There is no doubt that "an official-capacity suit `imposes liability on the entity that [the official] represents.'" Alkire, 330 F.3d at 810 (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985)). That is, "a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit, must look to the government entity itself." Id. (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). Therefore, as noted by the Sixth Circuit, "Holmes County, as the government entity that employed Sheriff Zimmerly, and the Holmes County Court, as the government entity that employed Judge Irving, are the only true defendants in this case." Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
The Sixth Circuit went on to state that the availability of Eleventh Amendment immunity becomes the important question, noting that, since Holmes County clearly "is not an arm of the state that is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity[,]" Alkire, 330 F.3d at 811, "[t]he only Eleventh Amendment question here is whether the Holmes County Court, which is responsible for the policies of its Clerk's Office and Judge Irving, should be considered an `arm of the state' and thus vested with sovereign immunity." Id. This question was remanded by the Sixth Circuit, without even a nodding acknowledgment to this Court's legal conclusion in its November 9, 2000 Memorandum Opinion that Holmes County Court was not a proper defendant because it is not sui juris. See Doc. No. 130, at 11, n. 12. A simple declaration that Holmes County and Holmes County Court (as opposed to the two individuals named in their official capacities) are "the only true defendants," cannot end the analysis. An entity that is not sui juris, such as Holmes County Court, cannot sue or be sued. It has no legal identity. There is no way to collect a money judgment from it, even if one were to be obtained. The Sixth Circuit's discussion seems to suggest, and perhaps simply takes for granted, that Holmes County and Holmes County Court are essentially one entity. It seems to assume that a money judgment against Holmes County Court would automatically be paid by Holmes County. In this Court's view, that is not necessarily so and will be discussed separately below.
As will become apparent in the subsequent discussion, it appears that the Sixth Circuit never actually read this Court's Memorandum Opinion of November 9, 2000 because, at several points in its opinion, the court "reviews" matters that were never before this Court and/or directs this Court to make determinations that it has already made (which were not reviewed on appeal) and/or directs this Court to make determinations which make no sense in light of other determinations which have already been made (and were not reviewed or overturned on appeal). Frankly, this is disappointing. Parties should not be permitted to re-frame the issues before the Court of Appeals, thereby driving additional proceedings in the district courts, and district courts should be able to rely on the Circuit to, at the very least, read the opinion it is reviewing.
The Sixth Circuit, again without any mention of whether Holmes County Court is sui juris, also remarked that "if Holmes County Court is not entitled to sovereign immunity, it will be necessary on remand to undertake an independent determination of whether Holmes County Court is a "person" under § 1983." Id. at 812, n. 7. In any event, this Court has now been directed to decide whether the § 1983 constitutional tort claims against Holmes County Court and Judge Irving, sued only in her official capacity, must be dismissed either because the Holmes County Court is an arm of the state that enjoys sovereign immunity or, absent that, because Holmes County Court is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 jurisprudence. For this latter analysis, the Sixth Circuit directed this Court to Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 61-70 (1989).
Of course, this Court already made that very determination in its Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 9, 2000, in reliance on Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1988). See Doc. No. 130, n. 12. Without explicit mention of that determination, the Sixth Circuit gave a nod of acknowledgment in its opinion when it noted that, in its view, Foster "has . . . been undermined by the recent Supreme Court decisions addressing sovereign immunity . . . as the issues of sovereign immunity and personhood under § 1983 are conceptually related[.]" Alkire, 330 F.3d at 812, n. 7. Therefore, the Court believes it has now been directed to re-determine the issue of "personhood" in conjunction with sovereign immunity.
Although the Sixth Circuit did not articulate it, there is another question lurking here and alluded to above, namely, whether the actions of the Holmes County Court and Judge Irving can be in any way attributed, for damages purposes, to Holmes County, rendering Holmes County liable for any constitutional violation committed by the County Court and responsible for paying any money judgment that might result from such violation. This will be discussed in more detail below.
