Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-CV-00844-SEG
2022-08-29
J.C., as mother and legal guardian of I.R. (a minor), Plaintiff, v. I SHRI KHODIYAR, LLC d/b/a Americas Best Value Inn, Defendant.
Matthew B. Stoddard, Belle-Anne Cooper, The Stoddard Firm, Atlanta, GA, Janelle Zabresky, Lawson, Reid & Dean, Cordele, GA, for Plaintiff. Michael Austin Moretz, Galloway, Johnson, Thompk, Pensacola, FL, Tujuana S. McGee, Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith, PLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.
Matthew B. Stoddard, Belle-Anne Cooper, The Stoddard Firm, Atlanta, GA, Janelle Zabresky, Lawson, Reid & Dean, Cordele, GA, for Plaintiff. Michael Austin Moretz, Galloway, Johnson, Thompk, Pensacola, FL, Tujuana S. McGee, Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith, PLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant. ORDER SARAH E. GERAGHTY, United States District Judge
This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 14). Having carefully considered the parties' positions and the applicable law, the Court enters the following order.
I. Background
Plaintiff, proceeding anonymously as J.C., is the mother and legal guardian of I.R., a minor who was allegedly trafficked for sex at the Americas Best Value Inn in Decatur, Georgia. (Compl. ¶¶ 17, 29.) Defendant I Shri Khodiyar is an LLC that owns and manages the Americas Best Value Inn. (Id. ¶ 2.) As the owner and manager of the Americas Best Value Inn, Defendant is responsible for hotel operations and hiring and supervising all employees and managers at the hotel. (Id. ¶ 65.)
Plaintiff contends that her daughter I.R., a fifteen-year-old girl at the time, was trafficked for sex in the Americas Best Value Inn from July 2019 through September 2019, and again in November 2020. (Id. ¶ 29.) During these periods, I.R. allegedly shared rooms with her traffickers—an adult man in his 50s and an adult man in his 30s—and was forced to have sex for money. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 77.) Plaintiff asserts that I.R. was regularly drugged, beaten, and starved by her traffickers, leaving her visibly "bruised, emaciated, and disoriented." (Id. ¶ 35.) In addition, I.R. allegedly exhibited numerous well-known and visible signs, characteristics, and behaviors common to minor sex trafficking victims, including her age and appearance, "physical deterioration, poor hygiene, fatigue, sleep deprivation, . . . loitering, [and] soliciting male patrons." (Id. ¶ 67.) She lacked "control of or possession of money." (Id.) And she could be seen walking around the hotel common areas and approaches wearing little clothing, speaking with different adult men, and being escorted and monitored by her traffickers. (Id. ¶¶ 68, 77.)
Plaintiff alleges that people purchasing sex with I.R. would park their cars in the hotel parking lot, go to I.R.'s room, stay for twenty minutes, then return to the parking lot and leave. (Id. ¶ 68.) This pattern would produce "heavy foot traffic" in the hallway outside I.R.'s hotel room, where numerous men would loiter and wait "for their turn." (Id. ¶¶ 68, 77.) Plaintiff alleges that hotel employees frequently observed these men outside I.R.'s room through the hotel's surveillance cameras and would act as "lookouts" by warning I.R.'s traffickers that the foot traffic was likely to draw law enforcement attention. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 72.) Allegedly, I.R.'s traffickers forced her to also have sex with several male employees of the Americas Best Value Inn. (Id. ¶ 70.)
I.R.'s rooms at the Americas Best Value Inn purportedly contained large amounts of condoms, sex-related paraphernalia, and bodily fluids on the sheets and towels. (Id. ¶ 77.) Plaintiff alleges that I.R.'s traffickers would also request stacks of towels "multiple times per day," and hotel staff complied with those requests. (Id. ¶ 73.)
Plaintiff further alleges that in the years leading up to I.R.'s trafficking at the Americas Best Value Inn, police responded to hundreds of incidents occurring at the hotel, many of which involved prostitution, drug dealing, and drug use. (Id. ¶ 63.) Hotel staff would allegedly interact with law enforcement officers when they came onto the premises. (Id. ¶¶ 64, 86.) Also during the years leading up to I.R.'s trafficking, Defendant received and responded to multiple online reviews mentioning prostitution, drug dealing, and other crimes occurring at the hotel. (Id. ¶ 61.)
Plaintiff contends that I.R.'s traffickers would pay Defendant for their rooms—in cash—for one night at a time. (Id. ¶ 31.) Ultimately, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, which received revenue from room rentals, knew or should have known that I.R. was a victim of trafficking based on all of the circumstances alleged in the complaint.
II. Procedural History
On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed this suit on behalf of her daughter, I.R. Plaintiff alleges four causes of action: (1) violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA"); (2) violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("Georgia RICO Act"); (3) premises liability negligence; and (4) nuisance. (Doc. 1.) On April 7, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 14.) Plaintiff submitted a response (Doc. 16) to which Defendant replied (Doc. 19, 20.) The motion is now ripe for review.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(1) allows a minor's guardian to sue on the minor's behalf.
Although Plaintiff lists her nuisance claim as part of her negligence claim, Georgia courts consider nuisance liability to be distinct from negligence liability. See, e.g., Camelot Club Condo. Ass'n v. Afari-Opoku, 340 Ga. App. 618, 798 S.E.2d. 241 (2017). As such, the Court construes Plaintiff's nuisance claim as an independent cause of action. Defendant does not address Plaintiff's nuisance claim in its brief and has not moved to dismiss it. Thus, Plaintiff may proceed with her theory of nuisance liability against Defendant. See Jefferson Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[C]ourts exercise their inherent power to dismiss a suit that lacks merit only when the party who brought the case has been given notice and an opportunity to respond.").
