Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4451-12T4
07-30-2015
SHAMAR D. INGRAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALTER M. INGRAM, JR., Defendant-Respondent.
Shamar D. Ingram, appellant pro se. William M. Ingram, Jr., respondent pro se.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Alvarez and Maven. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Cumberland County, Docket No. FD-17-0150-94. Shamar D. Ingram, appellant pro se. William M. Ingram, Jr., respondent pro se. PER CURIAM
In this case where child support orders issued out of two states, plaintiff Shamar Ingram appeals from the May 7, 2013 Family Part order granting defendant Walter Ingram's motion for reconsideration and reversing a December 2012 order. The December order denied Walter's request for emancipation of their youngest son and granted Shamar's request for an increase in child support. Our review is hampered by Shamar's pro se brief, which does not set forth any legal points of error or formal legal argument as required by Rule 2:6-2(a)(5). We surmise that she contends that the trial court erred by finding that New Jersey did not have continuing exclusive jurisdiction to address the parties' cross-motions for emancipation of or continuing child support for their son. Because we agree and find that the trial judge misapplied the applicable law, we reverse.
We use first names in this opinion for the sake of clarity. We intend no disrespect.
I.
We glean the following facts and procedural history from the parties' submissions. Shamar and Walter were married in 1987 and their first child, Junior, was born in August 1988. In 1991, the family relocated to Missouri. Ten months later, in July 1992, the couple separated and Shamar moved with Junior to New Jersey. In September 1992, Walter filed a divorce complaint in Missouri. Shamar gave birth to Sean, their second child, in New Jersey in December 1992. In 1993, Walter moved to Pennsylvania and began working in New Jersey.
We use pseudonyms for the children to protect their privacy.
In August 1993, Shamar filed an application for child support in New Jersey. Shamar appeared before a hearing officer on September 16, and Walter did not. The hearing officer calculated Walter's obligation as $150 per week with an additional arrears payment of $20, effective August 23, 1993. A judge signed the default child support order on September 22, 1993. According to Walter, New Jersey began garnishing his wages by the end of September. Walter appealed that order and sought a recalculation.
Shortly thereafter, in November, a Missouri court considered the divorce action. Both parties were represented by counsel, and Shamar had filed an answer to the complaint. The court entered a "Decree of Dissolution of Marriage" (Divorce Decree or Decree) on December 9, which addressed matters of custody, child support, and the distribution of the marital debts and assets.
The Divorce Decree provided that Missouri had jurisdiction to award custody of the minor children because it was Junior's home state when the complaint was filed in 1992. Though the court recognized that at the time of the divorce neither party resided in Missouri, it nevertheless declared that "[i]t [was] in the best interests of both minor children that [Missouri] assume jurisdiction because the children and their parents have a significant connection with the State of Missouri[.]" The court awarded joint legal custody of the children, and designated Shamar as the custodial parent. While acknowledging the pending child support action in New Jersey, the court nonetheless ordered Walter to pay child support of $215 per child per month, for a total of $430 per month, beginning December 1.
It is unclear what child support action the Missouri court believed was pending in New Jersey; whether it was Shamar's application for support or Walter's appeal of the default child support order. As will be discussed, the Missouri court's understanding of the facts does not affect our de novo review or the disposition of this appeal.
On January 13, 1994, the parties appeared before a hearing officer in New Jersey on Walter's appeal of the September 1993 default child support order. According to Walter, his counsel informed the hearing officer of the Divorce Decree and child support order. Despite being informed of the Missouri order, the hearing officer recalculated child support resulting in a reduced obligation of $110 per week plus $15 towards arrears, effective October 4, 1993. Walter was advised to contact Missouri. Both parties signed the child support order acknowledging they understood the terms and that they did not wish to appeal that day. A judge signed and filed the order on February 22, 1994.
In 1996, Shamar moved to modify child support and Walter filed a cross-motion for enforcement of the Missouri child support obligation. On March 11, a hearing officer dismissed Shamar's complaint because she failed to appear. Oral argument on Walter's cross-motion was held before a judge on March 18. On that date, Shamar appeared pro se and Walter appeared with counsel. The court apparently did not accept defense counsel's argument to enforce the Missouri child support order as Walter's New Jersey child support obligation was increased to $132 per week. However, the court accepted the parties' consent agreement to comply with the Divorce Decree's visitation schedule.
Our record does not reflect any further activity in either state until January 25, 2001, when the parties consented to a modification of the New Jersey child support order to $165 per week. Thereafter, in 2012, eleven years later, the parties filed cross-motions in New Jersey in which, we deduce, Walter moved to emancipate both sons, and Shamar moved to increase child support for Sean. The November 1, 2012 order reads:
[The] [c]ourt finds and the parties agree to the emancipation of the parties['] oldest child, [Junior]. The matter will be relisted for December 6[], 2012[,] at 9am for the court to recalc (sic) support for the 1 remaining child, [Sean]. Any modification may be retroactive to the filing date of the motion 10/5/2012. The parties are order[ed] to provide their 2011 Federal and State tax return and corresponding [W-2s] along with their last 3 most recent pay stubs. Ms. Ingram shall
also provide documentation concerning [Sean's] date of high school graduation and date of college enrollment.
On December 6, the hearing officer found that Sean was a full-time college student and that child support should continue. The recalculation resulted in an obligation of $283 per week, plus an additional $17 toward the arrears, effective October 11, 2012.
We have not been provided a copy of the December 6 order signed by a judge.
Walter moved for reconsideration before a judge. In his certification and legal brief filed in support of the motion, Walter asserted that Missouri had continuing jurisdiction to address the custody and support of the children. He argued that the New Jersey order was entered after the Missouri action had commenced and, therefore, Missouri entered the first child support order. Moreover, he contended that New Jersey could not modify the Missouri order because Shamar never registered the Divorce Decree in New Jersey. Finally, Walter argued that Sean should be deemed emancipated as of the date of his high school graduation in June 2011, because he enrolled in college on August 17, 2012, and not by October 1 following high school graduation, as required by Missouri law.
In addition to filing the motion for reconsideration, Walter filed additional applications in other states. In Maryland, he filed an application to have the case removed to the state of Maryland where he resided, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.65 to -30.123 (UIFSA), and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738B (FFCCSOA). The application was transmitted to New Jersey, however, Walter withdrew his request to change venue to Maryland during the May 2013 proceeding on his motion for reconsideration.
Walter also moved for Sean's emancipation in Missouri. On April 2, 2013, that court entered an order emancipating Sean effective February 4, 2013, because Sean was at least eighteen years old, had graduated high school, and had not enrolled "in an institution of vocational or higher education by October 1 following graduation[.]"
In New Jersey, the court heard oral argument on Walter's motion for reconsideration on May 7, 2013. During the proceeding, Shamar represented herself and Walter appeared with counsel. Shamar argued that the New Jersey child support order was the only order in effect. She contended that the Missouri child support order was never "initiated" and that she never received any child support money from Missouri. She claimed that Walter had that child support order "dissolved." Walter's counsel informed the court that Walter accumulated $93,000 in arrears in Missouri, and because he had "been paying the New Jersey Order [] Missouri vacated the arrears." Counsel also provided the court the Missouri order that emancipated Sean and terminated Walter's child support obligation.
It is unclear when Missouri acted upon its child support order as we have not been provided with any orders dissolving the child support order or vacating the arrears. --------
The trial court granted reconsideration of its prior decision denying emancipation. The court found that while the New Jersey child support order was the first entered in September 1993 prior to the Missouri Divorce Decree entered in December 1993, Missouri law controlled. The court ruled that the initial New Jersey support order was "assumed into [the Missouri] Divorce Judgement," and concluded that it was bound by the Missouri emancipation order, because it was the most recent and was controlling.
II.
Because of their expertise, we generally defer to Family Part judges' findings of fact, which will only be disturbed if they are manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 (1998); Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 193-94 (App. Div. 2007). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 544 (2002). An abuse of discretion "arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Motions for reconsideration are granted only under very narrow circumstances[.]" Fusco, supra, 349 N.J. Super. at 462. Reconsideration is reserved for cases where "'either (1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).
On appeal, Shamar seeks reversal of reconsideration, arguing that New Jersey, rather than Missouri, issued the controlling support orders. She contends that Sean was born in New Jersey, resides in New Jersey, and never lived in Missouri. She posits that the only active child support orders were issued by New Jersey, the only state in which Walter paid. She further contends that the trial court "did not allow her to present her evidence" to establish that Sean was a full-time student. Consequently, Shamar requests reinstatement of the child support order and further review of her request for continued support.
Walter argues that the New Jersey child support orders are void and a "legal nullity" because New Jersey never had subject matter jurisdiction. He contends that he made a sufficient showing under Rule 4:50-1(f) or 4:50-3 to warrant relief based upon his learning in 2012-2013 that Shamar misrepresented to the New Jersey court the status of the pending Missouri divorce proceedings when she applied for child support in 1993.
We begin by reviewing the applicable laws governing interstate child support orders. Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Support Act (URESA), N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.24 to -.61, which governed interstate disputes until it was repealed in 1998, child support orders could be enforced in multiple states.
In March 1998, as URESA was repealed, UIFSA was enacted. UIFSA'S purpose and mandate is to establish the means to enforce a child support order when a party moves from the issuing state, and to establish consistent ground rules for modifying such orders to avoid conflicts between states. Philipp v. Stahl, 344 N.J. Super. 262, 277-78 (App. Div. 2001) (Wecker, J.A.D., dissenting), rev'd on dissent, 172 N.J. 293 (2002). "Under UIFSA, jurisdictional disputes are resolved by reference to the concept of 'continuing, exclusive jurisdiction'." Peace v. Peace, 325 N.J. Super. 122, 128, (Ch. Div. 1999) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.72(a)). When faced with numerous prior support orders, the reviewing tribunal must identify whether it holds continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.72 provides:
a. A tribunal of this State issuing a support order consistent with the law of this State has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order:
(1) as long as this State remains the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is issued; orb. A tribunal of this State issuing a child support order consistent with the law of this State may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify the order if the order has been modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to this act or a law substantially similar to this act.
(2) until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written consents with the tribunal of this State for a tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
c. If a child support order of this State is modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to this act or a law substantially similar to this act, a tribunal of this State loses its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction with regard to prospective enforcement of the order issued in this State and may only:
(1) enforce the order that was modified as to amounts accruing before the modification;
(2) enforce nonmodifiable aspects of that order; and
(3) provide other appropriate relief for violations of that order which occurred before the effective date of the modification.
Thus, a state that has issued an order retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction if it is the residence of the obligor, the obligee, or the child, unless the parties have provided written consent for another state to assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.72(a).
d. A tribunal of this State shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal of another state which has issued a child support order pursuant to this act or a law substantially similar to this act.
Without written consent declaring which state has jurisdiction, it is possible under UIFSA for more than one state to have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Teare v. Bromley, 332 N.J. Super. 381, 386 (Ch. Div. 2000). In that case, the reviewing tribunal must then determine which state issued the "controlling order" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.74. Id. at 386-87. The state with the controlling order is the only state retaining jurisdiction to modify that order. Ibid. This requirement, found at N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.74, provides:
b. If a proceeding is brought under this act and two or more child support orders have been issued by tribunals of this State or another state with regard to the same obligor and child, a tribunal of this State shall apply the following rules to determine which order to recognize for purposes of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction:
(1) If only one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of this act, the order of that tribunal controls and shall be so recognized.
(2) If more than one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this act, an order issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the child shall be recognized, but if an order has not been issued in the current home state of the child, the order most recently issued controls and shall be recognized.
(3) If none of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this act, the tribunal of this State having jurisdiction over the parties, shall issue a child support order which controls and shall be recognized.
. . . .
(d) The tribunal that issued the controlling order that shall be recognized as controlling under subsections a., b., or c. of this section is the tribunal that has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
[(Emphasis added.)]
In Teare, supra, the court held that the "controlling order" was the New Jersey order because it was the child's home state, the initial order was issued by New Jersey, and the child never left New Jersey. 332 N.J. Super. at 390. Accordingly, Maryland, where the obligor resided, could not modify New Jersey's order. Ibid. In Peace, supra, a child support order was entered in New Jersey prior to a divorce entered in Nevada that included an agreement for child support. 325 N.J. Super. at 130. Since there was no written consent declaring which state had jurisdiction, both New Jersey and Nevada had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. In that instance, the court held that New Jersey, the home state of the child, was the State with the controlling order. Id. at 132. "[E]ven though the other state, which [was] not the home state of the child, may theoretically have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, the statute provides that only the controlling orders from the home state of the child be recognized." Ibid.
Our de novo review of the facts reveals that New Jersey issued the initial child support order on September 16, 1993, effective August 23, 1993. The order was subsequently modified in January 1994, retroactive to October 4, 1993. Both of the New Jersey orders were effective prior to the entry of the Missouri Divorce Decree obligating Walter to pay child support as of December 1, 1993. The record also demonstrates that one or both of the parties sought further modification or enforcement of the New Jersey order in 1996, 2001, and again in 2012. Notably, Walter did not present any evidence that Missouri ever exercised jurisdiction over the matter to enforce or modify its child support order, until the April 2013 orders emancipating Junior and Sean.
During oral argument on the motion for reconsideration, the trial court did not respond to defense counsel's request for a plenary hearing. Instead, the court accepted the recent Missouri emancipation orders from Walter, and declined to consider Shamar's evidence of Sean's college enrollment. The court determined that, since Missouri's order was the most recent, it was the controlling order and, therefore, New Jersey could not "expand the laws in the State of Missouri, for responsibility of child support and the length of responsibility for child support." In so ruling, we conclude the trial court misconstrued and misapplied the UIFSA law.
"The concept of the most recent order controlling the extent and nature of support is not supported by UIFSA's definition of 'controlling order.'" Teare, supra, 332 N.J. Super. at 387-88. As we held in Teare, the fact that the most recent order was entered in Missouri does not mean Missouri issued the controlling order. The reviewing court, here New Jersey, should have considered which state is the home state of the child, then recognized "an order issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the child." N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.74(b)(2). The most recently issued order is recognized and controls only "if an order has not been issued in the current home state of the child." Ibid.
Here, as in Peace, the New Jersey child support order was entered with effective dates prior to the Missouri Divorce Decree, even though the divorce complaint was filed first. Shamar and Sean never left New Jersey, and it remains their home state. The fact that Missouri claimed jurisdiction in the Divorce Decree is of no consequence in light of Sean and Shamar's residence in New Jersey, and of the actions taken in New Jersey over the years to exercise jurisdiction over the matter by modifying, enforcing, and collecting child support from Walter. Moreover, the fact that Missouri issued the most recent order is irrelevant to establishing continuing, exclusive jurisdiction because New Jersey, the home state, has issued child support orders.
Accordingly, as a matter of law, New Jersey is the issuing state, and has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in this matter. Thus, the trial court erred in ceding its jurisdiction and authority to Missouri. Having determined that the trial court misapplied the UIFSA law, we further conclude that the court abused its discretion by granting Walter's motion for reconsideration and reversing its December 2012 order denying Sean's emancipation.
Under New Jersey law, while there is a rebuttable presumption that a child is emancipated when he reaches the age of eighteen, N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3, there is no fixed age when emancipation occurs. Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 542 (2006). "[T]he essential inquiry is whether the child has moved 'beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtains an independent status of his or her own.'" Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Bishop v. Bishop, 287 N.J. Super. 593, 598 (Ch. Div. 1995)). If a child is dependent on his parents because he is attending college, a judge may decline to emancipate him or her. Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543 (1982).
In December 2012, the hearing officer found the evidence of Sean's enrollment in college satisfactory to continue child support. Walter did not dispute the child's enrollment in his motion for reconsideration or in this appeal, but instead argues that his enrollment was not timely under Missouri law. As we have already concluded, that assertion does not support reversal of the December 2012 order since Missouri law is not applicable to this case.
Because the court erred by determining that Missouri had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to emancipate Sean and terminate Walter's child support obligation, we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the December 2012 New Jersey child support order.
Reversed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION