PER CURIAM.

This cause was specially set down for argument on the appellants' (plaintiffs') petition for an injunction against the above named appellees (defendants) restraining them from continuing in effect a determination made under date of January 16, 1939, by appellee McLaughlin, as Acting Secretary of Labor, pursuant to "An Act To provide conditions for the purchase of supplies and the making of contracts by the United States, and for other purposes.", approved June 30, 1936, 49 Stat. 2036, 41 U.S.C.A. § 35 et seq. We had previously granted an injunction pendente lite, which will be continued in effect.

The case was fully argued at the hearing and has been given due consideration. Justices MILLER and VINSON are of opinion that the complaint states a valid cause of action entitling the plaintiffs to an injunction as prayed therein and, therefore, are of opinion that the District Court was in error in dismissing the complaint. The grounds of this court's opinion will be filed shortly, and Justice EDGERTON will file a dissenting opinion. A judgment will thereupon be entered remanding the cause to the District Court, with instructions to set aside and vacate its previous order dismissing the complaint, and directing that court to proceed in accordance with the opinion of this court.

On the Merits.

MILLER, Associate Justice.

In 1936, Congress enacted a statute which, among other things, provides that "in any contract made and entered into by any * * * agency * * * of the United States * * * for the manufacture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles, and equipment in any amount exceeding $10,000, there shall be included * * *" five representations and stipulations, the second of which reads as follows:

"That all persons employed by the contractor in the manufacture or furnishing of the materials, supplies, articles, or equipment used in the performance of the contract will be paid, without subsequent deduction or rebate on any account, not less than the minimum wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor to be the prevailing minimum wages for persons employed on similar work or in the particular or similar industries or groups of industries currently operating in the locality in which the materials, supplies, articles, or equipment are to be manufactured or furnished under said contract." [Italics supplied]

The complaint filed by appellants in the lower court alleged that on or about January 16, 1939, appellee McLaughlin, purporting to act pursuant to the statute, issued a determination — in which appellee Perkins actively participated, and which she authorized, approved and consented to — determining:

"(2) That the prevailing minimum wages for persons employed in the manufacture or furnishing of the products of the Iron and Steel Industry are the amounts indicated for each of the following localities whether arrived at on a time or piece work basis:

* * * * * *

"6. 62½ cents per hour in the locality consisting of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, and that portion of the State of West Virginia comprised within the counties of Hancock, Brooke, Ohio, Marshall, Harrison, and Monongalia, and the District of Columbia." [Italics supplied]

This determination was challenged in the lower court, and is challenged here, as void, beyond the authority of the appellees Perkins and McLaughlin to make, arbitrary and capricious, and wholly without warrant or authority of law; particularly in its employment of the word locality to describe an area consisting of thirteen states, a portion of a fourteenth, and the District of Columbia as well. The challenge is well justified and the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint. The determination in this particular is not only unwarranted but incongruous.

It is true that the word locality is one of somewhat indefinite meaning. Still, its indefiniteness has certain well recognized limits in common meaning and usage, which exclude and forbid the interpretation placed upon the word by the appellees in their determination. It is true that within the proper limits of the meaning of locality, the Secretary is required by the statute to exercise judgment and discretion; but the determination in this case goes so far beyond any possible proper application of the word as to defeat its meaning and to constitute an attempt arbitrarily to disregard the statutory mandate. The rule therefore — that where the adoption of one of several possible interpretations of a doubtful statute involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, upon which the duty of an officer to perform a particular act depends, the courts cannot control the exercise of that discretion — has no application in the present case.

Popular acceptance and usage accord to the word locality connotations of common interest and understanding, such as are revealed in the following expressions: Local self-government, our local schools, local interests, a local concern, local option, local boy makes good, local items as used in newspapers, local prejudices, local talent. Its meaning is suggested also by such terms as local anesthetic, and location as used in mining law, and in motion picture parlance. In ordinary and common usage locality is synonymous in meaning with such words as place, vicinity, neighborhood and community. These words, also, are too indefinite to be used for purposes of exact measurement in terms of acres or square miles. But neither they nor locality itself, in any case, connote large geographical areas, with widely diverse interests, such as the fourteen states and the District of Columbia, grouped in the protested determination. The word place, in its ordinary significance, has a distinctly limited meaning as is indicated by such expressions as place of birth, place of origin, the old home place, ore in place, and by the word placement as used in the game of tennis. Would a jury from the vicinity of Brooklyn be acceptable — within the well known rule — for the trial of an accused person in St. Lawrence County, New York, to say nothing of Sussex County, Delaware? Would it be a normal use of the word to say that folks in Van Buren, Maine, neighbor with those in the District of Columbia, or in Monongalia County, West Virginia? To ask these questions is to answer them. The word community connotes a congeries of common interests arising from associations — social, business, religious, governmental, scholastic, recreational — involving considerations of public health, fire protection, water, sewage, transportation, and other services, which bind together the people of such a community or set them quarreling with each other. The only community of interest revealed by the determination in the present case is steel and iron manufacture. It could almost as well be said that because Esperanto groups throughout the world have a community of interest, the whole world is a locality.

Words which approximate in meaning the definition contended for by appellees are area, region, province, territory, river basin, drainage area, water shed. In the Report of the Public Contracts Board — and upon which it is alleged that the protested determination was based — the words area and region are used throughout. The Report reveals that no attention was paid therein to the concept of locality specified in the statute. In fact, the basis of the determination — assuming the correctness of appellants' allegations, as we are bound to do upon a motion to dismiss — is revealed throughout the Report by such language as the following: "The predominant minimum wage practice in this industry comes to light only when we view the practice of the industry as a whole or over broad regional areas" [Italics supplied]; and again by the following language: "These various producing centers occupy relatively small areas and none of them can be called geographic regions. It should be noted that the variations in base rates between a majority of the producing centers are not wide. * * * The question here is whether these relatively small wage variations between relatively small geographical areas should be made the basis for separate findings of prevailing minimum wages which would be limited to the locale of the variation." [Italics supplied] The Report and the determination both answered the question in the negative; deliberately rejecting the delegation of power given by the statute and assuming a power neither given nor intended thereby.

It is significant that appellees cite no cases which support or suggest a meaning for the word locality comparable in geographical area or scope with the meaning given to it in the protested determination. But they argue that the use of the word locality in the Public Contracts Act in preference to the language "city, town, village, or other civil subdivision of the state" which is used in the Davis-Bacon Act "clearly discloses the congressional intent that the word `locality' shall not be restricted to a civil subdivision of the state." In this they are no doubt correct. Congress obviousy had in mind a local center of manufacture. This might lie entirely within a civil subdivision; but on the other hand it might overlap from one civil subdivision to another, or perhaps it might even overlap a state line. In order to avoid the difficulties inherent in a mandate to determine minimum wages paid within such civil subdivisions, Congress, instead, kept in mind the habits of industry itself, which frequently disregards imaginary political boundary lines, and establishes itself in economically strategic positions, determined by supplies of raw material and labor, and facilities for marketing, such as water and rail transportation. Localities develop in much the same manner as do industrial centers. A combination of a river, a rough mountainous terrain, deposits of coal and iron, and a hardy, independent people, is apt to produce a community, a neighborhood, which may in turn become a city or town, which may result in the formation of a county; but which, on the other hand, may be less or greater in area than such arbitrary political subdivisions. Sometimes such localities precede and sometimes follow the development of industrial and production centers.

It is vitally significant that Congress in its effort to deal with such industrial centers — rather than with civil subdivisions — did not use a word such as region or area, which might have been susceptible of the meaning for which appellees contend. It chose instead a word of limited meaning, long and well known to those acquainted with the American tradition. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that Congress will be presumed to have used language in its usual significance and in accordance with common understanding.

Appellees contend that to attribute to the word locality a limited — i.e., its well settled — meaning would produce difficult and objectionable problems of administration. While this may be true, it constitutes no reason for disregarding the clearly expressed intention of Congress. Administrative convenience and public interest may, under some circumstances, coincide. But it is not always so. Governmental functions may involve a multiplicity of administrative details. It would no doubt be much more convenient for the Postmaster General if a few large centers could be used for the collection and distribution of mail. But in that case, as in the present, Congress has spoken in terms of governmental service to be performed on a basis of localities; with all the administrative inconvenience which may follow the carrying out of its mandates. If the language used by Congress had been obscure, then the argument of hardship and inconvenience might be persuasive. "But considerations of this nature can never sanction a construction at variance with the manifest meaning of the legislature, expressed in plain and unambiguous language." If the language is plain and the meaning clear, the duty of interpretation does not arise and the sole function of the courts is to enforce the statute according to its terms.