III. Legal Standard
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court "accept[s] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[es] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Traylor v. P'ship Title Co., 491 F. App'x 988, 989 (11th Cir. 2012). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the pleading must contain more than "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Importantly, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). For a complaint to be "plausible on its face," the facts alleged must "allo[w] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Wooten v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 1187, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010). While all well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011), a court need not accept as true the plaintiff's legal conclusions, including those couched as factual allegations, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Accordingly, evaluation of a motion to dismiss entails a two-pronged approach: (1) a court must identify any allegations in the pleading that are merely legal conclusions to which the "assumption of truth" should not apply, and (2) where there are remaining well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should "assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
IV. Discussion
In its motion, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's TVPRA, Georgia RICO, and negligence claims fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed. The Court addresses these claims in turn.
A. TVPRA Claim
The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA") offers a civil remedy to people who have experienced certain types of human trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The statute states in part:
(a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
Under the TVPRA, therefore, a victim of sex trafficking may bring either (a) a direct civil claim against the perpetrator of her trafficking or (b) a "beneficiary" civil claim against "whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of [the TVPRA]." 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). In this case, Plaintiff is not suing the perpetrator of I.R.'s trafficking; instead, she seeks to establish beneficiary liability on I Shri Khodiyar, a business that she claims knowingly benefited from sex trafficking.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714 (11th Cir. 2021), articulated the elements of a TVPRA beneficiary claim. To state a claim for beneficiary liability under the TVPRA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant:
(1) knowingly benefited, (2) from taking part in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit, (3) that undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff, and (4) the defendant had constructive or actual knowledge that the undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff.
Id. at 726.
In order for Plaintiff's TVPRA beneficiary claim to survive Defendant's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must plausibly allege facts sufficient to satisfy each of these four elements. For the following reasons, the Court finds that J.C.'s complaint does so.
1. Element One: "Knowingly Benefited"
To satisfy the first element of a TVPRA beneficiary claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant "knew it was receiving some value from participating in the alleged venture." Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 724. Here, Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Defendant, the owner and manager of the Americas Best Value Inn, knowingly collected revenue from the rental of the rooms in which I.R. was trafficked for sex. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 12, 32.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that I.R.'s alleged traffickers paid cash to rent rooms at the Americas Best Value Inn for the purpose of sex trafficking from July 2019 to September 2019, and again in November 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 29-32.) Several district courts, including this one, have found that the rental of a room in exchange for money constitutes a financial benefit from a relationship with the trafficker sufficient to meet this element of the § 1595(a) standard. A.G. v. Northbrook Indus., Inc., 1:20-CV-05231-JPB, 2022 WL 1644921, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 24, 2022); G.W. v. Northbrook Indus., Inc., 1:20-CV-05232-JPB, 2022 WL 1644923, at *2 (N.D. Ga. May 24, 2022); M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp.3d 959, 965 (S.D. Ohio 2019); S.Y. v. Naples Hotel Co., 476 F. Supp.3d 1251, 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (collecting cases). The Court agrees that such an allegation is sufficient to satisfy this element. Therefore, Plaintiff plausibly alleges the first element of her TVPRA beneficiary claim.
2. Element Two: Participation in a Venture
Next, Plaintiff must allege that Defendant "participat[ed] in a venture" under circumstances that would violate the TVPRA. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). In the context of a civil suit, the Eleventh Circuit has defined "participation in a venture" as "t[aking] part in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit." Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 725. Unlike in the criminal provisions of the TVPRA, there is no scienter requirement for civil TVPRA beneficiary claims. Id. at 724.
To determine what conduct does and does not reach the level of "participation in a venture," the Court looks to the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Red Roof Inns. In that case, the plaintiffs were sex trafficking victims who sued the franchisors of the hotels at which they were trafficked. Id. at 719. To attempt to show that the franchisors participated in a sex trafficking venture with the plaintiffs' sex traffickers, the plaintiffs alleged that the franchisors received revenue from renting rooms to the sex traffickers, oversaw operations and hotel policies, controlled the training of managers, and "took remedial action when revenue was down." Id. at 726-27. The only allegations the plaintiffs made as to the franchisors' knowledge or participation in the sex trafficking venture were that "the franchisors sent inspectors to the hotels who would have seen signs of sex trafficking" and the franchisors "received reviews mentioning sex work occurring at the hotels." Id. at 727. The Eleventh Circuit deemed these allegations to be insufficient to establish the franchisors' participation in a common undertaking or enterprise with the plaintiffs' sex traffickers, stating that "observing something is not the same as participating in it." Id.
Although the plaintiffs in Red Roof Inns failed to allege facts that satisfied the second element of a TVPRA beneficiary claim, the Eleventh Circuit in that case provided insight into the kind of conduct that, if alleged, would pass muster under the TVPRA. For example, the court endorsed the holding in Ricchio v. McLean, 853 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017), a First Circuit case in which a sex trafficking victim's suit against the operators of the hotel where she was held hostage and sexually abused survived a motion to dismiss. In Ricchio, the First Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had adequately alleged the hotel operators' association with a sex trafficking venture in part because the plaintiff's abuser "had prior commercial dealings with the [operators], which the parties wished to reinstate for profit." Id. at 555. Further, the Ricchio plaintiff alleged that, by renting a room to her abuser, the hotel operators were "associating with him in an effort to force [the plaintiff] to serve their business objective." Id. The Eleventh Circuit in Red Roof Inns determined that "these kinds of allegations would establish a hotel operator's participation in a venture with a sex trafficker." 21 F.4th at 725-26.
This Court additionally finds persuasive the concurring opinion in Red Roof Inns, in which Judge Jordan drew a distinction between a franchisor and a hotel operator in the context of a TVPRA case. Id. at 729-30. Specifically, the concurring opinion underscored that the Eleventh Circuit's "opinion addresses the plaintiffs' TVPRA 'beneficiary' claims against franchisors, which do not operate or manage the hotels at which sex trafficking allegedly occurred." Id. at 729. But, "similar claims against those who own, operate, or manage the hotels in question . . . would withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Id.
Courts in other districts have similarly grappled with the question of what conduct constitutes a defendant's participation in a venture under § 1595(a). In reviewing these cases, the factor that appears to differentiate plaintiffs who adequately state TVPRA beneficiary claims from those who do not is that the successful plaintiffs "connect the dots" between the plaintiff's traffickers and the specific defendant in the case. See, e.g., G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., No. 20-cv-02335, 603 F.Supp.3d 626, 643-45 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2022); B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 20-cv-00656-BLF, 2020 WL 4368214, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2020). One way to connect the dots is to allege a "continuous business relationship" between a defendant hotel and a sex trafficker where the defendant rented rooms to people it knew or should have known were engaged in sex trafficking. See Northbrook, 2022 WL 1644921, at *3 (finding such conduct sufficient to show participation in a venture); S.Y. v. Best Western Int'l, Inc., 2:20-cv-616-JES-MRM, 2021 WL 2315073, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2021) (same); M.A., 425 F. Supp.3d at 971 (same); H.H. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-755, 2019 WL 6682152, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2019) (same); Ricchio, 853 F.3d at 555 (looking to "prior commercial dealings . . . which the parties wished to reinstate for profit" as evidence of the hotel defendant's participation in a venture).
Here, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Defendant's participation in a venture with the persons who were engaged in trafficking I.R. for sex. Unlike in Red Roof Inns (which involved defendant hotel franchisors), Plaintiff brings her TVPRA beneficiary claim against the operator of the hotel in which I.R. was allegedly trafficked—an operator that was closely involved with the daily management of the hotel and allegedly did far more than simply receive revenue and reviews mentioning sex work. (See Compl. ¶ 65.)
In support of the "continuous business relationship" theory, Plaintiff specifically asserts that: I.R. exhibited obvious signs, characteristics, and behaviors of a minor victim of sex trafficking such as "inappropriate" appearance, physical deterioration, poor hygiene, fatigue, sleep deprivation, injuries, loitering, and soliciting male patrons (Id. ¶ 67); I.R. could often be seen walking around the hotel's common areas and approaches while wearing "little clothing" and talking to various adult men (Id. ¶ 68); I.R. (a fifteen-year-old girl) shared hotel rooms for weeks at a time with her traffickers (an adult man in his 50s and an adult man in his 30s) that contained large amounts of condoms, sex-related paraphernalia, and bodily fluids on the sheets and towels (Id. ¶ 77); I.R.'s traffickers would escort and monitor her throughout the hotel, including in common areas (Id. ¶¶ 4, 77); hotel employees observed heavy foot traffic outside of I.R.'s room through surveillance cameras; numerous men would park in the hotel parking lot, go to I.R.'s room for twenty minutes, then leave, while other men "loitered in the hallway outside I.R.'s room waiting for 'their turn' " (Id. ¶ 77); and I.R.'s traffickers requested stacks of towels multiple times per day (Id. ¶ 73). Significantly, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant "aided" the sex trafficking operation by "acting as a lookout" for I.R.'s traffickers. (Id. ¶ 7.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that her daughter was forced to have sex with Defendant's employees. (Id. ¶ 70.) These last allegations, if true, put Defendant and/or its employees at risk of criminal prosecution. In sum, the combined allegations, in conjunction with Defendant's alleged decision to continually renew its business relationship with I.R.'s traffickers each day (and for two distinct periods of time separated by 14 months), are sufficient to establish Defendant's participation in a venture at this early stage of the case.
Defendant contends that if we accept Plaintiff's position as to the alleged joint venture, then "any hotel, restaurant, clothing store or gas station that a trafficker patronized with a victim would be participating in a sex trafficking venture." (Doc. 20 at 6.) The Court cannot credit this slippery-slope argument. First, Plaintiff is alleging not just that she and her trafficker "patronized" Defendant's hotel, but rather that the sex trafficking venture was stationed at and operating openly on Defendant's premises with Defendant's knowledge. Such a direct connection between entity and sex trafficking would be less likely to occur in the context of restaurants, clothing stores, and gas stations. Second, Plaintiff's claim here is not simply that Defendant is liable because she was trafficked at Defendant's hotel. Rather, as discussed herein, there are a constellation of accompanying circumstances pled in the complaint that flesh out her TVPRA claim.
The foregoing allegations, which are indicative of Defendant's alleged common undertaking with I.R.'s sex traffickers, distinguish this case from a recent case in this district in which a plaintiff failed to state a TVPRA beneficiary claim. In A.B. v. H.K. Grp. of Co., 1:21-cv-1344-TCB, 2022 WL 467786 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2022), a plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a hotel owner/manager's participation in a sex trafficking venture. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants observed the plaintiff's physical appearance and the condition of her room, and that by failing to assist her or alert authorities, the defendants participated in a sex trafficking venture. 2022 WL 467786, at *4. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's TVPRA claim, finding that, at most, plaintiff alleged "[d]efendants observed and/or had actual or constructive knowledge of the illegality of sex trafficking allegedly occurring in its hotels." Id. Here, by contrast, Plaintiff's allegations—including those set forth above, see infra at 1317-18—go far beyond mere observation of potential sex trafficking.
See also C.C. v. H.K. Grp. of Co., 1:21-cv-1345-TCB, 2022 WL 467813 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2022), a companion case to A.B. in which the Court reached the same conclusion based on facts identical to those alleged in A.B.
Because Plaintiff asserts specific facts as to Defendant taking part in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit with I.R.'s sex traffickers, she has plausibly alleged the second element of her TVPRA claim.
