Opinion
A161332
04-04-2022
Estate of ELIZABETH LANGES, Deceased. v. MONIQUE COLLINS, Objector and Appellant. ERIN LANGES, as Administrator, etc. Petitioner and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 18-PRO-00958)
MAYFIELD, J. [*]
Erin Langes, as administrator of the estate of Elizabeth Langes, filed a petition to establish the estate's claim of ownership to property, elder financial abuse and related causes of action, and subsequently obtained judgment on the pleadings as to the claim of ownership of certain real property. Monique Collins, who sold the real property under a power of attorney from the decedent and claims ownership of the proceeds as beneficiary of a holographic will, appeals. She contends the trial court violated her right to due process by granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the underlying petition was not properly noticed, and abused its discretion by failing to require respondent to adhere to statutory notice requirements and refusing to allow her to amend her response before granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Erin Langes (Langes) is the son of decedent Elizabeth Langes and lives in Colorado. Monique Collins provided care and assistance to decedent, who Collins says held her out as her granddaughter to family and friends and made her the beneficiary of a holographic will executed in 2012.
Decedent owned and lived in real property at 116 Daphne Way, East Palo Alto. After she suffered a stroke in August 2017, Collins provided care and assisted decedent with various tasks. Decedent moved to a skilled nursing home (according to Collins) or assisted living facility (according to Langes), and then to a different facility near where Collins lived in Stockton. On September 6, 2017, decedent signed an advance health care directive and durable power of attorney, both appointing Collins as her agent. According to Collins, decedent did so after speaking with an ombudsman at the first facility; according to Langes, Collins induced decedent to sign the power of attorney, exercising influence that overcame decedent's free will and judgment.
In December 2017, decedent decided to move closer to her family in Louisiana and her brothers told her she would need to sell her house in order to pay for living expenses and health care. According to Collins, decedent directed her to sell the property.
In February 2018, Collins executed and recorded (in the wrong county) a revocable transfer upon death deed with Collins as beneficiary. Collins states that the deed was prepared and filed by an individual to whom she had been referred after the holder of a reverse mortgage on decedent's property informed her it would keep the property upon decedent's death; she says the individual gave her "bad legal advice" and she never relied on the deed. Langes maintains the deed was fraudulent.
Later in February 2018, Collins was contacted by an investigator from the Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office-Langes says, in response to concerns of elder abuse of decedent by Collins, while Collins says the investigator contacted her regarding an investigation into the individual who advised her about the deed and did not say he was investigating possible financial elder abuse of decedent by Collins.
Decedent died in Louisiana on March 2, 2018. Collins states that she helped arrange the funeral and paid related expenses; decedent's family members told her she should keep all the funds in decedent's estate "because she cared for [decedent] so well"; and she believed the funds from sale of decedent's property, as well as funds from decedent's bank account and life insurance policies designating Collins as beneficiary, were hers. Collins asserts that Langes had not visited or had contact with decedent for 15 to 20 years prior to her death, and when Collins called him numerous times after decedent's first stroke, he hung up on her and told her not to call again.
On March 24, 2018, after decedent's death, Collins sold decedent's East Palo Alto property, signing the purchase agreement as decedent's "Attorney of Fact." The grant deed transferring decedent's property was recorded on March 29, 2018. On the same date, the net proceeds from the sale, $523,753, were wired to an account in decedent's name at BBVA Compass Bank (BBVA). Also on the same date, Collins obtained a cashier's check from BBVA for $520,000, payable to Collins.
According to Langes, Collins had opened the BBVA account in both her name and the decedent's, using the invalidly obtained power of attorney; Collins, who worked at BBVA, issued the cashier's check in her capacity as agent for BBVA; the cashier's check was deposited into Collins's personal account at Chase Bank (Chase); on May 1, 2018, Chase returned the balance of funds in Collin's account, $134,900.56, pursuant to a request from BBVA's Corporate Security Department; and these funds were subsequently seized by the district attorney and remain in the interest bearing account of the Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office's.
Langes filed a petition for letters of administration on August 18, 2018, stating that decedent died intestate and he was her only heir. Langes was appointed administrator of the estate on October 1, 2018, and letters of administration issued.
On March 20, 2019, Langes filed a petition pursuant to Probate Code section 850 seeking a determination that property including decedent's BBVA account, any money taken from decedent by Collins, decedent's East Palo Alto real property (valued approximately $1,500,000), and miscellaneous personal property of the decedent were assets wholly owned by decedent's estate and subject to the management and control of Langes as administrator of the estate and associated relief. The petition named Collins and various other respondents. Collins filed an objection to the petition on April 24, 2019. Among other things, Collins relied upon a holographic will dated July 5, 2012, and signed by two witnesses, in which decedent left her real property at 116 Daphne Way, East Palo Alto, and its contents to Eugene Martin or, in the event of his death, to "my granddaughter Monique Collins." Martin had predeceased decedent.
Further unspecified statutory references will be to the Probate Code.
The petition was captioned, "Petition to Establish Estate's Claim of Ownership to Property; for Order Directing its Transfer to Estate; for Finding of Invalid Donative transfer (Prob. Code 21380); Imposition of Constructive Trust; for Fraud; Elder Financial Abuse; Breach of Fiduciary duties; Negligent Supervision; Cancellation of Instruments; Accounting and for Damages."
Langes filed a first amended petition on May 15, 2019, to which Collins filed her objection on May 31, 2019, and Langes filed a reply on June 6, 2019.
On May 20, 2019, Langes filed a petition in Louisiana seeking appointment as independent succession representative and letters of independent administration for decedent's estate. The petition stated that decedent died intestate while domiciled in Louisiana. It also sought to file a document "purporting to be an [h]olographic testament of Decedent," which Langes challenged the validity of but stated he was required by Louisiana law to put into the record of the proceedings.
Langes filed a second amended petition in the present case on July 19, 2019, and Collins filed her objection on August 19, 2019.
On November 12, 2019, Collins filed a petition to admit the holographic will to probate. Langes's demurrer to the petition was sustained without leave to amend on February 5, 2020, apparently on the grounds that the petition was time-barred and that there was a petition for probate in Louisiana.
The court's February 5, 2020, minute order states, "The court informs all parties until the Will is admitted into Probate in Louisiana, it can't be admitted in California. [¶] The court finds/orders: Demurrer sustained without leave to amend." A "Notice of Ruling" filed by Langes's attorney on February 5, 2020, states that the court found: "The within matter is an ancillary probate. [¶] There is already a domiciliary probate in the State of Louisiana. [¶] Monique Collins is time barred under California Probate Code § 8226 from seeking to have the alleged Will admitted to probate herein. [¶] Accordingly, the court ordered that the Demurrer to Petition to Admit Elizabeth Langes' Holographic Will Dated July 5, 2012 To Probate was sustained without leave to amend." The court's February 11, 2020, minute order states, "At hearing on 2/5/2020 demurrer was granted without leave to amend based on the statute of limitations. As such, the Petition to Admit Elizabeth Langes' Holographic Will brought by Monique Collins is a nullity."
Langes filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on March 3, 2020, arguing his petition stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Collins and her objection did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Langes argued that as personal representative of decedent's estate, he had the right to take possession of decedent's property pursuant to section 9650, and Collins was liable to the estate for the outstanding balance of funds from sale of decedent's real property.
Collins's opposition to the motion relied upon the holographic will in arguing that her objection to the petition stated facts sufficient to constitute a defense and Langes was not entitled to the judgment he sought. Specifically, she argued the sale proceeds belonged to her as beneficiary of decedent's will because the sale occurred after decedent's death, and issues of fact existed as to whether decedent died intestate. Collins stated that she had just learned Langes had filed a petition to administer decedent's will in Louisiana and that she intended to file an objection to that petition and to file her own petition. She also urged the motion for judgment on the pleadings should be denied because Langes failed to properly notice the section 850 action pursuant to section 851 and failed to comply with a mandatory meet and confer requirement (Code Civ. Proc., § 439), and the motion failed to dispose of an entire cause of action. Collins sought leave to amend if the court was inclined to grant the motion.
Collins asked the trial court to take judicial notice of a "Motion to Probate Testament filed on August 26, 2020" in Louisiana and the court clerk's fax confirming filing. The court granted the request for judicial notice, but found the documents immaterial to the outcome of the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Collins argued the motion failed to dispose of the entire first cause of action because it sought only transfer of proceeds from sale of the real property while the cause of action included additional property (e.g., decedent's BBVA account, any money taken from decedent by Collins).
Langes's reply dismissed the procedural arguments and asserted the estate's claim to the proceeds from sale of decedent's real property was "incontrovertible as a matter of law," reiterating his right as administrator of decedent's estate to take possession of the funds from sale of the real property and Collins's liability for the outstanding balance of those funds.
Langes maintained the petition was properly noticed. As to the meet and confer requirement, Langes argued the failure to comply prior to filing the motion for judgment on the pleadings was inadvertent; four attempts to meet and confer after filing were ignored by Collins's counsel; and failure to adequately meet and confer is, by statute, not grounds to deny the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4).)
After a hearing on September 2, 2020, the trial court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found decedent's real property was part of her estate on the date of her death, Collins had no authority to sell the property after decedent's death and Langes, as administrator, was the only person with power to sell the property. The court overruled Collins's objections to notice, finding notice was adequate, and overruled her objections regarding the meet and confer requirements, finding they were not determinative. The court held the total $523,753.00 net proceeds from the sale of decedent's real property was an asset of decedent's estate; ordered Collins to transfer to Langes, as administrator of the estate, the sum $388,852.44 (the net proceeds of $523,753, less the funds seized by the district attorney), to be deposited into an account for the decedent's estate; and ordered the district attorney to transfer the seized funds ($134,900.56, plus accrued interest) to Langes, as administrator of the decedent's estate, for deposit into an account for the estate.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I.
"The standard for granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d); Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146.)" (In re Guardianship of Olivia J. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1155.) On review," '[w]e treat the pleadings as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . [¶] . . . . We consider evidence outside the pleadings which the trial court considered without objection. (O'Neil v. General Security Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 587, 594, fn. 1.)' (Baughman v. State of California (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 182, 187.)" (Estate of Dayan (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 29, 39-40.) Judgment on the pleadings may be granted either as to "the entire complaint or cross complaint or as to any of the causes of action stated therein." (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(2)(A).) The procedure may thus be used to resolve discrete issues in a case. (See Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 671 and fn. 3 [noting trial court's direction to, in effect, file motion for judgment on the pleadings as to identified issues].)
II.
Collins's primary contention is that the trial court abused its discretion and violated her due process rights by granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings because Langes's notices of hearing on his section 850 petition did not adhere to the requirements of section 851, subdivision (c). That provision states: "A notice of hearing shall contain all of the following: [¶] (1) A description of the subject property sufficient to provide adequate notice to any party who may have an interest in the property. For real property, the notice shall state the street address or, if none, a description of the property's location and assessor's parcel number. [¶] (2) If the petition seeks relief pursuant to Section 859, a description of the relief sought sufficient to provide adequate notice to the party against whom that relief is requested. [¶] (3) A statement advising any person interested in the property that he or she may file a response to the petition." Subdivision (c) was added to section 851 by a 2017 amendment and became effective on January 1, 2018. (Added by Stats. 2017, ch. 32, § 1.)
Section 859, referred to in paragraph (2) of the quoted text, concerns liability and remedies for wrongful taking, concealment or disposition of property belonging to specified parties, including the estate of a decedent.
Langes gave notice of the hearing on the second amended petition (as well as the initial and first amended petitions) on Judicial Council Form DE-120, which was then the applicable mandatory form for this purpose. Forms adopted by the Judicial Council for mandatory use must be used by all parties "[w]herever applicable." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.31; Gov. Code, § 68511.) Item 1 on form DE-120 provides spaces to provide the name and representative capacity of the person giving notice and specify the document that has been filed; item 2 on the form reads, "[y]ou may refer to the filed documents for more information." The petition was served with the notice.
Further references to forms will be to Judicial Council forms.
Collins contends this notice failed to comply with section 851, subdivision (c), in that it did not identify the property affected by the second amended petition, indicate whether a money judgment of double the value of the property was being sought, or alert the recipient of her right to file a response. Collins maintains she was prejudiced because she was not put on notice that Langes was seeking $388,852.44 from her.
Collins points to the legislative history of the amendment that added subdivision (c) to section 851 as highlighting the importance of the new notice requirements. The cited committee analysis stated: "[U]nder Probate Code section 850, an order may be sought from the court determining rights and claims to property that is in the control or possession of the estate or another party. Although the rights and claims of interested persons are being determined in the proceeding, the notice of hearing as prescribed under current law fails to convey the significance of the action, raising a due process issue. A further purpose of this proposal is to provide enhanced notice to better identify the property at issue, advise whether additional relief is sought under Probate Code section 859, and inform the recipient that there is a right to file a response to the Petition." (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 9, 2017, p. 4.)
The Judicial Council eventually adopted a new mandatory form to be used in section 850 proceedings, form DE-115, "Notice of Hearing on Petition to Determine Claim to Property." This form specifically gives notice that a petition has been filed under section 850 to determine a claim or claims to property and provides a space for description of "each item of real or personal property"; for real property, the directions state, "give the street address or, if none, describe the property's location and give the assessor's parcel number." The effective date for form DE-115, however, was January 1, 2020. As we have said, the applicable mandatory form when Langes filed the second amended petition on July 19, 2019, was DE-120.
Collins appears to complain that Langes did not use form DE-115, stressing it was adopted "for mandatory use," and argues that when Langes filed the second amended petition, the Judicial Council had "already proposed a working draft of the mandatory Form DE-115." These points, however, ignore the simple fact that the Judicial Council had not yet approved form DE-115 and use of form DE-120 was mandatory. As Collins recognizes, "courts may not require the use of an altered mandatory Judicial Council form in place of the Judicial Council form." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.31(e).)
The trial court found notice adequate, observing at the hearing that "there are minor defects in . . . the notice of motion" that "are not determinative" and "clearly do not go to the merits of notice." The second amended petition, which was served along with the notice of hearing, made clear that Langes was asserting the estate's claim of ownership to the decedent's real property at 116 Daphne Way, East Palo Alto, and challenging Collins's conduct in selling that property, taking possession of the $523,753 net proceeds of the sale and disposing of the balance of the proceeds exceeding the $139,900.56 remaining in Collins's Chase account at the time it was frozen as a result of the DA's investigation. Collins responded to the second amended petition (as she had to the initial and first amended petitions), asserting her right to the sale proceeds, as well as other funds in decedent's estate, on the basis of the holographic will and decedent's relatives' representations.
Collins asserts that the second amended petition did not put her on notice that Langes intended to "take possession of $388,852.44" from her; did not specifically request a court order "declaring that the Estate owns the $523,753 from the sale of the property and that [Collins] must transfer the sum $388,852.44 to [Langes]"; and did not even refer to the amount of "$388,852.44." The specific relief sought in the second amended petition included orders "[d]irecting all Respondents to transfer to [Langes] all of the Decedent's above-referenced assets taken and held by them," "[f]or a full and complete accounting of any and all of Respondent Collins's transactions with the money and property of Decedent and her estate," and "[f]or judgment against and restitution by Respondent Collins for any amount which in the accounting shall be found to be due[.]" This requested relief obviously encompassed the net proceeds from sale of decedent's property, which the petition alleged Collins's had taken unlawfully. The petition stated the full amount of the net proceeds ($523,753) and portion of those proceeds remaining in Collins's Chase account when the district attorney investigated ($139,900.56), and that the "remaining amount from the $523,753 was withdrawn by Respondent Collins and is unaccounted for at this time." Collins could not have been surprised that Langes sought to recover this balance from her, and determination of the specific amount of the balance- $388,852.44-was a matter of simple arithmetic calculation.
