Opinion
No. CV 106004043 S
August 2, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
The motion to strike was on the short calendar on August 2, 2010, with a take the papers ready marking. The court has issued this decision on the papers without oral argument.
On March 2, 2010, the plaintiffs, Robert Liedke and Adria Torcellini Liedke, filed this four-count complaint against the defendants, Erich Paquette and Leonard Paquette, alleging that on March 4, 2008, the plaintiffs were in a motor vehicle stopped in traffic at a traffic control signal, when their vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by the defendant, Erich Paquette. The complaint alleges that Erich Paquette was operating a vehicle owned by Leonard Paquette, as a family car within the scope of a general authority from the owner and/or as his agent.
There are no separate counts against Leonard Paquette. Any reference to "the defendant" in this opinion shall be limited to the defendant, Erich Paquette.
Counts one and three allege that the defendant was negligent in operating his motor vehicle. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant was negligent in a number of ways, including failing to keep his vehicle under proper control, failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to apply his brakes in time to avoid the collision, failing to turn his vehicle so as to avoid a collision, operating his vehicle with inadequate brakes, and violating General Statutes §§ 14-218a and 14-222.
Count one is in favor of Robert Liedke and count three is in favor of Adria Torcellini Liedke. Count three Incorporates the allegations of negligence of count one.
Counts two and four allege that the defendant was reckless in operating his motor vehicle in that his injuries were caused by the defendant due to his operation of his motor vehicle "with reckless disregard and in violation of" General Statutes §§ 14-218a and 14-222. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the defendant "operated said vehicle at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of the highway, the intersection of streets and weather conditions, in violation of Section 14-218a of the Connecticut General Statutes," and "used the highway in a manner which recklessly disregarded his own safety or the safety of others in violation of Section 14-222 of the Connecticut General Statutes. The plaintiffs allege the defendant's violation of §§ 14-218a and 14-222 were a substantial factor in causing their injuries and losses. They are seeking double and treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 under counts two and four.
Count two is in favor of Robert Liedke and count four is in favor of Adria Torcellini Liedke. Count four incorporates the allegations of negligence and recklessness of count two.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alvers, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. United Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 347, 890 A.2d 1269 (2006). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Ass'n v. King, 277 Conn. 238, 246, 890 A.2d 522 (2006).
The defendant argues in his motion to strike that the recklessness count pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 should be stricken on the grounds that the plaintiff "has failed to allege any supporting facts to establish the essential elements of reckless conduct." Any claim for relief on that basis should also be stricken. The defendant contends that the plaintiff has merely adopted and repeated the allegations of count one of simple negligence.
General Statutes § 14-295 provides: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property." The appellate courts have not decided what degree of specificity is required in pleading recklessness under § 14-295 and, thus, a division of opinion has occurred amongst the judges of the superior court. See e.g., Flores v. Viveros-Velazquez, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. 063971 (November 21, 2000). There are two lines of cases, the first representing the minority view, which holds that a plaintiff must not only plead a statutory violation as set forth in § 14-295, but also facts that would support a claim of reckless conduct at common law. "Relying on the usual rules of pleading, these courts generally reason that a plaintiff who is alleging recklessness must allege specific facts that informs both the court and the defendant what conduct is relied upon." Robbins v. Gondek, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 07-6000285 (March 18, 2008).
See McGuire-Kelley v. Sciuto, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 99-428860 (October 1, 1999); Chatterton v. Infinity Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 98-064615 (October 1, 1999); Nocera v. Besso, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. CV 98-086777 (September 29, 1999); Reed v. Sesta, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV 98-5777273 (June 19, 1998).
The second line of cases, referred to as the majority view, distinguishes between pleading common-law recklessness and statutory recklessness, thus holding that a plaintiff need only plead the required language in § 14-295, that is, that the defendant violated one or more of the enumerated statutory provisions named therein, and that violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. "The majority view is based on both an analysis of the legislative history as well as a review of the statutory language of § 14-295 itself. These cases conclude that as long as the general requirements of the statute are met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 14-295." Ferens v. Brown, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 00-509116 (October 11, 2001). After a careful review of both lines of cases, this court agrees that the plain meaning of statutory language in § 14-295 requires only that a plaintiff plead a violation of one or more of the enumerated statutes named therein, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.
See Kelly v. Miller, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. CV 08-5008707 (August 28, 2008); Sony v. Arselli, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 01-0386408 (May 14, 2002); Woolums v. Deveny, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 01-454434 (November 7, 2001); Donahue v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 01-161182 (February 28, 2001); Plimpton v. Amerada Hess Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 99-0169861 (September 27, 1999); Nelson-Hlebogiannis v. Lee, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 98-0167571 (May 17, 1999); Carta v. Cohn, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 98-0262531.
The essential allegations of count two and count four in the plaintiffs' complaint in this case are that when the defendant drove his car at an unsafe speed in violation of § 14-218a, or used the highway in a manner which recklessly disregarded his own safety or the safety of others in violation of § 14-222, such that the defendant caused a collision that injured the plaintiffs, the defendant engaged in reckless conduct under § 14-295, and that those violations were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' injuries. As pleaded, the second and fourth count sounding in statutory recklessness are legally sufficient as are the accompanying claims for double or treble damages.
CONCLUSION
The motion to strike is denied.