Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1648-14T2
02-09-2017
IN THE MATTER OF SUPERINTENDENT OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES, HUDSON COUNTY
Cindy N. Vogelman argued the cause for the County of Hudson (Chasan Leyner & Lamparello, attorneys; Ms. Vogelman, of counsel; Qing H. Guo, on the briefs). Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for the Civil Service Commission (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Todd A. Wigder, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Accurso and Manahan. On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service Commission, Docket No. 2014-1698. Cindy N. Vogelman argued the cause for the County of Hudson (Chasan Leyner & Lamparello, attorneys; Ms. Vogelman, of counsel; Qing H. Guo, on the briefs). Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for the Civil Service Commission (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Todd A. Wigder, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Hudson County (the County) appeals from a final administrative action of the Civil Service Commission (the Commission) declaring it had statutory and regulatory authority to establish minimum qualifications for a county superintendent of weights and measures, and that the County was not free to appoint an individual who failed to meet the qualifications established in the job specification. The County argues on appeal that it should be permitted to appoint a county superintendent of weights and measures who has completed a course in basic weights and measures conducted under the direction of the State Superintendent as prescribed by N.J.A.C. 13:47b-4.1. The County further argues that the Commission's five-year experience requirement for a county superintendent is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because the Commission lacks the authority to establish the qualifications of a county superintendent and, therefore, plays no role in the appointment. We affirm.
The County sought to appoint a new county superintendent of weights and measures after it was determined by order of the Law Division that the individual previously holding that position was not duly appointed. In furtherance of the appointment, the County, by letter dated October 24, 2013, memorialized its position that the qualifications for a county superintendent are exclusively defined in the weights and measures statute, N.J.S.A. 51:1-48, and by the administrative code provision N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1. In reply, the Commission's Division of Appeals and Regulatory Affairs (the Division) set forth its authority to establish the "minimum education and experience qualifications" for each civil service title, including that of a county superintendent of weights and measures. The Division noted that "sufficient scientific knowledge" as provided by N.J.S.A. 51:1-48, "has appropriately been defined [by the Commission] in the job specification for the subject title as 'five (5) years of experience in servicing, repairing, testing or calibrating, weighing and measuring devices.'" Furthermore, the Division noted that "the job specification indicates that applicants must successfully complete a training program, which is consistent with [N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1]."
Thereafter, the County requested a formal determination from the Commission regarding the required qualifications for the county superintendent. By final administrative action dated October 24, 2014, the Commission denied the County's appeal and concluded that the County "cannot appoint an individual to this title unless he or she meets the qualifications as set forth in the job specification." Further, the Commission concluded that it was vested with the authority by statute and regulation to establish the minimum education and experience requirements of a superintendent of weights and measures, and that the County could not appoint an individual absent the required qualifications.
In pertinent part, the Commission found:
N.J.S.A. 52:1-52 places a [s]uperintendent of [w]eights and [m]easures in the career service. That statue, in conjunction with N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1.2, N.J.S.A. 11A:3-1, and N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.1, permits the Commission to promulgate rules to effectuate the Civil Service Act and classify job titles, which includes the establishment of minimum education and experience qualifications for each title. While the appointing authority contends that N.J.S.A. 51:1-48 and N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1 establish the qualifications for the subject title, N.J.S.A. 11A:12-1 states that any law or statute inconsistent with the Civil Service Act is superseded to the extent of that inconsistency. Nonetheless, it does not appear that an inconsistency exists. N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1 applies to [w]eights and [m]easures [o]fficers and not to a [c]ounty [s]uperintendent. N.J.S.A. 52:1-48 provides that all county superintendents "shall be persons of sufficient scientific knowledge to properly inspect, examine, and report on the technical abilities of said standards." "Sufficient scientific knowledge" has appropriately been defined in the job specification for the subject title as "five (5) years of experience in servicing, repairing, testing or calibrating, weighing and measuring devices." It is noted that the job specification indicates that applicants must successfully complete a training program, which is consistent with the statutory and regulatory provisions that the appointing authority cites.The Commission concluded it has the statutory and regulatory authority to establish the minimum education and experience requirements of a superintendent of weights and measures and in turn, the County cannot appoint an individual unless he or she meets the qualification set forth in the Commission's job specification. This appeal followed.
The County raises the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I
THE [COMMISSION]'S DETERMINATION THAT FIVE YEARS EXPERIENCE IS REQUIRED FOR A COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASOANABLE.
