Opinion
No. CV 08 501 73 54
March 26, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION TO STRIKE
The defendant, Town of Weston, has moved the court to strike the plaintiffs' complaint for the reason that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiffs have filed an objection to the motion to strike. The parties appeared though counsel and were heard. The court reserved decision.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498 (2003). In ruling on a motion to strike, the trial court examines the complaint "construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378 (1997). "[T]he court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580 (1997). [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 173 (2004). "On a motion to strike, the trial court's inquiry is to ascertain whether the allegations in each count, if proven, would state a claim on which relief could be granted . . . A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are not supported by the facts alleged." In re Michael D., 58 Conn.App. 119, 122, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 911, (2000).
In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged that they are the owners of a certain piece or parcel of land known as 20 Martin Road in the town of Weston, and, as owners of that property, they have become owners of a contiguous parcel of land (the Disputed Property) which was once a continuation of Martin Road before it was abandoned by the Town of Weston and which presently "is unrecognizable as a public highway."
The plaintiffs have brought this action to claim title to that parcel of property and to quiet and settle title to that parcel pursuant to § 47-31, C.G.S.
The defendant, Town of Weston, argues that the plaintiff's complaint is insufficient on its face in that it fails to "state . . . the manner in which the [P]laintiff acquired the claim, interest or title," to the Disputed Property, as required by § 47-31(b), C.G.S. The defendant takes the position that by limiting their claim of legal title to the Disputed Property to the fact that they are "owners of the property contiguous to the northerly side of the Old Highway," their complaint is legally insufficient.
In their opposition to the motion, the plaintiffs have pointed out that there is case law which establishes a factual basis for the acquisition of title to property owners who were similarly situated.
In Luf v. Town of Southbury, 188 Conn. 336 (1982), our Supreme Court, citing Antenucci v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, 142 Conn. 349, 355-56 (1955), held that, "Under our law, such a highway creates no interests in fee, the presumption being that the landowners whose lands abut the highway continue to be the owners of the soil to the middle of the highway. Luf, supra, p. 341.
The defendant argues that under § 13a-55, C.G.S., the plaintiffs' interest is limited to having a right of way over the Disputed Property and, in view of the fact that the Disputed Property does not lead to another highway or street, the plaintiffs may not even be entitled to such an easement.
In Luf, the Court held that, "the effect of 13-55 C.G.S. is to alter the common-law consequences of the discontinuance of a public highway. While, before the statute, discontinuance extinguished both the public easement of travel and the private easement of access . . . after the statute, the public easement ceases but the private easement remains."
The court agrees with the plaintiffs' assertion that the statute, § 13a-55, C.G.S., has no effect on the fee ownership of the land underlying an abandoned or discontinued public highway.
As noted, "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." Broadnax, supra, p. 173.
By alleging that they own property contiguous to an abandoned town highway, the plaintiffs have sufficiently asserted an allegation which, if proven, would state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's second motion to strike the plaintiffs' complaint is hereby denied.