Opinion
No. 77-740
Decided December 28, 1978. Rehearing denied February 1, 1979. Certiorari granted May 14, 1979.
Invoking Open Meetings Law, trial court granted injunctive relief to group of citizens challenging practice of urban renewal authority in holding closed meetings. Urban renewal authority appealed.
Reversed
1. EMINENT DOMAIN — Urban Renewal Authority — Not State Agency — Open Meetings Law — Not Applicable. Rather than being a state agency or authority, an urban renewal authority is an arm or agency of the municipality which creates it, and therefore the Open Meetings Law has no applicability to such an entity.
Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable Robert T. Kingsley, Judge.
Davies St. Veltri, Robert Justin Driscoll, William R. James, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Benedetti, Opperman, Martinez Kokish, P.C., John Kokish, for defendant-appellant.
The sole question in this appeal is whether an Urban Renewal Authority is a state agency or authority within the meaning of the Open Meetings part of the Colorado Sunshine Law, § 24-6-402(1), C.R.S. 1973. We conclude that it is not a state agency or authority and therefore reverse the judgment of the district court, which reached a contrary conclusion.
The relevant facts were stipulated. The plaintiffs are an association of citizens who owned property in an area proposed for purchase and development by the Denver Urban Renewal Authority (DURA). They objected to DURA closing to the public in general, and to them in particular, any meetings of two or more of the board members of DURA at which public business would be discussed. They sought, and the trial court granted, injunctive relief. DURA appeals, asserting it is not a state agency or authority, and, therefore, not subject to that law.
The Open Meetings Law provides:
"All meetings of two or more members of any board, committee, commission, or other policy-making or rule-making body of any state agency or authority or of the legislature at which any public business is discussed or at which any formal action is taken by such board, committee, commission, or other policy-making or rule-making body are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, except as may be otherwise provided in the constitution." (emphasis supplied)
That the statute is meant to apply only to state agencies and authorities, and not to local governments, is manifested by the omission by the drafters of key language from the Florida Government and Sunshine Law, on which the Colorado statute is patterned.
The Florida Statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. 286.011 (West) reads:
"All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation or any political subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the constitution, at which official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution, rule, regulation or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting." (emphasis supplied)
[1] We hold that rather than being a state agency or authority, an Urban Renewal Authority is an arm or agency of the municipality which creates it, and that therefore, the Open Meetings Law has no applicability to such an authority. See People v. Bailey, 41 Colo. App. 504, 595 P.2d 252, (1978).
DURA was created pursuant to the Urban Renewal Law, § 31-25-101(1) et seq., C.R.S. 1973, which has as its stated purpose to provide for the creation of urban renewal authorities to alleviate the problems attendant to slum and blighted areas in the municipalities. Section 31-25-104(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973, refers to such authority as being "the urban renewal authority for [the] municipality."
The statute further provides that the governing body of the municipality shall create the authority to serve the public interest of the municipality with the mayor appointing commissioners, who also may be removed by the mayor with consent of the governing body of the municipality. Section 31-25-104(2), C.R.S. 1973. Moreover, the authority "may call upon the municipal counsel or chief legal officer of the municipality for such legal services as it may require . . . ." Section 31-25-104(2)(c), C.R.S. 1973.
Urban renewal plans are not state-wide programs. The Urban Renewal Law provides that an authority cannot function unless there is a local need and it is set up by the municipality, and further provides that an authority must be within the geographical boundaries of the city. Section 31-25-104(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973.
These factors demonstrate that the General Assembly enacted the Urban Renewal Law to enable municipalities to create the authorities for the benefit of the municipality. The statute gives the state no control over an authority. Only the city council's approval of urban renewal plans is needed. There is no state funding; the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the city provide the funds, and auditing is done by them. Bonds issued are not an indebtedness of the state, but of the authority itself. Section 31-25-109(6), C.R.S. 1973.
We reject plaintiffs' assertion that People ex rel. Stokes v. Newton, 106 Colo. 61, 101 P.2d 21 (1940), is controlling. There the court stated that the Denver Housing Authority is a state agency; however, the statement that the housing authority is a state agency was made in reference to a conflict between the enabling legislation creating the housing authority as an exercise of state police power, and Colo. Const. Art. XX, which grants home-rule powers to the City and County of Denver. The statement was not necessary to the opinion, and in any event, Stokes was dealing with a different entity and a different statute.
Nor does Rabinoff v. District Court, 145 Colo. 225, 360 P.2d 114 (1961), mandate a contrary result. There the court cited Stokes for the proposition that the Urban Renewal Law is a valid exercise of the state's police power and is not violative of Colo. Const. Art. XX. Hence, Rabinoff settles only the issue of the state's authority to enact the Urban Renewal Law and does not lead to the conclusion that an authority created under that law is a state agency for purposes of the Open Meetings Law.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.
JUDGE RULAND and JUDGE VAN CISE concur.