2. Remanded Merit Issues
Aside from these preliminary questions, the Sixth Circuit remanded two of the merit issues: (1) whether Alkire's Fourth Amendment rights not to be held for seventy-two hours on a warrantless arrest had been violated; and (2) whether Alkire's Thirteenth Amendment right not to be imprisoned for a civil debt and his Fourteenth Amendment right not to lose his liberty due to indigency had been violated. As for the second issue, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that this Court might now need to consider whether the claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). B. Holmes County Court as a Defendant
Oddly, in the context of this second issue, the Sixth Circuit also addressed the merits of plaintiffs fifth claim for relief. That claim states in its entirety:
38. Plaintiff has been incarcerated on various occasions for failure to pay fines and/or court costs without a hearing to determine ability to pay and without specific findings by the Court of ability to pay in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2947.14.
(Am. Compl, Doc. No. 4). The claim is nowhere linked to the allegations of violations of the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, this Court very clearly declined to exercise its jurisdiction over this claim and the sixth claim, which alleged a violation of the Ohio Constitution. See Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 130, nn. 9, 10. The Sixth Circuit did not evaluate whether this Court abused its discretion in dismissing these claims. Rather, it apparently permitted the plaintiff to reformulate his fifth claim to turn it into an assertion that violation of the Ohio statute "also violated the federal Constitution." Alkire, 330 F.3d at 818.
Notwithstanding the fact that the claim was no longer in the lawsuit and that the only recourse plaintiff should have had on appeal was an argument that the claim should be remanded for initial consideration by this Court because it had abused its discretion in dismissing the claimwithout considering it, and notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff hadnever in this Court framed his Ohio statutory claim as a "violation of" the federal constitution, the Sixth Circuit considered this new constitutional claim in the first instance and declared that plaintiff was correct: violating Ohio Rev. Code § 2947.14 "Violates the constitutional prohibition against incarcerating an indigent defendant for his failure to pay a debt." Id. at 819.
Although the Sixth Circuit has issued an advisory opinion on this issue, this Court still declines to exercise any jurisdiction over Ohio state law claims. That decision is now buttressed by the Heck case commended to this Court by the Sixth Circuit. Heck would not allow this Court to consider a claim for damages that has the potential to invalidate a criminal conviction until the plaintiff proves that the conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
The Court begins by considering the preliminary questions outlined above with respect to (1) the status of Holmes County Court as an "arm of the state" potentially enjoying sovereign immunity and the related question of whether it is a "person" subject to liability within the meaning of § 1983; and, (2) its status as a defendant, that is, an entity that is sui juris. Because it is dispositive, the Court will consider this second question first. 1. Is Holmes County Court Sui Juris?
Plaintiffs brief argues only that Holmes County Court is not entitled to sovereign immunity and that, in fact, Holmes County would be liable for any judgment against its court.
Defendant Holmes County Court does not address the questions raised by the Sixth Circuit at all. It argues only that it is not sui juris and that any judgment against it would be void. It further asserts that "although Plaintiff has demonstrated that the Holmes County Court of Common Pleas receives most of its funding from Holmes County and not the State of Ohio, that analysis does not change the fact that Holmes County can not [sic] be legally liable to pay any judgment rendered against the Holmes County Common Pleas Court." (Def. Brief at 3, emphases added). Counsel for the defendant does not seem to have a clear grasp of the identity of his client.
County courts in Ohio are a throw-back to the old justice of peace system. This Court takes judicial notice that county courts are creates of statute and are not to be confused with Ohio's Courts of Common Pleas. Ohio Rev. Code § 1907.01 provides:
There is hereby created in each county of the state, in which the territorial jurisdiction of a municipal court or municipal courts is not coextensive with the boundaries of the county, a court to be known as the county court. The county court shall have jurisdiction throughout a county court district that shall consist of all territory within the county not subject to the territorial jurisdiction of any municipal court. County courts are courts of record for all purposes of law.
Holmes County has a county court, as do other counties in Ohio with sparse population and no large municipalities. The jurisdiction of a county court is circumscribed by statute. See Ohio Rev. Code Chapters 1907-1921. The judges are elected. See Ohio Rev. Code § 1907.13.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2301.01 creates the courts of common pleas as follows:
There shall be a court of common pleas in each county held by one or more judges, each of whom has been admitted to practice as an attorney at law in this state and has, for a total of at least six years preceding the judge's appointment or commencement of the judge's term, engaged in the practice of law in this state or served as a judge of a court of record in any jurisdiction in the United States, or both, resides in said county, and is elected by the electors therein. Each judge shall be elected for six years at the general election immediately preceding the year in which the term, as provided in sections 2301.02 and 2301.03 of the Revised Code, commences, and the judge's successor shall be elected at the general election immediately preceding the expiration of such term.
In its Memorandum Opinion of November 9, 2000, this Court noted that "[t]here is no allegation, because there could not be, that the County Court is sui juris." Doc. No. 130, n. 12. Concluding that the Holmes County Court "is merely a nominal party[,]" the Court dismissed that defendant. The Sixth Circuit never addressed that conclusion and, were it not for its lengthy discussion of plaintiff s Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment claim against Holmes County Court, see 330 F.3d at 816-19, this Court would be inclined to believe that its decision in that respect had not been overturned. As it is, the Court cannot be sure and, in an abundance of caution, will re-examine that issue.
In Malone v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuvahoga County, 45 Ohio St.2d 245, 344 N.E.2d 126 (1976), a case involving the question of whether a court's administrative judge could enter into an employment agreement with court employees, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that "a court is not sui juris,"Id. at 248, 344 N.E.2d at 128 (quoting Todd v. United States, 158 U.S. 278, 284 (1895)) and "[a]bsent express statutory authority, a court can neither sue nor be sued in its own right." Id. (quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Municipal Court v. Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 121, 296 N.E.2d 544, 546 (1973)). Therefore, any money judgment rendered against a court "is wholly void." State ex rel. Mayer v. City of Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 119, 122, 19 N.E.2d 902, 903 (1938).
Here, Alkire seeks a money judgment against the Holmes County Court and its employee Judge Irving, sued only in her official capacity, for alleged constitutional violations. This Court concludes, supported by Ohio law, that Holmes County Court is not sui juris and cannot be sued as a separate legal entity. Therefore, Holmes County Court and its employee Judge Irving are dismissed. 2. Is Holmes County Liable for Actions of Holmes County Court and Judge Irving?
Although Holmes County Court is not sui juris and cannot be sued in its own right, the question arises whether Holmes County can be held liable for actions of the Holmes County Court and Judge Irving.
Plaintiff argues that Holmes County "would be legally liable for a judgment against the Holmes County Court." (Pl. Brief, at 1). Citing no authority, plaintiff declares: "By law in Ohio, [a judgment against Holmes County Court] will have to be paid from the court's current budget or a `judgment fund' established by the court and funded by the county's appropriations process with funds provided by Holmes County." (Pl. Brief on Remand, at 4-5).
Since any judgment against Holmes County Court would be void, Mayer,supra, the only way Alkire could recover damages from Holmes County for the actions of Holmes County Court and Judge Irving would be to show that those actions somehow resulted from a custom or policy of Holmes County.
This Court ruled in its Memorandum Opinion of November 9, 2000 that, although Alkire attributes Judge Irving's actions to Holmes County,
. . . there is nothing in the motions to establish that Holmes County has any control whatsoever over the actions of Judge Irving, whose office and court is [sic] created by Ohio statute,13 nor that Holmes County, if it did have control, had itself established and/or ratified any of Judge Irving's actions as its own policies and customs. In other words, with respect to County liability for any alleged constitutional violations stemming from the actions of Judge Irving, plaintiff has not met the Monell test.
Memorandum Opinion, Nov. 9, 2000, at 11-12 (footnote in original).
In Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that to hold a local governing body liable for a constitutional violation, the plaintiff must show that the violation resulted from policies, customs, or usages of the governing body. Under Ohio law, a county is a political subdivision, that is, a local governing body.
The Sixth Circuit referred to this issue only in passing, when determining whether or not Alkire had properly appealed the grant of summary judgment to Holmes County Court. It stated: "[Alkire's] briefs discuss at great length the wrongdoings of the Holmes County Court Clerk's Office, which is part of the Holmes County Court. Alkire seeks to phrase these wrongdoings as the wrongdoings of Holmes County, but it is clear that the Clerk's Office (as well as the Judge) are agents of Holmes County Court." Alkire, 330 F.3d at 810, n. 6.
This Court agrees that there is nothing in the record which would suggest that the County has any control over the customs and/or policies of the County Court, even though, under Ohio's statutes, the County provides the vehicle for funding the County Court. Notwithstanding its role as "funder," it does not follow that the County is automatically liable for actions of the County Court or the Court's employees. TheMonell test must be met. Here plaintiff has failed to do so. 3. Is Holmes County Court Entitled to Sovereign Immunity and. Relatedly. Is it a "Person"?
