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finding that based on Holbrook, the plaintiffs could not assert a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the IDEA
Summary of this case from Sammons v. Polk County School BoardOpinion
Civil Action No. 00-T-982-E
February 1, 2002
Margie Best, Law Offices of Margie Best, PC, Oak Park, IL, for Plaintiff.
Mark S. Boardman, Kathrine Charlotte Hortberg, Boardman Carr Weed PC, Chelsea, AL, Melinda M. Baird, Knoxville, TN, Larry E. Craven, Anita L. Kelly, Montgomery, AL, Michael R. White, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.
OPINION
Plaintiffs Katherine S., a minor, and Stewart and Aina S., her parents, sue for reimbursement for private school tuition and recovery of attorney's fees and costs from defendants Auburn City Schools and some of its employees under the following: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, also known as the IDEA, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1491; the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and the IDEA as enforced through 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. This lawsuit is now before the court for resolution on the parties' joint submission of the record on part of the IDEA claim and on the defendants' motion for summury judgment on the fourteenth amendment claim and the remainder of the IDEA claim. For the reasons discussed below, the court finds in favor of the defendants on all claims.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on July 22, 2000. There are two remaining claims: (1) that the due-process hearing officer made errors of fact and law in his decision that Katherine is not eligible for services under the IDEA; and (2) that the Auburn City School District and its officials or employees intentionally deprived Katherine of her civil rights under the fourteenth amendment and the IDEA as enforced through 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The submissions of the parties establish the following facts:
Mr. and Mrs. S. adopted Katherine as a baby. She attended private school in Florida through the sixth grade. After the family moved to Auburn, Alabama in the summer of 1994, Katherine entered seventh grade at Auburn Junior High School. She made all As during that year, consistent with her generally high achievement test scores. Katherine's school record from the first through seventh grades demonstrates consistently above-average to excellent academic ability and performance. Her parents described her as a bright child who was always excited about learning and performed well in school. Katherine has never been diagnosed with learning disabilities.
In the eighth grade, however, Katherine's grades fell: some of her grades on tests and progress reports included Ds and Fs, although her final grades for that year were two As, four Bs, and a C. Her parents became concerned about her slipping grades, difficulty in completing homework, and what they saw as significant emotional turmoil and inappropriate social relationships. They began to spend extra time with her, tutoring her themselves and hiring private tutors to supplement her studies.
Katherine entered the ninth grade at Auburn High School in 1996. She was enrolled in several academically accelerated, pre-International Baccalaureate courses. Her grades on assignments and progress reports continued to be erratic, ranging from As to Fs. Her final grades for the first semester were four As, three Cs, and one D. Her achievement test scores, which were in the superior range for all curricular areas, indicated that she was performing well below her ability, and her teachers believed that she could do much better. She displayed a lack of motivation and did not complete many homework assignments.
In October of her ninth grade year, Katherine wrote a story entitled "Not Even the Soil," which described a rape. Her parents found the story at home, took Katherine to her pediatrician who prescribed an anti-depressant; her parents also sought counseling for her. During that school year, Katherine wrote a poem describing depression and a sense of futility in living. She also wrote a note describing inappropriate sexual behavior that was discovered by her math teacher and given to her parents, who consulted the school counselor. Also during her ninth grade year, the basketball coach gave the school counselor a note with explicit sexual content that Katherine had written.
Beginning in December 1996, Katherine received individual psychotherapy for depression, family conflict, and acting out behavior from Dr. Bridget Smith, a clinical psychologist in Auburn, Alabama. Her parents discussed the fact that Katherine was seeing Dr. Smith with the school counselor.
Despite her under-achieving academic performance, Katherine participated in extracurricular activities during the ninth grade, including track and chorus. She had both male and female friends. Teachers from Katherine's ninth grade year described her as "giggly," "precocious," "outgoing," and "vivacious." Those teachers testified at the IDEA due-process hearing that Katherine actively participated in class and extracurricular activities, enjoyed friendships with classmates and teachers, and did not show any signs of depression or sadness at school or school functions. They noted that she lacked motivation at times and was not performing up to her academic ability, combined with some "boy crazy" behavior, but that she continued to make passing grades; they did not consider hers an extraordinary situation compared to that of other teenagers.
In recent deposition testimony, Katherine described herself as feeling depressed, scared, and intimidated during this time by the relationships she was having with older male students and the aggressive attention she was receiving from them. She testified that she often put on a facade, acting "bubbly and happy," while in reality she was feeling depressed and withdrawn. She also testified that she tried to hide much of her behavior and interactions with boys from her teachers and classmates.
On April 17, 1997, Katherine reported to a school guidance counselor that she had been raped by a 19-year-old male classmate on the school premises. The counselor reported the incident to the school principal, the State Department of Child Protective Services, and Katherine's parents. Mr. and Mrs. S. came to pick up Katherine from school on the day they were notified. Katherine did not return to Auburn High School for any academic classes after that date, although she did return for chorus and lunch until the end of the school year.
Katherine's attendance record through the ninth grade demonstrates no problems with attendance. She had no recorded tardiness and only one excused absence until mid-April 1997. After the rape on April 17, 1997, she did not attend Auburn High School.
Katherine reported the incident to the school counselor as a rape, and the reports of several mental health professionals who have evaluated Katherine (including Dr. Smith, her therapist at the time) describe it as a rape. Because of the ages of Katherine and the male classmate, the incident would have been designated at minimum as a statutory rape. However, the evidence indicates that Katherine had been betting sex on basketball games in her P.E. class, and that the incident happened after she lost the bet. The weight of the evidence also indicates that although the interaction between Katherine and the male classmate leading up to the incident may have been consensual, the sexual encounter itself may have become nonconsensual at some point during its occurrence. No police charges were ever filed, nor did Mr. and Mrs. S. ask the district attorney to pursue the case. There is no evidence that Auburn City School district officials took disciplinary action against either Katherine S. or the male classmate.
After the incident, Mr. and Mrs. S. met with the school principal to discuss Katherine's educational needs and their concerns for her safety. According to Katherine's parents, the principal informed them that it was common knowledge that Katherine was betting sex on basketball games. Mr. and Mrs. S. also assert that the principal offered to give Katherine full credit for her classes (effectively ending her school year several weeks early with no further instruction), and that he recommended a milieu school (a highly structured boarding school), but refused to provide any further information or assistance.
