Opinion
04-22-00320-CV
10-26-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF A.Z.P. and S.J.R., Children
From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020PA02402 Honorable Solomon Casseb, III, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
AFFIRMED
Two children were the subject of the underlying proceedings to terminate appellant R.R.'s parental rights: A.Z.P. and S.J.R. The case initially was tried to the bench on March 3, 2022, during which several witnesses testified. Following the March 3rd hearing, the trial court signed a Final Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship and Order of Termination terminating R.R.'s parental rights to both children. A de novo trial was held before the bench on April 1, 2022, during which several witnesses testified and the trial court considered the evidence from the March 3rd hearing. Following the de novo hearing, the trial court signed a Final Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship and Order of Termination Following Trial De Novo terminating R.R.'s parental rights as to S.J.R. and naming R.R. as possessory conservator of A.Z.P. On appeal R.R. challenges only the trial court's best-interest finding as to S.J.R. We affirm.
To protect the privacy of minor children, we use initials to refer to the children and their biological parents. Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8(b)(2). A.Z.P. was born on July 19, 2008 and S.J.R. was born on May 3, 2020.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the well-established standards of review. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 101.007, 161.206(a); In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (factual sufficiency); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (legal sufficiency). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. In a bench trial, such as here, "the trial judge is best able to observe and assess the witnesses' demeanor and credibility, and to sense the 'forces, powers, and influences' that may not be apparent from merely reading the record on appeal." In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citation omitted). We therefore defer to the trial court's judgment regarding credibility determinations. While we must detail the evidence relevant to the issue of parental termination when reversing a finding based upon insufficient evidence, we need not do so when affirming a verdict of termination. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014).
To terminate parental rights pursuant to Family Code section 161.001, the Department has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) one of the predicate grounds in subsection 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 161.001(b), 161.206(a). In this case, the trial court found evidence of two predicate grounds to terminate R.R.'s parental rights, specifically section 161.001(b)(1) subsections (O) and (P). The trial court also found termination of her parental rights was in S.J.R.'s best interest. In R.R.'s sole issue on appeal, she contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights is in S.J.R.'s best interest.
BEST INTEREST
When considering the best interest of the child, we recognize the existence of a strong presumption that the child's best interest is served by preserving the parent-child relationship. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). "[T]he best interest standard does not permit termination [of parental rights] merely because a child might be better off living elsewhere." In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (citation omitted). However, we also presume that prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is in the child's best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307(a). The Department has the burden to rebut these presumptions by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2017, no pet.). "'Clear and convincing evidence' means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007; R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 97. To determine whether the Department satisfies its burden, the Texas Legislature has provided several statutory factors for courts to consider regarding a parent's willingness and ability to provide a child with a safe environment, and the Texas Supreme Court has provided a similar list of factors to determine a child's best interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307(b); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).
These factors include, inter alia: "(1) the child's age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child's home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child's parents, other family members, or others who have access to the child's home; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child's family or others who have access to the child's home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child's family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency's close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child's family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child's family demonstrates adequate parenting skills [. . .]; and (13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child." Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307(b).
Those factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.
A best-interest finding, however, does not require proof of any particular factors. See In re G.C.D., No. 04-14-00769-CV, 2015 WL 1938435, at *5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Apr. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and "[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child's best interest." In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18-00181-CV, 2018 WL 3551208, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 25, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Evidence that proves a statutory ground for termination is probative on the issue of best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). "A trier of fact may measure a parent's future conduct by [her] past conduct [in] determin[ing] whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest." In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). This conduct can include drug use, which can destabilize the home and expose children to physical and emotional harm if not resolved. See, e.g., In re K.J.G., 04-19-00102-CV, 2019 WL 3937278, at *8 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In analyzing these factors, the court must focus on the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent. Dupree v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ).
BACKGROUND
The Department filed its petition for conservatorship and termination of parental rights on December 2, 2020. During the March 3rd termination hearing several witnesses testified. R.R. did not appear for the hearing, although her attorney was present. Rachel Kotowski, the original caseworker, testified the Department's original concerns were R.R.'s drug use, R.R.'s possible mental health issues, and possible domestic violence. The Department also had concerns R.R. used illicit drugs while pregnant with S.J.R., who was born positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines. S.J.R. did not display any specific withdrawal symptoms, but he displayed possible developmental concerns. Kotowski discussed the drug use allegations with R.R., and R.R. denied any drug use while pregnant, stated S.J.R. was not born drug positive, and the results were incorrect. Kotowski said she did not create R.R.'s service plan, but she reviewed the plan with R.R. Under the plan, R.R. was ordered to participate in a psychological evaluation and individual counseling; complete a drug assessment and subsequent drug treatment, as well as random drug testing; and maintain housing and employment. She also was ordered to complete domestic violence prevention classes and parenting classes. As of Kotowski's last day with the Department, R.R. had completed only a psychological evaluation, and had not engaged in any services. R.R. gave Kotowski no reasons for not engaging in any services, except to state she did not believe she needed to participate in drug treatment because she was not using any drugs. Of the twenty-five times R.R. was asked to do a drug test she went only three times. The tests were positive, but R.R. claimed the results were incorrect.
Kotowski's last day on the case was January 26, 2022.
R.R. did not provide Kotowski with any information about how she supported herself or with any specific information about housing. Regarding housing, R.R. told Kotowski she was in a domestic violence shelter because she was experiencing domestic violence, she lived with a family member, and she lived with a friend. Therefore, Kotowski had concerns about R.R.'s stability. In Kotowski's opinion, R.R. did not make the changes necessary to avoid termination of her parental rights, did not address her mental health concerns, and did not demonstrate she could take care of the physical and emotional needs of her children. Kotowski did testify that R.R. attended visits with both children.
Crystal Jones, the caseworker who took over the case in February 2022, testified R.R. had made no progress on her service plan. Jones said that since February 2022, she had asked R.R. to go for a drug test three times and R.R. never went. Although R.R. provided her with a home address, R.R. was not at the house for the two appointments Jones made with her for an assessment. Jones had not asked for proof of employment. In Jones's opinion, R.R. had done nothing to address the Department's concerns and she did not believe R.R. could care for the children's physical and emotional needs. She believed termination of R.R.'s parental rights was in the children's best interest. Although Jones did not witness the visits R.R. had with her children, she said she had a brief "positive conversation" with R.R. about the children. When asked how she could conclude R.R. could not provide for the physical and emotional needs of the children when she had been the caseworker for such a short period of time, Jones responded:
And so, I wasn't able to verify that she actually resides in the address that she provided to me. And then, I know the facts of the removal. And in order to ensure that she has learned from using, she hasn't gone to drug test when I've asked her to, even when I provided transportation for her to go drug test.
Jones stated she did not know when the Department's goal for R.R. to retain her parental rights to A.Z.P. changed. She stated A.Z.P.'s father wanted R.R.'s rights as to A.Z.P. terminated.
A.Z.P.'s father, N.O., testified about whether R.R. and A.Z.P. were bonded by stating,
[A.Z.P.] has stressed to me various times, one day she woke up crying that she's been through a lot of turmoil with her mother, her history. Very bad situations that she still-I had to take her to a couple of places. I got her a new therapist.
She loves her mother, but her mother is not in a condition to provide her with a safe, secure atmosphere.
When asked why he wanted R.R.'s parental rights to A.Z.P. terminated, he replied:
It's a type of person that is in denial of everything and will sit and argue - In other words, will stand there if she feels she has a right and will even demand, "Call the police. This is my"-I mean, and just completely get out of control. It's, in my opinion, just pure addiction. The drugs will drive you insane. You have to stop and be sober to begin to understand reality. It's obvious that she
Several witnesses also testified at the April 1, 2022 de novo bench trial, including R.R. Anahi, R.R.'s sister, testified R.R. and the two children lived with her for about nine months beginning in May 2020 and until the Department removed the children based on R.R.'s positive drug test results. Anahi said she would like to be considered for the children's placement if her sister's parental rights were terminated, she is employed, married, has two children, and owns her home. She said the Department did several home studies while the children were living with her. If A.Z.P. stayed with her father, she would like to adopt S.J.R. If she did not adopt S.J.R., she knew another family member wanted to adopt him. Anahi stated that, while R.R. and the children lived with her, R.R. "was 100 percent there for the kids" and there were no "issues." She said R.R. would bathe S.J.R. every day, they all had family dinners together, and would go to events together. She believed R.R. was bonded with her children.
At some point the safety plan with Anahi was broken because she allowed the children unsupervised visits with A.Z.P.'s father. Anahi explained she thought doing so was safe because A.Z.P. was placed with her father. She testified R.R. and the children moved in with A.Z.P.'s father, but she later stated R.R. and the children still lived with her but they would go to A.Z.P.'s father's house. She did not believe her sister's parental rights should be terminated; however, she was not aware her sister only went for three out of twenty-five drug tests, and she was not aware of the drug test results.
R.R. testified she started drug rehabilitation counseling. However, she said, "And I had a breakdown where I wasn't mind fitted [sic] to stay there knowing I wasn't prepared for-she just let-I thought I had more power handling [sic] out here but it didn't happen like that. If I would have stayed in rehab, things would have been done differently." She said she then voluntarily readmitted herself into another rehabilitation facility where she had another "breakdown." R.R. said she started another rehabilitation program until a drug test came back positive and she was asked to leave. She contended the hair follicle test was positive but from something that happened prior to her treatment. She denied using drugs while in treatment. She stated she also attends AA meetings on-line, and she attends counseling three or four times a week via an online Zoom app. When asked why she did not take the drugs tests as ordered by the Department, R.R. explained,
I was-on the removal it was very hard to accept what was happening to seeing my children neglect [sic] and abused in the system. It was really hard to. And I- not having the children or the support, not able to go back home where we were at, it put me in a position where I had to live on the street. And it was just really hard.
R.R. said she no longer lived on the street and was moving into her own place that day. She was not asked for details about her new home. She was not currently employed because she was in therapy after a car accident, but had previously worked for seven years. She believed her children and she were bonded, she and A.Z.P. had a healthy relationship, and she did not believe terminating her parental rights was in A.Z.P.'s best interest. As to S.J.R., she believed he would be loved in her home because he had a sister, mother, aunt, stepfather, and other family. She wanted her children placed with family with the option of her demonstrating she was capable of staying sober and giving her children the proper attention they needed. She was open to the Department staying involved.
When asked why she thought the children were being "abused and neglected in the system," R.R. explained,
Just from my first visit with the children I noticed that the kids were-my daughter was not herself anymore, the way she was dressed, the way the foster parent showed up and how [the foster father] was holding her. I know that they were in danger, with [S.J.R.] not having a diaper bag, with an infant in the car. It just didn't seem normal for a foster parent to drive from across town to a visit like that.
When asked if she brought to the caseworker's attention the way the foster father was holding her daughter, R.R. said the caseworker told her to "know her place" and this was not the way to handle the matter. She said her daughter made an outcry about the foster father August 10, 2021, and then ran away from the foster home.
R.R. admitted her methamphetamine use was "a bad choice" that affected her family and caused a lot of pain. When asked why her parental rights to two of her other children had been terminated, she responded "[b]ecause of the system, how they handled [her] case." She then refused to further answer the question. She recognized how her substance abuse and the pattern and frequency of her arrests impacted her life. She admitted she missed a court date after she was arrested for theft in January 2002 and her probation for that conviction was later revoked. She was arrested for driving while intoxicated in 2006. She then failed to appear in November 2006 and forfeited her bond. She was rebooked, but failed to appear for her jury trial. She eventually pled guilty and was placed on probation. A motion to revoke was later filed, but she was continued on probation. She admitted to "multiple arrests" for driving while intoxicated. She denied a warrant for her arrest was issued for failure to appear in March 2008, she was booked in July 2009, failed to appear in October 2009, and was not booked again until 2012. She denied being a fugitive for three years. She said she did not appear for the March 3rd termination hearing because she was on strong medication following her January 29, 2022 car accident. However, she still went to the visits with her children. When asked if she understood why it caused concern that she visited her children but failed to appear at the termination hearing, she explained she was not "fit" to attend trial.
She admitted she continued to use methamphetamine during the case. However, although she acknowledged S.J.R. tested positive when he was born, she believed there was "no reason" for the result because she did not "actually inhale or smoke anything," she merely had the "tools." She denied that during the pendency of the case, from December 28, 2020 to March 3, 2022, the Department asked her to submit to testing twenty-five times, she tested only three times, and all tests were positive. She admitted to being arrested for criminal trespass in January 2021 after changing a price tag on a notebook at Wal-Mart, a store she had been warned not to return to. She was currently released on bond for the charge.
Kotowski acknowledged that at the March 3rd hearing she stated the Department's goal was for R.R. to maintain possessory rights to A.Z.P. and to terminate her parental rights to S.J.R. She recalled that during a December 10, 2021 family group conference telling R.R. that if she did not reengage in her services the Department's goal would be to terminate her parental rights to both children. Up until Kotowski left the Department on January 26, 2022, R.R. had not engaged in her services. Therefore, from the time of the December 2021 family group meeting through the March 3rd hearing, the Department's goal was termination of parental rights to both children.
Dolly Lopez, the admissions director at Lifetime Recovery, testified the facility is a substance abuse disorder and inpatient/outpatient facility. She is a licensed chemical dependency counselor, although she was not R.R.'s counselor. She stated R.R. did not successfully complete the program and was discharged for nonattendance and not coming in for a drug test. Lopez was responsible for the decision to not readmit R.R. the second time R.R. was referred to the program because she twice failed to provide a urine analysis.
Rita Garcia, the Department supervisor overseeing the case for its entirety, testified that at the time of the children's removal and first placement with Anahi, the Department was concerned about its inability to contact R.R., it appeared the children were not living at the placement with Anahi, and that R.R. was permitting the children to stay with A.Z.P.'s father who was allowed only supervised visits. The Department later discovered R.R. and the children were not living with Anahi, but were actually living with A.Z.P.'s father. Garcia explained to Anahi the children were not allowed unsupervised visits with, and could not live with, A.Z.P.'s father and that R.R. was not allowed to be alone with her children or to leave the house with her children. The court's order was again violated and Anahi was asked if she would be willing to keep the children if R.R. was asked to move out of her house. Anahi said no.
Crystal Jones, the Department's conservator caseworker, testified she observed a visit after the March 3rd hearing at which R.R.'s parental rights were terminated, during which R.R. asked her questions about the case after having been told not to discuss the case during the visit. Jones said parents are allowed to ask about their case either before or after the visit, but not during the visit. Although the visit should have lasted two hours, R.R. was thirty minutes late arriving and continually asked questions about the case until A.Z.P. asked her to stop. During the visit, A.Z.P. held S.J.R., played with him, and gave him the food R.R. brought with her. Jones said that, although it was supposed to be a visit with R.R., it was mainly a visit between the siblings.
Jones stated that after the visit, R.R. continued to act inappropriately by asking to speak with the foster mother when the following transpired:
So [R.R.] was talking about the state corruption, about abuse and neglect, how she was going to appeal and going into details with [A.Z.P.] there, [S.J.R.] there and another child that foster parent had there. And then when she walked the foster
parent to the car, I was there-'cause she wanted to speak with me and so I reminded her that I had another visit to go to. And so she wanted to talk with me then. She talked with me and then she started cursing me. And [A.Z.P.] was there, again, and the other two children. And [A.Z.P.] left crying hysterically. And foster mom had to check on me to make sure that I was all right. And so [R.R.] was acting that way in front of everyone.
Jones said R.R. called her "the B word" several times within hearing of the children. When asked why she thought termination of R.R.'s parental rights as to both children was in the children's best interest, Jones responded:
The reason for removal was due to drug use and she hasn't completed a drug program for it. She has not provided drug tests for the Department or demonstrated that she can be clean. I had [sic] not been able to verify where [she] actually lives to show that she has a safe and stable environment for her children. And then [A.Z.P.] has psychiatric needs and Mom behaving this way and not ensuring that she's taken care of and that she's not using can upset [A.Z.P.] and lead her down the wrong way.
. . .
And [S.J.R.] is a baby so he can't verbalize his feelings or if he feels safe or not.
Jones did not believe the children were safe with R.R. She stated she visited S.J.R.'s foster home and it was a safe, stable, loving, and permanent home for the child. She said the foster parents were attentive to S.J.R.'s care, he received therapy three times a week for "different things," he was taken to all his appointments, and the foster mother provided a "nice loving note" for R.R. to tell R.R. about her son. She also stated there were no marks or bruises on S.J.R., he was healthy, and he appeared comfortable with his foster parents. He called his foster "dad" or "dada."
At the conclusion of the de novo hearing, the trial court terminated R.R.'s parental rights as to S.J.R. on two predicate grounds, found termination was in the child's best interest, and appointed the Department the child's permanent managing conservator.
The trial court appointed R.R. as possessory conservator of A.Z.P.
In its May 19, 2022 Final Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship and Order of Termination Following Trial De Novo, the trial court found (1) R.R. failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of her children; (2) R.R. used a controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health and safety of the children and (a) failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program or, (b) after completion of a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program continued to abuse a controlled substance; (3) the Department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with their mother; and (4) termination of R.R.'s parental rights as to S.J.R. was in the child's best interest. The trial court also found that, "[i]n accordance with § l61.001(d), Texas Family Code, . . . [R.R.] did not prove by a preponderance of evidence that [she]: (1) was unable to comply with specific provisions of a court order; and (2) [she] made a good faith effort to comply with the order and the failure to comply with the order is not attributable to any fault of [R.R.]." On appeal, R.R. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to the best interest finding.
ANALYSIS
As stated above, a best-interest finding does not require proof of any particular factors and none of the factors we consider are exhaustive. See G.C.D., 2015 WL 1938435, at *5; J.B.-F., 2018 WL 3551208, at *3. "Evidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child's best interest"; J.B.-F., 2018 WL 3551208, at *3; and evidence proving a statutory ground for termination is probative on the issue of best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. "A trier of fact may measure a parent's future conduct by [her] past conduct [in] determin[ing] whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest." E.D., 419 S.W.3d at 620. "[T]he best interest standard does not permit termination [of parental rights] merely because a child might be better off living elsewhere." In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (citation omitted).
The evidence shows R.R. received her service plan in early 2021. On February 25, 2021, the trial court signed a Status Hearing Order in which it found that R.R. did not sign the plan but had reviewed and understood her service plan and had been advised that unless she was willing and able to provide the children with a safe environment, even with the assistance of a service plan, within the reasonable period of time specified in the plan, her parental and custodial rights might be subject to restriction or termination or the children may not be returned to her. See Tex. Fam. Code § 263.103(d)(2) ("The original service plan takes effect when . . . the court issues an order giving effect to the plan without the parents' signatures.").
R.R. testified she was about to move into her own housing and she engaged in drug treatment but either left the program because she had a "breakdown" or was discharged for failure to provide a urine analysis. She claimed she attended AA meetings and counseling online. We defer to the trial court's judgment regarding credibility determinations. In re M.A.D.V., No. 04-22-00131-CV, 2022 WL 3372416, at *7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Aug. 17, 2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Therefore, the trial court could have discredited this testimony.
Kotowski testified that, under the plan, R.R. was ordered to participate in a psychological evaluation and individual counseling; complete a drug assessment and subsequent drug treatment, as well as random drug testing; maintain housing and employment; and complete domestic violence prevention classes and parenting classes. As of January 26, 2022, she had completed only a psychological evaluation, but not engaged in any of her services. Of the twenty-five times R.R. was asked to do a drug test she went only three times despite admitting her use of methamphetamine affected her family and caused a lot of pain. The tests were positive. Jones said R.R. attended visits with both children, but she also testified about R.R.'s disruptive behavior during the visits. R.R. also provided no proof of housing or employment. The trial court could have reasonably credited this evidence as supporting its best-interest finding. See In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d 681, 687 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (noncompliance with service plan is probative of child's best interest).
Of the Family Code statutory factors, the trier of fact can consider that S.J.R.'s age made him vulnerable and that R.R. admitted to methamphetamine use. See In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 887-88 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (considering parent's substance abuse and failure to comply with service plan in holding evidence supported best-interest finding).
Evidence of the Holley factors also supports the trial court's best-interest finding. Despite positive drug test results, R.R. failed to complete drug treatment. Illicit drug use is relevant to multiple Holley factors, including a child's emotional and physical needs now and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, R.R.'s parental abilities, and the acts or omissions that may indicate an improper parent-child relationship. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72. "Additionally, a parent's illegal drug use exposes [a] child to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or imprisoned." See In re A.M.L., No. 04-19-00422-CV, 2019 WL 6719028, at *4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 11, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (explaining drug use implicates multiple Holley factors).
The trial court also could have inferred from R.R.'s past drug use, failure to complete drug treatment and her other services, and multiple arrest history that she lacked parental abilities, including the motivation to seek out and utilize available resources. See In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) ("A fact finder may infer from a parent's failure to take the initiative to complete the services required to regain possession of [her] child that [she] does not have the ability to motivate [herself] to seek out available resources needed now or in the future."); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 263.307(b)(10), (11) (providing courts may consider willingness and ability of child's family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and willingness and ability of child's family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time).
R.R. provided no proof of housing or employment, and the trial court reasonably could have determined that any stability R.R. might achieve was unlikely to last. Cf. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009) ("[E]vidence of improved conduct, especially of short-duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value of a long history of . . . irresponsible choices.").
Finally, "[a] child's need for permanence through the establishment of a 'stable, permanent home' has been recognized as the paramount consideration in a best-interest determination." In re L.G.R., 498 S.W.3d 195, 205 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Jones testified she visited S.J.R.'s foster home and it was a safe, stable, loving, and permanent home for the child; the foster parents were attentive to S.J.R.'s care; he received therapy three times a week for "different things"; he was taken to all his appointments; the foster mother provided a "nice loving note" for R.R. to tell R.R. about her son; there were no marks or bruises on S.J.R.; he was healthy; and appeared comfortable with his foster parents.
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the best-interest finding, and applying the appropriate factors, we conclude the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of R.R.'s parental rights was in S.J.R.'s best interest. We also conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding. Here, there is no disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding and there are no undisputed facts contrary to the finding. Therefore, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of R.R.'s parental rights was in S.J.R.'s best interest.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we overrule R.R.'s sole issue on appeal and affirm the trial court's May 19, 2022 Final Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship and Order of Termination Following Trial De Novo.