Opinion
1863 EDA 2023 1864 EDA 2023 J-S40018-23
01-10-2024
IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.L.S., A MINOR APPEAL OF: V.L.S., MOTHER IN RE: ADOPTION OF E.C.S., A MINOR APPEAL OF: V.L.S., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decree Entered May 26, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-A0072, 2022-A0073
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J. [*]
MEMORANDUM
SULLIVAN, J.
V.L.S. ("Mother") appeals from the decrees granting the petitions filed by the Montgomery County Office of Children and Youth Services ("the Agency") to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her twin sons, A.L.S. and E.C.S. (born January 2021) (collectively, "Children"). We affirm.
By separate decrees of the same date, the Orphans' Court terminated the parental rights of the Children's father, J.W.B. ("Father"). Father did not file appeals or participate in the instant appeals.
The Agency's involvement with this family began after Children's premature birth at thirty-one weeks of gestation and Mother's positive test for marijuana. See Agency Exhibits 3 & 4, Orders of Adjudication and Disposition, 4/8/21, Findings of Fact, at ¶ 1-2; see also N.T., 1/17/23, at 57, 59, 137. Mother acknowledged that the home in which she resided with her mother, R.S. ("Maternal Grandmother"), and Father was "not livable" and "not in suitable condition" for Children. N.T., 1/17/23, at 57; Agency Exhibits 3 & 4, Orders of Adjudication and Disposition, 4/8/21, Findings of Fact, at ¶ 3. Upon investigation, the Agency confirmed the home was "uninhabitable." Agency Exhibits 3 & 4, Orders of Adjudication and Disposition, 4/8/21, Findings of Fact, at ¶¶ 4. Mother also reported to the Agency that she had been diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder. See Agency Exhibits 3 & 4, Orders of Adjudication and Disposition, 4/8/21, Findings of Fact, at ¶ 7.
Mother also stated she had been diagnosed as being on the autism spectrum when she was a minor, but the Agency did not have documentation of that diagnosis. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 26, 114, 205; see also id. at 43 (indicating Mother's behaviors and cognitive issues were more consistent with a mood disorder than autism).
The Agency made initial plans for Mother and Father to seek new housing and raise Children together, but Mother told the Agency they were separating, and Father stated he did not want to parent Children. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 58-59, 62; Agency Exhibits 3 & 4, Orders of Adjudication and Disposition, 4/8/21, Findings of Fact, at ¶ 5. Mother reported she was breaking up with Father because he subjected her to "every type of domestic violence other than sexual." N.T., 1/17/23, at 59. The Agency obtained emergency protective custody of Children in February 2021, took custody of them at the time of their discharge from the hospital, and placed them in foster care.
In April 2021, the court adjudicated Children dependent and established concurrent goals of reunification and adoption. In furtherance of reunification, the Agency instituted a family service plan with objectives focused on Mother's mental health and housing issues and requiring her cooperation with the Agency. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 63-66; see also Agency Exhibits 10, 11, 12, & 13. The Agency offered numerous services to Mother. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 68-69. In July 2021, a provider assisting Mother with her housing issues became concerned about Mother's mental health condition and sought an involuntary mental health commitment. When informed of the provider's concerns, Mother threatened to "do death by cop." N.T., 1/17/23, at 76. Mother underwent a nine-day psychiatric commitment.
In September 2021, Mother completed a parenting capacity and bonding assessment with Stephen Miksic, Ph.D. ("Dr. Miksic"), after which Dr. Miksic made recommendations and indicated Mother needed to show substantial progress in six months. Agency Exhibit 6, at 14-15; see also N.T., 1/17/23, at 45-46 (summarizing Dr. Miksic's recommendations as (1) therapy; (2) a written plan for how to provide for Children; (3) specific behavioral goals to limit her angry outbursts; (4) consistent contact with Children; and (5) healthy levels of parent-child interactions; and (6) consistent attendance of visits). That same month, Mother and Maternal Grandmother moved to Somerset County, Pennsylvania, approximately a four-hour drive from Montgomery County, where Children resided. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 71-73, 90, 148, 167-68. The Agency recommended against the move because of the distance from Children and advised Mother of the importance of maintaining in-person contact with Children, then eight or nine months old, as well as with the Agency and her providers. See id. at 148. Mother's communication with the Agency was "extremely limited" after she moved. Id. at 77. One year later, Father moved in with Mother and Maternal Grandmother in Somerset County. See id. at 101.
