Opinion
B296401 B300585
06-10-2020
In re D.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. E.L. et al., Defendants and Appellants. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.D., Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Vincent W. Davis & Associates and Vincent W. Davis for Defendants and Appellants J.D., E.L., and S.S. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah J. Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 17CCJP02642) APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Nichelle L. Blackwell, Commissioner. Affirmed. Law Offices of Vincent W. Davis & Associates and Vincent W. Davis for Defendants and Appellants J.D., E.L., and S.S. Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah J. Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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The juvenile court removed two-year-old D.D. from her parents' custody after finding they failed to provide adequate care. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) placed D.D. in the home of nonrelatives, with whom she had been living for most of her life. A few months later, D.D.'s paternal grandparents (Paternal Grandparents) filed a request for the child to be placed in their home, which DCFS and the juvenile court denied. The court also denied Paternal Grandparents' request for de facto parent status and terminated parental rights. Paternal Grandparents and D.D.'s father appealed. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
When D.D. was six months old, her mother (Mother) asked a friend's parents, Claudia K. and Marco S., to babysit the child for the night. We refer to Claudia and Marco jointly as the nonrelative extended family members (NREFMs). Mother ended up leaving D.D. with the NREFMs for a month. The NREFMs allowed Mother to move in with them on the condition that she not use drugs. Eight months later, Mother moved out and left D.D. with the NREFMs.
Father was not able to care for D.D. because he was serving a six-year prison term for an assault with a semiautomatic firearm. He called the NREFMs from prison and told them D.D. should be living with her relatives. The NREFMs agreed to drop the child off with Paternal Grandmother. Paternal Grandmother, however, said she could not take D.D. into her home because she was focused on charity work and her church. The NREFMs decided to begin the process of obtaining a foster care license so they could care for D.D. on a permanent basis.
On December 22, 2017, the juvenile court detained D.D., ordered her removed from her parents' custody, and gave DCFS discretion as to her placement. DCFS placed D.D. with the NREFMs.
In February 2018, Paternal Grandparents told DCFS they were not pursuing placement because Paternal Grandfather did not want another child. Paternal Grandfather also refused to participate in a Resource Family Approval (RFA) assessment, which was necessary to receive funding. An RFA assessment requires parenting orientation and CPR classes, and can take three months or longer to complete.
Paternal Grandfather eventually changed his mind, and on February 16, 2018, Paternal Grandparents signed the necessary paperwork to begin the RFA process. A DCFS social worker submitted the referral the same day.
Adjudication and Disposition Hearing
DCFS filed a petition asserting D.D. is a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). At the April 16, 2018 combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing, Father told the court Paternal Grandmother could not care for D.D. without funding, but she had not yet completed the RFA assessment. Father submitted to D.D. remaining suitably placed until then.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The court sustained the petition in part, removed D.D. from her parents' custody, and placed the child in the care, custody, and control of DCFS. The court granted Father reunification services and monitored visits if a DCFS-approved relative was willing to transport the child to his place of incarceration. The court found DCFS met its burden of finding relatives for placement by starting the RFA process with Paternal Grandparents, and it ordered DCFS to continue with that process. In the meantime, D.D. remained placed with the NREFMs.
D.D.'s Special Needs
The NREFMs noticed that D.D. had sensory processing issues, and they requested a Regional Center referral. D.D.'s pediatrician recommended she be assessed for a sensory processing disorder, noting she often rocked, jumped, and self-stimulated. A social worker observed D.D. was "painfully sensitive" to changes in her environment and had difficulty adjusting to the social worker being present. The Regional Center eventually diagnosed D.D. with Autism.
D.D. received services for more than 12 hours per week while placed with the NREFMs, including speech therapy, in-home child development services, in-home play therapy, "Mommy and Me" classes, and occupational therapy. In November 2018, D.D. began attending an intensive day program.
The NREFMs had extensive experience caring for children with special needs. Their biological child has Downs Syndrome, and they adopted two special needs children. The NREFMs also completed a D-Rate course, which teaches caregivers to identify and meet the needs of children with emotional and/or behavioral issues. A DCFS social worker described Claudia as a great advocate for D.D., noting she was able to navigate the complex service delivery systems to ensure D.D. received the highest level of services.
D.D.'s child development specialist, speech pathologist, family therapist, occupational therapist, and pediatrician all recommended she not be removed from the NREFMs' home. D.D.'s child development specialist reported D.D. had made significant progress in her development, which was due to the NREFMs' commitment. D.D. had developed a strong attachment to the NREFMs and was happy and emotionally stable with them. The specialist was concerned that removing her from the NREFMs' home could "unravel" the progress she had made.
D.D.'s speech pathologist was similarly concerned that removing D.D. from the NREFMs' home could have long term negative effects on her psychologically, emotionally, and academically. The pathologist described Claudia as "the perfect person to work with [D.D.]"
D.D.'s Relationship with Paternal Grandparents
D.D. had weekly unmonitored visits with Paternal Grandparents, which lasted between three and six hours. Before the visits, D.D. would scream "no" and try to hide. Upon returning from the visits, she displayed an increase in "non-typical behaviors," such as tantrums, waking up in the middle of the night crying, refusing to be touched, and self-stimulating. She was also more aggressive, clingy, and whiney.
A social worker observed D.D. during one of her visits with Paternal Grandparents. D.D. did not greet, acknowledge, or make eye contact with the social worker, which was remarkably different from how she interacted with the social worker in the NREFMs' home. D.D. was hyperactive throughout the visit, and she engaged in repeated patterns of frenzied behavior. The social worker described the behavior as disturbing and "almost painful to watch." Paternal Grandmother made unsuccessful attempts to connect with D.D. Paternal Grandfather spent the majority of the visit in a bedroom watching television. D.D. refused to hug or say goodbye to Paternal Grandmother when the visit ended.
Paternal Grandparents attended two of D.D.'s therapy sessions. When D.D. saw them at the first session, she began crying, which continued for the majority of the session. D.D. had a meltdown when she saw Paternal Grandparents at the second session, and she refused to leave the therapist's side. D.D. relaxed when Paternal Grandparents left and Claudia came into the room.
Paternal Grandparents told DCFS they did not see any signs that D.D. had special needs. A social worker recommended they complete a D-Rate course. Paternal Grandmother subsequently reported she had enrolled in the course, but she never provided proof of completion.
Paternal Grandparents' Requests for Placement and De Facto Parent Status
Paternal Grandparents completed the RFA process in June 2018. They provided the certificate of completion to a DCFS social worker in mid-July 2018 and requested D.D. be placed with them. Paternal Grandmother, however, did not show up to the initial meeting with DCFS to discuss their request. She said it was because she was involved with her faith and doing charity work that she could not miss. DCFS decided to keep D.D. in her current placement.
About two months later, Paternal Grandparents filed a section 388 petition seeking an order placing D.D. with them. They claimed their completion of the RFA process constituted changed circumstances warranting the order. The same day, they moved for a relative placement assessment pursuant to section 361.3 and requested de facto parent status. In response, DCFS filed a 26-page report addressing the relevant factors for relative placement and recommended D.D. remain placed with the NREFMs.
Six-Month Review Hearing
The juvenile court considered Paternal Grandparents' section 388 petition, request for placement under section 361.3, and request for de facto parent status on January 23, 2019, which was the same date it conducted the six-month review hearing.
The court first considered the section 388 petition, which D.D.'s counsel and DCFS opposed. The court denied the petition, explaining that circumstances had not fully changed and a new placement would not be in the child's best interest. The court noted the NREFMs were addressing D.D.'s special needs, which Paternal Grandparents failed to even acknowledge. The evidence also showed the child had no psychological, emotional, or physical bond to the Paternal Grandparents.
The court then considered Paternal Grandparents' request for placement pursuant to section 361.3. D.D.'s counsel and DCFS again urged the court to keep the child in her current placement. The court explained that, after considering the factors listed in section 361.3 as well as the preference for relative placement, it would not order D.D. placed in Paternal Grandparents' home. The court noted D.D. resisted visits and displayed troubling behavior after visits with Paternal Grandparents, there was no evidence showing Paternal Grandparents completed the D-Rate course, D.D.'s therapist recommended she continue in her current placement, Mother chose to leave D.D. in the NREFMs' care, Paternal Grandparents did not take care of D.D. when Mother was not able to, and there was no evidence of a psychological bond.
The court then considered and denied Paternal Grandparents' request for de facto parent status. The court noted the lack of evidence showing a psychological bond between D.D. and Paternal Grandparents, Paternal Grandparents' failure to assume the role of a parent on a day-to-day basis for a substantial period of time, their lack of capacity to care for D.D.'s special needs, and their failure to intervene when they knew Mother was not providing the child adequate care.
Finally, the court turned to the six-month review hearing. Father asked the court to find no reasonable services were provided because a DCFS social worker did not make adequate contact with him in prison. The court declined to do so, found the parents were not in compliance with their case plans, terminated reunification services, and set a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26.
Paternal Grandparents' Notice of Appeal and Father's Notice of Intent to File a Writ Petition
Paternal Grandparents timely filed a notice of appeal to challenge the juvenile court's orders on their section 388 petition, request for placement under section 361.3, and request for de facto parent status.
Father filed a notice of intent to challenge via writ petition the juvenile court's orders at the six-month review hearing. Father's counsel subsequently informed the court she was unable to file a petition on the merits. We granted Father an additional 15 days to file a petition in propria persona; he declined to do so.
Selection and Implementation Hearing
The court conducted the section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing on July 24, 2019. Father waived his right to appear. At D.D.'s counsel's and DCFS's request, and over Father's counsel's objection, the court terminated parental rights. The court designated the NREFMs as the prospective adoptive parents.
Father filed a timely notice of appeal to challenge the court's orders at the selection and implementation hearing.
We consolidated Father's and Paternal Grandparents' appeals for purposes of oral argument and decision.
DISCUSSION
I. Father's Challenges are Untimely
Father argues the juvenile court erred at the disposition hearing in granting him visitation only if a DCFS-approved relative transported D.D. to his place of incarceration. Father asserts that, had the court permitted more liberal visitation, he may have been entitled to continued reunification services at the six-month review hearing, which may have prevented termination of his parental rights. Father also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying Paternal Grandparents' section 388 petition, request for placement under section 361.3, and request for de facto parent status. DCFS responds that Father's challenges are untimely. We agree with DCFS.
Father did not address DCFS's timeliness arguments.
Pursuant to section 395, "the dispositional order is an appealable judgment, and all subsequent orders are directly appealable without limitation except for . . . orders setting a .26 hearing, which are subject to writ review . . . and related limitations (§ 366.26, subd. (l)). A consequence of section 395 is that an unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order. [Citations.] In other words, 'A challenge to the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.' [Citation.] The rule serves vital policy considerations of promoting finality and reasonable expedition, in a carefully balanced legislative scheme, and preventing late-stage 'sabotage of the process' through a parent's attacks on earlier orders." (In re Jesse W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 349, 355 (Jesse W.).)
Jesse W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 349, is instructive. In that case, the father appealed an order made at the selection and implementation hearing on the basis that a dispositional order—made a year and a half earlier—was void and rendered all subsequent orders void as well. The court refused to consider the father's argument, noting his failure to appeal or file writ petitions to challenge the dispositional order, a six-month review order, and the termination of his reunification services. (Id. at pp. 355-356.) The court explained that, "with three appealable prior orders in his wake, [the father] cannot be allowed to sabotage the process now and, as he requests, return the case to a fictional state where the children were never removed from a parent's custody." (Id. at p. 356.)
Here, too, Father attempts to "sabotage the process" by seeking to overturn the termination of his parental rights in July 2019 by challenging a visitation order made at the disposition hearing in April 2018. The visitation order was immediately appealable, and Father lost his right to challenge it when he failed to file a notice of appeal within 60 days of the disposition hearing. (See § 395; In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 667 [the "notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after the juvenile court makes a final appealable order"]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406.) The order is now final, and Father cannot challenge it by way of an appeal of orders made more than a year later at the selection and implementation hearing. (Jesse W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 356.)
Father's speculation that the visitation order caused the early termination of his reunification services is of no help. Even if Father could challenge a dispositional order in connection with the termination of his reunification services, his appeal would still be barred. This is because an order terminating reunification services and setting a selection and implementation hearing must be challenged by way of a writ petition. (§ 366.26, subd. (l).) A parent who fails to do so is precluded from challenging those orders on appeal of orders made at the selection and implementation hearing. (In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 247-248; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(g)(6)-(8).) Here, Father filed a notice of intention to challenge via writ petition the court's orders made at the six-month review hearing, but he never followed through on that intention. As a result, he is precluded from challenging those orders in connection with the present appeal.
Father's arguments related to Paternal Grandparents' section 388 petition, request for placement, and request for de facto parent status are also untimely. The juvenile court made the relevant orders at a January 23, 2019 hearing. To challenge those orders, Father was required to file a notice of appeal within 60 days. (See In re Daniel K., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 667; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406.) Alternatively, he could have challenged the orders via a writ petition. Father did neither.
Because all of Father's challenges are untimely, we affirm the court's orders at the selection and implementation hearing, including the termination of his parental rights.
II. Paternal Grandparents' Appeal is Moot and Lacks Merit
Paternal Grandparents contend the juvenile court erred in denying their section 388 petition, request for placement pursuant to section 361.3, and request for de facto parent status. Their challenges are moot and also lack merit.
A. Paternal Grandparents' Challenges to the Section 388 and Placement Orders Are Moot
DCFS contends—and Paternal Grandparents do not contest—the juvenile court's termination of parental rights rendered moot challenges to the denial of the section 388 petition and request for placement. We agree.
"An appeal becomes moot when, through no fault of the respondent, the occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant the appellant effective relief." (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404.) "We decide on a case-by-case basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case moot and whether our decision would affect the outcome in a subsequent proceeding. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights and transferred to DCFS the exclusive care, custody, and control of D.D. pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (j). Because Paternal Grandparents do not challenge those orders, DCFS will maintain exclusive control over D.D.'s placement going forward, regardless of the outcome of this appeal. DCFS, moreover, no longer must give preference to relatives when deciding where to place D.D. (See Department of Social Services v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 721, 741; In re K.L. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 52, 66; Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1031.) As a result, even if we found D.D. should have been placed with Paternal Grandparents in the past, she would nevertheless remain in her current placement. A reversal of the juvenile court's orders, therefore, would be an idle act, offering no meaningful relief. Paternal Grandparents' challenges to these orders are moot.
In some cases, the denial of a pre-termination placement order may affect the outcome in post-termination proceedings. For example, it may affect whether a relative caregiver is given preference for adoptive placement. (See § 366.26, subd. (k).) Paternal Grandparents, however, do not contend any such circumstances are present here.
B. Paternal Grandparents' Challenges to the Section 388 and Placement Orders Lack Merit
Even if Paternal Grandparents' challenges to the denial of their section 388 petition and request for placement were not moot, we would reject them on the merits.
1. Relevant Law
"A juvenile court dependency order may be changed, modified, or set aside at any time. (§ 385.) A parent may petition the court for such a modification on grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a).) The parent, however, must also show that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. (§ 388, subd. (a)(2); [citation].)" (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 525.)
Under section 361.3, whenever a child is removed from parental physical custody at disposition, "preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative." (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) "[A]t least through the reunification period, when a relative voluntarily comes forward at a time when a new placement is not required, the relative is entitled to the preference and the court and the social worker are obligated to evaluate that relative . . . ." (In re Joseph T. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 794.) The juvenile court must use its independent judgment when considering a relative placement request under section 361.3; it does not merely review DCFS's placement decision for an abuse of discretion. (Cesar V. v. Superior Court, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1033.)
" ' "Preferential consideration" means that the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated.' (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).) Preferential consideration 'does not create an evidentiary presumption in favor of a relative, but merely places the relative at the head of the line when the court is determining which placement is in the child's best interests.' [Citation.]" (In re Antonio G. (2007) 159 Cal.App.4th 369, 376-377.)
Section 361.3 sets forth numerous factors the court and DCFS must consider when determining whether placement with a relative is appropriate. Among those factors are the best interest of the child, the wishes of the parents, the nature and duration of the relationship between the child and relative, and the ability of the relative to provide a safe, secure, and stable environment for the child. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1)-(8).)
We review for an abuse of discretion the juvenile court's denial of a section 388 petition and its relative placement decisions under section 361.3. (In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1420; In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 525.) "An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court has exceeded the bounds of reason by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination." (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 642.)
2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Paternal Grandparents make various arguments as to why the juvenile court abused its discretion, none of which has merit.
First, they contend the juvenile court failed to timely and adequately weigh the section 361.3 factors "at the onset of D.D.'s case." It is not clear, and Paternal Grandparents do not explain, what they mean by this. To the extent they are claiming the court should have considered placing D.D. in their home at or before the disposition hearing, their argument is untimely. (See § 395.) To the extent they are contending the court should have considered placement with them after disposition, but before they filed their request, their argument lacks merit. Section 361.3 does not require the court to sua sponte reconsider placement after disposition. Here, the juvenile court properly considered the issue once Paternal Grandparents filed their request for placement.
There is also no merit to Paternal Grandparents' suggestion that the court failed to weigh the relevant factors. At the hearing on the request for placement, the court explicitly stated it had considered the factors set forth in section 361.3. The court then explained why several of those factors led it to conclude placement with Paternal Grandparents was not appropriate.
Paternal Grandparents also suggest, in passing, that the juvenile court's placement decision is unreliable because it was based on an incomplete investigation by DCFS. They fail to explain, however, how the investigation was inadequate and what information DCFS failed to gather. Paternal Grandparents, moreover, participated in the placement hearing and had the opportunity to submit evidence to support their request.
Finally, Paternal Grandparents briefly contend the juvenile court erred in finding a change in placement would not be in D.D.'s best interest due to their inability or unwillingness to address the child's special needs. Although never articulated, they seem to be arguing there was insufficient evidence supporting the court's finding. We disagree.
The evidence shows D.D. was diagnosed with Autism and had significant special needs, which required at least 12 hours of services per week. The NREFMs, a DCFS social worker, D.D.'s pediatrician, and D.D.'s various service providers all recognized D.D.'s special needs. Paternal Grandparents, however, claimed they saw no signs the child had special needs. It was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude Paternal Grandparents could not adequately address D.D.'s special needs if they were unwilling to acknowledge or unable to recognize them.
Evidence related to D.D.'s visits with Paternal Grandparents further supports the juvenile court's finding. During one of those visits, a social worker observed D.D. engaging in disturbing patterns of frenzied behavior. Paternal Grandmother was never able to connect with D.D., and Paternal Grandfather simply watched television in a bedroom. The NREFMs also reported that D.D. regressed after visits with Paternal Grandparents by displaying an increase in "non-typical behaviors" and other behavioral issues.
The juvenile court could have reasonably concluded from this evidence that Paternal Grandparents are either unable or unwilling to adequately address D.D.'s significant special needs, and it would not be in her best interest to be placed with them. Considered with the juvenile court's other factual findings—which Paternal Grandparents do not directly contest—it is clear the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition and request for placement under section 361.3.
3. DCFS Did Not Err
Paternal Grandparents alternatively urge us to reverse the juvenile court's orders because DCFS did not timely consider placing D.D. in their home, ignored the section 361.3 factors, and acted in bad faith. None of their arguments has merit.
First, the record does not show DCFS's placement assessment was untimely. Before the disposition hearing, Paternal Grandparents told DCFS they were not pursuing placement. Section 361.3 does not require DCFS to place, or even consider placing, children in homes of relatives who do not want them.
Paternal Grandparents eventually changed their minds, but even then, they maintained they needed funding before D.D. could be placed with them. This required completion of the RFA process, which Paternal Grandparents did not do until June 2018, more than two months after the disposition hearing. Several weeks later, they provided proof of completion to a social worker and requested D.D. be placed in their home. At that time, DCFS properly considered Paternal Grandparents for placement, yet ultimately concluded D.D. should remain with the NREFMs.
Paternal Grandparents suggest DCFS should have allowed liberalized visits and put in place a plan to transition D.D. from the NREFMs' home to theirs. Section 361.3, however, requires no such thing. In any event, the record shows DCFS did consider, but ultimately rejected, liberalizing visits. That decision was reasonable given the evidence, recounted above, showing Paternal Grandparents were unwilling or unable to adequately address D.D.'s special needs, and visits with Paternal Grandparents had significant negative effects on the child.
Paternal Grandparents next contend DCFS "completely ignored" the statutory factors in section 361.3. Once again, the record does not support their argument. DCFS prepared and filed a 26-page report addressing each relevant factor in section 361.3. That DCFS concluded those factors did not weigh in favor of placing D.D. in Paternal Grandparents' home does not mean it ignored them.
Finally, Paternal Grandparents argue DCFS acted in bad faith and never seriously considered placing D.D. in their home. They maintain this is evident from the fact that DCFS considered their placement request at the same time it was assessing the NREFMs as prospective adoptive caregivers. They also point to several internal DCFS emails, in which staff members indicated a preference for the NREFMs. In a July 2018 email, for example, a DCFS employee states the NREFMs were the primary adoptive candidates, and Paternal Grandparents would be considered for adoptive placement "as a courtesy due to their interest." In a September 2018 email, a staff member noted that if D.D.'s counsel agreed the child should remain with the NREFMs, it was likely a "done deal."
None of this shows DCFS acted in bad faith. It was entirely appropriate for DCFS to assess the NREFMs as prospective adoptive caregivers while simultaneously considering whether to place D.D. with Paternal Grandparents. This is especially true given the shortened reunification period for children of D.D.'s age, as well as the possibility that Paternal Grandparents would once again change their minds about caring for the child. (See § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).)
Moreover, the internal emails simply show DCFS felt strongly that D.D. should not be placed with Paternal Grandparents. Given the evidence of Paternal Grandparents' prior refusals to care for D.D., their inability or unwillingness to address her special needs, their lack of a meaningful bond with the child, and the unanimous recommendations from D.D.'s service providers, that determination was clearly reasonable; it does not show DCFS was acting in bad faith.
Even if DCFS did not seriously consider placing D.D. with Paternal Grandparents, or erred in some other way, reversal is not warranted. Section 361.3 requires DCFS and the juvenile court to independently decide whether to place a child with a relative. (Cesar V. v. Superior Court, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1033.) Here, the juvenile court exercised its independent judgment when it denied Paternal Grandparents' request for placement under section 361.3. That decision will stand, even if we find DCFS did not act appropriately. Paternal Grandparents, therefore, have not met their burden of showing prejudicial error. (In re Vanessa Z. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 258, 261 ["An appellant must show prejudicial error affecting his or her interest in order to prevail on appeal."].)
Paternal Grandparents' reliance on In re R.T. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1284, is misplaced. In that case, an aunt requested the child be placed in her home shortly after he was removed from his parents' custody. (Id. at p. 1293.) The agency initiated a home study for the aunt, but told her it favored placing the child with the father's ex-girlfriend. (Ibid.) At the disposition hearing, the court ordered a "permanent plan of placement" with the ex-girlfriend, denied reunification services, and set a selection and implementation hearing. (Ibid.) After the aunt's home study was completed, she moved to modify the placement order. (Id. at pp. 1293-1294.) At the hearing on that motion, agency employees testified that they never considered the aunt for placement and had a policy of not giving preference to relative placements. The juvenile court found section 361.3 did not apply because reunification services had been terminated, and it denied the aunt's motion. (In re R.T., at p. 1294.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, explaining that the agency violated section 361.3 by failing to "evaluate the relatives for placement, either before or after the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. The agency did complete the preliminary step of a home study . . . [but] did so without any intention of making a full assessment of the appropriateness of a relative placement." (In re R.T., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1299.) The juvenile court similarly violated section 361.3 by awarding permanent placement to the ex-girlfriend without first considering the relative. (In re R.T., at p. 1298.) In addition, the juvenile court erred in deeming section 361.3 inapplicable to the post-disposition proceedings. (In re R.T., at p. 1300.)
Here, in contrast, DCFS and the juvenile court both fully considered placing D.D. with Paternal Grandparents pursuant to section 361.3. As noted above, DCFS prepared a 26-page report addressing each relevant factor in section 361.3. The juvenile court similarly indicated it considered the section 361.3 factors in connection with Paternal Grandparents' request for placement. It declined the request after finding those factors weighed against placement with Paternal Grandparents. The court and DCFS acted appropriately.
C. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Paternal Grandparents' Request for De Facto Parent Status
Paternal Grandparents contend the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying their request for de facto parent status. We disagree.
DCFS briefly contends Paternal Grandparents' challenge to the de facto parent order is moot. We disagree. "Once granted, de facto parent status continues until terminated by the juvenile court or the dependency itself is terminated." (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1513.) Here, the dependency has not terminated, meaning a reversal of the juvenile court's order would afford meaningful relief.
A de facto parent is "a person who has been found by the court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of parent, fulfilling both the child's physical and psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.502(10); see In re B. G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 693, fn. 18; In re Jacob E. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 909, 919.) De facto parent status "provides a nonbiological parent who has achieved a close and continuing relationship with a child the right to appear as a party, to be represented by counsel, and present evidence at dispositional hearings." (In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61, 66, italics omitted.) We review the denial of a request for de facto parent status for an abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.)
Here, the juvenile court denied Paternal Grandparents' request for de facto parent status after finding they did not assume the role of a parent on a day-to-day basis for a substantial period of time, lacked capacity to care for D.D.'s special needs, and failed to intervene when they knew Mother was not providing the child adequate care. Paternal Grandparents do not challenge those factual findings, and they implicitly acknowledge they do not meet the definition of a facto parent as set forth in case law and the Rules of Court. Nonetheless, they contend the juvenile court should have granted their request pursuant to an exception to the general requirements, as set forth in Chares S. v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 151 (Charles S.). They are mistaken.
In Charles S., the juvenile court denied a grandfather's motion to participate in a permanency planning hearing for his grandchild, with whom he had been regularly visiting on a weekly basis. (Charles S., supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 154.) The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the juvenile court to vacate its order and conduct a new hearing. The court acknowledged the grandfather did not meet the definition of a de facto parent because he had not maintained a day-to-day relationship with the child. (Id. at p. 156.) Nonetheless, it found the same rationale for allowing de facto parents to participate in dependency proceedings was equally applicable to the grandfather. The court explained that " '[t]he simple fact that a person cares enough to seek and undertake to participate goes far to suggest that the court would profit by hearing his views as to the child's best interests; if the participant lacks a close relationship with the child, that fact will undoubtedly emerge during the proceedings.' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Contrary to Paternal Grandparents' suggestion, Charles S. does not stand for the proposition that de facto parent status should be granted to blood relatives, even if they do not meet the definition of a de facto parent. Rather, it stands for the proposition that some persons who are not de facto parents may still be entitled to participate in dependency proceedings. Here, the juvenile court permitted Paternal Grandparents to fully participate in the proceedings. Their reliance on Charles S., therefore, is misplaced.
Because it is undisputed that Paternal Grandparents do not meet the definition of de facto parents, we find the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying their request for such status.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's orders are affirmed.
BIGELOW, P. J. We Concur:
GRIMES, J.
STRATTON, J.