Again, appellees contend that their interpretation should be adopted by virtue of the rule that an administrative construction consistently adhered to and not plainly erroneous should be followed by the courts. That rule, if applicable under the circumstances of the present case, would bar judicial review of administrative action in all cases. The statute under which appellees purport to act was not approved until June 30, 1936, just two years and eight months prior to the filing of the complaint in this case; the Public Contracts Board was not created until October 6, 1936; the Report of the Public Contracts Board was dated October 27, 1938; and the protested Determination was not issued until January 16, 1939, forty days prior to the filing of the complaint in the present case. The record is bare of any showing of "administrative construction consistently adhered to" except the bald assertion to that effect contained in the Determination itself, dated January 16, 1939, and upon which appellees rely. In other words, we are asked to respect and follow an administrative construction first announced only forty days prior to the commencement of suit to challenge that construction.

The rule which appellees seek to apply, as revealed by the cases upon which they rely, relates to construction and practice of long standing, — revealed by the issuance of regulations, granting of permits and otherwise — made known to Congress and acquiesced in by it. Moreover, the rule relates to the interpretation of an ambiguous or doubtful statute, not one plain on its face as in the present case. "A custom of the Department, however long continued by successive officers, must yield to the positive language of the statute." Obviously, therefore, the rule has no application here.

The clearly expressed purpose of the statute is that the Secretary shall determine "the prevailing minimum wages for persons employed on similar work or in the particular or similar industries or groups of industries currently operating in the locality in which the materials, supplies, articles, or equipment are to be manufactured or furnished * * *" and not that he shall impose upon such local industries "the predominant minimum wage practice" of the industry viewed "as a whole or over broad regional areas." To permit the Secretary to establish a minimum wage scale for the area embraced within fourteen states and the District of Columbia would be to defeat rather than to accomplish the purpose of the Act. Under the circumstances it is not necessary to look farther to discover the legislative intent. But if there were any element of vagueness or uncertainty in the language used, either as to the purpose of the Act in using the word locality or as to the intent of Congress that the Secretary of Labor should not be empowered thereby to fix wages, it would be eliminated immediately by reference to explanations given on the floor of the House by those in charge of the measure.

Appellees contend that the present suit is in fact one against the United States; that the latter is an indispensable party which, not having given its consent, cannot be sued. It is true, as a general rule, that the United States is an indispensable party in certain suits in which the judgment or decree rendered may substantially affect its interests; but all suits against public officers do not fall within the operation of that rule. Thus, it has long been recognized that an officer who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law may be liable even in damages for injuries suffered by a citizen as a result thereof. And the Supreme Court has in numerous instances approved the use of injunction process in clear cases of illegal action or threatened illegal action by public officers. By reason of their illegality, the acts or threatened acts of such officers are personal and derive no official justification from their being done in asserted agency for the Government.

The jurisdiction of the lower court in the present case depended upon the allegations of the bill of complaint. The bill did not ask the court to interfere with the official discretion of the appellees. It challenged their authority to do the things of which complaint was made. If the allegations of the complaint are true — and we must assume this to be the fact — the action complained of in the present case was not an interpretation of law within the scope of appellees' authority, as in Wells v. Roper; or within the range of their statutory discretion, as in Morrison, Jr., v. Work and Transcontinental Western Air, Inc. v. Farley; but, instead, it was a palpable evasion of the letter and spirit of the pertinent statute. It was an arbitrary attempt "wholly to disregard the statutory mandate"; "to act in the teeth of a [the] statute." In such a case "the suit rests upon the charge of abuse of power, and its merits must be determined accordingly; it is not a suit against the United States."

