Summary
holding that failure to follow a DOCCS prison regulation “does not give rise to a constitutional violation”
Summary of this case from Jackson v. AnnucciOpinion
96 Civ. 7748 (RCC).
March 15, 2001.
Opinion and Order
Plaintiff William Hyman ("Hyman"), an inmate at the Sing-Sing Correctional Facility, brings this action against Correction Officer Christopher Holder, Correction Officer J. McCarthy, Lieutenant Robert Patterson, Lieutenant Thomas Lucas, First Deputy Superintendent Charles Greiner and Superintendent John P. Keane (collectively, "defendants"), alleging that defendants conspired to violate his civil rights by filing a false inmate misbehavior report against him and by failing to conduct an adequate hearing before imposing certain disciplinary sanctions. Defendants now seek summary judgment on the grounds that no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute and that defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 9, 1995, Hyman heard the sounds of a disturbance coming from the Southgate section of the Sing-Sing Correctional Facility. Hyman proceeded to that area where certain officers were engaged in a confrontation with a prisoner, inmate Delacruz. Roughly 40 other prisoners were in the vicinity and had begun shouting at the officers.
Hyman observed Officer Holder force inmate Delacruz to the ground. According to Hyman, Delacruz began thrashing on the floor in what Hyman assumed was an epileptic seizure. A principal dispute between the parties concerns Hyman's response to Officer Holder's actions. Hyman claims that he then raised his voice in order to alert the officers of his concern for Delacruz's presumed medical condition. In contrast, defendants contend that Hyman shouted obscenities and other loud and boisterous remarks, inciting other inmates to do the same.
The officers transported Delacruz to the Emergency Room. After Delacruz was removed, the prisoners moved on to their assigned activities. Hyman continued to follow his daily routine until the next morning, when Hyman was advised that he was in keeplock status and would be fed in his cell. That afternoon, Hyman received an inmate misbehavior report prepared by Officers Holder and McCarthy, which charged him with violations of Institutional Rules 104.10 (Rioting), 104.13 (Creating a Disturbance) and 102.10 (Threats). The reviewing officer, Lieutenant Patterson, designated the subsequent hearing as "Tier III," the most serious in the New York prison system.
Hyman met with his assigned assistant, Ms. Ibrahim, on December 11, 1995, in order to prepare his defense. Hyman again met with Ms. Ibrahim on the day of the hearing, December 15, 1995. During the proceeding before Lieutenant Lucas, Hyman pled guilty to the charge of creating a disturbance. Hyman withdrew his request to call witnesses and did not proffer any witness testimony. Hyman was found guilty of rioting and threats and was sentenced to 270 days in keeplock, loss of 9 months good-time credits and loss of phone, commissary and package privileges.
Hyman wrote to Superintendent Keane by letter dated December 22, 1995, to request a discretionary review of the disciplinary hearing. The letter was forwarded to First Deputy Superintendent Greiner, who affirmed the underlying determination on January 8, 1996. Hyman appealed defendant Greiner's decision to the Director of Special Housing Donald Selsky. Selsky reduced Hyman's loss of good-time credits to 6 months and the keeplock sentence to 150 days, and dismissed the charge of rioting.
Hyman brings the instant suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985(3), 1986 and 1988 on the basis that defendants conspired to violate his civil rights by filing a false inmate misbehavior report and conducting a procedurally improper hearing. In addition, Hyman alleges that his equal protection rights were violated because he alone was singled out for discipline and that his confinement to segregated housing was contrary to the Eight Amendment. Finally, Hyman contends that defendants violated a number of prison regulations and directives.
The Complaint also refers to 18 U.S.C. § 24 1-42. However, those criminal statutes do not provide a private right of action. See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 1994).
Defendants make the following arguments in support of summary judgment: (1) Hyman's due process claims are barred under Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); (2) the allegations as to the inmate misbehavior report fail to state a constitutional claim because the Tier III hearing comported with due process; (3) Hyman has not established a viable equal protection violation on the basis of selective enforcement; (4) there is no evidence of conspiracy; (5) the Eighth Amendment claim is not cognizable; (6) the Court lacks jurisdiction over any allegations of state law violations; (7) defendant Keane was not personally involved with any alleged constitutional deprivations; and (8) defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. These arguments are addressed below.
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate only where no genuine issues of material fact remain for trial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proof on such a motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Facts, and all inferences therefrom, must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); American Cas. Co. v. Nordic Leasing. Inc., 42 F.3d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1994). If the moving party meets its burden, then the non-movant must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Mere "metaphysical doubt" is inadequate; sufficient evidence must exist upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant.Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. A grant of summary judgment is appropriate when no rational jury could find in favor of the non- moving party because there is no genuine issue of material fact based on the evidence in the record or the substantive law. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services. Ltd., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).
A. Edwards v. Balisok
Defendants first argue that Hyman's due process claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because the sanctions imposed on Hyman include the loss of good-time credits. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). In Edwards, which involved similar penalties to those here, the petitioner alleged that his prison disciplinary hearing, which led to the revocation of his good- time credits as well as a term of segregated confinement, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Although the petitioner did not request restoration of the credits and framed his case solely as a challenge to the prison's procedures, the Supreme Court nevertheless determined that the § 1983 suit was barred. The Court held that the petitioner's case implicitly presented a challenge to the length of his sentence, and as such was not cognizable until the prison's determination was overturned administratively or judicially by the state courts, or through federal habeas review. See also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
Hyman argues that Edwards is inapplicable and that his suit should be allowed to proceed because his loss of good-time credits does not in and of itself affect his term of imprisonment. Although Hyman does not cite any case law, Hyman appears to rely on Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 1999), in which the Second Circuit held that Edwards does not bar suits that do not affect the overall length of confinement. Hyman argues that the length of his confinement is not affected by the prison sanctions because under New York regulations the hearing disposition is merely tentative until a final decision is made by the Time Allowance Committee. See 7 N.Y.C.C.R. § 260.4. Hyman notes that the Committee may restore all or part of the lost allowance. See 7 N.Y.C.C.R. § 261.3. However, the possibility that the credits may be restored does not alter the Superintendent's decision. As another court in this District noted in rejecting the same argument:
None of the cases evaluating § 1983 claims attacking a disciplinary decision involving a loss of good-time credits suggests that the fact or length of confinement is not implicated unless the inmate has already been considered for parole or conditional release. If Plaintiff were correct, if the deprivation of good-time does not implicate the fact or length of a prisoner's confinement unless and until the time allowance committee actually implements the superintendent's decision, a prisoner could not attack the deprivation in a state court CPLR article 78 proceeding or via habeas, which the law clearly allows him to do. . . . Although the prisoner has available to him ways by which he may recoup time lost, potentially cancelling out the effect of part or all of the deprivation, whether he will earn all of the lost time back is what is speculative. Unless and until he does, the deprivation of good-time most certainly does affect the length of the prisoner's sentence.Gomez v. Kaplan, No. 94 Civ. 3292, 2000 WL 1458804, at *7 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000). Therefore, because any ruling by this Court in Hyman's favor on his procedural claims would invalidate his sentence under Edwards, Hyman's due process claims are not cognizable until the prison's determination is overturned through administrative channels or through habeas corpus review. B. Due Process
Hyman also appears to suggest that the length of his confinement was unaffected because he was held past his earliest release date of May 19, 1999. However, Hyman does not indicate whether the Parole Board thereby affirmed the loss of the good- time credits or whether the issue of good-time credits may be reviewed again in the future with respect to another release date. In either event, Hyman's loss of good time credits affects the overall length of his confinement.
Even if Edwards was not dispositive, Hyman's due process claims nonetheless must be dismissed as a matter of law. First, as a preliminary matter, Hyman's allegation that defendants conspired to file a false inmate misbehavior report does not in and of itself state a constitutional claim. The Constitution requires only that prison officials conduct a proper hearing before sanctioning an inmate based upon such a report. See Greaves v. State of New York, 958 F. Supp. 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("In other words, the failure to conduct an adequate disciplinary hearing may give rise to a Section 1983 action, but the mere filing of a false misbehavior report does not."); see also Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 982 (1988) ("a prison inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest").
Similarly, Hyman's assertion that a prison disciplinary determination must be supported by substantial evidence also does not comport with the case law. In Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453 (1985), the Supreme Court made clear that due process is satisfied if "some" evidence supports the prison's determination. In spite of "meager" evidence, including the lack of any direct evidence identifying the violator, the Supreme Court nonetheless found that the record in Hill was not "so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary." Id. at 457. Here, it is undisputed that Hyman raised his voice either during or directly following a violent situation. Moreover, Hyman pled guilty to the charge of creating a disturbance. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to support the determination at Hyman's disciplinary hearing.
Furthermore, Hyman has presented no other facts which would suggest that his Tier III hearing was in any way contrary to due process. Hyman suggests that his rights were violated because (1) the hearing was held less than 24 hours after he met with his assistant; (2) he was not provided with a to-from memorandum or an unusual incident report, as allegedly required by New York regulations; and (3) he was not permitted to call witnesses at the hearing.
In Wolff v. Macdonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974), the Supreme Court elucidated the requirements of due process with respect to prison hearings, holding that an inmate is entitled to no less than 24 hours "advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement of the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken." However, Wolff does not require that the inmate meet with his assistant 24 hours in advance of the proceeding as well; indeed,Wolff necessarily presumes that assistance will be provided during the 24 hour period. Furthermore, the undisputed evidence indicates that Hyman met with Ms. Ibrahim on December 11, 1995, approximately 4 days prior to the hearing. The fact that Hyman met with her again on the day of the hearing does not vitiate the prior meeting, and indeed suggests that Hyman was provided with ample assistance.
Hyman next points out that defendants did not provide him with a to-from memorandum or an unusual incident report, which Hyman contends is required under New York regulations. First, even if New York law does indeed require that an unusual incident report be filed in Hyman's situation, the failure to do so does not give rise to a constitutional violation. In a similar case from this district also involving the failure to provide an unusual incident report, the court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding that:
Defendants contend that the incident at issue here did not rise to the level of an unusual incident because no force was used by or against Hyman, and no disruption of normal facility operations resulted. See Holder Reply Aff. ¶ 5.
Although DOCS Directives 4933 and 4004 do require that special SHU logs and unusual incident reports should have been filed following the January 7, 1990 incidents, the failure of defendants to make such reports is a violation of a state directive, not a violation of a federal constitutional right.Woods v. Robertson, No. 90 Civ. 1672 (JFK), 1990 WL 115717, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1990); see also infra Section F.
Second, Hyman was not provided with a copy of the to-from memorandum because defendant Lucas believed that no such document had been issued, as to-from memoranda generally accompany only unusual incident reports, not inmate misbehavior reports. See Lucas Aff. ¶ 7. Hyman proffers no evidence that Lucas knowingly withheld the memorandum. The negligent failure to turn over materials cannot support a § 1983 claim. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Moreover, as the to-from memorandum was identical to the inmate misbehavior report, Hyman was not deprived of any relevant information prior to his hearing.
Finally, Hyman's claim that he was denied the right to call witnesses is wholly unsupported by the record. It is undisputed that Hyman withdrew his request to proffer witness testimony at the hearing. Indeed, defendant Lucas specifically asked Hyman if he would like to call witnesses, and Hyman declined. Lucas Aff. ¶ 7.