A. The [Commission] Erred in Finding that N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1 Does Not Apply to a County Superintendent.
B. The [Commission] Does Not Have the Statutory Authority to Substantively Increase the Minimum Education and Experience Requirements for a County Superintendent of Weights and Measures.
C. The Weights and Measures Statutes and Regulations Establish the Requirements for the Title.
In the County's reply brief, it also raises the following points:
POINT II
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS NO ROLE PRIOR TO OR IN THE APPOINTMENT OF A COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.
POINT I
BECAUSE THE [COMMISSION] HAS FAILED TO UNDERTAKE OR ARTICULATE ANY JOB ANALYSIS RELATED TO ITS FIVE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE "JOB SPECIFICATION," THIS CRITERIA IS VOID AND THE ONLY VALID REQUIREMENTS FOR THE POSITION OF
COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES IS CONTAINED IN N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1.
POINT II
THE [COMMISSION] DOES NOT HAVE ANY AUTHORITY TO COMMANDEER THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF A COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.
A. The [Commission]'s "Expansive Authority" Must Yield to Established Law[s].
B. "Job Specifications" Cannot Override Duly Promulgated Statutory and Regulatory Acts.
POINT III
THE [COMMISSION] CONCEDES THAT N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1 APPLIES TO THE COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.
A. The State Superintendent Specifically Set Forth Requirements for the County Superintendent.
B. The Court Should Defer to the Weights and Measures Laws and Regulations.
POINT IV
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS NO ROLE PRIOR TO OR IN THE APPOINTMENT OF A COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.
In recognition of the executive function of administrative agencies, the judicial capacity to review administrative actions is limited. In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007). "A strong presumption of reasonableness accompanies an administrative agency's exercise of statutorily-delegated responsibility." Gloucester Cty. Welfare Bd. v. N.J. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 93 N.J. 383, 390-91 (1983) (citing City of Newark v. Natural Res. Council, 82 N.J. 530, 539, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983, 101 S. Ct. 400, 66 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1980)). The burden of showing that the agency's action was arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious rests upon the appellant. Barone v. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. Of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 355 (1987).
A reviewing court "should not disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008). Although this court is "in no way bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue," Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973), if substantial evidence supports the agency's decision, "[we] may not substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's even though [we] might have reached a different result." Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992) (citations omitted). After considering the record and the parties' arguments with these standards in mind, we discern no basis to disturb the Commission's denial of the County's appeal.
Preliminarily, the County argues that the Commission erred in finding that the applicability of N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1 is limited to weights and measures officers, and does not extend to a county superintendent of weights and measures. The County notes that N.J.S.A. 51:1-2(f) includes a county superintendent within its definition of weights and measures officer. As such, the determination by the Commission was erroneous. However, when placed in the context of the entirety of the Commission's decision, we find the error does not render the decision arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
While in its October 24, 2014 decision, the Commission concluded N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1 did not apply to the county superintendent of weights and measures, the Commission no longer advances this position on appeal.
N.J.S.A. 51:1-54 sets forth the qualifications and minimum training requirements for individuals appointed as county superintendent through the enactment of both N.J.S.A. 51:1-48 and N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1, "[n]o person appointed as a State, county, or municipal weights and measures officer will be provided with a badge and/or credentials pursuant to N.J.S.A. 51:1-64 until such time as the appointee has qualified through a course in 'basic weights and measures' conducted under the direction of the State Superintendent." In pertinent part, N.J.S.A. 51:1-48 mandates that "[a]ll county and municipal superintendents and all assistant superintendents shall be persons of sufficient scientific knowledge to properly inspect, examine and report on the technical conditions of said standards."
In this matter, the dissonance between the parties pertains to the extent of the Commission's authority to establish qualifications beyond those adopted by the state superintendent of weights and measures. The County posits the Commission does not have the statutory authority to establish qualifications. Conversely, the Commission contends that Title 51 does not prohibit the Commission from exercising its authority under Title 11A to establish its own qualifications for appointments to the civil service.
We must engage in statutory and regulatory interpretation to resolve whether the Commission has statutory authority to establish additional qualifications for a county superintendent of weights and measures. If that authority exists, we must then determine whether the Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably through its implementation of a five-year experience requirement.
