Summary
finding that conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions failed to satisfy the non-moving party's burden in a motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's allegations of intentional discrimination
Summary of this case from Evans v. St. Bernard Parish School BoardOpinion
Civil Action No: SA-02-CA-1133-XR
November 25, 2003
ORDER
Plaintiff Tyshion Jackson ("Jackson") filed this suit on behalf of her son, Montel Hadley ("Montel"), alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, a conspiracy to violate Montel's civil rights, and gender discrimination in education. On September 18, 2003, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and for qualified immunity. Plaintiff's response conceded that the facts of the case did not support liability under the theories of conspiracy or gender discrimination, but argued that qualified immunity should not apply and that the motion for summary judgment should be denied. The Defendants' reply was received on October 20, 2003, and Plaintiff's sur-reply on November 4, 2003.
After careful consideration of all the pleadings, the Court will GRANT the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 27) and finds that qualified immunity applies to each individual defendant. Thus, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Willis v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). Once the movant carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment is inappropriate. Fields v. City of S. Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th Cir. 1991). All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In making this determination, the court should review all the evidence in the record and disregard the evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000). In order for a court to conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have found for the nonmovant, or, in other words, that the evidence favoring the nonmovant is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 4 (1986). If the record, viewed in this light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is proper.When a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden "to rebut this defense by establishing that the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law." Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992). The first inquiry for the Court is whether the plaintiff has "failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991). "If plaintiffs have stated valid claims, they bear the burden of demonstrating that the [defendant's] actions violated clearly established law." Solas, 980 F.2d at 306. Only after the plaintiff has met this burden does the Court examine the objective reasonableness of the defendant official's conduct. Id. The qualified immunity standard "gives ample room for mistaken judgments" by protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341 (1986).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Jackson, the mother of Montel Hadley, alleges that Montel was racially discriminated against when the administrators at Alamo Heights Junior School removed him from acting as Student Body President. In the Spring term of Montel's seventh grade year, he ran for and was elected to the student council office of Student Body President for the eighth grade. After approximately nine weeks in office, it is undisputed that Montel was removed from his post. Jackson alleges that Principal Don Ellisor ("Ellisor") and Vice Principal Chris Cadena ("Cadena"), forced Montel out by; 1) misapplying the grade requirements for a student council officer and, 2) by applying an abnormally harsh punishment for a minor disciplinary infraction. In addition to the alleged affirmative steps taken by Ellisor and Cadena, Jackson alleges that the constant criticism from Vice Principal Betsy Nash ("Nash") demonstrates a racial animus towards the first black Student Body President at Alamo Heights Junior School.
The dispute began on the very first day of school. Montel, acting as Student Body President, was required to make announcements on the public address system. Although he was aware of this duty, he alleges he received no instruction or training. However, Montel was at least somewhat familiar with this duty since he had heard announcements from past presidents while at school. When handed the microphone for his first official announcement, he addressed the school with informal language and asked "what's up?" He was criticized immediately by Nash and Ellisor.
Nash allegedly continued this criticism throughout the first six week grading period. Jackson alleges that Nash told Montel "it's scary that you're the President, you have your head in a hole" and on another occasion, "don't walk around here like you run everything because you don't." In addition, Jackson alleges that she became concerned with Ms. Nash's treatment of her son because Ms. Nash was constantly reminding him that if he did not have an 80 in every class, he would be demoted. Jackson became so concerned that she called Principal Ellisor. Ellisor admits that Jackson called and remembers telling her to call Nash directly, assuring her that there must be some sort of misunderstanding. Although Jackson did in fact call Nash, neither party can agree as to the whole conversation. Nash, however, denies making inappropriate remarks to Montel.
Montel, like all students elected to the student council, was required to keep his grades at a certain level. On the application for student council office, it states;
As a presiding officer, you will be expected to maintain a B average of 80 or above throughout the year.
The student handbook addressing the academic requirements for membership in the student council states;
Because of the leadership role of the Student Council, certain standards will need to be maintained. The following requirements need to be met each six weeks:
1. each report card grade must be 75 or higher
2. Conduct grades on report cards must be "S" or "E"
3. Each member must participate in the minimum number of planned activities to maintain the required "active status"
If the requirements are not met, then a student is placed on "probationary status". If the problem is not corrected, the student will be removed from the Student Council.
Because Jackson was concerned about the grade requirement and Montel's ability to meet that requirement, she asked for a "cluster meeting." The meeting, which brings the student's teachers and parent together, was held on September 23, 2002, before the first six week grade report was issued. Before this meeting started, Jackson alleges that she believed Montel only needed a 75 in each class to remain Student Body President and that she thought Ms. Nash was interpreting the requirement wrong. During the meeting however, she states that Principal Ellisor informed her that Montel needed an 80 in every class but that he also said he would help Montel through it this first time. Jackson alleges that this grade requirement was applied in a discriminatory fashion when Principal Ellisor allegedly changed his mind, and informed Montel that he would be required to maintain an 80 in every class.
It is undisputed that Montel's first six week grade report had one grade below 80 (although above 75) but that his overall average was above 80. Jackson alleges that the application should be read to require only an average of 80 across all of Montel's classes. She points to the student handbook to demonstrate that the school knew how to specify a minimum grade level in each class when it wished to do so. However, the administration maintains that the "80-rule" applies to each and every class. Thus, at the end of the first six weeks, Montel had not met the requirement. Instead of immediately being removed though, Ellisor gave Montel a three week probationary period to improve his grades. At the end of the three weeks, it is undisputed that Montel's progress report showed two grades below 80.
Approximately two weeks later, Ellisor met with Montel's mentor, Ms. Guerra. She argued on behalf of Montel that the language of the application was ambiguous and could be construed as requiring only an overall average of 80 rather than an 80 in each class. Ellisor, upon reflection and consultation with the student council advisor, Ms. Lowe, agreed with Ms. Guerra and decided that Montel would be "reinstated" as Student Body President. He later confirmed this decision with Superintendent Dr. Jerry Christian. On the morning of November 6, 2003, Ellisor told Montel he would be reinstated.
However, a disciplinary incident occurred on November 5, 2003, the day before Montel was told he was reinstated. On November 5, 2003, Montel was dismissed from class after allegedly arguing with his teacher. Upon dismissal, the teacher handed Montel a referral. Instead of taking the referral to Defendant Cadena, Montel spent the remainder of the class period at his locker. Montel claims that he had never seen a referral before and did not know he was to go directly to the administrative office. Although the teacher admits she cannot remember telling Montel to go to the office, Montel had received a referral a few weeks earlier and had taken that referral to the office. It is undisputed that Montel had been disciplined in the past and his signature can be found on that earlier referral. Later that day, the teacher saw Defendant Cadena and informed him that Montel had been given the referral. Montel's failure to report to the office is considered an "insubordination offense."
During lunch on November 6, 2003, the day of Montel's reinstatement, Defendant Cadena informed Montel that he would be sent for later in the day and that he was to bring the referral slip with him to that appointment. At approximately 2:45 p.m. during the last class period of the day, Defendant Cadena sent for Montel. Although Montel reported to Cadena's office, he did not bring the referral with him. Defendant Cadena asserts that he told Montel to go get it and bring it back. Instead, Montel went back to the band hall and began helping the Band Director. After approximately fifteen minutes, Defendant Cadena called down to the band hall and informed the Band Director that Montel should report back to the office. At this point, Montel returned to Cadena's office but again, did not bring the referral. Cadena demanded that Montel bring the referral for the third time that day. However, instead of taking the referral to Cadena the third time, Montel sent it on with a friend and attended basketball tryouts. These three separate acts of insubordination were in addition to the original offense of being argumentative and disruptive in class.
Jackson argues that Cadena discriminated against Montel when he applied a two day in school suspension for these acts of insubordination rather than applying an after school detention. Either the low grades or the two day in school suspension would disqualify Montel from his position as Student Body President. An after school detention however, would not have disqualified Montel. It is undisputed that after the in school suspension, Montel was no longer Student Body President.
ANALYSIS
1. Does the doctrine of qualified immunity shield Don Ellisor, Chris Cadena and Betsy Nash?
Jackson alleges that Principal Ellisor, and the two Vice Principals, Cadena and Nash, can be held individually liable for violating Montel's civil rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause requires persons who are similarly situated to be treated alike. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1999) citing Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). "In order to state a claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the [state] official was motivated by intentional discrimination on the basis of race." Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997). But "[w]hen intent is an element of a constitutional violation . . . the primary focus is not on any possible animus directed at the plaintiff; rather it is more specific, such as an intent to disadvantage all members of a class that includes the plaintiff. . . ." Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592 (1998).
However, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields a state official from personal liability when the state official, exercising his or her discretionary authority, deprives another of a right secured by federal law. Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1997). A claim of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiffs claims and is a question of law. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). The Fifth Circuit engages in a two part test when determining if qualified immunity applies. First, the Court must determine if the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 702 (5th Cir. 1999). Second, if that constitutional right was violated, the Court must determine whether the official's actions were objectively reasonable. Id. The first step generally involves an analysis at a "higher level of generality than the second, which focuses . . . on the particulars of the challenged conduct and/or of the factual setting in which it took place." Pierce, 117 F.3d at 872.
The Plaintiff has the burden to rebut the defense of qualified immunity by "establishing that the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law." Id. citing Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir. 1992). "The Court need not reach the second inquiry, however, if [the plaintiff] fails to tender the requisite summary judgment evidence that the individual defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right." Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1995). Thus, "[t]he plaintiffs showing of a violation of a clearly established constitutional right is a `prerequisite' to overcoming the qualified immunity defense; failure to do so obviates the need to address the second step of the analysis." Nunez v. Simms, 341 F.3d 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2003) citing Martinez v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 300 F.3d 567, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2002).
Here, Jackson first alleges that the administrators violated Montel's civil rights by applying the student council grade requirement in a discriminatory way. Plaintiff argues that she has alleged a clearly established constitutional right — namely, that students have the right to be free from racial discrimination in education. See Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at Wetting Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 775 (11th Cir. 1991). She places great emphasis on the fact that racial animus is inherently a question of fact which turns on credibility. See Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 11 citing International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1991). However, Plaintiff's complaint states her cause of action as a violation of equal protection. Thus, in order to allege a claim under equal protection, she must provide summary judgment evidence that students who were similarly situated were treated differently.
Jackson has offered no evidence that this grade requirement was applied differently to other students similarly situated. She does not counter Ellisor's affidavit saying that the 80 rule had always been applied to each class, nor does she contend that other students were allowed to remain in their respective offices with grades below 80. She does not show that past Presidents were given more than a three week grace period to get their grades up or even that a past President ever needed a grace period to get his or her grades up. In short, Jackson does not show that Montel was treated differently at all.
Instead, Jackson points to the fact that Ellisor reinstated Montel after Montel's mentor argued that the language on the application form could be interpreted to require an 80 overall grade point average. The Court agrees that the language of the two clauses taken together is subject to different interpretations. But by focusing on the language of the requirement itself, claiming a fact issue exists, and arguing that it could only be interpreted to require an 80 overall, Jackson does not demonstrate that the administration applied the rule in a discriminatory fashion. Because Jackson has not argued that other similarly situated students were treated in a different way, she has failed to allege a constitutional violation. Thus, qualified immunity is proper as to Principal Ellisor.
Secondly, Jackson alleges that Defendant Cadena violated Montel's civil rights when he applied a two day in school suspension without considering alternative punishments. While the Student Handbook requires the principal or designee to consider reasonable alternatives, it does not require the teacher to consider the effects of the punishment. Here, Cadena testified that he "felt that in school suspension was exactly what was warranted." He also testified that he applied the two day in school suspension because of Montel's three acts of insubordination towards him, not the dismissal from class.
Jackson argues that by choosing a punishment that stripped Montel of the presidency, Cadena discriminated against Montel. However, the fact "[t]hat a better punishment may have been available does not establish that the punishment administered was unconstitutional." Hassan, 55 F.3d at 1082. Conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions cannot satisfy the non-moving party's burden in an intentional discrimination case. Lawrence v. University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 312(5th Cir. 1999). Instead, it is necessary "to present evidence-not just speculation and conjecture-that the defendants discriminated against" Montel based on his race. Id. Jackson offers no evidence that other students who disobeyed a vice-principal three times would have received less punishment. Jackson offers no evidence and does not dispute that Montel had disciplinary problems before this immediate action. Again, Jackson does not show that Cadena applied a lesser punishment to other students for similar offenses and thus cannot prevail with "mere conclusory statements evidencing only a personal belief that the defendants were motivated by an impermissible animus." Burns-Toole, D.D.S. v. Byrne, D.D.S., 11 F.3d 1270, 1274 (5th Cir. 1994), Cert. denied 512 U.S. 1207 (1994). Because Jackson failed to adequately allege a violation of the equal protection clause, qualified immunity is proper as to Cadena.
Finally, Jackson argues that Nash's alleged rude and completely uncalled for remarks violated Montel's rights. Assuming these remarks were made, they would reflect a hostility towards Montel but unfortunately, are not probative of whether or not he was discriminated against. See Foley v. University of Houston System, 324 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2003); Burns-Toole, D.D.S., 11 F.3d 1270. Jackson does not argue that Nash treated past Presidents with more respect. She does not argue that Nash allowed past Presidents to use informal language when addressing students on the public address system. She does not argue that Nash did not urge or even require that past Presidents aspire to be role models for the other students in the school. She only argues that these statements, if made, would be highly inappropriate for a teacher to say to a student. The Court cannot disagree with that point, however, it is Plaintiff's burden to allege a constitutional violation, not merely inappropriate behavior. Thus, again, Jackson has not shown that Montel was treated differently under the law and therefore qualified immunity applies.
Although this Court holds that Jackson has not alleged a violation of a constitutional right because her pleadings do not show that Montel was treated differently than other similarly situated students, Jackson has also not met her burden of showing defendants violated clearly established law. See Burns-Toole, D.D.S., 11 F.3d at 1274. "Indeed, `a subjective belief of discrimination, however genuine, [may not] be the basis of judicial relief" Lawrence v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 1999) citing Elliot v. Group Med. Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 557 (5th Cir. 1983). For the same reasons as above, Jackson cannot demonstrate that the administrators violated the right to equal protection because she has not shown that other students were treated differently. Thus, qualified immunity applies.
2. Can Defendant Alamo Heights Independent School District be held liable for its actions?
Jackson alleges that Defendant Alamo Heights Independent School District (the "District") deprived Montel of his civil rights when it refused to reinstate him to the president position. A school district may not be held liable for a deprivation of a constitutional right solely because its employee is a tort-feasor, nor can it be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of its employees. Eugene v. Alief lndep. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1995); Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S . 658 (1978). To hold the District liable, Jackson must show that Montel's civil rights were violated through the execution of an official District policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Thus, to hold the District liable, the policy or custom "must be the moving force of the constitutional violation." Id.
Here, Jackson alleges that when the District refused to reinstate Montel, under threat of lawsuit, it chose to persist in its course of discriminatory conduct. However, up until that point, the Board of Trustees was not aware of any situation involving Montel. See Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 266-67 (5th Cir. 1998) (summary judgment granted when plaintiff had not notified the school district of her problems until shortly before suit). While the Superintendent had been contacted when Ellisor was reviewing the alleged ambiguous language concerning Montel's grades, his understanding was that the situation was taken care of and he did not relay this information to the Board until after the threat of suit. The situation at that time allowed Montel to be reinstated as President. It was only after the imposition of the two day in school suspension that Montel no longer could be President. The Board was unaware of this chain of events until after the threat of suit. Plaintiff does not counter the Defendant's affidavits or argue that the individual defendants contacted the Board.
Although actions by the Board may represent official policy, the Board responded to Plaintiff's threat of suit by asking for more information, urging her to use the school's internal grievance procedures, urging a counter offer where Montel could have been reinstated as President at the end of the next 6 weeks, or as an alternative, for the parties to go before a mutually agreeable third party mediator. See Harris v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1999). The Board engaging in settlement negotiations after being threatened with suit cannot be said to be pursuing a discriminatory path. Cf. Gebser v. Lago Vistalndep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (holding that where a case does not involve official policy, a damages remedy will not lie unless an official, who at a minimum had authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures, had actual knowledge of the discrimination and failed to adequately respond). Plaintiff offers no other evidence and makes no other arguments in order to hold the Board liable. Thus, because the District cannot be held vicariously liable for any actions of its employees, and because it was not aware of any problem prior to the threat of suit, summary judgment is proper.