As pointed out by the Sixth Circuit in reliance on Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Dovle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977), Holmes County is not an arm of the State of Ohio. If that is so, it would be even more true that Holmes County Court is not an arm of the State of Ohio and would not enjoy sovereign immunity. The issue has no relevance here, however, in view of the fact that this Court has already concluded (and re-concluded), uncommented on by the Circuit, that Holmes County Court is not sui juris. The same can be said of the question of whether Holmes County Court is a "person" for purposes of § 1983.
Mt. Healthy held that a local school board, although receiving a significant amount of money from the state, is not an arm of the state.
It would be an exercise in futility at this point to examine this issue under Will, as suggested by the Sixth Circuit. Holmes County Court cannot be sued as it is not sui juris; therefore, it is irrelevant whether it could be considered a "person" under § 1983. Without deciding that issue, this Court will say that, intuitively, it seems unlikely that a non-sui-juris entity could be a person.
Further, these questions are rendered even more irrelevant in view of the fact that (1) any money judgment against a court "is wholly void,"Mayer, supra, and (2) absent proof of a policy and custom of Holmes County resulting in actions by the Holmes County Court, Holmes County is not liable in damages for those actions. C. The Two Remanded Merits Claims
The Sixth Circuit remanded the case for trial on two claims, provided, presumably, that they would survive the preliminary matters also raised by the Circuit. These claims are:
(1) whether Holmes County, due to its customs and policies, violated Alkire's Fourth Amendment right not to be detained without a prompt probable cause hearing; and
(2) whether Holmes County Court, due to its customs and policies, violated Alkire's Thirteenth Amendment right not to be imprisoned for a civil debt and/or his Fourteenth Amendment right not to lose his liberty due to indigency.
Neither the Holmes County Court nor Judge Irving are in any way implicated in Alkire's first remanded claim against Holmes County and Sheriff Zimmerly for unconstitutional detention. The Holmes County Court and Judge Irving were sued only under the second claim.
Just as there is nothing to suggest that the County Court and/or Judge Irving were in anyway implicated in Alkire's first remanded claim, there is also nothing to suggest that Holmes County and/or Sheriff Zimmerly had anything to do with the customs and policies of the County Court set forth in the second remanded claim.
Because the Holmes County Court is not sui juris and cannot be sued, and because Holmes County is not liable for any money judgment which might be rendered against the Holmes County Court (which would, in any event, be void), the second remanded claim does not survive after the preliminary analysis directed by the Sixth Circuit.
Furthermore, as suggested by the Sixth Circuit, this claim would also not survive under the Supreme Court opinion of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) which held that:
[T]o recover damages for [an] allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 18 U.S.C. § 2254.Id. at 486-87. There is no suggestion here that Alkire ever appealed the Holmes County Court's contempt orders or the fines and costs levied against him. If this Court were to conclude that the customs and policies of Holmes County Court in connection with those contempt orders, fines and costs resulted in violation of Alkire's Thirteenth and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights, it would necessarily imply that the convictions were invalid. This it cannot do under Heck.
Accordingly, the only thing remaining for trial by jury is the narrow issue of "whether Alkire was being held on the arrest warrant or the DWI arrest." Alkire, 330 F.3d at 816.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that defendant Holmes County Court is not sui juris and must be dismissed, along with Judge Jane Irving, who was sued solely in her official capacity as an agent of Holmes County Court. Further, since Holmes County cannot be held liable for actions of Holmes County Court or Judge Irving and, even more so, because this Court cannot make a declaration that policies and customs are unconstitutional if such declaration would implicate the validity of criminal convictions as yet unchallenged, Alkire's damage claims with respect to alleged imprisonment for a civil debt and alleged loss of liberty due to indigency are dismissed without prejudice. Of course, these dismissals for purposes of any claim fordamages in no way affect the stipulated settlement of the parties with respect to the declaratory and injunctive portions of the suit.
All that remains for trial is the question of whether Holmes County, through its agent Sheriff Zimmerly, unconstitutionally detained Alkire without a prompt probable cause hearing.
That matter will be tried before a jury during the two-week period beginning October 20, 2003.
IT IS SO ORDERED.