3. Element Three: The Venture Violated the TVPRA as to Plaintiff
To satisfy the third element, the plaintiff must allege that "the venture in which the defendant participated and from which it knowingly benefited must have violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff." Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 725. The TVPRA criminalizes various acts of human trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1591. In this case, Plaintiff specifically alleges that I.R. was trafficked in violation of § 1591(a), which makes it a crime to "caus[e]" a person under 18 years old to "engage in a commercial sex act." (Compl. ¶ 84); 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Consequently, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that the venture in which Defendant participated caused I.R. to engage in a commercial sex act. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); Northbrook, 2022 WL 1644921, at *3.
The Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to show that the venture alleged in the complaint violated the TVPRA as to I.R. Plaintiff alleges, and Defendant does not dispute, that I.R. was sex trafficked as a minor and was caused to engage in commercial sex acts with several adult men at Defendant's hotel in 2019 and 2020. (Compl. ¶ 4.) As a result, Plaintiff has satisfied the third element of her TVPRA beneficiary claim. See Northbrook, 2022 WL 1644921, at *3 (finding similar allegations sufficient to satisfy the third TVPRA element).
4. Element Four: Defendant Knew or Should Have Known the Venture Violated the TVPRA as to I.R.
The final element of a TVPRA beneficiary claim comes from the statutory requirement that the defendant "knew or should have known [that the venture] has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). This element requires the plaintiff to allege that the defendant had either actual or constructive knowledge that the venture violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff. Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 725. Knowledge is defined as "a[n] awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance." Id. (quoting Knowledge, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). Constructive knowledge, on the other hand, is "that knowledge which 'one using reasonable care or diligence should have.' " Id. (quoting Constructive Knowledge, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). Thus, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that Defendant had at least constructive knowledge that the venture in which it participated and from which it benefited violated the TVPRA as to I.R. Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of I.R.'s sex trafficking at the Americas Best Value Inn. In Plaintiff's complaint, she alleges that Defendant knew or should have known about the sex trafficking venture involving I.R. based on the following: "[I.R.'s] age and inappropriate appearance, physical deterioration, poor hygiene, fatigue, sleep deprivation, no control of or possession of money, loitering, soliciting male patrons, and heavy foot traffic outside her hotel room." (Compl. ¶ 67.) Also relevant to this element are Plaintiff's allegations that a "daily parade" of men would park in the hotel parking lot, go to I.R.'s hotel room for twenty minutes, and then leave (Id. ¶ 68); men would loiter in the hallway outside I.R.'s room, in view of hotel surveillance cameras, while they waited for "their turn" (Id. ¶¶ 72, 77); law enforcement responded to many incidents of alleged prostitution at the Americas Best Value Inn and generated police reports for those incidents (Id. ¶ 63); I.R. walked around hotel common areas while "scantily clad" and "visibly bruised, emaciated and disoriented" and escorted various men to her room (Id. ¶¶ 35, 77); and when several male hotel employees went to I.R.'s room, her trafficker forced her to have sex with them (Id. ¶ 70). Courts considering similar allegations have found them sufficient to infer at this early stage of the case that a defendant knew or should have known of the sex trafficking venture, and this Court finds these allegations sufficient as well. Northbrook, 2022 WL 1644921, at *4; Naples Hotel, 476 F. Supp.3d at 1257 (collecting cases).
The allegation that Defendant's employees engaged in sex with I.R., when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, suggests that the sex trafficking venture was not entirely covert.
As explained in the preceding paragraphs, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to support each element of her TVPRA beneficiary claim.
B. Georgia RICO Claim
Plaintiff's complaint asserts claims against Defendant for alleged violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("Georgia RICO Act"), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant is liable for (1) a substantive Georgia RICO Act violation and (2) a conspiracy under the Georgia RICO Act.
1. Substantive Georgia RICO Act Claim
Under the Georgia RICO Act, it is "unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity or proceeds derived therefrom, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise, real property, or personal property of any nature, including money." O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a). The Act provides a civil cause of action to "[a]ny person who is injured by reason of any violation of [O.C.G.A. §] 16-14-4" against the violator. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c); Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 728.
A "racketeering activity," also known as a "predicate act," is "the commission, attempted commission, solicitation, coercion, or intimidation of another 'to commit any crime which is chargeable by indictment under' " one of forty-one enumerated categories of offenses. Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 728 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(5)(A)).
A "pattern of racketeering activity" means "[e]ngaging in at least two acts of racketeering activity in furtherance of one or more incidents, schemes, or transactions that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics." O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(4)(A); Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 728. In other words, to state a claim under the Georgia RICO Act, the plaintiff must allege facts showing "that the defendant committed predicate offenses . . . at least twice." Cobb Cnty. v. Jones Grp., P.L.C., 218 Ga.App. 149, 460 S.E.2d 516, 521 (1995). To constitute a "pattern," the defendant's acts "must be linked, but distinguishable enough to not be merely 'two sides of the same coin.' " McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 817 F.3d 1241, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, "a single extended transaction cannot provide the basis for a Georgia RICO claim." Shea v. Best Buy Homes, LLC, 533 F. Supp.3d 1321, 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2021).
Unlike federal civil RICO, "the Georgia RICO statute does not require proof of an 'enterprise.' " Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d 1277, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). Rather, to establish liability, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to show only that the defendant, through a pattern of racketeering activity or proceeds derived therefrom, acquired or maintained any "real property or personal property of any nature, including money." Cobb Cnty., 460 S.E.2d at 520-21 (citing Dover v. State, 192 Ga.App. 429, 385 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1989)).
Moreover, to state a civil claim based upon a violation of the Georgia RICO Act, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the defendant violated the Georgia RICO Act; (2) as a result of this conduct, the plaintiff has suffered an injury; and (3) the defendant's violation of the Georgia RICO Act was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Wylie v. Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 746 S.E.2d 689, 693 (2013).
Here, Plaintiff alleges as the bases for her Georgia RICO claim the predicate offenses of keeping a place of prostitution under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-10 and pimping under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-11(5). Both offenses are enumerated "racketeering activities" under O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(5)(A)(vii).
a. Keeping a Place of Prostitution
O.C.G.A. § 16-6-10 provides: "A person having or exercising control over the use of any place or conveyance which would offer seclusion or shelter for the practice of prostitution commits the offense of keeping a place of prostitution when he knowingly grants or permits the use of such place for the purpose of prostitution." "Prostitution" is defined as when a person "performs or offers or consents to perform a sexual act . . . for money or other items of value." O.C.G.A. § 16-6-9.
A person must be "18 years of age or older" to be convicted of prostitution, but that age restriction does not apply in the context of keeping a place of prostitution or pimping. See O.C.G.A. § 16-6-13(b)(2); Clemmons v. State, 361 Ga.App. 666, 865 S.E.2d 274, 281 n.9 (2021).
To keep a place of prostitution under Georgia law, one must have actual knowledge of prostitution occurring on one's premises. See Ahn v. State, 279 Ga. App. 501, 631 S.E.2d 711, 712-13 (2006) (affirming a spa owner's conviction for keeping a place of prostitution where she was "keenly aware" of prostitution taking place on site). Liability will not attach where there is knowledge only of a place's general reputation for housing prostitution. Birdwell v. State, 112 Ga.App. 836, 146 S.E.2d 374, 376 (1965).
In Red Roof Inns, the Eleventh Circuit considered and rejected a Georgia RICO claim in an analogous case, where the plaintiffs alleged that hotel franchisors engaged in the predicate offense of keeping a place of prostitution at their franchised hotels. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs' Georgia RICO claims, since the complaint "contained no more than a threadbare recital of the elements of the crimes supported by conclusory allegations." Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 728.
Here, unlike in Red Roof Inns, Plaintiff has adequately alleged Defendant engaged in a racketeering activity by keeping a place of prostitution. Taken as true, the allegations described above in discussing the TVPRA claim (see infra at 1317-18) establish that Defendant knew or should have known that sex trafficking involving I.R. was occurring at the Americas Best Value Inn. These same allegations are relevant to the Court's Georgia RICO analysis. See S.Y. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 519 F. Supp.3d 1069, 1087 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (referring to court's TVPRA analysis in its analysis of Florida state law RICO Act, which, like the Georgia RICO Act, is largely based on the federal RICO statute). Particularly significant for the RICO analysis is Plaintiff's contention that Defendant generated profits by continuing to renew its business relationship with I.R.'s traffickers while its employees frequently observed, acted as a "lookout" for, and sometimes participated in, apparent sex trafficking and prostitution occurring on its premises. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-32, 70, 86.) Also notable is Plaintiff's contention that Defendant knew of "law enforcement activity" at the hotel "reporting widespread prostitution" and that police responded to hundreds of incidents occurring at the hotel, many of which involved prostitution. (Id. ¶ 63.) In view of the Court's discussion above of Defendant's alleged knowledge, and Rule 9(b)'s "general" standard for pleading a defendant's knowledge, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient at this stage to demonstrate that Defendant knowingly permitted the Americas Best Value Inn to be used for the purpose of prostitution.
Further, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Defendant engaged in a "pattern" of keeping a place of prostitution. Plaintiff alleges I.R. was forced to engage in prostitution at the Americas Best Value Inn from July 2019 through September 2019 by one trafficker, and then again in November 2020 by another trafficker. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff further alleges that in November 2020, one of I.R.'s traffickers was also sex trafficking another young female victim at the same hotel. (Id. ¶ 40.) And the online reviews and police reports to which Plaintiff cites in her complaint allegedly describe several other instances of prostitution taking place at the Americas Best Value Inn. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 63.) The number of persons involved in these incidents of alleged prostitution, and the temporal range across which they allegedly occurred, means that Plaintiff's Georgia RICO claim is based on more than just a "single extended transaction." As such, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendant committed the predicate offense of keeping a place of prostitution, "at least twice." See Wyndham Hotels, 519 F. Supp.3d at 1087 (finding sex trafficking victim plausibly alleged two or more predicate acts in state law RICO claim where she alleged sex trafficking occurred "repeatedly" on defendant hotel's premises over a period of three years).
Having found that Plaintiff plausibly alleged a violation of the Georgia RICO Act, we now turn to the issue of causation. To satisfy the proximate cause element of a Georgia RICO claim, a plaintiff must show that her injury "flowed directly" from a predicate act. Najarian Capital, LLC v. Clark, 357 Ga.App. 685, 849 S.E.2d 262, 270 (2020). "This burden is not met where a plaintiff shows merely that his injury was an eventual consequence of the predicate act or that he would not have been injured but for the predicate act." Id. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a Georgia RICO claim "must allege more than that an act of racketeering occurred and that she was injured," and instead "must show that her injury was the direct result of a predicate act targeted toward her, such that she was the intended victim." Wylie, 746 S.E.2d at 694 (citations omitted). Notably, it is also insufficient to allege only that an injury was a "reasonably foreseeable" result of a RICO violation. Gentry v. Volkswagen of Am., 238 Ga.App. 785, 521 S.E.2d 13, 19 (1999).
Here, Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Defendant's RICO violations "involved transactions affecting I.R." and that I.R.'s injuries "flow directly from the pattern of racketeering violations committed by Defendant." (Compl. ¶ 103.) She further contends that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge—not just of prostitution at the hotel in general—but of I.R.'s individual victimization. (Id. ¶ 65.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's employees acted as lookouts for I.R.'s traffickers, thus facilitating the provision of "seclusion or shelter" for the practice of prostitution at its hotel. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-10; (Id. ¶ 72.) The complaint even alleges that Defendant's employees themselves engaged in commercial sexual activity with I.R. (Compl. ¶ 70.) As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's involvement in keeping a place of prostitution, Plaintiff allegedly experienced emotional and physical injury. (Id. ¶ 104.) Taking the foregoing allegations in combination and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, I.R. has plausibly alleged that her injuries were a direct result of Defendant's predicate acts. Even considering the exacting nature of the proximate cause standard under Georgia RICO law, the foregoing allegations, if true, are sufficient to show that I.R. was an "intended victim" of the Defendant's predicate acts. As a result, Plaintiff has stated a claim under the Georgia RICO Act based on the predicate act of keeping a place of prostitution.
b. Pimping
Plaintiff argues Defendant also committed the predicate offense of pimping. Specifically, Plaintiff contends Defendant engaged in pimping by "receiving proceeds and profits derived from prostitution by aiding and abetting I.R.'s traffickers and their associates in the commission of I.R.'s traffickers' plan to force others into commercial sex acts." (Compl. ¶ 97) (emphasis added). The provision of the Georgia pimping statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-6-11, that deals with "aiding and abetting" states that pimping occurs when a person "[a]ids or abets, counsels, or commands another in the commission of prostitution or aids or assists in prostitution where the proceeds or profits derived therefrom are to be divided on a pro rata basis." O.C.G.A. § 16-6-11(5). One of the few cases that directly applies this provision is Prescott v. State, 357 Ga.App. 375, 850 S.E.2d 812 (2020). In that case, a defendant's conviction for "pimping by aiding and abetting" was affirmed where he created advertisements for the victim's sexual services, "provid[ed] her with clothing and a location for those services, and us[ed] the victim's telephone to arrange customers for those services." 850 S.E.2d at 820. And in a similar case, Creighton v. State, 327 Ga. App. 825, 761 S.E.2d 373 (2014), a defendant's conviction for pimping was upheld when he "took pictures of [the victim] which she used to place advertisements seeking persons interested in sex for money," allowed the victim to use his phone "to take calls responding to the advertisements," and rented the motel room in which the victim would meet persons who responded to the advertisements. 761 S.E.2d at 376. Another example of conduct that is "arguably . . . a violation of the pimping by aiding and abetting provision of § 16-6-11(5) is when one "instruct[s] a person to commit prostitution and receiv[es] money therefrom knowing that it was earned from prostitution." Burroughs v. State, 292 Ga.App. 580, 665 S.E.2d 4, 6 (Ga. App. 2008).
Aside from these cases, there is a dearth of authority dealing specifically with the pimping by aiding and abetting provision on which Plaintiff relies, and Plaintiff does not cite to a single case in the portion of her brief that addresses pimping. The cases that do discuss this provision, either explicitly or implicitly, reveal a common theme: they each involve a direct association between the defendant and the person committing the commercial sex acts. In the case at hand, by contrast, Plaintiff does not allege Defendant's direct association with I.R. As already discussed, Plaintiff's complaint is replete with allegations demonstrating Defendant's contacts and participation in a common venture with I.R.'s traffickers. However, unlike the criminal defendants in Prescott, Creighton, and Burroughs, Defendant did not engage directly with I.R. in a manner that aided and abetted the commission of her commercial sex acts. There is no allegation, for example, that Defendant advertised I.R.'s services or arranged "customers." The Court is unwilling to extend the application of Georgia's pimping statute in the novel way Plaintiff advocates, especially in the absence of any supporting case law. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the predicate offense of pimping.
2. Georgia RICO Act Conspiracy Claim
Plaintiff brings a Georgia RICO conspiracy claim against Defendant. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(c) makes it illegal "for any person to conspire or endeavor to violate" Section 16-14-4(a) of the Georgia RICO Act. Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 728. To violate Section 16-14-4(c), one must "knowingly and willfully join a conspiracy which itself contains a common plan or purpose to commit two or more predicate acts." Wylie, 746 S.E.2d at 693. An agreement to join a conspiracy "need not be express, nor does it require a 'meeting of the minds' to the same degree necessary to form a contract," but there must at least be "a tacit mutual understanding between persons to pursue a common criminal objective." Frazier v. State, 349 Ga.App. 507, 826 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2019) (quoting Griffin v. State, 294 Ga. 325, 751 S.E.2d 773, 775 (2013)). The "essence of conspiracy" is "a common design, and conduct which discloses a common design." Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 482 S.E.2d 299, 309 (1997). As is the case with her substantive Georgia RICO claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendant's conspiracy to violate Georgia RICO was the proximate cause of I.R.'s injuries. Wylie, 746 S.E.2d at 693.
Plaintiff's theory of her conspiracy claim is that Defendant conspired with I.R.'s sex traffickers and buyers in the commission of a Georgia RICO violation—namely, keeping a place of prostitution. The allegations described in the Court's TVPRA analysis above, which show that Defendant participated in a sex trafficking "venture" with I.R.'s traffickers, are relevant here to show a "tacit mutual understanding" between Defendant and I.R.'s traffickers to pursue a "common criminal objective." (See infra at 1317-18.) The allegations discussed above, collectively, show that Defendant and I.R.'s traffickers had a tacit mutual understanding that I.R.'s traffickers would pay Defendant several months' worth of room rental fees in exchange for Defendant knowingly providing seclusion and shelter for the prostitution venture. And viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the allegation that Defendant's employees served as "lookouts" for I.R.'s traffickers to help facilitate the prostitution scheme is particularly probative of a common conspiracy. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 281 Ga.App. 523, 636 S.E.2d 709, 711-12 (2006) (finding sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to commit robbery where defendant, inter alia, "acted as a 'lookout' by 'watching out' over the apartment's occupants and 'looking out for people coming in' "); see also United States v. Morley, 353 F. App'x 256, 264-65 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding sufficient evidence of conspiracy to import marijuana where defendant "acted as a lookout" for co-conspirators who were offloading marijuana). Accepted as true, these allegations demonstrate Defendant's participation in a conspiracy to keep a place of prostitution.
The Court notes that although I.R.'s traffickers, as mere hotel guests, could not commit the substantive offense of keeping a place of prostitution, this does not mean they could not conspire with Defendant to do so. Indeed, a person may participate in a criminal conspiracy "even though he [is] incapable of committing the substantive offense." Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 64, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997); see also S. Intermodal Logistics v. D.J. Powers Co., 10 F. Supp.2d 1337, 1361 (S.D. Ga. 1998) ("[E]ven if he did not agree to commit each and every part of the substantive offense, . . . those who provide support for a RICO scheme are as guilty as the perpetrators").
Further, just as Plaintiff has sufficiently pled her injury was the proximate cause of Defendant's alleged substantive Georgia RICO violation, she has done the same with respect to Defendant's alleged conspiracy to violate the Georgia RICO Act. Specifically, Defendant's acts, such as serving as lookout for I.R.'s traffickers and providing a locale for the commission of I.R.'s trafficking, targeted I.R. such that she was the intended victim of the RICO conspiracy. Thus, because Plaintiff adequately pled Defendant's participation in a conspiracy to violate the Georgia RICO Act, and that the conspiracy proximately caused her injuries, Plaintiff has stated a Georgia RICO Act conspiracy claim.
The parties have not addressed the fact that Georgia law does not permit Plaintiff to prevail on both her substantive RICO claim and RICO conspiracy claim. See Ferguson v. State, 335 Ga.App. 862, 783 S.E.2d 380, 387 (2016) ("[A] person may not be convicted of both conspiracy to commit a crime and the completed crime") (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-4-8.1). Nevertheless, at the pleading stage of the case, Plaintiff may "state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of consistency." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(3); see Smith v. Haynes & Haynes P.C., 940 F.3d 635, 647 (11th Cir. 2019) ("[W]e explicitly permit litigants to assert inconsistent positions when pleading their case.").
3. Vicarious Liability
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to impute the acts of Defendant's employees upon Defendant for her Georgia RICO claim, she must establish Defendant's vicarious liability. Because the Georgia RICO Act is directed at "organized criminal elements," the Supreme Court of Georgia has found it "more appropriate to assess vicarious liability under [the statute] in accordance with liability for criminal acts." Clark v. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 270 Ga. 165, 509 S.E.2d 602, 604-05 (1998) (disapproved in part on other grounds by Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 280 Ga. 631, 632 S.E.2d 376 (2006)) (emphasis added). An employer may be vicariously liable for the criminal acts of an employee in a civil Georgia RICO case where "the employer's board of directors or managerial official, acting within the scope that person's employment, authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated the employee's acts." Duvall v. Cronic, 347 Ga.App. 763, 820 S.E.2d 780, 790 (2018) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a)(2)).
Under the law of this Circuit, the issue of criminal vicarious liability is typically not appropriate for adjudication at the pleading stage. The Eleventh Circuit has held that, when considering a defendant's alleged vicarious liability under the Georgia RICO Act, "[w]hether the acts were performed at the request, command, or authorization of the board of directors or other managers is a question of proof at trial, not a sufficiency-of-the-pleading issue." Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 411 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. dismissed, vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 516, 126 S.Ct. 2016, 164 L.Ed.2d 776 (2006); see State v. Military Circle Pet Ctr. No. 94, Inc., 257 Ga. 388, 360 S.E.2d 248, 249 (1987) ("Although the state must prove the applicable provisions of [§ 16-2-22(a)(2)] at trial against a criminal defendant, it is not necessary that the state allege these provisions in the accusation.")
Plaintiff contends that she has sufficiently alleged vicarious liability because her complaint makes allegations "that Defendant's managerial agents recklessly tolerated the conduct [of Defendant's employees] by continually allowing room rentals to suspected traffickers and failing to do anything to remedy the prostitution and sex trafficking den that Defendant was running." (Doc. 16 at 19 n.4.) The Court agrees that Plaintiff's complaint makes such allegations. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 31, 77, 78, 86.) And the "conduct" referred to above includes allegations that Defendant's employees were "look outs" for the prostitution venture and engaged in commercial sex with I.R. In light of these allegations, and the general rule that criminal vicarious liability is "not a sufficiency-of-the-pleading issue," the Court finds that the issue of vicarious liability does not act as a bar to Plaintiff's Georgia RICO claim at this early stage of the case.
In summary, Plaintiff has met her burden in adequately pleading a claim under the Georgia RICO Act based on Defendant's alleged keeping a place of prostitution and conspiracy to violate the Georgia RICO Act. This conclusion is warranted by the well-pleaded facts alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, which the Court must accept as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Whether Plaintiff will be able to support her claims with evidence at the summary judgment stage is, of course, another matter entirely.
C. Negligence Claim
Plaintiff brings a negligence claim against Defendant, alleging that I.R. was an invitee on Defendant's premises, and Defendant breached its duty to her by failing to exercise reasonable care under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff's negligence claim on two grounds: (1) Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege I.R.'s status as an invitee on Defendant's premises, and (2) I.R.'s injuries were caused by intervening criminal acts of third parties thus insulating Defendant from liability.
1. Whether Plaintiff was an Invitee on Defendant's Premises
With respect to Defendant's invitee argument, the Court finds at this preliminary stage of the litigation that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged I.R.'s status as an invitee on Defendant's premises. The duty of an owner or occupier of land to invitees on its premises is prescribed by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 which states as follows:
Duty of owner or occupier of land to invitee. Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.
The test to determine whether one is an invitee is "whether the party coming onto the business premises had present business relations with the owner or occupier which would render his presence of mutual benefit to both, or whether his presence was for his own convenience, or was for business with one other than the owner or occupier." Freeman v. Eichholz, 308 Ga.App. 18, 705 S.E.2d 919, 923 (2011).