In particular, the County argues "[t]he [Commission] lacks the authority to establish qualifications for the position of County Superintendent that are substantially different and more onerous than those adopted by the State Superintendent of Weights and Measures — who is charged with overseeing and promulgating rules and regulations applicable to this subject matter." The County further submits that N.J.S.A. 51:1-54 and N.J.S.A. 51:1-61 provided the state superintendent with the authority to adopt N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1, which sets forth the minimum training requirements for individuals appointed as a state, county or municipal weights and measures officer.
N.J.S.A. 51:1-54 provides:
[t]he State superintendent shall have general supervision of the administration of the provisions of Title 51 of the Revised Statutes. He shall have general supervision over the work of county and municipal superintendents. He shall make such rules for the administration of the affairs of his office and of the offices of the county and municipal superintendents as may be necessary for the proper enforcement of Title 51 of the Revised Statutes. State weights and measures officials shall be under his direct control.Similarly, N.J.S.A. 51:1-61 provides in relevant part that:
[N. J.S.A. 51:1-54].
[t]he State superintendent may adopt, pursuant to the provisions of the "Administrative Procedure Act," . . . rules and regulations necessary for the implementation of the provisions of Title 51 of the Revised Statutes. Statutes, rules and regulations published by the United States Government and standardizing groups listed in the National
Bureau of Standards Publication 417, "Directory of United States Standardization Activities," or any subsequent publication may be adopted by title or reference only. Regulations may include, but are not limited to:
a. Provisions for the administration and enforcement of Title 51 of the Revised Statutes, and the supervision and training of personnel;
. . . .
h. Any other matter which the State superintendent deems necessary for the effective enforcement of laws relating to standards, weights and measures, consistent with the provisions of Title 51 of the Revised Statutes.
[N. J.S.A. 51:1-61(a), (h).]
The Commission does not dispute that the state superintendent had legal authority to adopt N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1. Similarly, the Commission has not claimed that N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1 should be ignored or that it fails to establish the minimum training requirements for a county superintendent of weights and measures. Rather, the Commission notes that Title 51 does not "[prohibit] the Commission from establishing its own qualifications for appointments to the civil service, even if they may be 'more onerous' than the minimum knowledge and training necessary to be credentialed by the State Superintendent."
Further, there is no disagreement between the County and the Commission that "N.J.S.A. 51:1-64 and N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1 require a county superintendent to complete a basic weights and measures course in order to obtain credentials from the State Superintendent to perform this work." The Commission argues, however, that the weights and measures course merely provides that the "minimum training requirements" needed to obtain the state-issued credentials. Those requirements are neither exclusive nor conditions to appointment. Indeed, the training course contemplated by N.J.S.A. 51:1-64 and N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1 is taken and the credentials issued after appointment.
Thus, the Commission avers the Weights and Measures Act and its implementing regulation set only minimum standards for credentials, and do not forbid the Commission from exercising its authority under Title 11A to establish the qualifications necessary to be eligible for appointment in the civil service to the County Superintendent position. We agree.
It is well-established that the best indicator of legislative intent is "the plain language chosen by the Legislature." State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010). In interpreting a statute, courts give the relevant language its ordinary meaning and construe it "in a common-sense manner." State in Interest of K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 91 (2014) (citations omitted); see also N.J.S.A. 1:1-1 (stating that the words of a statute are customarily construed according to their generally accepted meaning). "We do not add terms which may have been intentionally omitted by the Legislature, speculate, or otherwise engage in an interpretation which would avoid its plain meaning." State v. Perry, 439 N.J. Super. 514, 523 (App. Div.) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)), cert. denied, 222 N.J. 306 (2015). Where plain language "leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then the interpretive process should end, without resort to extrinsic sources." State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 164 (2007) (citing DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492). Only when a fair "reading of the enactment leads to more than one plausible interpretation" do we look to extrinsic evidence. Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 222 (2008) (citing DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492-93).
A plain reading of N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1 demonstrates that the basic weights and measures course requirement is applicable only after an individual is "appointed as a State, county, or municipal weights and measures officer." N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1. This is also apparent from the regulation's reference to N.J.S.A. 51:1-64. When N.J.A.C. 13:47B-4.1 and N.J.S.A. 51:1-64 are read in conjunction, it is evident that completion of a course in basic weights and measures is a requirement for obtaining a "badge or a similar identification device." N.J.S.A. 51:1-64. Accordingly, as argued by the Commission, completion of a course in weights and measures is not a prerequisite for appointment or hire as the County suggests. Rather, it is a post-appointment requirement for obtaining credentials.
This "badge" displays an officer's "official number" and must be "exhibit[ed] . . . upon demand during the performance of his official duties." N.J.S.A. 51:1-64.
Moreover, it is clear from a plain reading of the provisions of Title 11A, the administrative regulations in Title 4A and our Constitution that the Commission has the authority to promulgate and enforce minimum education and experience qualifications for positions in the classified service. The Civil Service Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to -12-6, established the Commission and implemented the constitutional provision requiring a civil service system. See N.J.S.A. 11A:2-1; N.J. Const. art. VII, § 1, ¶ 2. The purpose of the Act is "to ensure efficient public service for state, county, and municipal government." Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. N.J. Dep't of Pers., 154 N.J. 121, 126 (1998) (citing Borough of Park Ridge v. Salimone, 21 N.J. 28, 44 (1956)); see also N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2. "The goal of the Act is to permit employees to be appointed and advanced based on their merit and demonstrated abilities." In re Johnson, 215 N.J. 366, 375-76 (2013) (citing N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2(a), 2(c); Commc'ns Workers, supra, 154 N.J. at 126; Kelly v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 37 N.J. 450, 456 (1962)). "Civil Service positions are designed to be 'beyond political control, partnership, and personal favoritism.'" Id. at 376 (quoting Commc'ns Workers, supra, 154 N.J. at 126); see also N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2(e).
The Legislature has given the Commission the statutory authority to "establish and supervise the selection process" for civil service employment. N.J.S.A. 11A:2-11(f); see also N.J.S.A. 11A:2-6(d); N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1.2 (providing the Commission with authority to adopt rules to carry out the civil service law, including the promulgation of regulations to effectuate the purposes of the Act). Furthermore, the Commission is responsible for "the assignment of titles among the career service, the senior executive service, and the unclassified service for positions in State service and political subdivisions." Johnson, supra, 215 N.J. at 376 (citing N.J.S.A. 11A:3-1); see also N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2.
The civil service selection process is triggered when a civil service employer intends to fill a vacant position or make a provisional appointment. N.J.S.A. 11A:4-5 ("Once the examination process has been initiated due to the appointment of a provisional or an appointing authority's request for a list to fill a vacancy, the affected appointing authority shall be required to make appointments from the list[.]"). If there are no available candidates for appointment, the Commission must provide for "the announcement and administration of examinations which shall test fairly the knowledge, skills and abilities required to satisfactorily perform the duties of a title or group of titles. N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1(a). "The examinations may include, but are not limited to, written, oral, performance and evaluation of education and experience" necessary for civil service jobs. Ibid. Moreover, the examination announcement must include the title to be examined, the minimum qualifications necessary for admission to the examination, the duties and responsibilities of the position, and salary and filing information. N.J.A.C. 4A:4-2.1.
Administrative regulations in Title 4A further delineate the Commission's authority. N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.1 to -10-3.2. For example, N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.1(b)2 requires that positions in the career service be assigned a specific job title, which "[e]stablishes the minimum education and experience qualifications necessary for successful performance." N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.1(b)2. Additionally, N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2 requires the Commission to establish and maintain classification plans that list job titles and provide a "job specification for each title, which shall include a descriptive summary of duties and responsibilities of a position or group of positions which are sufficiently similar in content to be assigned a job title[.]" N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2(a)-(b)2. Therefore, an appointing authority, such as the County, cannot appoint an individual to a civil service title unless he or she meets the qualifications set forth in the Commission's job specification.
Our Supreme Court has stated that the authority granted to the Commission should be construed liberally to enable the agency to accomplish the Legislature's goals. Johnson, supra, 215 N.J. at 376; Gloucester Cty. Welfare Bd., supra, 93 N.J. at 390; Mastrobattista v. Essex Cty. Park Comm'n, 46 N.J. 138, 147 (1965). "Courts provide the widest possible interpretation of the Act as it was designed to procure efficient public service and to maintain stability and continuity in ordinary public employment." Johnson, supra, 215 N.J. at 377 (citations omitted). "When the Commission exercises its authority to prescribe the qualifications for a position, courts are loathe to interfere." Ibid. (citing Gloucester Cty. Welfare Bd., supra, 93 N.J. at 393).
In Gloucester Cty. Welfare Bd., supra, the Court held the Commission did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably when it refused to broaden the educational qualifications for the position of deputy director of welfare, namely a master's degree in social work, social welfare, public administration, or business administration, to include a law degree. 93 N.J. at 387-88. The Court further held that the Commission was authorized by the Legislature to promulgate and enforce educational qualifications for positions in the classified service pursuant to former N.J.S.A. 11:1-7. Id. at 398. Further, the Court concluded the Commission had broad discretion in this area and the record did not support a finding that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not permitting substitutions. Id. at 398-99.
Title 11 was repealed in its entirety in 1986 and replaced by Title 11A. Johnson, supra, 215 N.J. at 371 n.1.
The Court's analysis in that case is particularly relevant to the instant matter:
The Commission's familiarity with the duties and job specifications were the predicate for its determination of the required educational background and experience. Its expertise should be respected.Here, as in Gloucester Cty. Welfare Bd., the Commission properly exercised its authority in establishing and enforcing a five-year experience requirement for a county superintendent of weights and measures, a position in the classified service. See also State v. State Supervisory Emps. Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 90 (1978) (recognizing Commission's authority to classify positions and to prescribe qualifications for specific titles).
We find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in adherence to uniform minimum standards for determining eligibility of each applicant for a competitive examination.
. . . .
A fundamental purpose of Civil Service, to assure objective appointments based on merit, is furthered if the minimum eligibility requirements are demanded of all applicants. Use of educational equivalency disserves this goal, and the Commission properly exercised its authority in this respect by not providing for substitution.
[Id. at 395-96 (internal citations omitted).]
N.J.S.A. 51:1-52 provides that "[a]ll county and municipal superintendents in counties and municipalities operating under the provisions of subtitle 3 of the title Civil Service (11:19-1 et seq.), shall be placed in the classified service and shall continue in such positions subject to the provisions of said subtitle 3."
In light of the strong presumption of reasonableness to which we afford the Commission's decision, and after reviewing the record and applicable law, the County has failed to meet its substantial burden of demonstrating that the five-year experience requirement is clearly mistaken or erroneous. See Gloucester Cty. Welfare Bd., supra, 93 N.J. at 390-91. Accordingly, the County cannot appoint an individual to this title unless he or she meets the qualifications properly set forth by the Commission.
We next address the County's argument that the Commission does not have a role prior to or in the appointment of a county superintendent of weights and measures. The County contends the Legislature has expressly reserved that authority to the county governing body, and therefore, it is only after a county superintendent is appointed that the civil services laws regarding discipline, suspension, discharge, and hearing procedures apply. We disagree.
While it is accurate that a governing body of a county is charged with appointing a county superintendent, N.J.S.A. 51:1-43, the appointment is subject to the civil selection process. We have held that:
See also N.J.S.A. 51:1-53 ("The county superintendents . . . appointed by the respective county . . . or other governing bodies or by the respective county . . . superintendents upon resolution of said governing bodies, shall hold office during good behavior."); N.J.S.A. 11A:4-5 (examination process triggered by appointing authority's request to fill a vacancy or its action to make a provisional appointment); N.J.S.A. 11A:4-13 (types of appointment an appointing authority may make); N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.3 (defining "appointing authority"). --------
the party challenging a regulation has the burden of demonstrating an inconsistency between the regulation and the statute it implements, a violation of policy expressed or implied by the Legislature, an extension of the statute beyond what the Legislature intended, or a conflict between the enabling act and other statutory law that cannot be harmonized.Here, we are satisfied the County has not demonstrated either an inconsistency or a conflict. The Legislature placed the county superintendent position in the civil service. It thus follows that the Commission has the constitutional, statutory and regulatory authority to establish minimum education and experience requirements. See N.J.S.A. 51:1-52; see also N.J. Const. art. VII, § 1, ¶ 2; N.J.S.A. 11A:2-11(f); N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1(a); N.J.S.A. 11A:4-5; N.J.S.A. 11A:12-1; N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.1; N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.2. The civil service selection process was triggered when the County sought to fill a vacant position for county superintendent of weights and measures; militating against the finding that the Commission plays no role in the appointment of a county superintendent.
[In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 , 431 N.J. Super. 100, 118 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 216 N.J. 8 (2013) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted).]
Finally, for the first time in its reply brief, the County raises the argument that the Commission did not articulate a "job analysis" pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:3-3.1 in its October 24, 2014 final administrative decision. Given the timing of this argument, not raised before the Commission, we do not consider it on appeal. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20-22 (2009); Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).
From our review of the record and in conformance with applicable law, we conclude that the County's remaining arguments, not specifically addressed herein, lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION