Opinion
No. COA11–1265.
2012-04-3
In the Matter of T.M., S.M., and J.M.
Lauren Vaughan for petitioner-appellee Iredell County Department of Social Services. Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant mother.
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 20 July 2011 by Judge Deborah Brown in Iredell County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 March 2012. Lauren Vaughan for petitioner-appellee Iredell County Department of Social Services. Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant mother.
Pamela Newell for guardian ad litem.
ELMORE, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from the district court's order terminating her parental rights to her sons T.M. (“Tom”), S.M. (“Sam”), and J.M. (“Jeff”). We affirm.
The Iredell County Department of Social Services (DSS) became involved with the family in May 2008, based on respondent-mother's substance abuse and the family's inadequate housing and instability. Respondent-mother has three older children by a different father who were taken into DSS custody in May 2008. However, DSS allowed Sam, Tom, and Jeff to move to Pennsylvania with their father (respondent-father). In the spring of 2009, respondent-father and the children moved back to Iredell County into respondent-mother's residence.
On 19 October 2009, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging that Tom, Sam, and Jeff were neglected juveniles. Between May and October, DSS had received several reports that respondent-father physically abused respondent-mother and the children. The petitions also alleged that respondent-mother was in jail and respondent-father allowed the children to be cared for by an inappropriate babysitter.
On 21 January 2010, DSS filed a second set of juvenile petitions alleging that Tom, Sam, and Jeff were neglected and abused juveniles, after receiving additional reports of inappropriate discipline and physical abuse by respondent-father. The juveniles were taken into nonsecure custody by DSS on the same day, but were allowed to remain with respondent-mother so long as they resided together at a domestic violence shelter. On 2 February 2010, DSS moved the juveniles to a foster care placement after learning that respondent-mother had been visiting various medical providers seeking pain medication.
On 29 June 2010, the trial court entered an order adjudicating the juveniles neglected based on stipulations by the parents. The trial court entered a separate disposition order in which it kept the juveniles in the custody of DSS.
On 2 February 2011, DSS filed a motion to terminate both parents' rights to the juveniles. DSS alleged the following grounds for termination against both parents: (1) neglect; (2) willfully leaving the juveniles in foster care for more than twelve months without showing reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to removal; and (3) willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juveniles. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111 (a)(1)-(3) (2011). DSS also alleged dependency as a ground for termination against respondent-mother. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(6).
Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order on 20 July 2011 in which it found the existence of all four grounds for termination alleged against respondent-mother. The trial court also concluded that termination of respondent-mother's parental rights was in the juveniles' best interests. Respondent-mother timely appealed from the order. The trial court also terminated the parental rights of respondent-father, but he does not appeal.
It is well-established that termination of parental rights proceedings involve a two-stage process: (1) the adjudication stage, where the petitioner is required to prove the existence of grounds for termination by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and (2) the disposition stage, where the court's decision whether to terminate parental rights is discretionary. N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 7B–1110, –1111 (2009); In re White, 81 N.C.App. 82, 85, 344 S.E .2d 36, 38 (1986), disc. review denied, 318 N.C. 283, 347 S.E.2d 470 (1986). On appeal, respondent-mother does not make any challenges to the adjudicatory stage of the proceedings. Therefore, the trial court's adjudication of grounds for termination is binding on appeal.
Respondent-mother, however, raises challenges to the dispositional portion of the trial court's order. After an adjudication determining that grounds exist for terminating parental rights, the trial court is required to consider six statutory factors in determining whether termination is in the juvenile's best interest. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a) (2009); see, e.g., In re S .C.H., 199 N.C.App. 658, 666–67, 682 S.E.2d 469, 474 (2009), aff'd per curiam, 363 N.C. 828, 689 S.E.2d 858 (2010). We review the trial court's determination that a termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the juvenile for an abuse of discretion. In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002).
Respondent-mother first challenges one of the trial court's dispositional findings of fact on the ground that it is not supported by sufficient evidence. Respondent-mother challenges the portion of finding of fact number 4, which states:
The current foster parents have not made a decision regarding their intent to adopt the juveniles, although they have not ruled out the possibility.
Respondent-mother argues that this finding is not supported by the evidence because, at the hearing, the foster care social worker offered the following testimony:
Q. And have you had talks with [the foster parents] about their desires or future plans for these children?
A. At this time, they're not an adoptive placement.
Q. They're not an adoptive placement?
A. No.
Q. So they are not willing at this time to adopt the [juveniles] children?
A. At this point in time, no.
Respondent contends that the social worker's testimony was not contradicted at the hearing and that there was no testimony to support the finding that the foster parents “have not ruled out the possibility” of adoption. We disagree.
While the social worker may not have directly stated that the foster parents had not ruled out the possibility of adoption, she did qualify her responses with the phrase “at this time.” From this qualification, one can infer that the foster parents had not made a final determination. Furthermore, this finding is supported by evidence in the reports submitted to the court by DSS and the guardian ad litem, both of which indicate that the foster parents had not yet made a decision. Therefore, we conclude that this finding of fact is supported by sufficient evidence.
Next, respondent-mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the best interests of the juveniles would be served by termination of her parental rights. Respondent-mother does not contend that the trial court failed to consider the statutorily mandated factors. Indeed, based on our review of the trial court's fourteen dispositional findings of fact, it is clear that the trial court properly considered all of the factors required by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110 (a). Respondent-mother instead argues that the trial court's best interest determination was incorrect because the juveniles lacked prospective adoptive parents.
We disagree with respondent-mother's contentions for two reasons. First, contrary to respondent-mother's suggestion, a trial court is not required to find that a child is adoptable before terminating a parent's parental rights. See In re Norris, 65 N.C.App. 269, 275, 310 S.E.2d 25, 29 (1983) (“It suffices to say that such a finding [of adoptability] is not required in order to terminate parental rights.”), cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 703 (1984). Second, the trial court found that the likelihood of adoption was strong, provided that the juveniles were free for adoption, and that DSS would immediately begin adoption recruitment efforts. Thus, it is clear from the trial court's findings that it carefully considered the statutorily-mandated factor regarding likelihood of adoption. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a)(2) (2009).
Accordingly, we conclude that the dispositional portion of the trial court's order demonstrates that the trial court weighed the evidence and made a reasoned decision that termination of respondent-mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We find no abuse of discretion in this determination, and we therefore affirm the order of the trial court terminating respondent-mother's parental rights to Tom, Sam, and Jeff.
Affirmed. Judges GEER and THIGPEN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).