Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-379, C/W 03-572 SECTION "R" (5)
April 5, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of defendant Stephen "Larry" Cowan to dismiss plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against him. For the following reasons, the Court denies defendant's motion.
I. Background
Plaintiffs allege that defendant Charles O'Neil sexually molested their minor child, A.G., when she was a student at P.G.T. Beauregard Middle School during the period from 1998-2001. Plaintiffs assert that at the time of the alleged molestation, O'Neil was a physical education and math teacher at P.G.T. Beauregard.
Plaintiffs allege claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against O'Neil, the St. Bernard Parish School Board, and Cowan, P.G.T. Beauregard's principal. Plaintiffs allege that the School Board and Cowan were aware of similar complaints against O'Neil well before the acts complained of in their complaint, and yet they did nothing to remedy the situation. Plaintiffs contend that the defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to the constitutional right of bodily integrity and due process of their minor child, that Cowan developed and maintained policies or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the P.G.T. Beauregard students, and that it was the policy and/or custom of the School Board and/or P.G.T. Beauregard to supervise and train its teachers inadequately. In the alternative, plaintiffs allege claims under Louisiana state law.
In their answer, defendants assert a qualified immunity defense. Defendants filed a motion for a Rule 7(a) reply, which the Court granted and ordered plaintiffs to file a reply. Plaintiffs adopted and expanded the Rule 7(a) reply filed by plaintiffs in the consolidated case in this matter, Civil Action No. 03-379. In addition, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add allegations that respond to defendants' qualified immunity defense.
Plaintiffs in the consolidated case have since settled their claims against defendants, and as a result, the Court dismissed their claims with prejudice.
Cowan now moves to dismiss plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims. Cowan contends that plaintiffs' amended complaint and Rule 7(a) reply fail to plead specific facts sufficient to defeat his qualified immunity defense. Plaintiffs argue that their Rule 7(a) reply and amended complaint allege specific facts sufficient to overcome defendant's qualified immunity defense because they identify three specific occasions on which Cowan received complaints of inappropriate behavior by O'Neil, and Cowan failed to respond adequately to these complaints.
II. Discussion
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). Dismissal is warranted if "it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512; 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)). In deciding whether dismissal is warranted, the Court will not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as true. See Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
B. Section 1983 Claim
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress [.]Id. In response to plaintiffs' claims, Cowan asserts an affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields public officials who perform discretionary functions from suit and liability under Section 1983. "unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993); Gibson v. P.A. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995). Once a Section 1983 defendant pleads qualified immunity and shows that he is a governmental official whose position involves the exercise of discretion, the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting this defense by establishing that the official's wrongful conduct violated clearly established law. Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 456-57, 460 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1977)).
The first step in the qualified immunity analysis is to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of clearly established federal constitutional or statutory right. Id. at 457. If the plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation, the Court must assess whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time that the challenged conduct occurred. Id. "Clearly established" means the "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). A defendant's acts are objectively reasonable unless all reasonable officials in those circumstances would have then known that the defendant's conduct violated the Constitution or federal statute as alleged by plaintiff. Thompson, 245 F.3d at 457 (citing cases). In this determination of objective reasonableness, the defendant's subjective state of mind is irrelevant. Id. Furthermore, even officials who reasonably, but mistakenly, commit a constitutional violation are entitled to immunity. Glenn v. City of Tyler, $42 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 2001).
Here, plaintiffs allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. In 1994, the Fifth Circuit held that school children have a "liberty interest in their bodily integrity which is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," and that a violation of this liberty interest occurs "When a state actor sexually abuses a schoolchild." Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court also held that "school officials can be held liable for supervisory failures that result in the molestation of a schoolchild if those failures manifest a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of that child." Id. at 445. The Court noted that these legal principles were clearly established in 1987, when the violations occurred in that case. See id. Here, the alleged sexual abuse occurred between 1998 and 2001. Consequently, the Court finds that these legal principles were clearly established at the time of the alleged abuse in this case.
The Fifth Circuit has established the following test to determine the personal liability of school officials based on the sexual abuse of a student by a subordinate:
A supervisory school official can be held personally liable for a subordinate's violation of an elementary or secondary school student's constitutional right to bodily integrity in physical sexual abuse cases if the plaintiff establishes that:
(1) the defendant learned of facts or a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior by a subordinate pointing plainly toward the conclusion that the subordinate was sexually abusing the student; and
(2) the defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference toward the constitutional rights of the student by failing to take action that was obviously necessary to prevent or stop the abuse; and
(3) such failure caused constitutional injury to the student.See id. at 454. The Fifth Circuit applied this test in Hagan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 48 (5th Cir. 1995), and found that a complaint by another student that he had sexual relations with a teacher and later rumors that still another student was having sexual relations with the teacher provided a sufficient basis to conclude that the school principal "had undoubtedly learned of facts or a pattern of behavior that pointed plainly toward the conclusion that [the teacher] was engaging in sexual activity with [the school's] students." Id. at 52. The Court ultimately concluded that the principal's response to the complaint and rumors, although ineffective, did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference, and the principal was therefore entitled to summary judgment on the third student's Section 1983 claims on the basis of qualified immunity. Id. at 53.
Plaintiffs in this case identify three sources who alerted Principal Cowan to O'Neil's actions. First, plaintiffs allege that Lilliane Hambrich, the school counselor, informed Cowan of earlier incidents of sexual misconduct by O'Neil with students. Plaintiffs also alleged that Lisa Burdkt, a teacher's aide, reported several inappropriate incidents between O'Neil and students in the school gym. Finally, plaintiffs allege that the parents of a student complained to Cowan that O'Neil molested their daughter at the time he was their daughter's teacher. Plaintiffs assert in their amended complaint that these sources alerted Cowan to the inappropriate actions of O'Neil before O'Neil molested their child. In a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and views the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Based on this standard, the Court finds plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support a conclusion that Principal Cowan was aware of a pattern of inappropriate sexual behavior by O'Neil that pointed toward the conclusion that O'Neil was sexually abusing students at P.G.T. Beauregard.
Plaintiffs also allege that in response to the complaints of inappropriate behavior and sexual molestation by O'Neil, Cowan did nothing to remedy the situation and therefore demonstrated deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of their minor daughter. "Deliberate indifference" consists of "a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from various alternatives." See Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 756 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1989)). Here, plaintiffs aver that Cowan knew of O'Neil's actions and failed to respond to them properly. In light of plaintiffs' allegations, the Court finds that Cowan's course of action (or inaction) may rise to the level of deliberate indifference and therefore the Court is unable to conclude that plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief. Accordingly, the Court finds that dismissal of plaintiffs' claims is not warranted.
Defendant argues that plaintiffs fail to establish that Cowan knew of O'Neil's actions before the alleged molestation of A.G. because plaintiffs said in their complaint that they "believe" that all of these complaints were made before plaintiff was molested. Defendant argues that personal belief is not enough to defeat the defense of qualified immunity. At the outset, the Court observes that plaintiffs also "specifically aver" in their complaint that defendant was aware in advance of O'Neil's actions based on complaints from the three sources. Furthermore, the cases defendant cites for the principle that personal belief is insufficient to defeat qualified immunity are inapposite. In most of these cases, the courts found that allegations based on the plaintiff's subjective belief were insufficient to overcome a qualified immunity defense in the context of a motion for summary judgment. See Southard v. The Texas Board of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 555 (5th Cir. 1997J (finding plaintiff's subjective interpretation of defendant's comments insufficient to raise a fact issue as to sexual harassment and thus summary judgment was appropriate); Burns-Toole D.D.S. v. Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270, 1274 (5th Cir. 1994) (addressing defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Fifth Circuit held that "plaintiff could not prevail with mere conclusory statements evidencing only a personal belief that the defendants were motivated by an impermissible animus"); Jackson v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 2003 WL 22799827, *6 (W.D.Tex.) (finding that conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions failed to satisfy the non-moving party's burden in a motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's allegations of intentional discrimination); Tarantino v. Pierce, 1997 WL 528054, *3 (N.D.Tex.) (concluding that plaintiff could not defeat summary judgment with only a subjective belief that the City's response to the job-related stress of policemen and firemen amounted to deliberate indifference). In Shelton v. Chief of Police Tom Schockley, 2001 WL 1057629 (N.D.Tex.), the court dismissed plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because she failed to allege any facts to support a conclusion that the defendant's inappropriate acts were directed at her or any other woman and failed to allege any facts to demonstrate deliberate indifference by the movants. The Shelton case, as well as the other cases cited by defendant, are distinguishable because they involved allegations supported only by a subjective interpretation of the defendants' statements or actions. Here, plaintiffs allegations turn on objective facts — whether Cowan received reports and complaints about O'Neil's actions before or after the alleged molestation of A.G. If plaintiffs cannot prove these allegations, defendant can seek summary judgment, but the complaint is not dismissable under Rule 12(b)(6) solely because plaintiffs ground their allegations on "belief." Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs' allegations of specific occasions on which Cowan received notice of O'Neil's inappropriate behavior are sufficient to state a claim against defendant Cowan.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims.