Opinion
No. 521, 2000.
Submitted: May 25, 2004.
Decided: May 28, 2004.
Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Kent County, C.A. No. 99C-12-036.
Before BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices.
ORDER
This 28th day of May 2004, it appears to the Court that:
1. The appellant, Diana Kopicko, was terminated as an employee of the appellee, State of Delaware, Department of Services for Children, Youth and their Families ("the Department") during her probationary period. Kopicko sued the Department in the Superior Court, challenging her dismissal as a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the Department on the basis that sovereign immunity operated as an absolute bar to Kopicko's claim. Kopicko appealed the Superior Court order granting summary judgment to this Court.
2. In an Opinion issued on February 12, 2002, this Court held that Kopicko's remedy was to pursue administrative relief under the Merit System of Personnel Administration, by filing a direct appeal with the Merit Employee Relations Board ("MERB"). This Court stayed all proceedings in this appeal to allow Kopicko an opportunity to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Kopicko v. Dept. of Services for Children, 805 A.2d 877 (Del. 2002).
3. Kopicko then appealed to the MERB, which held two days of hearings and ultimately upheld the Department's action in terminating Kopicko's employment. The MERB determined that the reasons for the appellant's termination during her employment were all merit, as opposed to non-merit, factors, and constituted a reasonable basis for the Department's determination that Kopicko's performance during her probationary period had been unsatisfactory. Kopicko then appealed the MERB decision to the Superior Court, which upheld the MERB's determination. This Court thereafter affirmed the Superior Court's determination, holding that "the MERB's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error."
Kopicko v. Delaware Dept. of Services for Children, 2003 WL 21976409 (Del.Super. 2003).
Kopicko v. State Dept. of Services for Children, 2004 WL 691901 (Del. 2004).
4. On March 26, 2004, this Court issued a Notice to Kopicko, directing her to Show Cause why the instant appeal should not be dismissed. Although Kopicko argues that this appeal involves a different cause of action than her Merit System grievance, we conclude that this appeal must in all events be dismissed. Kopicko's exclusive remedy is the administrative remedy provided in the Merit System statute. She exhausted that remedy, and has no further right of action. Moreover, the critical issue of fact that underlies her breach of contract action in the Superior Court (the subject of this appeal) is the same fact issue that underlies her Merit System grievance, specifically, whether Kopicko was terminated for a performance or merits-based reason. That fact issue was resolved adversely to Kopicko. Where, as here, an administrative agency has "decided an issue of fact necessary to its decision, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of that issue in a subsequent suit or hearing concerning a different claim or cause of action involving a party to the first case."
29 Del. C. § 5949.
Betts v. Townsends, Inc., 765 A.2d 531, 534 (Del. 2000).
5. Accordingly, Kopicko's Superior Court action that is the subject of this appeal is barred, for two reasons. First, the Superior Court has no original subject matter jurisdiction over the claim in that action. Kopicko's exclusive remedy was to litigate her grievance by appealing to the MERB, and to appeal any adverse decision by the MERB to the Superior Court, which by statute has appellate jurisdiction only. Kopicko availed herself of that remedy. Second, Kopicko's Superior Court claim is barred by operation of collateral estoppel, because the MERB, whose determination was affirmed by two courts and is now final, decided a fact that is central to that claim, adversely to Kopicko.
6. Accordingly, Kopicko has failed to show cause why her appeal to this Court should not be dismissed.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this appeal is DISMISSED.