Collins has thus asserted no plausible claim of lack of notice or prejudice from the notice of hearing with respect to the first item section 851, subdivision (c), requires to be included in the notice of hearing, the description of the property at issue. The same is true with respect to the second item, relief pursuant to section 859: The relief requested by the petition included "double damages pursuant to Probate Code § 859" and, in any event, the judgment on the pleadings did not order such damages. And it is true as well for the final item, "[a] statement advising any person interested in the property that he or she may file a response to the petition, " as Collins did in fact timely file her objection to the second amended petition (as she had to the prior iterations of the petition).
In sum, Collins has shown no abuse of discretion or due process violation with respect to the notice of hearing.
Collins additionally asserts that trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the judgment on the pleadings due to the automatic stay imposed by title 11, United States Code section 362 when a bankruptcy petition is filed. Langes makes the obvious point that there must be a bankruptcy petition for the automatic stay to be triggered, and Collins has not even asserted, much less demonstrated, any such bankruptcy petition exists-even in her reply brief, after Langes made this point. Indeed, Collins's reply brief is notable for its lack of pertinent contents: With the exception of approximately six pages devoted to the section 851, subdivision (c) issue, Collins's 22-page reply brief is a verbatim repetition of her opening brief.
III.
Collins argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow her to amend her response before granting judgment on the pleadings. She relies upon the following passage in MacIsaac v. Pozzo (1945) 26 Cal.2d 809, 815-816: "[W]hen the facts stated indicate that the party probably has a good cause of action or defense, but that it has been pleaded imperfectly or defectively, and the defects have not been called to his attention by demurrer or by a notice of motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court should not grant the motion without first giving the party an opportunity to elect whether he will stand on his pleadings or amend them. The granting of the motion without leave to amend would in many cases be an absolute denial of justice, and is directly opposed to the policy of the law that cases should be tried and decided on the merits."
In MacIsaac, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings after ruling that the defendants' pleadings were defective and denying the defendants' request for leave to amend" 'to conform with'" that ruling. (MacIsaac v. Pozzo, supra, 26 Cal.2d at p. 816.) Reversing, the reviewing court explained that the defendants had pleaded facts that, if true, would defeat the plaintiffs' entitlement to judgment, and while their legal claims were not sufficiently stated, the defects could be cured by amendment. (Id. at pp. 813-815.) Neither of these points appears to apply to the present case. The trial court found Collins had no authority to sell decedent's property after decedent's death. Collins purported to do so pursuant to the power of attorney decedent gave her, but a power of attorney generally terminates on the death of the principal. (People v. Fenderson (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 625, 634; § 4152, subd. (a)(4).) "On termination of an attorney-in-fact's authority, the attorney-in-fact shall promptly deliver possession or control of the principal's property as follows: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) In the case of the death of the principal, to the principal's personal representative, if any . . . ." (§ 4238, subd. (a).) Collins offers neither fact nor law contradicting the conclusions that upon decedent's death, the real property belonged to decedent's estate and Collins had no authority to sell it and or right to take possession of the sale proceeds.
Aside from the situation described in MacIsaac v. Pozzo, supra, 26 Cal.2d 809, Collins argues that a second situation in which leave to amend should be allowed is where "the defective pleading has previously been upheld against a general demurrer." She quotes Shabrick v. Moore (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 56, 60:" 'The need for allowing an opportunity to amend is particularly apparent where . . . the complaint has already been upheld against a general demurrer. As said by Witkin: . . . It would seem even more true that, after a complaint or answer has been held sufficient by a law and motion judge, if the trial judge decides otherwise on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, an opportunity to amend should be allowed. . . .' (2 Witkin Cal. Procedure (1954) Proceedings Without Trial, § 74, p. 1711.)" It is not apparent what relevance this point has to the present case.
Although Collins does not directly address the merits in her briefs in this court, she appears to assume she has a right to the proceeds of the sale of decedent's real property as beneficiary of the holographic will. Collins's attempt to probate that will in California failed: Langes had previously filed a petition to initiate the probate process in Louisiana, and the California trial court, sustaining Langes's demurrer, ruled that the will could not be admitted in California until it was admitted into probate in Louisiana, as well as that Collins's petition to admit the will to probate was barred by the statute of limitations. At the hearing on Langes's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court declined to revisit the demurrer ruling (which had been issued by a different judge).
In opposition to Langes's motion for judgment on the pleadings, Collins argued the real property does not belong in the intestate estate being administered in California because Collins is the sole beneficiary of the holographic will disposing of the real property and its contents. In Collins's view, because the property was sold after decedent's death, the proceeds belong to her, not to the estate. At the trial court hearing, Collins's attorney argued Collins "was acting under the auspice and the belief that . . . ultimately the funds generated from the sale of the property would eventually be hers."
Section 8226, subdivision (c), provides: "If the proponent of a will has received notice of a petition for probate or a petition for letters of administration for a general personal representative, the proponent of the will may petition for probate of the will only within the later of either of the following time periods: [¶] (1) One hundred twenty days after issuance of the order admitting the first will to probate or determining the decedent to be intestate. [¶] (2) Sixty days after the proponent of the will first obtains knowledge of the will."
The record does not disclose the status of the Louisiana proceeding initiated by Langes. Collins represents that the petition to probate the holographic will she subsequently filed in Louisiana remains pending.
Langes, as personal representative of decedent's estate, "has the right to, and shall take possession or control of, all the property of the decedent to be administered in the decedent's estate . . . ." (§ 9650.) Even a person "presumptively entitled to" property "shall surrender it to the personal representative on request by the personal representative." (§ 9650, subd. (c).) Collins suggests no facts or law that would defeat Langes's entitlement, as administrator of decedent's estate, to recover the proceeds of the sale of real property that belonged to decedent's estate at the time of her death for purposes of administering the estate.
IV.
Langes argues Collins's appeal is frivolous-lacking all merit and taken for the improper purpose of delaying the effect of the trial court's judgment on the pleadings. "[A]n appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive-to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment-or when it indisputably has no merit-when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit." (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) "An appeal taken for an improper motive represents a time-consuming and disruptive use of the judicial process. Similarly, an appeal taken despite the fact that no reasonable attorney could have thought it meritorious ties up judicial resources and diverts attention from the already burdensome volume of work at the appellate courts." (Ibid.) At the same time, "[c]ounsel and their clients have a right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that they will win on appeal" and" 'the borderline between a frivolous appeal and one which simply has no merit is vague indeed.'" (Ibid., quoting People v. Sumner (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 409, 415.)
Collins appears to hold a fervent belief in the merit of her position, but she has presented nothing to us to support it. Her main argument on appeal is based on a discrepancy between the specific notice requirements section 851, subdivision (c), and the mandatory Judicial Council form that remained in effect for two years after that subdivision was enacted that could not have prejudiced her in any way. As we have already noted, her briefs include a jurisdictional argument for which she presents no factual support, and her reply brief, the majority of which simply repeats her opening brief verbatim, fails to respond to most of the points raised in Langes's brief.
Curiously, Collins's reply brief includes a paragraph taken verbatim from Lange's respondent's brief that says precisely the opposite of what Collins's is arguing.
Langes has not requested sanctions, however, only that we admonish Collins and her counsel. We need not definitively resolve whether this appeal should be deemed frivolous; suffice to say it is at best very close to the line, if not across it.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Costs to Erin Langes, as administrator of the estate of decedent Elizabeth Langes.
We concur: Richman, Acting P.J., Stewart, J.
[*] Judge of the Mendocino County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.