Summary
In Long v Cleary (273 AD2d 799), the Fourth Department observed that the defendant City was not required by the MUTCD to place skip lines on a certain street, but the result in that case, once again, was based on the absence of a causal connection between defendant's actions and the injury: "The record is devoid of proof that the City's negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the accident and plaintiff's resulting injury..."
Summary of this case from Dispenza v. StateOpinion
June 16, 2000.
Appeal from Amended Judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Kane, J. — Negligence.
PRESENT: PIGOTT, JR., P.J., PINE, HAYES, BALIO AND LAWTON, JJ.
Amended judgment unanimously reversed on the law without costs, motion granted and amended complaint against defendant City of Lackawanna dismissed. Memorandum: Defendant City of Lackawanna (City) appeals from an amended judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding the City 40% liable for an automobile accident between the vehicles driven by defendant Kevin G. Cleary and plaintiff. The jury found Cleary 45% liable and plaintiff 15% liable.
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the City properly appealed from the amended judgment, which superseded the original judgment, because the amended judgment altered the original judgment in a material respect ( see, Gormel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 151 A.D.2d 1048; cf., Matter of Kolasz v. Levitt, 63 A.D.2d 777, 779).
The record is devoid of proof that the City's negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the accident and plaintiff's resulting injury, and thus Supreme Court erred in denying the City's motion for a trial order of dismissal pursuant to CPLR 4401. The sole basis for the alleged negligence of the City was its failure to place skip lines on the highway before the intersection. Plaintiff, however, presented no proof that such markings were required under the New York Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Indeed, plaintiff's expert testified that the only applicable reference in the manual was a provision "that any roadway with pavement sixteen feet or wider may be marked to indicate lane use [emphasis supplied]", and that such markings are intended to prevent vehicles from wandering from lane to lane.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the City should have placed the skip lines on the highway, we conclude that plaintiff failed to establish that the failure to do so was a proximate cause of the accident ( see generally, Ball v. State of New York, 96 A.D.2d 1139, aff'd 61 N.Y.2d 990 ; Atkinson v. County of Oneida, 59 N.Y.2d 840, rearg denied 60 N.Y.2d 587; Boucher v. Town of Candor, 234 A.D.2d 669 ; Levitt v. County of Suffolk, 166 A.D.2d 421, 423, lv dismissed 77 N.Y.2d 834 Price v. Hampson, 142 A.D.2d 974). The speculation of plaintiff's expert that the skip lines would have alerted plaintiff to the fact that this was a four-lane intersection and the self-serving statement of Cleary that, had he known it was a four-lane highway, he would have been "more cautious" before turning in front of plaintiff's oncoming vehicle do not establish proximate cause. "Speculation, guess and surmise may not be substituted for competent evidence" ( Price v. Hampson, supra, at 975-976). At the very most, the failure to mark the intersection "merely furnished the condition or occasion for the occurrence of the event rather than one of its causes" ( Sheehan v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 496, 503; see, Margolin v. Friedman, 43 N.Y.2d 982, 983 ; Bonsera v. Universal Recycling Servs. Corp., 269 A.D.2d 483 [decided Feb. 22, 2000]; Haylett v. New York City Tr. Auth., 251 A.D.2d 373).
Owens v. City of Syracuse ( 258 A.D.2d 898), relied upon by plaintiff, does not support a contrary result. In Owens, the plaintiffs' expert testified that the failure of defendant City of Syracuse to provide a center line along the entire length of the street violated a provision of the New York Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (17 NYCRR 262.2 [a]). Here, there is no proof of a violation of the manual. Likewise, Scheemaker v. State of New York ( 125 A.D.2d 964, 965, aff'd 70 N.Y.2d 985), also relied upon by plaintiff, is inapposite. The State's liability in Scheemaker was predicated on the failure of the State to post lower mandatory speed limit signs at a dangerous intersection.
Thus, we reverse the amended judgment, grant the motion of the City and dismiss the amended complaint against it.