Appellees contend, also, that their actions are not subject to judicial review and restraint because the protested determination is not an order but a mere "finding" which does not command appellants to perform an act or refrain from performing an act; specifically, that no order — based upon such finding — has been issued "directing the Appellants or anyone else to bid upon Government contracts and to agree to pay the prescribed minimum wage." This contention is without merit. No order was required to make the determination effective. By its own terms, it was made binding and effective upon all interested persons and agencies. Thus, it was expressly provided that the "determination shall be effective and the minimum wages hereby established for the respective localities shall apply to all contracts awarded subject to Public Act No. 846, 74th Congress, on or after January 31, 1939." [Italics supplied]

While the decision thus rendered may not be an "order" in the sense that it does not command or enjoin action, it has legal effect and is final and binding upon all persons desiring to submit bids for government contracts, as well as upon all government agencies. In this respect the determination is similar to many which have been successfully challenged in the courts. Thus, no order was issued in the McAnnulty case, directing the American School of Magnetic Healing, or anyone else, to conduct or refrain from conducting business by mail, and, similarly, no order was issued in the case of Waite v. Macy, requiring anyone to import or refrain from importing tea. In Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, no order was issued requiring complainant to exercise or refrain from exercising the privilege of grazing sheep upon the public domain. Likewise, in Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm., the Supreme Court, although dismissing the complaint on the merits, sustained the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear a challenge of the authority of the Coal Commission to direct a disclosure of allegedly confidential information already in its possession. The determinations attacked in these cases — as in the case at bar — were not addressed to the parties complaining but were directed to and purported to govern the activities of administrative officials in carrying out duties created by statute.

Neither is it necessary that special legislative authorization be found in order to permit use of injunction process. As the Supreme Court recently said: "We have held that the determination of the Commission is not an `order' reviewable under the Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913. Shannahan v. United States, supra [ 303 U.S. 596, 58 S.Ct. 732, 82 L.Ed. 1039]. But we have not held that the determination of the Commission was not subject to judicial review by other procedure, a question which, as we said in the Shannahan Case, we had no occasion there to consider. Id., [303 U.S.] at page 603, 58 S.Ct. 735 [ 82 L.Ed. 1039]. The nature of the determination points to the propriety of judicial review. * * * Equity jurisdiction may be invoked when it is essential to the protection of the rights asserted, even though the complainant seeks to enjoin the bringing of criminal actions."

But appellees contend that appellants have no right which can be protected by injunction; that they are no better off in this respect than would be an ordinary taxpayer. This contention, also, is without merit. In Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the Supreme Court discussed the doctrine that one threatened with direct injury by the act of an agent of the Government "which, but for statutory authority for its performance, would be a violation of his legal rights, may challenge the validity of the statute in a suit against the agent." and said: "The principle is without application unless the right invaded is a legal right, — [1] one of property, [2] one arising out of contract, [3] one protected against tortious invasion, or [4] one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." [Numbers in brackets added] Certainly the principle should not be less broadly stated in the present case where appellants are not challenging the validity of the statute but are contending, instead, that appellees acted and threaten to act, in violation of the statute, without authority of any kind. In fact, four of the nine cases cited by the Supreme Court, in illumination of the language quoted, were ones in which the acts of the officer were alleged to be without statutory authorization, as in the present case.

It is not denied that appellants have a general legal right to carry on their business free from unlawful restraints, but it is contended that no such right is interfered with or molested in the present case — that the determination of the Secretary of Labor is not applicable to appellants' business generally but only to transactions with the Government; that appellants have no legal right to do business with any particular individual; that especially they have no legal right to do business with the Government under any terms or conditions, hence, it is immaterial that an administrative official imposes an unlawful condition. In support of their position, appellees rely upon such cases as B.F. Cummins Co. v. Burleson, 40 App.D.C. 500; O'Brien v. Carney, D.C.D.Mass., 6 F. Supp. 761; and Colorado Pav. Co. v. Murphy, 8 Cir., 78 F. 28, 37 L.R.A. 630. These cases are not in point. They hold merely that the lowest bidder is not entitled to an injunction against the letting of a contract to another bidder, or of mandamus to compel an award, since these acts require the exercise of judgment and discretion which cannot be controlled by judicial process. They do not hold that a person has no legal right to deal with the Government in the ordinary course of his business and to bid in competition with others on government contracts; provided, of course, that he observes terms or conditions lawfully imposed. On the contrary, the right to carry on business, generally, necessarily includes the right to negotiate with prospective customers and purchasers free from unlawful restrictions and interference. In this respect it is immaterial whether the prospective customer be a private individual or a government agency. In fact, the right of a person to bid on government contracts is a more valuable right — because of the policy adopted by Congress to encourage free and full competition — than is his right to seek the patronage of private individuals. In the latter case, the prospective customer may decline to carry on business, upon any ground, whether of reason, of whim, caprice, prejudice or malice. Section 3709, R.S., 41 U.S.C.A. § 5, on the other hand, imposes a duty upon the government departments to advertise publicly for bids and proposals, except when the public exigencies require otherwise, and to award contracts to the lowest responsible bidders.

Cases such as American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, Gegiow v. Uhl, Waite v. Macy, and Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, present situations analogous to that of the present case. The right of the complainants which was infringed in the McAnnulty case was "the legal right under the general acts of Congress relating to the mails to have their letters delivered at the post office as directed," and to conduct their mail order business. In the Gegiow case it was the right to enter and remain in the United States subject to the conditions imposed by Congress. In the Waite case it was the right to import tea subject only to the conditions imposed and permitted to be imposed by the statute. In the Red Canyon Sheep Co. case it was the privilege of carrying on the business of sheep raising upon the public domain, subject only to similar statutory conditions and limitations. In the present case it is the right to bid for government contracts and, if awards are made, to perform such contracts under the general acts of Congress relating to such matters, in each case subject only to limitations and conditions imposed or permitted to be imposed by Congress.

A person need not conduct business by mail, or import tea, or graze sheep, or migrate to the United States, unless he wishes to do so, but it is his right to do so, and if he does he can be subjected to any lawful limitation imposed by Congress. Similarly, a citizen need not bid for government contracts but it is his right to do so, and if he does he, too, can be subjected, similarly, to any lawful limitation imposed by Congress. But when any person, private or official, attempts to interfere with these rights by unlawful limitations not imposed or allowed to be imposed by Congress, then relief may be obtained upon a proper showing. A statute, by prescribing the conditions and limitations which properly may be imposed upon one who seeks to enjoy a right, prohibits the denial of the right upon other grounds. In the present case, appellees admit that appellants have a right to bid on government contracts. They argue that appellants may bid on any terms they choose, and without including the minimum wage stipulation required by the protested determination. But bidding in the manner suggested would be a useless gesture, foredoomed to failure, because of the imposition of the unlawful requirements; hence, the imposition of such requirements is tantamount to a denial of the right to bid in the first instance.

In the present case, as in the ones last cited, the complainants "had violated no law which Congress had passed"; nevertheless, in each case their rights have been interrupted and blockaded by "the absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a public and administrative officer, whose action is unauthorized by any law and is in violation of the rights of the individual."