Mother did not have a driver's license and she indicated she was completely reliant on Maternal Grandmother for transportation. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 250. We note that it was undisputed that Maternal Grandmother's and Mother's home in Somerset County was not "uninhabitable," but there was some opposing evidence concerning how clean and appropriate it was for Children. Specifically, there were reports that numerous cats lived in the home, the litter box was overflowing, and there were cat feces on the floor, either around the litter box or throughout the home. The Orphans' Court noted this evidence but did not discuss it when terminating Mother's parental rights. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 5/26/23, at 5, 20, 23-25.
Mother last participated in an in-person visit with Children in January 2022, although Mother continued to have virtual visits with Children in their foster home. See id. at 92-93, 144, 158. The court ordered Mother to undergo a follow-up assessment with Dr. Miksic, but Mother did not comply because she did not agree with Dr. Miksic's borderline personality disorder diagnosis and wanted a second opinion. See id. at 78, 206. Mother did not progress beyond weekly supervised in-person visits, and she was discharged from every provider without successful completion of services. See id. at 70, 73, 75, 77-85, 142-44.
On May 10, 2022, the Agency filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (8), and (b). The Orphans' Court held hearings on the Agency's petitions in October 2022 and January 2023. Mother was present and represented by counsel at the hearings. The Agency presented the testimony of Chief Ray Wilhelm of the Boswell Borough Police Department in Somerset County; two Montgomery County security officers; M.B., Children's current foster mother ("Foster Mother"); Lakisha Richardson ("Ms. Richardson"), a family support specialist with Carson Valley Children's Aid ("Carson Valley"); Dr. Miksic, whom the parties stipulated was an expert in general psychology, and who performed the parenting capacity evaluation of Mother; and Amber McCarthy ("Ms. McCarthy"), the Agency caseworker. Mother presented testimony from Maternal Grandmother and testified on her own behalf.
The Orphans' Court appointed Sara Hentschke, Esquire ("Attorney Hentschke") as Children's guardian ad litem in the dependency proceeding, and ordered she continue to represent Children in the termination proceeding. Attorney Hentschke reported no conflict between the legal interests and best interests of Children, who had recently turned two years old during the pendency of this case. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 264-65; N.T., 10/12/22, at 11-12. We conclude that the court's appointment of Attorney Hentschke satisfied section 2313(a). See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. 2020). Attorney Hentschke did not submit a brief to this Court.
The parties presented exhibits, which the court admitted into the record. Mother's exhibits are not included with the certified record. Given the testimony related to these exhibits, this omission does not impede meaningful appellate review. However, we remind Mother's counsel that the appellant bears the responsibility to ensure that the certified record is complete. See In re R.N.F., 52 A.3d 361, 364 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1921 Note (stating, "Ultimate responsibility for a complete record rests with the party raising an issue that requires appellate court access to record materials.") (citation omitted).
We summarize the relevant evidence as follows. In September 2021, Dr. Miksic met with Mother, observed her interactions with Children, and wrote psychological, parenting, and bonding evaluations. Dr. Miksic diagnosed Mother as having bipolar mood disorder-severe with psychosis, cannabis use disorder, and borderline personality disorder. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 34-35, 42. He noted Mother tended to be impulsive and lacked an ability to control her frustration and anger. See id. at 35. Dr. Miksik described a conflict between Mother's emotions and her cognitive abilities to monitor and match her behavior to given social situation. See id. at 40. Dr. Miksic opined Mother's emotional and mental health issues were "not consistent" with someone could provide adequate care for a child. See id. at 45. He further concluded Mother's prognosis was poor and explained Mother had "overwhelming psychological conditions that have not responded to treatment or self-examination lending to the conclusion that she will not be able to acquire the skills and make the behavioral changes necessary to parent these children in the near future." See id.; Agency Exhibit 6, at 14. Dr. Miksic noted that Mother was unable to take responsibility or compromise when presented with opportunities for positive behavior changes and blamed others for her lack of progress. See Agency Exhibit 6, at 12.
Ms. McCarthy, the Agency caseworker, testified regarding her concerns about Mother's emotional stability, inability to use coping skills, uncontrolled mental health issues, and inability to follow through with recommendations. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 84, 137-38; see also id. at 128. Ms. McCarthy detailed how she struggled to communicate with Mother due to Mother's antagonistic and threatening behavior toward her. This included Mother screaming at her, threatening her, and calling her profane names. See id. at 78-80, 115. Ms. McCarthy stated:
[Mother] goes from zero to a hundred in a matter of seconds . . .. I couldn't bring her back to what we were talking about, back to reality of why I was standing there, what I wanted to talk to her about. It just wasn't doable.Id. at 80. Ms. McCarthy further recounted a visit where Mother "got in [her] face" with her "fists balled up by her side," and said to her, "You know you're standing in a corner." Id. Moreover, Mother would appear for visits at the Agency "agitated," requiring the involvement of security, and in one instance, a call to 911. Id. at 81-82, 117; see also N.T., 10/12/22, at 33-39, 44-47; see also Agency Exhibits 8 & 9. According to Ms. McCarthy, Mother's behavior escalated "to the point where county detectives were involved due to her making threats towards m[e] and my family. I was no longer just -- we would try to talk about goals, and we were not able to talk about them." N.T., 1/17/23, at 79-80. Other employees of the Agency were similarly unsuccessful in their interactions with Mother. See id. at 79-81.
Ms. McCarthy testified that Mother's participation in mental health treatment was "sporadic" and "inconsistent." Id. at 142; see also id. at 129-30. Ms. McCarthy described Mother's continuing inappropriate behaviors during video calls in November 2022 and January 2023 and testified she saw no improvement in Mother's conduct in the two years the Agency had been involved. See id. at 84-85, 129, 138-39, 162.
Ms. McCarthy stated that Mother, during the November 2022 video call, told her that she should thank her for not cursing but gave Ms. McCarthy the middle finger at the beginning and the end of their conversation. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 84. During the January 2023 video call, Mother walked out, returned, but refused to speak. See id. at 85
Ms. Richardson, who had worked with Mother at Carson Valley, testified Mother was not interested in mental health treatment and stated medical marijuana helped her more than medication. See id. at 27. Carson Valley discharged Mother in January 2022 at Mother's request. See id. at 20. Ms. Richardson testified that Mother requested the discharge because she felt betrayed because Carson Valley shared information with the Agency. See id.
Mother obtained authorization to use medical marijuana during the Agency's case. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 119-20.
Both Dr. Miksic and Ms. McCarthy also observed Mother's interactions with Children before Mother stopped in-person visits. They testified Mother attempted to make the visits a positive experience. However, both relayed that Mother experienced difficulties managing her frustration and being able to understand, and behaving consistently with, Children's needs. See id. at 44, 94-96. Specifically, both testified that Mother attempted to give Children directions using mature language and tones that Children could not be expected to follow at their age and she would become frustrated or believe they were trying to oppose her. See id.
Foster Mother testified that Children were doing well in her care and she was addressing Children's medical needs. See N.T., 10/12/22, at 54-55. She testified Mother did not ask her about Children and did not send them gifts or letters. Foster Mother testified Children had made Christmas colorings that she offered to send Mother, but Mother did not give her address. See id. at 84. She noted Mother tended not to be on-screen during virtual visits with Children and allowed Maternal Grandmother or Father to be in the center of the screen. See id. at 61, 71-72. Foster Mother recounted an in-person visit when Mother arrived with diapers two sizes too small for Children and baby food, even though Children had advanced to solid foods. See id. at 58-60. Foster Mother noted that Maternal Grandmother, not Mother, reached out to her to see what Children needed before that visit. See id. at 59.
