Opinion
(2782)
The plaintiff sought damages from his defendant employer for injuries he sustained when he was assaulted by a fellow employee. The defendant claimed, by way of special defense, that the plaintiff's action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations ( 52-584). In his reply to that special defense, the plaintiff alleged that, as a result of the assault, he had been rendered physically and mentally incapable of asserting his rights against the defendant. Thereafter, the defendant, citing 52-584, moved for summary judgment without filing supporting affidavits, to which the plaintiff filed a counter-affidavit repeating the allegations that he had been incapable of asserting his rights. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. Held: 1. Since the facts on which the defendant relied in its motion were uncontroverted and were admitted in the pleadings and in the plaintiff's responses to requests for admission, supporting affidavits were unnecessary. 2. Section 52-584 does not specifically provide for tolling of its time limitations for claims of incompetent persons and, even were such a tolling possible, the defendant's bare assertion here that he was incapable of asserting his rights was insufficient to raise an issue of material, relevant fact.
Argued February 21, 1985
Decision released April 23, 1985
Action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, where the court, Budney, J., rendered summary judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. No error.
David C. Shaw, with whom, on the brief, were Frank Cathcart and Jeffrey M. Christian, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Donn A. Swift, for the appellee (defendant).
The plaintiff appeals from the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff, Agapito Lopez, was employed by the defendant, United Nurseries, Inc., as a farm worker in Virginia. In connection with the plaintiff's employment, the defendant supplied him with housing at a nominal cost. The plaintiff was assigned to a trailer to which one Hector Serrano, another of the defendant's employees, was also assigned. The plaintiff alleges that while asleep in the trailer he was assaulted and suffered severe injuries when he was beaten about the head and face with a club by Serrano. The plaintiff's revised complaint contains three separate counts all sounding in negligence relating to the defendant's hiring of Serrano and its failure to provide the plaintiff with safe housing. The revised complaint states that the assault occurred on or about June 12, 1980. Suit was not filed until June 17, 1982, five days after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. General Statutes 52-584.
"[General Statutes] Sec. 52-584. LIMITATION OF ACTION FOR INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY. No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed."
In its answer, the defendant claimed, by way of special defense, that all three negligence counts were barred by General Statutes 52-584. The plaintiff's reply to the defendant's special defense alleged that as a result of the beating he was for several months disabled and physically and mentally incapable of asserting his rights against the defendant, and that he was legally incompetent and should have been adjudicated as such. There is also an allegation that he was hospitalized in Virginia until August 1, 1980, during which time his access to the courts of this state was impaired.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to all three counts of the revised complaint on the ground that they were barred by General Statutes 52-584. The defendant's motion for summary judgment was filed without supporting affidavits, instead relying on the pleadings and the plaintiff's responses to the defendant's request for admissions which were part of the court file.
The plaintiff filed a counter-affidavit in opposition, in which he averred that he was, as a result of the beating by Serrano, rendered mentally disabled and incapable of asserting his rights and that this period of incompetency lasted for several months.
The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred (1) in granting the motion without supporting affidavits, (2) in concluding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact since there were factual questions concerning the extent of the plaintiff's disability and the circumstances under which he had sustained his injuries, and (3) in concluding that the allegations in the plaintiff's reply to the defendant's special defense would not toll the provisions of General Statutes 52-584.
The facts on which the defendant relies in its motion for summary judgment are uncontroverted and admitted in the pleadings and the plaintiff's responses to the defendant's request to admit. Under the circumstances, affidavits or further documentation were unnecessary. Practice Book 380.
We find that the only material facts at issue in the defendant's motion for summary judgment are the date of the assault, June 12, 1980, and the date the action was filed, June 17, 1982. Those facts are admitted. Material facts are defined as facts which will make a difference in the result. Barrett v. Southern Connecticut Gas Co., 172 Conn. 362, 378, 374 A.2d 1051 (1977). Facts other than the date of the assault and the date the action was filed were not material to the trial court's decision on the motion for summary judgment, unless the applicable statute of limitations is tolled because of facts asserted in the plaintiff's counter affidavit.
"The rule that the court will not read exceptions into statute of limitations applies in the case of persons non compos mentis. Generally if there is no exception in favor of incompetents, the statute will run against claims in their favor the same as against claims of others not expressly mentioned in the exceptions of the statute." 51 Am.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions 186.
General Statutes 52-584, provides no exceptions for minors; Lametta v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 139 Conn. 218, 92 A.2d 731 (1952); nor does it provide an exception for insane persons. Kirwan v. State, 168 Conn. 498, 501-502, 363 A.2d 56 (1975). Even if the statute were tolled in the event a person has been formally adjudicated as incompetent or should have been and no provision has been made to insure that such person's interests are adequately protected; see Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn. 533, 539, 429 A.2d 801 (1980); Kirwan v. State, supra, 502-503; Hobart v. Connecticut Turnpike Co., 15 Conn. 145, 148 (1842); neither the pleadings nor the plaintiff's counter affidavit contain facts which indicate that such is the case here. The pleadings aver a head injury. The plaintiff's counteraffidavit states that the plaintiff was rendered mentally disabled and incapable of asserting his rights. That mere assertion is insufficient to establish the existence of a material, relevant fact.
Other Connecticut statutes of limitations do provide exceptions. General Statutes 52-575, 52-576, 52-579 and 52-594.
"A trial court may appropriately render summary judgment when the documents submitted demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining between the parties and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book 384; Yanow v. Teal Industries, Inc., 178 Conn. 262, 268, 422 A.2d 311 (1979); United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 377-78, 260 A.2d 596 (1969)." Bartha v. Waterbury House Wrecking Co., 190 Conn. 8, 11, 459 A.2d 115 (1983); see Herman v. Endriss, 187 Conn. 374, 446 A.2d 9 (1982). "Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed relevant factual issue." (Citations omitted.) Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 455, 472 A.2d 1257, 1259 (1984). It is not enough for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. The nonexistence of an issue of fact is not rebutted by the bald statement that an issue of fact does exist. Id.