Appellees contend that appellants have failed to allege facts which show that any injury is sufficiently impending and threatening to justify the exercise of equity jurisdiction. It appears from the complaint that appellants are engaged in the production and sale of products of the iron and steel industry, within the area of fourteen states and the District of Columbia determined by appellees to constitute a locality; that they employ common laborers at wages ranging from 52½ to 56½ cents per hour, which in each case, respectively — at Coatesville, Pennsylvania, at Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, at South Chester, Pennsylvania, at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, at Colgate, Maryland, and at Branford, Connecticut — constitutes the minimum base rate of pay for common labor in the iron and steel industry, although wages paid to common laborers in other employments in such localities are much lower; that four of the seven appellants are parties to agreements with groups of organized labor, which provide for the payment of the common labor base rates specified; that five of the seven appellants have sold iron and steel products to various agencies of the United States for many years, particularly to the Departments of War, Navy and Interior; that the principal products sold have consisted of steel plates, sheets, pipe, slabs, high pressure gas cylinders, steel fianges and aerial bombs; that approximate amounts of gross sales by certain of the appellants to agencies of the United States during 1937 were, respectively: Lukens, $107,750, Alan Wood, $134,000, Harrisburg, $184,807, Eastern, $27,000; and during 1938: Lukens, $277,749, Alan Wood, $185,400, Harrisburg, $71,436, Eastern, $3,350; that only during short periods in more than 20 years has Central been without a government contract in progress; that "Lukens presently is a party to four contracts made with the Department of the Navy the performance of which has not been completed. The sales price of the iron and steel products to be furnished under such contracts is approximately $100,000"; that Alan Wood has unfilled orders from the War and Navy Departments for iron and steel products, the price of which aggregates approximately $200,000; that the tonnage of products furnished by Central to agencies of the United States during the last ten years has averaged approximately 8% of its total product; that each of the appellants desires to continue to bid on such contracts and carry on similar business with agencies of the United States in the future. The complaint then sets out the various capacities in which appellees Morgenthau, Peoples, Swanson, Woodring, Ickes, and Farley, act in the making of contracts for such products as are manufactured by appellants; it sets out sections of the Public Contracts Act previously referred to; it recites the procedure followed by appellees Perkins and McLaughlin in arriving at the protested determination, together with portions of that determination. It further sets out that appellees Perkins and McLaughlin are threatening to make the determination effective; that the determination is "void and wholly beyond the authority" of said appellees; that they "acted arbitrarily and capriciously and wholly without warrant or authority in law"; that the protested determination constitutes an attempt by said appellees "purporting to act in their respective official capacities above set forth and under the guise and pretense of determining the minimum wages actually prevailing in the respective localities in which the plants of plaintiffs and other manufacturers of products of the Iron and Steel Industry are located, but, in fact, acting completely beyond any authority conferred upon them by law, to raise and fix the wage rates to be paid at such plants." It further appears from the complaint that appellees Perkins, McLaughlin and Walling "have been and are threatening to require that there be included in every contract made and entered into after March 1, 1939, by any agency of the United States, for the manufacture or furnishing of products of the Iron and Steel Industry (as that Industry is defined in the Determination), in any amount exceeding $10,000, a stipulation or representation that any person employed by the contractor in the manufacture or furnishing of any of such products used in the performance of the contract will be paid, without subsequent deduction or repayment on any account, not less than the minimum wages set forth in the Determination, or a stipulation or representation of like purport and effect; * * *." It appears further that appellee Peoples, "acting pursuant to the direction and instruction of the defendants Perkins, McLaughlin and Walling, and purporting to act as Director of Procurement, has directed and threatens to continue to direct every agency of the United States desiring to enter into any such contract after March 1, 1939, to include such a stipulation in such contract and the invitations to bid therefor." It appears further that a regulation issued by appellee Perkins requires the insertion of the said stipulation in contracts for the manufacture of such materials; that invitations to bid on such contracts, issued by appellee Swanson, contain a statement that such determination and the wages therein established shall be effective; that appellees Morgenthau, Swanson, Woodring, Ickes and Farley intend to and will, unless restrained, require the insertion of a similar stipulation in all contracts awarded under their direction; that large appropriations have been made by Congress for purchase of such materials; that large and important contracts are soon to be let; that appellants desire to bid on such contracts and that unless appellees are enjoined and restrained, appellants will suffer immediate and irreparable injury for which they have no adequate remedy at law for the following reasons, among others:

(i) The plaintiffs will be deprived of their lawful right to bid on contracts for the manufacture or furnishing to any agency of the United States, including the executive departments of which the heads thereof are defendants named herein, of any of the products of the Iron and Steel Industry (as defined in the Determination), free of limitations other than those imposed by Congress, and will be precluded from selling to any such agency any of such products, unless the plaintiffs shall agree, in each contract for the sale to any such agency of any such products in an amount in excess of $10,000, to pay the persons employed in the performance of such contract at the rate of wages specified in the Determination. The plaintiffs will be deprived of such right, and will be required so to agree, not by any statute of the United States or by any action lawfully taken thereunder by any officer or agent of the United States, but by reason of arbitrary and capricious acts of the defendants in excess of and without warrant of, but under color of, authority conferred upon them by law.