Foster Mother testified that Children were born with twin-to-twin-transfusion (a syndrome involving an unequal sharing of blood between twins during gestation, see https://www.chop.edu/conditions-diseases/twin-twintransfusion-syndrome-ttts), as well as cardiac, ophthalmologic, and audiologic/speech issues that required monitoring. See N.T., 10/12/22, at 54-55. Additionally, they required physical therapy. See id.
Mother and Maternal Grandmother testified about their efforts to secure appropriate housing, furniture, and supplies for Children. They explained that they moved to Somerset County because it was more economical to live there and provided a nice place to raise Children. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 168-173, 181-82, 221-22. Mother and Maternal Mother testified to Mother's continuing, independant efforts to seek mental health treatment. See id. at 184-87. Mother testified about the difficulties she experienced finding a provider due to waitlists and COVID-19, as well as finding a provider with whom she felt comfortable. See id. 211-18, 252. She testified that since November 2022, she was working with a new provider and was taking a new medication for anxiety and depression that has helped her not "snap[] unreasonably for stupid reasons." See id. at 241. Mother acknowledged, and stated she regretted, her angry and inappropriate behavior with Agency employees and explained that she had been adjusting to different medications at the time. See id. at 217-18. Mother stated she continued to avoid Ms. McCarthy, however, and threatened to seek a "protection order against her" or to sue her for defamation. Id. at 253.
Mother's own testimony established gaps in her mental health treatment. She did not start treatment following her pregnancy until between March and May 2021. She stated she was in treatment from November 2021 until July 2022, after her move to Somerset County. She then restarted treatment with a new provider in November 2022. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 211-16, 244, 256-58.
By separate decrees entered May 26, 2023, the Orphans' Court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). The court filed a contemporaneous opinion detailing its rationale and concluding, in relevant part, that Mother lacked the capacity to parent Children due to mental health issues which she did not treat consistently; there was no parent-child bond; and the termination of Mother's parental rights would not detrimentally affect Children. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 5/26/23, at 25-27. Mother, through counsel, filed timely notices of appeal, which were consolidated by this Court sua sponte. The Orphans' Court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion adopting its prior opinion of May 26, 2023.
While suggesting in its concurrent opinions that it found grounds for termination pursuant to subsection (a)(8), the Orphans' Court did not include that subsection in its decrees terminating Mother's parental rights.
Mother failed to designate these matters as Children's Fast Track appeals, see Pa.R.A.P. 904(f), and did not file concise statements of errors complained of on appeal concurrently with her notices of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). In response to the Orphans' Court's orders, Mother filed concise statements just over two weeks after her notices of appeal. As there is no assertion of any prejudice, we decline to find waiver from Mother's failure to comply with Rule 1925(a)(2)(i). See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 and n.1 (Pa. Super. 2009). We add that the certified record contains two copies of the concise statement for E.C.S., and no concise statement for A.L.S. However, it is apparent that Mother intended to raise the same appellate issues as to both Children.
On appeal Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the [Orphans' Court] committed an error of law and/or abuse of discretion in its determination that [the Agency] sustained its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory standards set forth in 23 [Pa.C.S.A. § 2511](a)(1), (2), and (8) had been met[?]
2. Whether retention of [Mother's] parental rights was supported by the evidence when the record demonstrates that: 1) the housing conditions which le[d] to the removal or placement of [C]hildren were remedied; 2) [Mother's] substance abuse issues were adequately addressed[;] and 3) [Mother's] mental health conditions were actively addressed with [Mother] receiving treatment[?]
3. Whether retention of [Mother's] parental rights was supported by the evidence when the record demonstrates that [Mother's] mental health condition and difficult economic status does not represent clear and convincing evidence that [Mother] cannot fulfill her parental obligations for [C]hildren[?]
4. Whether retention of [Mother's] parental rights was supported by the evidence when the record demonstrates [Mother's] clear intent to maintain a parental relationship and to perform her parental duties for [C]hildren?
5. Whether the [Orphans' Court] committed an error of law and/or abuse of discretion in its determination that [the Agency] sustained its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights best meets the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child as required by 23 [Pa.C.S.A. § 2511](b)[?]Mother's Brief at 2-3 (reordered).
Mother's issues implicate the involuntary termination of parental rights. Pennsylvania's Adoption Act ("the Act") governs involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion, which requires an error of law or a showing of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See In re L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). In applying this standard, an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact and credibility determinations if supported by the record. See Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021); see also In re C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). This standard "reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings." Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 831 (Pa. Super. 2022).
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a court must balance the parent's fundamental right "to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control" of his or her child with the "child's essential needs for a parent's care, protection, and support." See C.M., 255 A.3d at 358. Termination of parental rights can have "significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and child." L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591. Pennsylvania law requires the moving party in a parental rights termination case to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so "clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." M.E., 283 A.3d at 830 (citation omitted). We remain mindful of "a parent's basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of [her] child" but note that the right "is converted, upon the failure to fulfill [her] parental duties, to the child's right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment." In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Here, the Orphans' Court terminated Mother's parental rights to Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). To affirm the underlying decrees, we need only agree with the court's decision as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). As such, we limit our discussion to section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
* * * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. . . ..23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
To prove the applicability of subsection (a)(2), the party petitioning for termination must establish: "(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied." In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Subsection (a)(2) emphasizes the child's present and future needs, not the parent's refusal to perform their duties and thus "should not be read to compel courts to ignore a child's need for a stable home and strong continuous parental ties. . .. This is particularly so where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it." In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Section 2511(a)(2) grounds are not limited to affirmative misconduct; they may also include acts of refusal and incapacity to perform parental duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by In re K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023). We have long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. See Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Mother's first four issues challenge the Orphans' Court's subsection (a) findings, and we address these issues together to the extent they relate to a subsection (a)(2) analysis. Mother argues that Dr. Miksic's report failed to establish she was incapable of performing parental duties, or her incapacity could not be remedied, when she complied with the family service plan, met goals, and demonstrated a capacity to provide for Children. Citing Matter of M.L.W., 452 A.2d 1021 (Pa. Super. 1982), she asserts that the court erred in solely relying on testimony from Dr. Miksic and Ms. McCarthy when finding she was incapable of performing parental duties. Mother indicates that she was working toward eliminating, or had remedied any allegation of, parental incapacity. Mother highlights, among other things, her evidence as to her home in Somerset County, her ongoing mental health treatment, and her satisfaction of any concerns the Agency had regarding substance abuse. Mother admits her angry outbursts but insists her frustration and anger focused on Ms. McCarthy; her outbursts never escalated to actual physical violence; and her control has improved since finding a new provider and obtaining new medication. She contends the Orphan's Court improperly terminated her parental rights based on factors that were beyond her control, including her mental health and economic issues that impeded her cooperation with the Agency.
The Orphans' Court concluded that Mother lacked the capacity to parent Children due to her mental health issues, which she did not treat consistently. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 5/26/23, at 24-25. The court determined the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence supporting its determination based on the testimony from Ms. McCarthy and Dr. Miksic. See id. at 25.
We conclude that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence establishing the subsection (a)(2) grounds for terminating Mother's parental rights. Here, the Orphans' court heard and credited Dr. Miksic's and Ms. McCarthy's testimony that Mother's behavioral and mental health issues impacted her decision-making, behavioral issues, and capacity to parent. Mother's own testimony established a basis for the court to find her mental health treatment record to be sporadic. Thus, there is competent record support for the court's findings, and we must affirm even if the record could support the opposite result. See In re B.J.Z., 207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also A.H., 247 A.3d at 442.
