Opinion
6 Div. 344.
June 21, 1928. Rehearing Denied August 7, 1928. Reversed on Mandate November 20, 1928.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; H. P. Heflin, Judge.
William J. Kendrick was convicted of practicing law without a license, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Judgment reversed and rendered on writ of error by Supreme Court in Kendrick v. State, 218 Ala. 277, 120 So. 142. Certiorari denied, 218 Ala. 279, 120 So. 144.
The complaint charges that defendant, being engaged in the business of conducting a commercial collection agency, did secure from a named firm a disputed or controverted claim or demand against a named person, and did settle same by collecting from the debtor a stated amount and received from the creditor a stated sum, out of the money so collected, as compensation for his services; defendant not being in privity with or in the relation of employer and employee to either party, and not being regularly licensed to practice law in the state of Alabama.
The act of 1927, under which the prosecution is had (Gen. Acts 1927, p. 669, amending Code 1923, § 6248) provides that only such persons as are regularly licensed have authority to practice law, and, for the purposes of the act, defines the practice of law. That part of the definition here pertinent is as follows:
"Whoever * * * (d) as a vocation, enforces, secures, settles, adjusts or compromises defaulted, controverted or disputed accounts, claims or demands between persons with neither of whom he is in privity or in the relation of employer and employee in the ordinary sense; is practicing law."
It is provided that —
"Any person, firm or corporation who is not a regularly licensed attorney who does an act defined in this section to be an act of practicing law, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction must be punished as provided by law."
Defendant's demurrer to the complaint takes the point that said act is void, in that it is violative of sections 1, 6, 22, 36, 43, and 45 of the Constitution of Alabama and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
W. Emmett Perry, of Birmingham, for appellant.
The title of the act is not broad enough to include all the provisions of the act, and same violates section 45 of the Constitution. Wood v. McClure, 209 Ala. 523, 96 So. 577; State v. Smith, 187 Ala. 411, 65 So. 942; Ballentyne v. Wickersham, 75 Ala. 533; Ex parte Cowert, 92 Ala. 94, 9 So. 225; Yahn v. Merritt, 117 Ala. 485, 23 So. 71; Ex parte Reynolds, 87 Ala. 138, 6 So. 335; Sanders v. Commrs., 117 Ala. 543, 23 So. 788; Black v. State, 144 Ala. 92, 40 So. 611. The act violates section 43 of the Constitution, in that it is an usurpation of judicial power by the Legislature. Allgood v. Sloss Co., 196 Ala. 500, 71 So. 724. It deprives persons of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, in violation of section 6 of the Constitution of Alabama, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. State v. Skinner, 20 Ala. App. 204, 101 So. 327; State v. Goldstein, 207 Ala. 569, 93 So. 308; McLendon v. State, 179 Ala. 54, 60 So. 392, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 691. It denies to citizens equal civil and political rights, in violation of section 1 of the Constitution. State v. Goldstein, supra; In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293; McLendon v. State, supra. It is violative of section 22 of the Constitution, in that it grants special privileges and immunities to certain classes of citizens. McLendon v. State, supra; State v. Goldstein, supra. It impairs and denies rights retained by the people in adopting the Constitution. Const. 1901, § 36.
Charlie C. McCall, Atty. Gen., and W. M. Rayburn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
W. Marvin Woodall, of Birmingham, amicus curiæ.
The act offends neither the State nor Federal Constitution, and is valid. McCaskell v. State, 53 Ala. 510; Brooks v. State, 88 Ala. 122, 6 So. 902; In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 295; 6 C.J. 569; In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 55 S.E. 635, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 288, 10 Ann. Cas. 187; Bradwell v. Ill., 16 Wall. 130, 21 L.Ed. 442; State v. Rossman, 53 Wn. 1, 101 P. 357, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 821, 17 Ann. Cas. 625; Matter of Co-op. L. Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 55, 139 Am. St. Rep. 839, 19 Ann. Cas. 879; Montreal Bar v. Sprague's Agcy., 25 Quebec S.Ct. 383; St. Bd. v. Cronk, 157 La. 321, 102 So. 415; Dent v. W. Va., 129 U.S. 114, 9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623; Wideman v. State, 20 Ala. App. 422, 104 So. 438; Id., 213 Ala. 170, 104 So. 440; Harris v. State, 215 Ala. 56, 109 So. 291; Robinson v. State, 212 Ala. 459, 102 So. 693; Cummings v. State, 214 Ala. 209, 106 So. 852; R. R. Comm. v. A. G. S., 185 Ala. 354, 64 So. 13, L.R.A. 1915D, 98; Davidson v. Phelps, 214 Ala. 236, 107 So. 86; In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 65 S.E. 210, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 750, 18 Ann. Cas. 657; People v. Lower, 251 Ill. 527, 96 N.E. 346, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1203; Weed v. Bergh, 141 Wis. 569, 124 N.W. 664, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1217; State v. Skinner, 20 Ala. App. 204, 101 So. 327; Lindsay v. U.S. S. L. Co., 120 Ala. 156, 24 So. 171, 42 L.R.A. 783; Cousins v. State, 50 Ala. 113, 20 Am. Rep. 290. A section of the Code may be amended by reference to the section number only, when the subject-matter of the amendment is germane to the original section. Smith v. Birmingham R. Co., 208 Ala. 114, 94 So. 117; State v. Smith, 187 Ala. 411, 65 So. 942; McCord v. Bridges, 211 Ala. 295, 100 So. 469; Board of Rev. v. Hewitt, 206 Ala. 405, 90 So. 781; Dodd v. Commr's Ct., 203 Ala. 271, 82 So. 521; Hagan v. State, 207 Ala. 514, 93 So. 600; Davidson v. Phelps, 214 Ala. 236, 107 So. 86; Ex parte Johnson, 203 Ala. 579, 84 So. 803; Thomas v. State, 200 Ala. 661, 77 So. 35; Ham v. State, 156 Ala. 645, 47 So. 126.
This court has considered this case, sitting en banc, giving careful attention to the points presented and apparent on the record. As appears from the agreed statement of facts upon which the case was tried in the lower court, the sole, decisive issue, involved is the constitutionality, vel non, of the act of the Legislature of Alabama approved September 7, 1927 (Gen. Acts Ala. 1927, p. 669). We are of the opinion that said act is not subject to any of the grounds of unconstitutionality urged against it, and is, in all respects, a valid expression of the legislative will, as contained therein.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Reversed and rendered, on authority of Kendrick v. State, 218 Ala. 277, 120 So. 142.