The facts in this case as averred in Plaintiff's complaint do not make for a straightforward determination of I.R.'s status on Defendant's premises. See A.B., 2022 WL 467786, at *5. Plaintiff alleges that, although I.R.'s traffickers were the ones who rented the rooms in which she stayed, Defendant owed I.R. a duty as an invitee on its premises. (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 107.) There is no question that one who rents a hotel room is an invitee on the hotel's premises. See, e.g., Briddle v. Cornerstone Lodge of Am., LLC, 288 Ga.App. 353, 654 S.E.2d 188, 189 (2007). However, Georgia law appears at best unsettled as to whether a hotel invitee's guest is an invitee, licensee, or something else. This classification is of paramount importance because it dictates the scope of the duty owed to the guest. See Martin v. Six Flags Over Ga. II, L.P., 301 Ga. 323, 801 S.E.2d 24, 29 (2017).
The Court observes that in most circumstances, an invitee's guest stands in the invitee's shoes and is herself an invitee. See 43A C.J.S. Inns, Hotels, and Eating Places § 47 (2021) ("Persons who respond to an invitation, either express or implied, to visit or call on registered guests of an inn at proper times are invitees . . . ."); Anderson v. Cooper, 214 Ga. 164, 104 S.E.2d 90 (1958) (holding that parent-customer's infant child was an invitee because the parent would not have been present at the business if she could not bring her child—thus the business owner benefitted from the child's presence); Cham v. ECI Mgmt. Corp., 311 Ga. 170, 856 S.E.2d 267, 279 (2021) (Peterson, J., dissenting) (noting that similar to Anderson, where it was " 'obvious' that a store owner would receive a benefit from permitting an invitee's guest to be present," in the case under consideration, "when renters are allowed to host guests, the guests are thus implicitly invited by the landlord"); Ortner v. Linch, 128 So.2d 152, 153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) ("a guest of a guest in the hotel" has "the status of . . . an invitee." (citing Steinberg v. Irwin Operating Co., 90 So.2d 460, 461 (Fla. 1956))); Corinaldi v. Columbia Courtyard, Inc., 162 Md.App. 207, 873 A.2d 483, 491 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) ("Generally, a property owner owes the same duty to the guest of an invitee as it owes to the invitee himself."); Mackey v. Allen, 396 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Ky. 1965) ("[B]ecause her visit to the premises was 'for the convenience or arose out of the necessities' of another person who definitely was in the [business] for purposes of the possessor's business," "a business invitee's guest is also an invitee.").
Considering Georgia law and the settled law of other jurisdictions, the Court holds that at this preliminary stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that I.R.—as the guest of an invitee—was herself an invitee.
2. Whether Intervening Criminal Acts Insulate Defendant from Liability
"The general rule regarding premises liability is that a landlord does not insure tenants' safety against third-party criminal attacks." Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 267 Ga. 785, 482 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1997). However, "[i]f there is reason to anticipate some criminal conduct, the landowner must exercise ordinary care to protect its invitees from injuries caused by such conduct, but landowners need not guard against imagined dangers." Martin, 801 S.E.2d at 30. In other words, "the landowner's duty extends only to foreseeable criminal acts." Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation omitted). Here, I.R. was injured as a result of an illicit sex trafficking operation occurring on Defendant's premises. Thus, the key question is whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that sex trafficking was a foreseeable criminal act at the Americas Best Value Inn such that Defendant had a duty to protect its invitees from it. The Court finds that Plaintiff has met this burden at this stage of the case.
For a duty to arise, "the incident causing injury to the plaintiff must be substantially similar in type to the previous criminal activities occurring on or near the premises so that a reasonable person would take ordinary precautions to protect his or her customers or tenants against the risk posed by that type of activity." Mason v. Chateau Cmtys., Inc., 280 Ga.App. 106, 633 S.E.2d 426, 431-32 (2006) (internal quotation omitted). "Substantially similar" does not mean "identical"; rather, "[w]hat is required is that the prior incident be sufficient to attract the landlord's attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in the litigated incident." Sturbridge, 482 S.E.2d at 341 (alterations in original) (evidence of prior burglaries precluded summary judgment on premises liability claim arising out of rape). Further, the question of whether criminal activity is reasonably foreseeable is "generally for a jury's determination." Bethany Grp., LLC v. Grobman, 315 Ga.App. 298, 727 S.E.2d 147, 150 (2012).
Here, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendant was on notice of prior criminal activities on its premises that were substantially similar to the sex trafficking that targeted I.R. Plaintiff alleges that there are several online reviews and hundreds of police reports mentioning prostitution, drug dealing, and drug use occurring at the Americas Best Value Inn leading up to the period I.R. was trafficked there. (Compl. ¶¶ 53-64). Plaintiff further states that Defendant was aware of these incidents of criminal activity because Defendant allegedly responded to the online reviews referencing prostitution and drug dealing. (Id. ¶¶ 61, 86.) Also significant is that Defendant allegedly knew of "law enforcement activity" at the hotel "reporting widespread prostitution" and that police responded to hundreds of incidents occurring at the hotel, many of which involved prostitution. (Id. ¶ 63.) The alleged pervasiveness of crime and law enforcement activity at the Americas Best Value Inn should have "attracted [Defendant's] attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in" sex trafficking on the premises. Sturbridge, 482 S.E.2d at 341. Therefore, the Court finds, at this preliminary stage of the case, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that the illicit acts of I.R.'s sex traffickers were reasonably foreseeable and Defendant owed I.R. a duty to protect her from injuries arising from this kind of criminal activity. See A.B., 2022 WL 467786, at *6 (finding the same based on similar allegations of online reviews and police reports).
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 14) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 29th day of August, 2022.