C. Equal Protection
Hyman also fails to state a viable claim for selective enforcement in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to prevail, Hyman must show that (1) he was selectively treated as compared with others similarly situated, and (2) his selective treatment was prompted by an impermissible consideration, such as membership in a suspect class, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of a constitutional right or malicious or bad faith intent to injure.Birmingham v. Ogden, 70 F. Supp.2d 353, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Hyman claims that he was singled out for discipline because he exercised his First Amendment right to report a medical emergency. However, it is undisputed that Hyman expressed his opinion by yelling during or immediately after a violent situation. Hyman acknowledges that he created a disturbance to get the officer's attention. Hyman Aff. ¶ 4. Such behavior is not constitutionally protected activity. See Butler v. Westchester Ctv., 94 Civ. 8216, 2000 WL 335539, at *7 (S.D.N Y Mar. 30, 2000) ("[t]here is no constitutional right to behave problematically"). Although no other prisoners were subject to disciplinary proceedings, Officer Holder has sworn that he charged Hyman because Hyman was the loudest, most threatening and most repetitive. Holder Reply Aff. ¶ 3. Moreover, Holder denies the allegation that he issued the report in order to retaliate against Hyman for calling attention to another inmate's illness. Id. Hyman points to no evidence beyond mere speculation which would cast doubt upon defendant Holder's stated motive.
D. Conspiracy
Similarly, Hyman's conspiracy allegations also are unsupported. Hyman claims that defendants conspired to assist Officers Holder and McCarthy in the filing of the inmate misbehavior report, for the purpose of covering up the assault on Delacruz. It is well settled that plaintiff must proffer more than mere conclusory allegations in order to support a civil rights conspiracy complaint. See Salahaddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff must put forth facts demonstrating an agreement among two or more persons. See Whitfield v. Forest Elec. Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Hyman claims that each defendant took actions that resulted in Hyman's keeplock sentence. However, Hyman points only to tasks that defendants are required to perform under state law, such as defendant Patterson's review of the report, defendant Lucas' hearing determination and defendant Greiner's appellate review after receiving the file from defendant Keane. These actions cannot constitute a "meeting of the minds;" otherwise, prison officials would be liable for conspiracy each time they performed their assigned duties.
E. Eighth Amendment
Hyman claims that his confinement to a special housing unit constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. To prevail on an Eight Amendment claim, Holder must show that the conditions of his confinement involved "unquestioned and serious deprivations of human needs" and that prison officials imposed those conditions with deliberate indifference. Jackson v. New York Dep't of Correctional Servs., 994 F. Supp. 219, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Hyman does not point to any specific way in which his human needs went unmet. The Second Circuit has held that the conditions of special housing units do not per se violate the Eight Amendment. See Anderson v. Coughlin, 757 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1985). Thus summary judgment is warranted on this claim as well.
F. State Law Violations
To the extent that Hyman claims defendants failed to follow prison regulations, such as directives concerning the implementation of disturbance control plans or the failure to include the specific roles of other prisoners in the inmate misbehavior report, these state law violations are not cognizable under § 1983. Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, not for violations arising solely out of state or common- law principles. Fluent v. Salamanca Indian Lease Auth., 847 F. Supp. 1046, 1056 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Doe v. Connecticut Dept. of Child Youth Servs., 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[A] violation of state law neither gives [plaintiff] a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.") (citations omitted). Because Hyman fails to allege the violation of any underlying federal law, his state law claims must be dismissed.
G. Defendant Keane
Hyman seeks to impose liability on defendant Keane on the grounds that Keane was notified of Hyman's appeal by letter and failed to remedy the alleged wrong. Courts consistently have held that mere receipt of a letter does not render the supervisor personally liable. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995); Richardson v. Coughlin, No. 93-CV-6254, 2000 WL 815117, at *4-5 (W.D.N.Y. June 19, 2000). Nor can Hyman assert a viable claim based upon mere conclusory allegations that defendant Keane failed to supervise defendant Greiner. Hyman has provided no evidence which shows that Keane's supervision was grossly negligent as required in this Circuit. See Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1986).
H. Qualified Immunity
Because Hyman fails to establish any constitutional violations on the merits, this Court need not address defendants' qualified immunity claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.