(ii) As heretofore shown herein, the bids on substantial contracts to be awarded by or under the authority of the defendant Swanson, on which contracts or parts thereof certain plaintiffs heretofore named desire to submit bids, are to be opened on or shortly after March 1, 1939. As also heretofore shown herein, numerous other valuable and important contracts will be let by or under the authority of defendants named herein within a relatively short time after March 1, 1939. If the plaintiffs should submit bids upon any such contract, and enter into any such contracts, which include stipulations or representations in terms or to the effect that the plaintiffs will pay to persons employed by the plaintiffs in the performance of such contracts the minimum wages set forth in the Determination, the plaintiffs would be in danger of being estopped, and counsel for the plaintiffs have advised the plaintiffs that a court might hold that they were estopped, to secure a judicial determination of the invalidity of the Determination. Moreover, the penalties provided in Sections 2 and 3 of the Act, 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 36, 37, for non-compliance with any such stipulation or representation would impose upon the plaintiffs the burden of obtaining a judicial decision of the question of the validity of the Determination only upon the condition that, if unsuccessful, the plaintiffs must pay excessive penalties, have their contracts subject to cancellation, and be precluded from obtaining the award of any public contract for three years, unless the Secretary of Labor otherwise recommends. Such penalties are so severe as in effect to close all approaches to the courts and deprive the plaintiffs of any adequate remedy at law in the premises.

(iii) As has heretofore been shown, the rates of pay for wage earners employed by the plaintiffs at other than common labor base rates of the respective plaintiffs for common labor are generally ascertained by adding various differentials to such common labor base rates, respectively, and an increase in such common labor base rates will, as a practical matter, necessarily result in an increase in the rates of pay for such other persons. Furthermore, it will be impracticable, in the case of any of the plaintiffs who enter into contracts with an agency of the United States requiring an increase in the base rate of pay for persons employed in a particular plant by such plaintiff in the performance of such contract, to fail correspondingly to increase the base rate of pay for other wage earners employed by such plaintiff on other matters in such plant.

(iv) If the plaintiffs are required to pay the minimum wages fixed in the Determination, there is grave danger that they will no longer be able successfully to compete for Government contracts since large, fully integrated companies enjoying more favorable geographic locations from the standpoint of proximity to sources of supply for the raw materials used by them, proximity to the markets for their products and freight rate differentials should be able to underbid plaintiffs, if the plaintiffs must pay the same minimum wages as such competitors are now paying. On the other hand, if plaintiffs do not agree to pay such minimum wages, they will be in grave danger of losing a substantial source of revenue.

These allegations sufficiently present every requisite to the exercise of equity jurisdiction for the protection of the rights which appellants assert. Moreover, the threat of injury in this case is made greater by the provisions of the Act which penalize failure to conform to orders and determinations made thereunder.

Appellees contend that the complaint should be dismissed because appellants have not exhausted their administrative remedy. But no administrative remedy is provided by the Act to meet the grievances alleged in the complaint, and no administrative remedy is otherwise available. The Act does not contemplate unlawful conduct beyond its terms and entirely outside the scope of its authority. Section 6, 41 U.S.C.A. § 40, which appellees contend establishes an administrative remedy, provides for application to the Secretary of Labor for exception from the operation of the Act, but only (1) at the instance of the "head of the contracting agency or department" upon a written finding that adherence to the Act would seriously impair government business, or (2) upon joint recommendation of the contracting agency and the contractor after a contract has been made. The section further provides that the Secretary may make rules and regulations allowing exemptions from the Act, but we have been referred to no such action by the Secretary. Section 6 assumes a proper determination within the scope of the Act and pursuant to the authority thereof. The procedure therein provided could not possibly be used to challenge the authority of appellees to act as they have done. Moreover, even if that procedure were available to appellants, its use would admit the legality of the protested determination and leave them at the mercy of appellees in carrying out their unlawful purposes.

Appellants request also a judgment under the appropriate statute declaratory of their rights in the premises. A determination of the propriety of that request involves consideration of questions of law which have heretofore been discussed. However, a declaratory judgment may be given even though there be insufficient allegations of threatened irreparable injury to support a prayer for relief by injunction. As the complaint in the present case is sufficient in that respect, as well as in others, it follows that appellants would be entitled to declaratory relief in any event.

The case is therefore remanded to the District Court, which is instructed to set aside and vacate its judgment dismissing the complaint, and is directed to proceed in accordance with the opinion of this court.

Reversed.

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