Opinion
Case No. 97-70598.
February 5, 2000.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
Petitioner Patrick Harold Little, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Carson City Correctional Facility in Carson City, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that he is incarcerated in violation of his constitutional rights. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
II. Procedural History
On November 24, 1987, Petitioner pleaded guilty in Genesee County Circuit Court to assault with intent to do great bodily harm and habitual offender, third. He was sentenced to twelve to twenty years imprisonment.
Following his conviction, Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals, presenting the following claims:
I. Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying defendant's motion to suppress his statement to the police, and specifically in finding that defendant had knowingly, understandably and voluntarily waived the right to the presence of court-appointed counsel prior to the commencement of police interrogation?
II. Whether the trial court committed error in denying defendant's motion to suppress his statements?
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction.People v. Little, No. 108583 (Mich.Ct.App. March 17, 1989).
Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Little, No. 85820 (Mich. Oct. 31, 1989).
Petitioner then filed the pending habeas corpus petition, presenting the following claims:
I. The trial court committed reversible error in denying Petitioner's motion to suppress his statement to the police, and specifically in finding that Petitioner had knowingly, understandably and voluntarily waived the right to the presence of court-appointed counsel prior to the commencement of police interrogation.
II. Petitioner should not be deemed to have waived his right to appeal the trial court's decision denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police where he was not advised by the trial court that his plea of guilty would have the effect of waiving that right.III. Analysis A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA") altered the standard of review federal courts must apply when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus. The AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the act, April 24, 1996. Because petitioner's application was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the amended standard of review, apply to this case.
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) imposes the following standard of review that a federal court must utilize when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1998). Additionally, this court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1); see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous").
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.
Where the issue presented on habeas corpus review is a mixed question of law and fact, the federal habeas court must decide "whether the state court [decision] . . . involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court." Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 360 (6th Cir. 1999), citing Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 327 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1112 (1998), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) (alterations and omission in original). The Sixth Circuit has defined "unreasonable application" as follows:
[T]he unreasonableness of a state court's application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent will not be debatable among reasonable jurists . . . if it is so offensive to existing precedent, so devoid of record support, or so arbitrary as to indicate that it is outside the universe of plausible, credible outcomes.Id. at 362 (internal quotations omitted).
With this standard in mind, the court proceeds to examine the merits of petitioner's Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
B. Denial of Petitioner's Motion to Suppress
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police. Petitioner claims that the police failed to stop questioning him after he invoked his right to counsel.
As an initial matter, Respondent claims that by pleading guilty Petitioner has waived his right to appeal this issue. All non-jurisdictional issues, except ineffective assistance of counsel, are waived when a defendant voluntarily enters a guilty plea. U.S. v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir. 1994). However, where the trial court record does not clearly demonstrate that a defendant understood that a guilty plea waived the right to appeal, this Court may address the merits of a non-jurisdictional issue. See U.S. v. Robinson, 187 F.3d 516, 517 (5th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Bull, 182 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 1999). The plea hearing transcript in the pending case reveals that the trial court judge did not inform Petitioner prior to accepting the guilty plea that he was waiving his right to appeal. Therefore, for purposes of Petitioner's habeas corpus petition, this Court concludes that Petitioner has not waived his right to appeal this issue and will address the merits of this claim.
Whether a petitioner invoked his right to counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact. See Boles v. Foltz, 816 F.2d 1132, 1135 (6th Cir. 1987). Therefore, this Court must determine whether the state court's decision that Petitioner did not invoke his right to counsel was a reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. This Court holds that it was.
Petitioner claims that prior to making his statement to police he requested counsel. He filed a motion to suppress his statement with the trial court. In response to Petitioner's motion to suppress, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v. Walker, 374 Mich. 331 (1965).
Following the Walker hearing, the trial court held that Petitioner's waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and voluntary:
[I] find no undue duress and I find no evidence of coercion. And I want to comment that the Court is very mindful now that I've heard it, that he answered the questions clearly and completely without hesitation, he appeared in all respects to be calm, the content of the answers was coherent and responsive to the questions, there was no moaning, no groaning, no sounds of pain, no sighs or other evidence of despair, fear — despair or fear. Indeed, he seemed very ready, willing and able to talk, and having heard all that, I'm even more persuaded that . . . the defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waive[r]. . . .
Nov. 20, 1987 Transcript, pp. 40-41.
Petitioner claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress. He bases this claim on the following tape-recorded exchange during which Petitioner was informed of his Miranda rights prior to giving his statement to police:
Police Officer: You have the right to talk with an attorney before making any statements. Do you understand this?
Petitioner: Yes.
Police Officer: If you do not have the money to hire an attorney one will be appointed for you and you have the right to remain silent until this attorney is present. Do you understand this?
Petitioner: Yes.
Police Officer: if you decide to discuss this you may stop the interview anytime you wish. Do you understand this?
Petitioner: Yes.
Police Officer: Do you wish to waive your right to have an attorney present and discuss this matter, it means do you want to go ahead and talk to me now without an attorney present?
Petitioner: No, I don't want to but I will.
Police Officer: What does that mean, I don't understand?
Petitioner: It means I'd like my own attorney present but I will talk without an attorney present.
Police Officer: Either you can talk with an attorney or without an attorney, that's within your rights —
Petitioner: But if I don't I have to wait until I go through court proceedings before I talk because I can't hire a lawyer.
Police Officer: So, it's your wish to go ahead and talk to me without an attorney?
Petitioner: Yes.
Police Officer: All right. That — those — the warnings, Miranda warnings as were read to, you do understand clearly?
Petitioner: Yes.
Police Officer: Okay. And there is no hesitation or confunction [sic] in your mind as to go ahead and talk to me freely, is that correct?
Petitioner: Yes.
Nov. 20, 1987, Transcript:, pp. 13-14.
This Court determines that the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion to suppress was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner's statement "I'd like my own attorney present but I will talk without an attorney present" does not constitute an unequivocal request for counsel. The United States Supreme Court has explained the invocation of the right to counsel as follows:
Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney . . . But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning . . . . Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel.Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994).
Petitioner's statement that he would like to have counsel present but was willing to proceed without counsel was, at best, an ambiguous reference to an attorney which did not require the cessation of questioning because Petitioner clearly and expressly articulated his desired to continue talking to police even in the absence of his attorney. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 (holding that defendant's statement that "maybe I should talk to a lawyer" was not an unambiguous request for counsel); Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that suspects statement that "it wold be nice" to have an attorney was not an unambiguous request for counsel). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief:
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and the matter is DISMISSED.
PAUL D. BORMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATE: FEB 11 2000