Moreover, Mother does not demonstrate error in the Orphans' Court's legal conclusions. Mother relies on M.L.W., a case in which this Court found evidence that a mother's low I.Q. and achievement levels was insufficient to show the mother's incapacity to parent. In M.L.W., this Court reasoned: the mother's cognitive issues did not establish her incapacity where the agency offered no services; the mother had made marginal progress in the four parenting courses she took over two months; and the caseworker's testimony opinion concerning the mother's incapacity to parent was "of limited value" given the "limited contact" the caseworker had with the mother and the child. M.L.W., 452 A.2d at 1023-25.
By contrast to the circumstances in M.L.W., the record here establishes that the Agency provided numerous services to Mother over the two years Children were in the Agency's custody, but Mother did not successfully complete any service. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 68, 70, 108. Additionally, the Agency presented testimony from several witnesses who observed Mother's interactions with Children during in-person and virtual visits. The court credited the Agency's evidence that during the two years Children have been in Agency's care: (1) Children had never been in Mother's care; (2) Mother and Maternal Grandmother moved to Somerset County, despite being advised of the difficulties this would create in sustaining a parent-child bond with Children; (3) Mother was unwilling or unable to facilitate a working relationship with the Agency or other service providers; (4) Mother did not provide Children with any cards, gifts, letters, supplies, or support; and (5) Mother generally did not attend Children's medical appointments. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 5/26/23, at 23-24. To this we add that Mother's last in-person visit with Children occurred in January 2022 and there is no indication that she made any efforts to stay up to date with Children's progress with Foster Mother or the Agency.
We note that the Orphans' Court issued these findings with respect to its subsection (a)(1) analysis and conclusion that Mother failed or refused to parent Children. However, these findings are equally applicable to a subsection (a)(2) analysis, which considers whether Mother's "repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused [Children] to be without essential parental care . . . and the causes of the incapacity or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
Mother's omissions established her incapacity, and her refusals to act caused Children to be without essential parental care. Having reviewed the totality of the circumstances demonstrated in the record, we agree with the Orphans' Court that Mother's incapacity cannot, or will not, be remedied. We acknowledge Mother took some measures to reunify with Children. We also recognize her most recent efforts to seek mental health treatment. However, over approximately two years, Mother's mental health treatment and visitation was sporadic, she did not cooperate with the Agency and providers to comply with her reunification goals, she did not demonstrate an ability to parent Children, and she showed little interest in their welfare while they were under the Agency's care. As this Court has stated, "A child's life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future." Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 914 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation and brackets omitted). Therefore, we affirm the Orphans' Court's determination as to section 2511(a)(2).
In her fifth and final issue, Mother asserts that the Orphans' Court erred in finding sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to section 2511(b). Section 2511(b) requires a separate consideration of whether termination will meet the child's needs and welfare. See Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. The Supreme Court has recently re-emphasized that pursuant to section 2511(b) courts "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. . . . This of course requires the court to focus on the child and consider all three categories of needs and welfare." K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105 (citation omitted). K.T. specifically directs courts to "consider the matter from the child's perspective, placing [his] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent." Id. (citation omitted; emphasis added). The child's emotional needs and welfare include intangibles, such as love, comfort, security, and stability. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
Courts considering an involuntary termination petition "must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly." K.T., 296 A.3d at 1108 (citation omitted; emphasis omitted) (also noting that T.S.M. advised courts to move toward an alternative permanent home when it is clear the parent will be unable to provide for the child's basic needs in the near future, so as not to impair the bond with pre-adoptive parents).
When it considers the parental bond, the court must examine whether termination of parental rights "will destroy a necessary and beneficial relationship, thereby causing a child to suffer extreme emotional consequences." K.T., 296 A.3d at 1110 (quotation marks and original case citation omitted). However, "[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case." In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). When evaluating a parental bond, "the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well." Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citations omitted).
Moreover, in reiterating that the parental bond is only one part of the analysis, the K.T. Court held that the "[s]ection 2511(b) inquiry must also include consideration . . . [of] certain evidence if it is present in the record." K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113 & n.28 (emphasis omitted). The Court recognized that "case law indicates that bond, plus permanency, stability and all 'intangible' factors may contribute equally to the determination of a child's specific developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of 'primary' importance in the section 2511(b) analysis." Id. at 1109. For instance, if relevant in a case, a trial court "can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child" in its analysis under section 2511(b). See In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Mother argues that "no evidence exists as to how [the termination of her parental rights] would affect the well-being of [C]hildren.". Mother's Brief at 38.
We reiterate that K.T. requires a court, in considering a child's developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, to examine whether the termination of parental rights "will destroy a necessary and beneficial relationship, thereby causing a child to suffer extreme emotional consequences." K.T., 296 A.3d at 1110 (quotation marks and original case citation omitted).
In concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights best serves Children's developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to section 2511(b), the Orphans' Court found that no parental bond existed between Mother and Children. The court stated:
In this case, the testimony clearly established that . . . [Mother] ha[s] never lived with [C]hildren, nor provided for them, and further that . . . [Mother] ha[s] not maintained sufficient contact with [C]hildren to permit [her] to develop a parental relationship with [C]hildren. . . . [Mother] initially had visits with [C]hildren, but has had no in-person visits with [C]hildren since January 26, 2022. While she participates in weekly virtual visits, she is often not fully in view on the screen for [C]hildren to see her, according to the testimony of both [F]oster [M]other and the [Agency] caseworker, but rather appears off to the side.
This [c]ourt concludes, based upon all of the evidence, that there is no parental bond between [Children and Mother]. . . .Orphans' Court Opinion, 5/26/23, at 26-27.
Upon review, we find ample record support for the Orphans' court's finding that Children's developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare favor termination of Mother's rights pursuant to section 2511(b). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. At the time of the January 2023 hearing, Children had been placed for approximately two years, essentially their entire lives. See N.T., 1/17/23, at 110. Mother's last in-person visit occurred on January 26, 2022, one year prior. See id. at 92-93, 144, 158. While Mother maintained virtual visitation, Ms. McCarthy testified that no bond existed between Mother and Children. See id. at 133, 144, 152; N.T., 10/12/22, at 60, 74-75. Ms. McCarthy stated, "[I]n order to have a bond, there needs to be in-person communication. It needs to be in-person involvement." N.T., 1/17/23, at 152. She continued, "I can also say, on the Zoom calls, I will say it's rare that [Mother] is actually fully on screen for the boys to see her. She may be half on screen, not on the screen. So that's another piece that would help build a bond if you're only having virtual visits. . . ." Id. Foster Mother confirmed that Mother is rarely visible on Zoom calls. See N.T., 10/12/22, at 60-61, 71-72 ("[Mother] occasionally has been -- I've heard her speak, and occasionally I have seen her come on camera briefly, but [Children] don't regularly see her. But they do regularly see [Maternal Grandmother]."). Foster Mother described how Children's faces "light up" when they see Maternal Grandmother but not Mother, given their "brief encounters." Id. at 70.
Moreover, Ms. McCarthy indicated that Children were doing well in their pre-adoptive foster home where they had been placed for over a year. She observed, "They're doing well, . . .they are happy and thriving there. All their needs are being met in the foster home." N.T., 1/17/23, at 109. She noted that Children have ongoing special needs, such as speech services, which Foster Mother was addressing. See id. As such, Ms. McCarthy opined that it is in Children's best interests to terminate parental rights "due to [C]hildren's needs, . . . [Mother's] family service plan goals not being met at this time, and [C]hildren's needs . . . being met in their current foster home." Id. at 110.
Thus, the record corroborates the Orphans' Court's determination that termination of Mother's parental rights best serves the twins' developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to section 2511(b). Therefore, we do not disturb the Orphans' Court's determination. See B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921.
Decrees affirmed.
[*] Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.