The parties dispute whether Mr. and Mrs. S. refused to permit Katherine to return to Auburn High School, or whether the school principal refused to allow her to return. The weight of the evidence indicates that there was a meeting of the minds on both sides that Katherine should not return to Auburn High School. The evidence indicates that during the meeting, Katherine's parents asked the principal to guarantee Katherine's safety at school, the principal advised that Katherine not come back to Auburn High School because he could not guarantee her safety there, and Katherine's parents said they did not wish Katherine to come back to Auburn High School. Both Mr. and Mrs. S. have testified that they would not have allowed Katherine to return to Auburn High School that year in any event.
The principal arranged for homebound instruction for Katherine for the remainder of the school year. However, Katherine returned to Auburn High School for chorus and lunch for the next several weeks, ultimately participating in a year end chorus performance.
The homebound instruction during the remainder of Katherine's ninth grade year was not provided or funded by the Auburn City Schools' special education budget. This instruction was provided by Pené Williams, a teacher employed by the Auburn City Schools. Williams went to the plaintiffs' house eleven times before the end of the school year. After Williams witnessed Mrs. S. in what she described as a "fit of rage," she refused to return to the plaintiffs' house. Katherine received full credit for the second semester of ninth grade, with final grades of two As, one B, and three Cs.
In a letter dated July 30, 1997, Dr. Smith referred Katherine to Dr. Ronnie Pollard for evaluation. Dr. Smith's letter begins by noting Katherine's "conflictual and intense relationship with her mother." The letter then summarizes several problems and potential problems Dr. Smith had identified in Katherine, including "some PTSD symptomatology of the rape" as well as "a possible emergence of Bipolar Disorder." Dr. Smith found that Katherine's behavior during psychological testing was "consistent with the diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder," but also found that "no formal learning disability was present." Finally, Dr. Smith suggested that Katherine "will require long term outpatient therapy for her characterological issues and family issues, particularly her lack of trust, low self esteem, poor judgement, and social and emotional isolation." Dr. Smith expressed hope that medication could assist Katherine in "controlling her impulsivity, depression, and attentional difficulties."
The evidence is clear that Dr. Smith was familiar with the special education system at the Auburn City School district, that she frequently met with Auburn City School district staff about other students, and that she made referrals for students for whom she believed special education was appropriate. Although she treated Katherine for over a year, at no point did Dr. Smith make a referral or recommendation for Katherine to receive special education in the Auburn City Schools.
Katherine did not return to public high school in Auburn for the tenth grade. Two days before she was raped, Katherine's parents, believing that she was not performing up to her abilities, applied to enroll her in a private day high school in Auburn, the Lee-Scott Academy. After six weeks at Lee-Scott Academy in the fall of 1997, Katherine was asked to leave the school due to inappropriate behavior, specifically for making sexual comments to others.
In October 1997, the plaintiffs sent a letter to the Auburn City Schools' superintendent, informing him that Katherine had been expelled from Lee-Scott Academy and that they would be home-schooling her. The superintendent did not respond and did not notify Mr. and Mrs. S. of any services that could be available for Katherine.
Following her expulsion from Lee-Scott Academy, Katherine was again home-schooled. During this time, when she was not supervised during the day, Katherine testified that she walked around her neighborhood and met several older male construction workers with whom she had sexual relations.
In November 1997, Katherine was evaluated by Dr. Rama Rao, a psychiatrist at the Vaughan Clinic in Birmingham. Dr. Rao's report noted "ongoing, chronic multiple symptoms and issues." Dr. Rao diagnosed Katherine with a history of attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder-inattentive type, depression NOS (not otherwise specified), possible bipolar symptoms, and oppositional-defiant disorder. Dr. Rao also noted that Katherine had emerging borderline personality disorder traits, along with issues in primary support and education. Dr. Rao's report suggests "the possibility of residential day treatment or residential treatment because her parents are unable to fully contain her at home. . . She has no structure that would help her with both therapy as well as her school situation." Dr. Rao's recommendations to Katherine's psychologist "include more direct family intervention; primarily working on the relationship between her mother and her trying to decide what could be salvaged at this age, and what the parameters would be for her to be at home." Thus, although the report mentions "issues in education," Dr. Rao's recommendations focused on Katherine's family life and did not include a referral or recommendation for special education.
In November or December 1997, Mrs. S. contacted the Auburn City Schools' Director of Special Education to ask what resources the school system had for students with social problems. The parties dispute the substance and outcome of this conversation. The plaintiffs contend that Mrs. S. specifically asked the director whether Katherine would qualify for services under the IDEA, and that Mrs. S. was in fact seeking specific assistance from the Auburn City Schools for Katherine's education. However, according to the defendants, Mrs. S. indicated to the director that she was not interested in obtaining services from the Auburn City Schools, and the director did not interpret the contact as a request for an evaluation for special education services. The director therefore did not refer the matter formally for an evaluation or provide Mr. and Mrs. S. with written information about parents' rights under the IDEA.
Auburn City Schools has a school-based special education referral system, where a "special education coordinator" refers cases for special education evaluations. No teacher or counselor initiated such a referral for Katherine.
In May 1998, after Katherine had been unsuccessfully homeschooled for several months, Mr. and Mrs. S. placed her in Piney Ridge Center, a residential psychiatric hospital facility in Missouri. Mr. S. wrote to a counselor at Auburn High School and asked him to coordinate Katherine's education at Piney Ridge. Mr. S. copied this letter to the special education director. Students who are hospitalized at Piney Ridge receive educational services from the Waynesville, Missouri public schools through a cooperative arrangement.
Katherine did not receive special education and related services while she was in Piney Ridge during the summer of 1998. In their legal pleadings, the plaintiffs assert that Piney Ridge staff considered Katherine disabled under the IDEA and requested an IEP for her from the Auburn City Schools. These assertions are unsupported by the record. The Piney Ridge records contain a "Notice of Intent and Consent for Initial Placement in Special Education" that is signed only by Mr. S., not by any Piney Ridge staff. There is no other evidence in the record that Piney Ridge recommended that Katherine receive special education services from the Auburn City Schools or any school.
The plaintiffs also assert that around that time, Mrs. S. called the Special Education Director again and asked for an IEP for Katherine. According to Mrs. S., the Special Education Director did not say yes or no, but said that the school counselor would be in touch. The director testified that the conversation in November or December of 1997 was the only time that she spoke to Mrs. S.
Although the Special Education Director and other Aubarn City School district officials were aware that Katherine had been unsuccessful in home-schooling, and had been placed in Piney Ridge, none of those officials took any action to investigate the situation, to develop an IEP for Katherine, or to evaluate her for eligibility under the IDEA. Piney Ridge and the Waynesville school district also did not develop an IEP for her. Katherine received no academic credits for the 1997-1998 school year.
Katherine remained at Piney Ridge for three months. Her Piney Ridge discharge summary contains a diagnosis of "oppositional-defiant disorder; history of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, inattention type, rule out bipolar disorder; emerging "B" cluster traits; asthma; conflict with her mother, poor choices in relationships." The discharge summary contains no finding of eligibility under the IDEA or recommendation that Katherine receive special education services. The discharge summary indicates that Katherine successfully met some of her treatment goals in the areas of behavioral problems: she was able to display a stable mood in four out of seven activity therapy groups, and was able to be a leader and a role model in five out of seven activity therapy groups.
In its discussion of Katherine's placement after her discharge from Piney Ridge, the discharge summary states that Katherine, her family, Piney Ridge staff, and Dr. Smith all agreed that "it would not be appropriate for Katherine to return to live with her family." Although the plaintiffs have characterized this as a "recommendation" that Katherine be placed in a residential educational setting because of her alleged emotional disabilities, the report (as well as ample evidence in the record) clearly attributes the reasons for residential placement to the family's preference and to conflict within the family. Specifically, the report states that "It was the agreement that Katherine needed continued structure, though she did not need to stay at this level of care. The parents also did not feel it was realistic for Katherine to return to Auburn, due to her previous behaviors and their place in the community." The report also reflects the agreement of the Piney Ridge therapist and Dr. Smith that "Katherine's family currently could not provide the support necessary to maintain her behavior improvement here."
Mr. and Mrs. S. enrolled Katherine at the Elan School in Maine in August 1998, shortly after her discharge from Piney Ridge. The Elan School is a private residential facility that serves teenagers with social and behavioral difficulties. The plaintiffs' pleadings characterize Elan as a "residential special education program for seriously emotionally disturbed and/or learning disabled students." Elan's own literature states that it is licensed by the Maine Department of Education as a residential, special-purpose junior and senior high school. However, Elan does not require that its students be certified as having disabilities, it does not provide specialized instruction or create IEPs, and less than half of its students are ever identified as eligible for special education. Elan focuses on students' behavioral difficulties; academic classes in core subjects are taught in the evenings (five classes, 50 minutes each).
No IEP was created for Katherine by Elan, although Elan's director of education testified that the reason was that an IEP would have been the responsibility of the Auburn City Schools, which had not contacted her or any other Elan personnel, to her knowledge.
In November 1998, the plaintiffs wrote a letter to the Auburn City Schools to request that the Auburn City Schools pay for Katherine's residential placement at Elan. Following this request, both parties evaluated Katherine.
The plaintiffs had Katherine evaluated in March 1999 by a team whose members included a psychologist, Greggus Yahr, a psychologist, Arthur DiRocco, and a social worker, Mary Bennett. Their joint report (the Yahr report) based its findings on a review of records; interviews of Katherine, her parents, and Elan staff; observations of Katherine in two classes at Elan; and various psychological tests. The team did not review any Auburn City School district ;for Katherine, nor did the team interview any of her Auburn teachers. The Yahr report found that Katherine met the federal criteria for classification as a "seriously emotionally disturbed" student. However, the report's credibility is compromised by its statements that Katherine had problems with failing grades, tardiness, and truancy: official Auburn City School district records and other evidence at the due-process hearing establish that these statements were the result of inaccurate reporting by Katherine.
A psychiatrist at the Elan School, Dr. James Maier, also testified at the due-process hearing that Katherine was emotionally disturbed. However, Dr. Maier stated that he had no knowledge of the criteria for eligibility under the IDEA.
The defendants' evaluators included a neuropsychologist, Thomas Oakland, and a psychiatrist specializing in child and adolescent psychiatry, Michael Greer. In April and May 1999, Dr. Oakland and Dr. Greer (working independently) interviewed Katherine's teachers at both Auburn and Elan, reviewed educational and treatment records, and evaluated Katherine. Both found that Katherine did not meet the criteria set forth by the IDEA or the Alabama Code to be eligible for special education and related services.
In June 1999, the Auburn City Schools convened a multidisciplinary eligibility determination committee, which determined that Katherine was not eligible for special education and related services. The committee had the reports of the Yahr team, Dr. Greer, and Dr. Oakland available for its review. However, the committee did not include any of Katherine's Auburn teachers or counselors.
The plaintiffs appealed this decision by submitting a written request for a due-process hearing. A hearing was held before Hearing Officer John W. Green in December 1999 and February 2000. In May 2000, Officer Green rendered a final decision in favor of the Auburn City Schools on all issues. He held that Katherine is not "disabled" within the meaning of the IDEA, that the Auburn City Schools' failure to inform the plaintiffs of their procedural rights under the IDEA was harmless, and that Katherine is not entitled to reimbursement for her placement at the Elan School because she is ineligible for special education and related services.
Katherine attended the Elan School from August 1998 until her graduation and successful completion of the program in August 2001.
III. DISCUSSION A. Appeal of Due-Process Hearing Decision
The IDEA provides federal funds to assist state and local schools in providing a "free and appropriate education" for all students with disabilities. The IDEA's primary purposes are "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs . . . [and] to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(d).
The IDEA provides for parent participation in all matters related to the child's education, and specifies procedural safeguards to ensure that parents have processes of review to address any decisions or placements which they deem inappropriate or unsatisfactory. § 1415. The IDEA assures parents the right to examine all records pertaining to evaluation and educational placement of the child, to obtain an independent evaluation of the child, and to receive prior written notice whenever the responsible educational agency proposes or refuses to change the child's placement. § 1415(b). The IDEA also affords parents who have a complaint an opportunity for an impartial due-process hearing, to be conducted by the state educational agency or by the local educational agency or intermediate educational unit, as determined by state law or by the state educational agency. § 1415(b)(2).
Under § 1415(e)(2) of the IDEA, any party aggrieved by the findings and decisions made in a due-process hearing may file suit in state or federal district court. This section also specifies that the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
As an initial matter, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the IDEA, and thus that this court is without jurisdiction to hear this action. The defendants argue that § 1415(c) of the IDEA requires the plaintiffs to contest the decision of the due-process hearing officer to the state educational agency before filing suit in federal court. However, § 1415(c) merely provides that if the due-process hearing is conducted by a local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit, the party receiving an adverse decision may appeal to the state educational agency which shall conduct an impartial review of the hearing and issue an independent decision. Thus, the procedure set forth in § 1415(c) will apply only when the due-process hearing is conducted by an entity other than the state educational agency. As the IDEA permits, the Alabama regulations implementing the IDEA provide only a single-level, not a dual-level, review process. 1975 Ala. Code § 290-8-9-.08(8)(c)(11). In this case, the due-process hearing officer was appointed by the state agency, the Alabama Department of Education. Under the Alabama regulations, the plaintiffs' only avenue of appeal was to file suit in court. Furthermore, the hearing officer's written decision itself directs the parties to appeal by filing a civil action in court. Thus, there was no additional administrative remedy to exhaust and this lawsuit will not be dismissed on this ground.
2. Standards of Review
The Supreme Court has held that courts' review of due-process hearing decisions under § 1415(e)(2) of the IDEA should focus on two issues: (1) whether the State has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA, and (2) whether the IEP developed through the IDEA's procedures was "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3051 (1982). InRowley, the Court emphasized that although reviewing courts "must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States," they must also make independent decisions based on a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051.
The Eleventh Circuit discussed the "confusing" standard of review in IDEA cases in Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853 (11th Cir. 1988). The court in Breen acknowledged an earlier decision of the Eleventh Circuit holding that the role of the district court is simply to "`review the administrative determinations contemplated by the Act, `Manecke v. School Bd., 762 F.2d 912, 919 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 747 U.S. 1062, 106 S.Ct. 809 (1986)." 853 F.2d at 857. But the court held that "the extent of deference to be given the administrative findings of fact is an issue left to the discretion of the district court." Id. at 857. The court also cited the First Circuit's holding that "the district court must consider the administrative findings of fact, but is free to accept or reject them. Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ. Coin. of Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 792 (1st Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (1985)." Id.
In this case, the central issue raised by the plaintiffs' appeal of the due-process hearing is whether the hearing officer erred in his finding that Katherine S. is not disabled and thus in denying her eligibility under the IDEA. As the Second Circuit held in Muller on Behalf of Muller v. Committee on Special Educ. of the East Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1998), describing the district court's role in that case, this court is not faced with the traditional Rowley analysis in which a disputed IEP must be evaluated, but rather, whether Katherine "satisfied the definition of `emotionally disturbed' set forth in the relevant state and federal regulations." Muller, 145 F.3d at 101-102. Such an inquiry necessarily involves mixed questions of fact and law.Id. at 102.
As in the Muller case, this court must resolve this issue through interpretation of the IDEA and the definition of `emotional disturbance' under the applicable federal and state regulations. Id. Under the discretionary standard set forth in Breen and followed in Muller, the court may consider the issue of Katherine's statutory eligibility de novo. Having reviewed the administrative record and the additional evidence presented by the parties, this court finds that the due-process hearing officer did not err in his conclusion that Katherine S. is not disabled under the IDEA.
3. Eligibility under the IDEA
The due-process hearing officer found that Katherine did not satisfy the IDEA's definition of a "child with a disability" because she did not require "specially designed instruction." The IDEA requires local school districts to "locate, identify, and evaluate" all students with disabilities. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(3). A "student with a disability" is a student who has been evaluated to have one of the categories of disability, including "emotional disturbance," and who needs special education and related services. § 1401. As the hearing officer noted, a student who has an impairment, but who only needs a related service and not special education, is not a "student with a disability" within the meaning of the law. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7 (a)(2). Special education is defined as "specially designed instruction." § 300.26(a)(1). Specially designed instruction means:
"[A]dapting, as appropriate to the needs of an eligible child under this part, the content, methodology, or delivery of instruction —
(i) to address the unique needs of the child that result from the child's disability; and
(ii) to ensure access of the child to the general curriculum, so that he or she can meet the educational standards within the jurisdiction of the public agency that apply to all children."
§ 300.26(b)(3). Therefore, in order to qualify as a "student with a disability" pursuant to the IDEA, Katherine must require "specially designed instruction" in order to have access to, and benefit from, the general educational curriculum.
The evidence clearly demonstrates that Katherine was accessing, and achieving benefit in, the general education curriculum at Auburn High School until she stopped attending in April 1997. Until that point, her most significant educational difficulty was her slipping, but still passing, grades in accelerated courses. She attended school regularly, had friends, and participated in extracurricular activities. The behavior problems and family conflict experienced at home were not reflected in her behavior at school. Moreover, the therapist she was seeing throughout this period, Dr. Smith, never identified her as needing special education services. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that she required specially designed instruction in order to access and benefit from the general curriculum at Auburn High School. As the due-process hearing officer found, there was no reason for any Auburn City School district personnel to suspect that Katherine was in need of special education and related services while she was a student there.
The rape incident itself, and subsequent events, make this determination more complicated. There is a substantial conflict in the testimony about this incident: in the plaintiffs' version, Katherine was raped, told not to come back to Auburn High School, and therefore obviously could not learn at Auburn High School. In the defendants' version, Katherine participated in consensual sex and was removed from Auburn High School solely at her parents' insistence. Given all of the documentary and testimonial evidence, it is clear only that the truth lies somewhere in between these versions. Yet it is important that under the applicable case law, neither of these versions is ultimately determinative of whether Katherine is eligible for special education and related services under the IDEA. Rather, the expert testimony, the evaluation and treatment records, the testimony of teachers, and the facts as detailed above create an entire context that does not support a finding of eligibility under the IDEA.
The Auburn City Schools' actions have contributed to the difficulty and delay in determining Katherine's eligibility. Between the time that Katherine was removed from Auburn High School until the Auburn City Schools received notice of the demand for reimbursement for her Elan School tuition, Auburn City School district officials did not respond to several attempts by Mr. and Mrs. S. to communicate about Katherine's educational progress. There has been no satisfactory explanation why Auburn City Schools failed to respond to their letters. Auburn City School district personnel demonstrated a marked lack of attention throughout this young woman's troubling situation. The Auburn City Schools' failure to show any concern for Katherine's education after she left Auburn High School and until this litigation was commenced, even when they knew she had been expelled from Lee-Scott Academy and later placed in Piney Ridge Center, is disappointing. It is no wonder Mr. and Mrs. S. felt frustrated and rebuffed to the extent that they have pursued legal recourse.
At the same time, however, the fact that the Auburn City Schools made mistakes does not itself mandate a finding of eligibility. The great weight of the evidence, as determined by the testimony and reports of almost all of the educators and mental health professionals who taught and evaluated Katherine both before and after she left Auburn High School, in addition to much legal precedent interpreting schools' responsibilities under the IDEA, does not support liability in this case. Rather, the facts and law establish that Katherine s emotional and behavioral problems do not rise to the level of requiring special education. Again, Katherine's behavior at school before the rape did not create any reason to believe she needed special education evaluation or services. None of the mental health professionals who evaluated Katherine before she enrolled at Elan recommended her for special education; they focused instead on her relationship with her family and the dynamic of conflict at horn. Even after she left Auburn High School, Katherine was able to function as "a leader and a role model" in several peer groups at Piney Ridge Center. The Piney Ridge therapists did not diagnose her as unable to learn or function at school. The fact that she was unsuccessful in a home schooling setting during the 1996-1997 school year does not mean that she could not have accessed and benefitted from general education at that time, especially given the ample evidence regarding conflict within her family. Finally, at the Elan School, Katherine did not receive special education services, yet was able to make academic progress and to graduate successfully.
Several recent court decisions cited by the hearing officer support this conclusion. In Norton v. Orinda Union Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 825, 120 S.Ct. 74 (1999), the Ninth Circuit held that a student who met the eligibility criteria for "learning disabled" was ineligible for special education and related services because the student was successful in the regular classroom with minor classroom modifications. And in Sylvie M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Dripping Springs Independent School Dist., 48 F. Supp.2d 681 (W.D. Tex. 1999), aff'd, 214 F.3d 1351 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 879, 121 S.Ct. 190 (2000), the district court held that a student with emotional and behavioral problems, who performed at or above grade level in every subject at her original school, was ineligible for special education because she was receiving educational benefit from her public education program. Similar to Katherine, Sylvie M.`s behavior problems were mainly manifested at home, and her private therapy focused on her turbulent relationship with her mother.
Numerous other administrative and federal court decisions have denied IDEA eligibility (or disability status under the Rehabilitation Act) to students with emotional or behavioral problems which were either not primarily manifested at school or otherwise did not give school personnel reason to suspect that the student had a disability that required special education and related services. See T.J.W. v. Dothan City Sch. Bd., 26 IDELR 999 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (fighting, emotional outbursts, and speaking out of turn did not create a reason to suspect that the student was disabled under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Hoffman v. East Troy Comm. Sch. Dist., 38 F. Supp.2d 750 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (falling asleep, poor classroom performance, and failing one class was not enough reason to suspect that the student was emotionally disturbed); West Chester Area Sch. fist., 32 IDELR 275 (SEA PA 2000) (there was no reason for school to suspect that student with depression and behavior problems at home was disabled simply because her grades had fluctuated and declined); Bd. of Educ. of the Midland Pub. Schs., 25 IDELR 669 (SEA MI 1996) ("emotionally disturbed" classification and residential placement at the Elan School was not appropriate for a teenager who developed severe behavior problems at home and whose grades dropped from As and Bs to Cs and Ds); Springer v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 659 (4th Cir. 1998) (student who was truant, abused alcohol and drugs, and had been convicted of burglary and theft, but who also maintained satisfactory relationships with teachers and peers and did not manifest a pervasive mood of unhappiness and depression, was not emotionally disturbed under the IDEA); Doe v. Board of Educ., 753 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1990) (student placed in a psychiatric hospital for depression and violence, but whose grades and achievement tests were satisfactory and who had no behavior problems in the classroom, was not emotionally disturbed).
The fact that Katherine's problems were not as drastic as many of the children at issue in these cases is relevant, yet it is not the key reason behind the hearing officer's decision or this court's affirmation of that decision. Rather, it is key that none of the evidence, especially including reports and testimony from the experts who evaluated Katherine, supports a finding that her emotional difficulties caused her to be disabled in an educational context or in need of special education or related services. Her treating psychologists and psychiatrists focused on the source of her emotional difficulties as the conflict within her family. In addition, the ultimate decision to place her in a structured boarding school in Maine rather than return her to Auburn High School was clearly motivated in large part by her parents' inability to care for her at home, rather than the Auburn City Schools' inability to provide her with an education.
The case of Muller on Behalf of Muller v. Committee on Special Educ. of the East Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1998), cited by plaintiffs, does not provide legal ground to establish Katherine's eligibility under the IDEA. Treena Muller, the student in that case, had demonstrated learning disabilities from her earliest school years and developed behavioral problems in adolescence including poor school attendance, failing the majority of her classes, defying and generally disobeying her parents, lying, stealing, attempting suicide, and attempting arson. Furthermore, unlike the instant case, numerous mental health professionals testified that Treena's emotional problems were having a seriously detrimental impact on her education, and that she required placement in a residential treatment center or else she would likely return to her harmful behavioral patterns. The appellate court's decision to uphold the district court's finding of eligibility under the IDEA was thus well-supported.
Sierra Sands Unified Sch. Dist., 30 IDELR 306 (SEA CA 1998), also cited by the plaintiffs, is likewise inapposite to this case. There, the student was raped by eight older boys at the age of 13, subsequently attempted suicide twice, and experienced long-term depression that ultimately prevented her from attending school. All of the psychiatrists and psychologists who evaluated her, except for one, reported that she qualified as seriously emotionally disturbed under the IDEA; that her depression significantly impaired her life functions; and that she required residential placement. The one school psychologist who found that this student's difficulties did not adversely affect her educational performance was unclear at the hearing about the criteria for a serious emotional disturbance and had not even tested or evaluated the student before her initial finding of ineligibility. Thus, neither the facts regarding the emotional functioning of the student in Sierra Sands nor the weight and credibility, of the experts' testimony correspond to those in Katherine's case.
The plaintiffs' main argument responding to the lack of evidence to support classification of Katherine as needing special education and related services under the IDEA is that only an overly narrow definition of education would result in a finding, of ineligibility. They assert that even if Katherine's behavior at Auburn High School did not put school personnel on notice that she was emotionally disturbed, the entire history of her behavior supports such a finding, including her emotional problems as diagnosed by Drs. Smith and Rao and her expulsion from Lee-Scott Academy, among other facts. As the hearing officer pointed out, it is clear that the entire record must be carefully examined in order to determine whether Katherine is eligible to receive special education under the IDEA and Alabama state law. The reason Katherine's functioning at Auburn High School must be considered is that, as the hearing officer noted, the IDEA generally requires a showing of "actual impact of the disabling condition on any area of education as expected to be provided within a public school context." The law does not permit a finding, of entitlement to special education and related services when the student has not demonstrated an inability to learn in the public school context. See, e.g., Hoffman v. East Troy Comm. Sch. Dist., 38 F. Supp.2d 750 (E.D. Wis. 1999); West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 32 IDELR 275 (SEA PA 2000).
The plaintiffs also argue that the due-process hearing officer ignored the obvious conclusion that Katherine was experiencing an educational impact since her emotional disabilities are so "severe and complex" that she could not safely attend school. This argument is weakened by the fact that it was Mr. and Mrs. S. who testified that they would not have allowed Katherine to return to school in any event. The fact that Katherine was diagnosed with psychological disorders by Drs. Smith and Rao, and at Piney Ridge Center, does not per se lead to the conclusion that these disorders were so "severe and complex" that she could not safely attend school. None of the reports from these professionals articulated the belief that Katherine could not learn; rather, the reports and testimony show that any suggestions or recommendations to place Katherine at the Klan School arose out of recognition that Katherine's parents could not provide the support necessary for her to be at home.
4. Eligibility under Alabama State Law
Both the IDEA and Alabama state law require the Auburn City Schools to provide a free appropriate public education to students with disabilities who are "in need of special education and related services." 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400(d), 1401(3)(A) (ii); 1975 Ala. Code § 290-8-9-.1-.72ER(1)(c). The IDEA also requires school districts to conduct a "full and individual" evaluation of all students suspected of being disabled and in need of special education and related services. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320 (a). The Alabama State Board of Education has promulgated regulations to implement the requirements of the IDEA. These regulations contain specific and complex evaluation criteria that must be followed to identify a student with an emotional disturbance:
"(a) Emotional disturbance means a disability characterized by behavioral or emotional responses so different from appropriate age, cultural, environmental, or ethnic norms that the educational performance is adversely affected. Educational performance includes academic and/or social/emotional skills. Such a disability is more than a temporary expected response to stressful events in the environment, is consistently exhibited in the educational environment, and persists despite individualized intervention within the general education environment and other settings. One or more of the following characteristics must be exhibited over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely affects educational performance:
1. An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or health factors;
2. An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers;
3. Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances;
4. A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; or
5. A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems.
Emotional disturbance does not include socially maladjusted children unless they meet the criteria for emotional disturbance as defined in Ala. Admin. Code r.290-8-0-.3(r)(a)1. through 5., but does include children who are schizophrenic.
"(b) Criteria.
1. Evidence that the behavior is not due to intellectual, sensory, or health factors.
2. Scores on three behavior rating scales that are considered clinically significant by the test authors. Results from three independent raters, one of whom may be the parent, must be considered.
3. Evidence that the emotional disturbance adversely affects the child's academic performance and/or social/emotional functioning in the environment.
4. Evidence that the emotional disturbance is exhibited over a long period of time (typically six months) and to a marked degree, and that the child's educational performance is adversely affected.
5. Observational data that documents the emotional disturbance in two or more educational settings.
"(c) Evaluations Required.
1. Individual intellectual evaluation.
2. Administration of the same behavior rating scale by at least three persons, one of whom may be the parent, who have had contact with the child for at least six weeks.
3. Individual educational achievement evaluation and the evaluations in Ala. Admin. Code r.290-8-9-.3 (4)(c)2. and 4.
4. Documentation that the emotional disturbance is exhibited over a long period of time (typically six months) to a marked degree that adversely affects educational performance. Such documentation may include, but is not limited to: (i) Teacher, parent, and/or child interview(s).
(ii) Clinical psychological/psychiatric reports.
(iii) Observation of the child in an educational environment other than the observation required in Ala. Admin. Code r.290-8-9-.3(4)(c)5.
(iv) School psychologist/counselor report.
(v) Language evaluation.
(vi) Documentation of environmental, socio/cultural, and/or ethnic information.
(vii) Medical reports
(viii) Anecdotal records from classroom teacher (s) or other education agency personnel.
5. Observation by a qualified professional in two or more educational settings."Alabama State Board of Education Rules, r.290-8-9-.3(4).
The record does not support a conclusion that Katherine exhibited one or more of the five characteristics of emotional disturbance to a marked degree that adversely affected her educational performance. The record does show that Katherine's emotional and behavioral problems lasted longer than six months, but those problems. were not manifested in the educational environment at Auburn High School for that length. of time. Each characteristic is considered below:
a. An inability to learn which cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or health factors: Katherine was able to learn at Auburn High School: she passed all of her classes. and received full credit for her ninth grade year. It is well settled in the Eleventh Circuit that school districts are required to provide educational services to ensure that students with disabilities receive "some educational benefit." Doe v. Alabama State Dept. of Educ., 915 F.2d 615, 655 (11th Cir. 1990). By ninth grade, Katherine's grades had slipped from the straight As she had received in seventh grade, yet they were still passing grades in an accelerated curriculum. However, as her teachers testified, she was not unable to learn but at times unwilling or unmotivated to learn. Her teachers testified consistently that this lack of motivation is typical of some adolescents and that they saw no cause for alarm in Katherine.
b. An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers: Again, Katherine's teachers testified that she had close friends at Auburn High School, was a popular student, and participated in chorus and track. Katherine confirmed in her deposition testimony that she regularly spent time with friends. Additionally, even during her confinement in Piney Ridge Center, Katherine was able to be a "leader and a role model" among her peers.
c. Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal conditions: Given the treatment records from Dr. Smith, Dr. Rao, and Piney Ridge Center, it is clear that most of Katherine's emotional and behavioral problems were experienced primarily at home. Her teachers have recounted "boy crazy" behavior and stated their belief that she was not performing up to her potential, but they consistently testified that her behavior did not go beyond typical adolescence. They observed her to be an outgoing, popular student, not a depressed, acting out student.
d. A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression: The evidence shows that Katherine did not appear to be depressed at school. As noted, above, this contrasts with Katherine's own later description of herself. However, her teachers reported to one of the psychiatrists who evaluated her that her consistent mood was "good" or "bubbly."
e. A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems: No evidence in the record supports a finding under this section.
The professionals who have evaluated Katherine and whose reports are part of the record uniformly support the conclusion that she has emotional and behavioral problems. However, none of their reports except for one supports her eligibility for special education and related services under the IDEA. As previously discussed, none of Katherine's therapists or psychiatrists before Elan diagnosed her as requiring special education. In 1999, after she had been at Elan for several months, Drs. Greer and Oakland each traveled to Auburn and Elan to review records and interview Katherine's teachers, as well as to evaluate Katherine herself. The plaintiffs attack these experts' reports as focusing only on Katherine's "in class behavior" and thus ignoring the overall context of her behavior. However, Katherine's behavior at school in Auburn is essential to evaluating her eligibility under the IDEA.
The only report which did find Katherine to be eligible under the IDEA was the Yahr report. As discussed previously, this report contains descriptions of significant educational, problems such as truancy, tardiness, and failing grades that were shown at the due-process hearing to be the result of inaccurate or exaggerated reporting. Because the Yahr; report does not specify that its authors were recounting these claims as exaggerations or inaccuracies rather than as the truth, it must be assumed that the claims were believed to be true. Thus, the validity of this report is certainly questionable.
Furthermore, the testimony of Dr. James Maier, psychiatrist at the Elan School, that Katherine is seriously emotionally disturbed cannot be given weight since he admitted his ignorance of the criteria for emotional disturbance under the IDEA.
5. Procedural Violations under the IDEA
The plaintiffs have argued that the Auburn City Schools failed to follow proper procedures under the IDEA. The actions of Auburn City School district personnel after Katherine's withdrawal from Auburn High School are troubling in this regard. Mr. and Mrs. S. kept Auburn City Schools updated on Katherine's educational situation, and asked for help "coordinating" her education, yet no school official contacted them to offer assistance or information. As the due-process hearing officer noted, their "inquiries and communications sight have been considered a referral/request for special education evaluation/placement." The Special Education Director testified that she did not provide the plaintiffs with a written explanation of their procedural safeguards pursuant to the IDEA because there was no reason to suspect that Katherine needed special education, and because Mrs. S. indicated that she was not interested in placing Katherine in a special class. However, even if the director had no reason to suspect that Katherine needed special education, she and other Auburn City School district personnel could have suspected that Mr. and Mrs. S. were seeking help again when they received the communication from Mr. and Mrs. S. about Katherine's expulsion from Lee-Scott Academy and her placement in Piney Ridge. Even if the director's understanding was that Mr. and Mrs. S. were uninterested in the Auburn City Schools' special education offerings, the director should have been more forthcoming in explaining the IDEA process to this family, and the possibility of evaluation for residential placement, either at the time Mrs. S. called her or later when she received the letters from Mr. and Mrs. S. In the future, the Auburn City Schools should make sure to provide parents with written copies of their rights under the IDEA whenever they request information about special education or residential placement, even if parents do not "specifically ask for evaluation under the IDEA.
At the same time, this procedural violation is no more than de minimis for Katherine because the evidence strongly suggests that Katherine would not have met the criteria for IDEA eligibility even if she had been evaluated in late 1998. As the hearing officer found and this court agrees, because Katherine is not eligible for special education or related services as emotionally disturbed under the IDEA, the Auburn City Schools' procedural violations do not support a claim for damages. The Eleventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff must prove actual harm in order to sustain a claim for damages based on alleged procedural violations. Doe v. Alabama State Dept. of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 665 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Knable v. Bexley Sch.Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 765 (6th Cir. 2001) (an actionable procedural violation of the IDEA requires proof of substantive harm); Tice v. Boutetort County Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200, 1209 (4th Cir. 1990) (de minimis procedural violations are not actionable where there is no harm); Evans v. District No. 17 of Douglas County. Neb., 841 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1988) there is no basis for relief based on procedural1 violations where there is no harm to the child).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' § 1983 Claim 1. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Once the party seeking summary judgment has informed the court of the basis for its motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary judgment would be inappropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1966); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993). In making its determination, the court must view all evidence and any factual inferences in the light most, favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 5 Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).
2. Discussion
Section 1983 creates a private cause of action for damages and injunctive relief against individuals and governmental bodies whose conduct under color of state law deprives a plaintiff of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Arnold v. Board of Educ. of Escambia County Alabama, 880 F.2d 305, 310 (11th Cir. 1989). To prove a § 1983 claim, the plaintiffs must show (1) a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.
The initial inquiry in a § 1983 claim is whether the plaintiffs have alleged a deprivation of rights secured under the United States Constitution. In their response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated Katherine's rights of due process and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment, as enforced by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that defendants Michael Martin (Auburn City Schools superintendent) and Michael Self (Auburn High School principal) failed to investigate the rape or to initiate disciplinary action against the rapist, and that they told Katherine's parents that she would not be safe at school and should. be home-schooled. The plaintiffs include Bobbie Umbach (Auburn City Schools Director of Special Education) as also having failed to investigate the rape. The plaintiffs further allege that Umbach gave Mr. and Mrs. S. incorrect and/or incomplete information about their rights and Katherine's potential eligibility under the IDEA, thus violating their rights under the IDEA. Finally, the plaintiffs apparently allege that the Auburn City Schools and school administrators allowed Katherine's ninth grade P.E. teacher to leave his P.E. class unattended repeatedly while students not enrolled in the class came in to bet sex on basketball, intimidate Katherine, and pull up Katherine's shirt. In support of this final claim, which was not specifically raised in the complaint, the plaintiffs present Katherine's deposition taken pursuant to this litigation in June 2001. The plaintiffs have not specified whether they are seeking damages or injunctive relief.
The court first considers the plaintiffs' claims against the individual school administrators, Umbach, Self, and Martin. When individual school administrators are sued in their official capacities, they are considered officers of the board of education. See Godby v. Montgomery County Board of Educ., 996 F. Supp. 1390, 1403 (M.D. Ala. 1998). Section 1983 [c]laims against officers in their official capacity are "functionally equivalent to claims against the entity that they represent" Id. (quoting Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991)). Thus, the plaintiffs' claims under § 1983 against both the Auburn City Schools and individual administrators in their official capacities are redundant. Umbach, Self, and Martin are therefore entitled to summary judgment in their favor as to all claims against them in their official capacities.
Second, the plaintiffs' claims against these defendants in their individual capacities also cannot succeed because the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. A two-step analysis is followed to determine whether public officials are entitled to qualified immunity.Sims. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 1992). First, the defendants must prove that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority at the time of the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Id. Once this is shown, the burden. shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the defendants' actions violated clearly established statutory or constitutional law. Id.; Busby v; City of Orlando, 931 F.2d at 773; Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989). Here, the parties do not dispute that Umbach, Self, and Martin were employees of the Auburn City Schools at all times relevant to this case, and that they were acting within their discretionary authority as public officials at all relevant times. Thus, the plaintiffs must show that the actions of Umbach, Self, and Martin violated clearly established statutory or constitutional law.
Here, the plaintiffs' allegations of constitutional violations must fail because Eleventh Circuit case law is well established that public educators and other government officials are protected from civil liability for violating a person's civil rights when there is no clearly established law in this circuit setting forth the specific rights that the plaintiffs allege were violated in a specific factual context. See Jenkins v. Talladega City Board of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 966, 118 S. Ct. 412 (1997); see also Lassiter v. Ala. A M University, 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), Hartley v. Parnesll, 193 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 1999). "For the law to be clearly established to the point that qualified immunity does not apply, the law must have earlier been developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant's place, that "what he is doings violates federal law." Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987)). The plaintiffs have offered no evidence to show that any of the individual defendants' actions caused Katherine to be deprived of her right to notice, a hearing, or any other procedural safeguards under her right of procedural due process, or her life, liberty, property, or other fundamental interest under her right of substantive due process. The plaintiffs make a bald statement that Katherine's equal protection rights were violated by the defendants' actions with no explanation of how her equal protection rights are implicated at all by the facts of this case. In the absence of any clearly established law under closely analogous facts, the plaintiffs cannot meet their burden for defeating the defendants' qualified immunity in this case.
The plaintiffs' claim that Umbach violated Katherine's rights under § 1983 by giving her parents incorrect and/or incomplete information about their rights and Katherine's potential eligibility under the IDEA fails on an additional ground. The Eleventh Circuit has held that a § 1983 action may not be maintained in addition to an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) cause of action if the only alleged deprivation is of the employee's rights created by the ADA. Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1997). In Holbrook, the employee's ADA claims were based on the same facts used to support his § 1983 claim. The court reasoned that since the ADA "provide[s] extensive, comprehensive remedial frameworks that address every aspect of the plaintiff's claims," allowing the plaintiff to sue both under the substantive statutes and § 1983 would give the plaintiff "two bites at the same apple." Id. at 1531. Here, the plaintiffs have similarly based their § 1983 claim on the same facts used to support their claim of a violation of the IDEA. Like the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the IDEA is a "substantive statute that set[s] forth detailed administrative avenues of redress." Id. at 1531. To allow the plaintiffs to maintain this duplicative action on the basis of alleged IDEA violations would similarly circumvent its detailed remedial framework. Thus, summary judgment will be granted as to the claims against Umbach and the Auburn City Schools for alleged violations under the IDEA.
The remaining claims under § 1983 are against the Auburn City Schools and/or school administrators in regard to the unsupervised P.E. class. The plaintiffs claim that the P.E. teacher's failure to supervise Katherine's P.E. class led to a deprivation of her equal protection rights. However, the only evidence cited by the plaintiffs for this claim is Katherine'se deposition, in which she also states that the deposition was the first time she had ever told anyone associated with the Auburn City Schools about the incident, and that no one would have been able to tell what had occurred between her and the other student when she returned to the gym after the incident occurred. Thus, the plaintiffs cannot show that either the Auburn City School district or any of the administrators knew about this incident.
The plaintiffs have also failed to allege any theory of equal protection that would withstand the defendants' claim of qualified immunity for discretionary actions that do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. The plaintiffs cite a Tenth Circuit case as legal authority for their claim, Armijo by and through Chavez v. Wagon Mound Public Schools, 159 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998), which held in part that school officials could be liable for a special education student's suicide after suspending him and driving him home where he was alone and unsupervised under a "danger creation" theory. The Tenth Circuit concluded that a "danger creation" theory could be sustained where the state actors had "culpable knowledge and conduct in affirmatively placing an individual in a position of danger, effectively stripping a person of her ability to defend herself, or cutting off potential sources of private aid." Id. at 1263. The plaintiffs have presented no evidence to show that the P.E. teacher's alleged failure to supervise his class rose to this level of malfeasance. At best, the plaintiffs have raised a negligence claim, which cannot withstand the qualified immunity defense applicable to the individual administrators.
An approriate judgment will be entered.
JUDGEMENT
In accordance with the memorandum opinion entered this date, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT and DECREE of the court as follows:
(1) The decision of the due-process hearing officer, dated May 25, 2000, and filed on July 16, 2001 (doc. no. 42), is affirmed.
(2) The motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Bobbie Umbach, Michael Self, Michael Martin, and Auburn City Schools on July 16, 2001 (doc. no. 42), is granted.
(3) Judgment is entered in favor of defendants Umbach, Self, Martin, and Auburn City Schools, and against plaintiffs Katherine S., Aina S., and Stewart S., with plaintiffs Katherine S., Aina S., and Stewart S. taking nothing by their complaint.
It is further ORDERED that costs are taxed against plaintiffs Katherine S., Aina S, and Stewart S., for which execution may issue.