Opinion
FBTCV166058066S
01-30-2017
Val Jean Harston v. Wilker Candido
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE
Edward T. Krumeich, J.
Defendants Wilker Candido and Eliene Nascimento have moved to strike the Second Count of the Complaint dated June 21, 2016, filed by plaintiff Val Hairston, that asserts a recklessness claim under Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295. This motion squarely raises the issue of whether a plaintiff needs to allege facts that would constitute reckless conduct or whether merely alleging conclusory violations of the statutory predicate for liability under C.G.S. § 14-295, here a violation of § 14-218, would suffice. For the reasons stated below, I am granting the motion to strike for failure to allege facts that would constitute reckless conduct.
The Standards for Deciding a Motion to Strike
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " [A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350, 71 A.3d 480 (2013). " If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action . . . the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). On the other hand, " [a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
The Split in Authority on Pleading Multiple Damages Under C.G.S. § 14-295
There is a split in authority among the Superior Court Judges as to pleading requirements to state a claim under C.G.S. § 14-295. See generally Reddick v. Guirguis, 2016 WL 3266120 **2-3 (CT.Sup.Ct. New Haven 2016) (Wilson, J.). The " majority view" holds that it is not necessary to allege facts that would show common-law recklessness but merely to follow " the plain meaning of statutory language in § 14-295 [which] requires only that a plaintiff plead a violation of one or more of the enumerated statutes named therein, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries." Liedke v. Paquette, 2010 WL 3447840 *2 (CT.Sup.Ct. New Britain 2010) (Swienton, J.). Accord Sears v. Brooks, 2015 WL 9871320 **4-5 (CT.Sup.Ct. Hartford 2015) (Noble, J.). The contrary view, sometimes referred to as the minority view, " is based on the necessity of fact-pleading rules under P.B. § 10-1 and holds " the plaintiff must plead particularized facts that when taken as true would show that the defendant acted with reckless disregard. The facts must show that the defendant consciously chose a course of action despite the fact that the defendant did know, or reasonably should have known, that the action posed serious danger to others." Reddick, 2016 WL 3266120 *3 (citations omitted).
The Complaint Does Not Allege Facts Showing Recklessness
I have not taken sides on the different views about pleading requirements under C.G.S. § 14-295 because the complaints before me had always alleged conduct, incorporated into the statutory recklessness count, that satisfactorily described reckless conduct, i.e. conduct that would demonstrate intentional, willful or reckless indifference to the safety of others. Jack v. Scanlon, 4 Conn.App. 451, 455, 495 A.2d 1084 (2009). Compare State v. Miller, 122 Conn.App. 631, 635, 999 A.2d 844 (2010); State v. Sandra Q., 51 Conn.App. 463, 467-68, 724 A.2d 1127 (1999) (" [w]hile speed alone may be insufficient to warrant a conviction for reckless driving, it may be taken into consideration to show a reckless disregard of consequences"). See generally, Bishop v. Kelly, 206 Conn. 608, 614-15, 539 A.2d 108 (1988).
" As aptly stated in Eustace v. Adley Express Co., [1 Conn.Supp. 58, 59 (1935)], and reiterated in Goldfarb v. Bragg, [39 Conn.Supp. 228, 229, 475 A.2d 346 (1983)], 'the imposition of the penalty of double or treble damages should be reserved for cases which involve offenses more serious than simple negligence. Such a penalty should be imposed only where the violation of the rules of the road has been deliberate or at least under conditions which indicate that the defendant was conducting himself with reckless disregard of the rights of others.'" Jack, 4 Conn.App. at 455.
" Recklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater . . . than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent . . . More recently, we have described recklessness as a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts . . . It is more than negligence, more than gross negligence . . . The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. But, in order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them . . . Wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct . . . It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action. The result is that [wilful], wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent . . . It is at least clear . . . that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention . . ." (Internal citations omitted.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, 317 Conn. 357, 382-83, 119 A.3d 462 (2015).
This complaint does not allege facts that would constitute reckless conduct under the common-law definition. The allegations in the Second Count merely repeat the identical allegations in the negligence count and adds conclusory allegations that the conduct was " deliberate" and " reckless"; the only statutory predicate for Section 14-295 is little more than a boilerplate recitation of the statute's description of the conduct volative of C.G.S. § 14-218a, without any subsidiary facts about what actually is alleged to have happened or as to defendant's culpability beyond negligence.
C.G.S. § 14-218a provides: " [n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state, or road . . . at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of highway, road or parking area, the intersection of streets and weather conditions."
I agree with the minority view explained by Judge Sferrazza in Stelma v. Comarella, 2014 WL 4637548 (Conn.Super. 2014), who concluded that the 1988 amendment to C.G.S. § 14-295 incorporated the common-law definition of recklessness and should be held to the normal fact-pleading standard under Practice Book § 10-1:
Section 14-295 now explicitly confines the availability of multiple damages to cases where a plaintiff " has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of [certain statutory provisions] . . ." (emphasis added). The court refuses to regard this phrase as creating a shibboleth that is satisfied by the mere utterance of the word " reckless" in the pleadings. Instead, the court construes " specifically pleaded" to encompass the normal rules of pleading set forth in Practice Book § 10-1. That is, the plaintiff's allegations must go beyond a statement of legal conclusions, such as that a defendant violated a statute " recklessly, " and specify the material facts which establish the viability of that legal conclusion.
Judge Sommers wrote a scholarly opinion in Rogers v. Dellop, 2013 WL 2350620 *1-8 (Conn.Super. 2013) [56 Conn.L.Rptr. 152, ], that adopted the " minority view" and required fact pleading to sustain a claim for double or treble damages under C.G.S. § 14-295. Judge Sommers examined the entire legislative history of C.G.S. § 14-295 and concluded that in the 1988 amendment the Legislature did not intend to carve out an exception to normal pleading requirements but, to the contrary, required that recklessness be " specifically pleaded, " a phrase that emphasized the need to differentiate negligent and reckless conduct in a complaint. For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Strike the Second Count is granted.