Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC353137, Conrad Aragon, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Y. Kim, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Latham & Watkins LLP, Milton A. Miller and Philip M. Midgen, for Defendant and Respondent The SCPIE Companies.
Robie & Matthai and Kyle Kveton for Defendants and Respondents Moore, Winter, Skebba & McLennan, LLP; Raymond R. Moore; and Juliet E. Binford.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP and William John Rea, Jr. for Defendants and Respondents Hemer & Barkus, Rasmune Barkus and Jack Rosenbaum.
Bonne, Bridges, Mueller, O’Keefe & Nichols, David J. O’Keefe, William R. Johnson and Vangi M. Johnson for Defendants and Respondents David J. O’Keefe and Bonne, Bridges, Mueller, O’Keefe & Nichols.
Peterson & Bradford, George E. Peterson, Avi Burkwitz and Oliver Tomas for Defendant and Respondent Michael Mulvehill, III.
Martyn Green, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent Martyn Green.
MOSK, J.
Plaintiff and appellant Richard Y. Kim (plaintiff) appeals a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend demurrers to plaintiff’s first amended complaint (FAC). Based on the legal authorities that we are required to follow, we conclude that plaintiff failed to allege cognizable damage, and therefore the trial court properly sustained the demurrer. We can only reverse a trial court’s decision not to allow an amendment if the trial court abused its discretion. In this case, the trial court’s decision not to allow an amendment does not constitute an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Allegations in the FAC
Plaintiff is a dentist. In January 2003, one of plaintiff’s patients, John C. Haedrich, filed a dental malpractice action against plaintiff in Los Angeles Superior Court (the Haedrich action). Plaintiff tendered defense of the Haedrich action to his malpractice insurer, The SCPIE Companies (SCPIE). SCPIE accepted the tender and retained the law firm of Moore, Winter, Skeeba & McLennan (the Moore, Winter firm) to defend plaintiff. In June 2003, the Moore, Winter firm retained Michael Mulvehill, III (Mulvehill) as an expert in connection with the Haedrich action. Plaintiff alleged the following misconduct by the Moore, Winter firm and Mulvehill:
· The Moore, Winter firm had “previously worked with the opponent lawyer” on other cases, giving rise to a conflict of interest;
· The Moore, Winter firm and partner Raymond Moore (Moore) “failed to exercise reasonable skill and care” in providing legal services;
· Moore and one of his associates, Juliet Binford (Binford), “intentionally wrote biased and negative reviews about the case” that were “misleading as to Plaintiff’s negligence”;
Binford is also referred to in the FAC as Juliet Kim.
· Moore directed Mulvehill “to write a negative expert review about Plaintiff’s dental work”;
· Mulvehill also had “worked previously with the opponent lawyer,” giving rise to a conflict of interest;
· Moore failed to advise plaintiff to file a cross-complaint against Haedrich;
· Moore “interrogated, scared, and threatened Plaintiff” and “unreasonably pressured Plaintiff” to accept a settlement offer in the Haedrich action; and
Because plaintiff’s was a professional liability policy covering a health care provider, SCPIE was required to obtain plaintiff’s consent to settle the Haedrich action. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 801, subd. (f); Health & Saf. Code, § 1306; see also Robertson v. Chen (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1294, fn. 3.)
· Moore failed to obtain plaintiff’s informed consent to his “dual representation, and/or conflict of intrest [sic] between Plaintiff and Defendant SCPIE.”
In August 2003, plaintiff complained to SCPIE about the Moore, Winter firm. As a result SCPIE removed the Moore, Winter firm and retained for plaintiff the law firm of Hemer & Barkus to represent plaintiff in the Haedrich action. Plaintiff alleged the following misconduct by Hemer & Barkus:
· Hemer & Barkus and two of its lawyers, Ramune Barkus (Barkus) and Jack Rosenbaum (Rosenbaum), “failed to exercise reasonable care and skill” in performing legal services for plaintiff;
· Barkus and Rosenbaum never informed plaintiff of “the conflict of interest issue of the prior representation by” the Moore, Winter firm;
· Hemer & Barkus “never provided Plaintiff an informed consent [sic] of dual representation”;
· Rosenbaum “participated in a settlement with the opponent lawyer against Plaintiff’s wish, and pressured, scared, and threatened Plaintiff to settle his complaint at a reduced amount”; and
· Rosenbaum “intentionally provided false information to the Dental Board of California” and breached the attorney-client privilege in doing so.
In December 2004, plaintiff complained to SCPIE about Hemer & Barkus. As a result, SCPIE removed Hemer & Barkus, and retained for plaintiff the law firm of Bonne, Bridges, Mueller, O’Keefe & Nichols (the Bonne, Bridges firm) to represent plaintiff in the Haedrich action. Plaintiff alleged the following misconduct by the Bonne, Bridges firm:
· The Bonne, Bridges firm and partner David O’Keefe (O’Keefe) “never informed Plaintiff of the conflict of interest issue of the prior representations by” the Moore, Winter firm and Hemer & Barkus, and “never provided an informed consent of the dual representation”;
· O’Keefe “manipulated” plaintiff’s expert Martyn Green (Green), who thereafter “scared and threatened Plaintiff in an effort to settle the case . . . .”
In March 2005, plaintiff complained to SCPIE about the Bonne, Bridges firm. This time, SCPIE refused to change lawyers, and told plaintiff that “if he would not do as SCPIE advised Plaintiff would be compelled to hire his own lawyer at Plaintiff’s own expense.”
The Bonne, Bridges firm took the Haedrich action to trial. The jury returned a verdict finding plaintiff was not negligent. Judgment was entered in plaintiff’s favor in the malpractice action against him. The Dental Board of California also concluded that plaintiff’s care of Haedrich “appear[ed] to be within the standard of care in the dental community.”
Plaintiff further alleged that, when plaintiff’s malpractice insurance expired, SCPIE refused to renew his policy. Plaintiff also alleged that SCPIE “intentionally concealed” that plaintiff was entitled to “an additional daily benefit” during the trial of the Haedrich action until plaintiff complained about not receiving it. After plaintiff complained, SCPIE paid plaintiff $5,000.
B. Procedural Background
In May 2006, plaintiff filed his original complaint against SCPIE; the Moore, Winter firm; Hemer & Barkus; the Bonne, Bridges firm; Moore; Binford; Barkus; Rosenbaum; O’Keefe; Mulvehill; and Green (collectively, defendants). The complaint alleged causes of action against defendants for (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (bad faith); (3) attorney malpractice; and (4) civil conspiracy. In July 2006, before any of defendants had responded to the complaint, plaintiff filed the FAC, alleging the same causes of action. On his breach of contract claim, plaintiff sought general damages of $200,000 and unspecified special damages; on his bad faith claim, plaintiff sought $300,000 for emotional and mental distress, unspecified special damages, and punitive damages; on his malpractice claim, plaintiff sought general damages of $300,000 and unspecified special damages.
We sometimes refer to the Moore, Winter firm; Hemer & Barkus; the Bonne, Bridges firm; Moore; Binford; Barkus; Rosenbaum; and O’Keefe collectively as the law firm defendants.
Defendants demurred and moved to strike plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations. Defendants requested that the trial court take judicial notice of, among other things, the judgment in plaintiff’s favor in the Haedrich action. Plaintiff opposed the demurrers, submitting in support of his opposition a 15-page declaration, more than 500 pages of exhibits, tape recordings of phone messages left for plaintiff by Haedrich, and a request for judicial notice of the judgment in the Haedrich action.
In his briefing on appeal, plaintiff relies extensively on the declaration and exhibits he submitted in opposition to the demurrers. We do not consider plaintiff’s extrinsic evidence in reviewing the sufficiency of his complaint. “‘On a demurrer a court’s function is limited to testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint. [Citation.] “A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.” [Citation.]’” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-114.) If a pleader desires to allege additional material facts, he or she should do so by means of an amended pleading, not by submitting extrinsic materials to supplement the existing pleading. (See James v. Superior Court (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 415, 417.)
On October 16, 2006, the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend. The trial court concluded, among other things, that because SCPIE and the law firm defendants had fully and successfully defended the Haedrich action, and because the Dental Board had also exonerated plaintiff, plaintiff had suffered no cognizable injury as a matter of law. The trial court entered judgments of dismissal on November 14 and 16, 2006 and, with respect to Binford, on February 7, 2007. Plaintiff timely appealed.
Plaintiff did not designate the reporter’s transcript of the October 16, 2006 demurrer hearing as part of the record on appeal. The failure to do so leaves us with an inadequate record. Nevertheless, we reach the merits. Binford filed a motion to quash service of the summons and complaint, which the trial court denied; as a result, she demurred separately from and later than the other defendants. The trial court heard and sustained her demurrer without leave to amend on January 11, 2007. The reporter’s transcript of the January 11, 2007 hearing is part of the record.
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff Failed to Allege Cognizable Damage
“On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citations.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.]” (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.) The judgment must be affirmed if any one of several grounds of demurrer is well taken. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
An essential element of each of plaintiff’s claims is damage proximately caused by defendants’ alleged misconduct. (Wiley v. County of San Diego (1998) 19 Cal.4th 532, 536 [legal malpractice]; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 47 [civil conspiracy]; Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822, 830 [breach of insurance contract]; Wolkowitz v. Redland Ins. Co. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 154, 162 [third-party insurance bad faith].) Plaintiff did not allege that SCPIE’s actions caused him to incur attorneys fees or other expenses relating to the defense or disposition of the Haedrich action. (See Emerald Bay Community Assn. v. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1088-1089 [no contract damage from breach of duty to defend when insured did not pay any attorneys fees or costs]; Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 602, 615 (Bogard) [insured not damaged by insurer’s refusal to accept settlement when insurer settled claim within policy limits three years later].) Nor did plaintiff allege that the law firm defendants should (or could) have achieved a better result in the Haedrich action. (See Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1241 [plaintiff in litigation malpractice action must establish that plaintiff would have obtained a more favorable judgment or settlement but for attorney’s negligence].) To the contrary, plaintiff alleged that SCPIE hired and paid for three different law firms and at least two experts to defend plaintiff, and that plaintiff was exonerated at trial. Plaintiff therefore alleged none of the economic losses usually associated with claims for the breach of an insurance contract, bad faith or legal malpractice. (See generally 3 Croskey et al., California Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶¶ 13:2-13:28, pp. 13-1 to 13-7 [contract damages for breach of insurance contract]; id. at ¶¶ 13:68-13:163, pp. 13-14 to 13-47 [tort damages in bad faith cases]; 1 Vapnek, et al., California Practice Guide: Professional Responsibility (The Rutter Group 2006) ¶¶ 6:322-6:330, pp. 6-61 to 6-70 [damages in legal malpractice cases].)
Plaintiff alleged that the Moore, Winter firm “failed to inform Plaintiff about filing a cross-complaint against Haedrich within the policy limit.” Plaintiff has not identified any colorable claim he might have had against Haedrich at that time, nor has he asserted that the prosecution of a cross-complaint was within the scope of the Moore, Winter firm’s engagement.
Plaintiff refers to a third expert, Dr. Grossman, in his opening brief.
Plaintiff attempted to allege two other types of economic loss in the FAC, but neither is sufficient to sustain a breach of contract or tort claim. First, plaintiff alleged that SCPIE’s decision not to renew his liability policy has caused damage “in excess of about $15,000 per year” for three or more years. SCPIE’s decision not to renew plaintiff’s policy, however, was neither a breach of contract nor tortious. Generally, a professional liability insurer may opt not to renew a term liability policy for any or no reason. (Schimmel v. NORCAL Mutual Ins. Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1285-1286; see also Greene v. Safeco Ins. Co. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 535, 537-539 [automobile liability insurance].) Plaintiff alleged no facts to support a contrary conclusion in this case.
Second, plaintiff alleged that SCPIE “intentionally concealed” that plaintiff’s policy entitled him to an “additional daily benefit” for days plaintiff was in trial in the Haedrich action. Presumably, plaintiff’s entitlement to this per diem was set forth in plaintiff’s insurance policy, so it is unclear how SCPIE “intentionally concealed” it. In any event, plaintiff alleged that SCPIE paid him $5,000, which he accepted, to satisfy its obligation to pay the per diem, and plaintiff alleged no harm from any delay in receiving the money.
Plaintiff’s prayer for unspecified special damages in each cause of action is also insufficient to plead economic loss. “Special damages are those that are not deemed to be a necessary or usual result of the wrongful act. To avoid surprise and unfairness to the defendant who would not anticipate them, the pleader must give specific notice of what will be claimed at the trial. It is not enough merely to inform the defendant that special damages of some unspecified kind will be claimed . . . . The items of damage and the amounts must be pleaded in detail and with certainty.” (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 888, p. 347; accord, Emerald Bay Community Assn. v. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095 [“Special damages must be pleaded with particularity”].) Accordingly, plaintiff failed to allege that he suffered any economic loss as the proximate result of defendants’ alleged misconduct.
In connection with his bad faith claim, plaintiff sought to recover damages for emotional and mental distress. It is well settled, however, that a bad-faith plaintiff may not recover damages for emotional distress absent economic loss. (Clayton v. United Services Automobile Assn. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1161; Waters v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069 [“emotional distress damages are recoverable in first and third party bad faith cases only when the insureds have suffered a financial loss”]; Continental Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 69, 85 [“a claim for emotional distress in a bad faith action cannot stand alone, but must be accompanied by some showing of economic loss”]; see also Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 121, 128 [“once the threshold requirement of economic loss is met, the insured need not show additional loss or injury to recover damages for his mental distress as long as such damages were proximately caused by his insurer’s breach of the implied covenant”].) Plaintiff thus failed to allege any compensable injury in the FAC. The trial court properly sustained defendants’ demurrers to all causes of action.
Plaintiff did not specifically seek damages for emotional distress in his claims for breach of contract and attorney malpractice. California law may permit damages for emotional distress as consequential damages for breach of an insurance contract in failure-to-defend cases, but only upon a showing that the plaintiff also suffered economic loss. (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 508, 527-528; see Croskey et al., supra, ¶¶ 12:685-12:685.1 at p. 12B-110.5.) Damages for emotional distress generally are not recoverable for litigation-related attorney malpractice. (Camenisch v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1697; Pleasant v. Celli (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 841, 852-854 [noting that it “is possible to envision cases in which the attorney’s conduct—while not necessarily intentional or in bad faith—is so reckless and the resulting damage is so foreseeable that imposition of liability is proper”], disapproved on another ground in Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 591, fn. 4; Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 9-11, disapproved on another ground in Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1037, 1053; see 1 Vapnek et al., supra, ¶ 6:327 at pp. 6-68 to 6-69.
B. Denial of Leave to Amend
“‘[W]hen [a demurrer] is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.’ [Citations].” (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend is cognizable on appeal even if plaintiff did not request leave to amend in the trial court (Code Civ. Proc., § 472c, subd. (a)), and “even if the plaintiff does not claim on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist., supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 971.)
Plaintiff contends that he can allege economic loss because he had to “divert[] his attention to the [Haedrich action] and could not pursue his practice vigorously . . . .” Plaintiff asserts that, as a result, he lost income and the value of his dental practice was diminished. Plaintiff articulates no theory, however, to explain how defendants’ alleged misconduct was the legal cause of any such damage. Defendants were not responsible for plaintiff being sued by Haedrich, nor could defendants force Haedrich to capitulate—as plaintiff implies they should have done—merely because plaintiff asserted his lack of negligence. The only ways to resolve the Haedrich action were to settle or to litigate the matter to conclusion. The FAC indicates that plaintiff, contrary to defendants’ advice, rejected three opportunities to settle the Haedrich action within policy limits, including an offer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 998 that would have terminated the Haedrich action only six months after it was filed and approximately two years before trial. Defendants are not responsible for plaintiff’s choice to seek complete exoneration through trial rather than to settle, nor are defendants answerable for plaintiff’s decision to spend his time attending to the lawsuit rather than his dental practice—particularly as SCPIE provided a full defense and promised indemnification for any potential liability. SCPIE “is an insurer, not a guardian angel.” (Camelot By The Bay Condominium Owners’ Assn. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 33, 52.)
Plaintiff also contends that the FAC alleged facts sufficient to state claims against defendants for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that he should be permitted to amend his complaint to specify those claims. We disagree. The FAC fails to allege that any of the defendants made, or that plaintiff reasonably relied upon, any fraudulent misrepresentation. Both are essential elements of a fraud claim. (See Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 173.)
The FAC also fails to allege a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. “‘The elements of a prima facie case of intentional infliction of mental distress are (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] In addition, ‘[whether] treated as an element of the prima facie case or as a matter of defense, it must also appear that the defendants’ conduct was unprivileged.’ [Citations.]” (Bogard, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 616; Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 394.) “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress extends ‘only to conduct so extreme and outrageous “as to go beyond all possible bonds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”’” (Coleman v. Republic Indemnity Ins. Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 403, 416 (Coleman); Bogard, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 616; see also Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1122, superseded by statute on another ground as noted in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853, fn. 19.) Conduct by insurers held not to be sufficiently “outrageous” includes the delay or denial of insurance benefits (Coleman, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 417); the refusal to accept a settlement demand within policy limits (Isaacson v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 775, 788-789; Schlauch v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 926, 936); failure to properly investigate a claim and accusing the insured of “trying to put something over on” the insurer (Ricard v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 886, 889, 895); and unfair settlement practices and advising an insured not to retain an attorney, both in violation of an insurer’s statutory duties under Insurance Code section 790.03 (Coleman, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 416-417). (See generally 3 Croskey et al., supra, ¶¶ 11:66-11:79 at pp. 11-19 to 11-22.)
Plaintiff alleged no extreme and outrageous conduct. The worst conduct plaintiff alleged was that SCPIE “conspired” with Moore and Binford to write “biased and negative reviews about” the potential liability exposure in the Haedrich action and “directed [Mulvehill] to write a negative expert review,” all in an effort to pressure plaintiff to accept a settlement offer from Haedrich. This is insufficient to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Even under plaintiff’s theory of the case, as reflected in the FAC and his briefs on appeal, SCPIE was not attempting to deprive plaintiff of policy benefits, but was attempting to persuade plaintiff to accept a settlement offer from Haedrich within policy limits. There is no allegation that the case reviews contained material misstatements of fact, or that the case reviews were disseminated by defendants to anyone outside the defense team of insurer, insured and defense counsel. (See Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1407.) There is no allegation that the attorneys did not believe in good faith that their evaluation of the case was reasonable, or that settlement was in plaintiff’s best interest. Accordingly, even if SCPIE and the attorneys deliberately communicated to plaintiff the worst case outcome in the Haedrich action—which it appears from plaintiff’s exhibits they did not do—that conduct would not be so extreme and outrageous as to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. “Undoubtedly an insurance company is privileged, in pursuing its own economic interests, to assert in a permissible way its legal rights and to communicate its position in good faith to its insured even though it is substantially certain that in so doing emotional distress will be caused. [Citations.] . . . .” (Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., supra, 10 Cal.App.3d at p. 395.) Further, an attorney has a professional duty to render candid advice to his or her client, even when that advice “involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. . . . . [A] lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.” (ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct, rule 2.1, com. 1.)
We have reviewed the declaration and exhibits submitted by plaintiff to the trial court in connection with evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend. (See ante fn. 4.) The allegedly “biased and negative” case reviews identified by plaintiff are summaries and evaluations of plaintiff’s deposition testimony prepared by Moore and Binford, and letters to plaintiff and SCPIE from the Moore, Winter firm and Hemer & Barkus reporting Mulvehill’s expert conclusion that plaintiff’s care of Haedrich fell below the applicable standard of care. The deposition summaries are neither overtly negative nor biased; to the contrary, they appear to be objective evaluations of the strengths and weaknesses of plaintiff’s deposition testimony and his demeanor as a witness. With respect to the letters reporting Mulvehill’s conclusion, none is unduly negative or coercive in tone. Mulvehill’s conclusions and the bases therefore are set forth in detail in neutral, objective language. In fact, one letter cited by plaintiff, from Hemer & Barkus to SCPIE, expressly states that Mulvehill’s opinion was not reliable because it was based not on his independent evaluation but on the conclusions of others, including Haedrich’s expert.
Plaintiff has identified no additional facts he could allege to state a valid claim against defendants, and none appears in the declaration and exhibits submitted by plaintiff to the trial court. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend.
Because we affirm on the grounds stated, we need not address defendants’ other contentions on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants to recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: TURNER, P. J., ARMSTRONG, J.