Opinion
C/A 6:22-cv-3573-DCC-JDA
06-07-2023
Zikomo Z. Hendrix, a/k/a Hendrix Z. Zikomo, Plaintiff, v. State Entities/Corporation, Brittany Scott, Teal Johnson, Courtney Rea, Henry McMaster, Magistrate Judge Hudson, Greenville County Detention Center, Greenville County and City Police, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Zikomo Z. Hendrix (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution. [Docs. 1; 13.] Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
As will be discussed in detail below, Plaintiff is a “sovereign citizen” and he refers to himself using a variety of names, nicknames, and descriptions. For example, Plaintiff notes that he is also known by the name of “Zeke, Sun of God.” [Doc. 1-3 at 2.] He asserts that his ancestors were “Rooted in ancient ‘Egypt' the Capital Empire of the dominion of Africa making [him] the descendant of Ancient Canaanites, from the Land of Canaan/Atlantis Island.” [ Id. at 66-67.]
Plaintiff contends that Defendants have violated his constitutional rights under the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 14th Amendments, “and more.” [Doc. 1-3 at 5.] Indeed, Plaintiff makes scattered references to various state and federal statutes and constitutional provisions throughout his rambling Complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center. [Doc. 1-3 at 2, 5.] Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a 9-page, hand-written document styled as a “motion” for various relief against Defendants State Entities/Corporation and Brittany Scott, along with various exhibits. [Docs. 1; 1-1.] By Order dated October 20, 2022, the undersigned directed Plaintiff to bring this case into proper form by filing the appropriate information and paperwork, including a properly completed complaint on the standard court form. [Doc. 5.] Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a standard court form for a “Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Prisoner Complaint)”, identifying the following Defendants: State Entities/Corporation, Brittany Scott, Courtney Rea, Teal Johnson, Henry McMaster, Magistrate Judge Hudson, the Greenville County Detention Center, and the Greenville County/Greenville City Police Department. [Doc. 1-3 at 1-4.] The standard court form contains numerous hand-written pages and attachments such that the pleading is 68 pages in length. The Court construes both the original handwritten document [Doc. 1] and the standard court form [Doc. 1-3] together as the Complaint filed in this matter. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a motion to dismiss [Doc. 7] and other motions including a second motion to dismiss, a motion to change venue, and a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction [Doc. 14]. The Court has carefully reviewed each of Plaintiff's documents.
The full title of Plaintiff's initial filing is “Omnibus Motion (1889) Dispositive Motion (1939) Speaking Motion (1935) Motion-for-judgment of acquittal (1923) Motion for summary judgment (1842) Motion-in-arrest of judgment Motion-to-dismiss-for-failure-to-prosecute (1889) Appeal by Right.” [Doc. 1 at 1.]
In the Order, the undersigned noted that it was “unclear whether Plaintiff intends to bring this action as a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as a habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, or as some other action.” [Doc. 5 at 1.] As such, Plaintiff was directed to “notify the Court, in writing, as to the proper nature of suit and causes of action.” [Id.] Plaintiff was provided with blank copies of a standard court form for both a habeas corpus action under § 2254 and a civil rights action under § 1983. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff was directed to complete, sign, and return the appropriate court form based on the type of action he intended to bring in this Court. [Id. at 2-3.] In response, Plaintiff completed and returned the standard court form for an action under § 1983. [Doc. 1-3.] Therefore, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff intends to bring this action as a civil rights action under § 1983 and not as a habeas corpus action under § 2254.
Plaintiff's voluminous, rambling Complaint is confusing and difficult to decipher. However, the Court is able to glean the following pertinent allegations.
It appears that Plaintiff's claims arise from his continued detention as a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center on various criminal charges pending against him in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions. [Doc. 1-3 at 18.] Plaintiff contends that he was the subject of an illegal traffic stop on May 11, 2020, resulting in his false imprisonment. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that he has been unlawfully detained since his arrest on April 11, 2021, due to insufficient evidence and in violation of his speedy trial rights. [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges he is suffering from post-traumatic stress, economic injury because he is unable to enter into any type of business arrangement to turn a profit, “‘Indivisible Injury,'” “‘Legal Injury,'” “‘Malicious Injury,'” and Pecuniary Injury and Reparable Injury.'” [Id. at 31.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $500,000. [Id.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions with the following crimes: threatening the life, person, or family of a public official at case number 2020A2330204918; threatening the life, person, or family of a public official at case number 2020A2330204919; kidnapping at case number 2021A2330203401; domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature at case number 2021A2330203402; attempted murder at case number 2021A2330203403; driving under the influence at case number 7102P0888530; driving under a suspended license at case number 7102P0888534; and possession of drugs at case number 7102P0888535. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers) (last visited Dec. 9, 2022). Those charges all remain pending against Plaintiff at this time.
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Certain other charges against Plaintiff were recently disposed. For example, on October 11, 2022, Plaintiff pled guilty to indecent exposure at case number 2019A2330207111. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number 2019A2330207111) (last visited Dec. 9, 2022).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
As noted, Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his civil rights. The allegations in the Complaint are difficult to decipher and the Court is unable to determine what precise causes of action Plaintiff intends to assert in this case. Indeed, the lengthy, rambling Complaint contains many nearly incomprehensible allegations. What is clear, however, is that the crux of this action is Plaintiff's challenge of his ongoing detention at the Greenville County Detention Center and the charges pending against him in the state court. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to allege that Plaintiff's continued detention constitutes punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and perhaps in violation of the Constitution's due process clauses, that he is being detained without the opportunity for bail, and that he has been denied the right to a speedy trial. Despite Plaintiff's contentions, this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
Frivolous Allegations
As an initial matter, the undersigned concludes that the action should be dismissed to the extent Plaintiff's claims rely on the sovereign citizen theory. Indeed, the entire Complaint is substantively without merit as Plaintiff is asserting his claims as a sovereign citizen and such claims are patently frivolous.
A complaint is deemed frivolous when it is “clearly baseless” and includes allegations that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing for frivolousness, the Court looks to see whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Harley v. United States, 349 F.Supp.2d 980, 981 (M.D. N.C. 2004). The Court must accept all well-pled allegations and review the Complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, it is well-settled that the Court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff's nonsensical allegations are frivolous and that his assertions fail to state a cognizable claim for relief as they are based on the sovereign citizen theory. Plaintiff's Complaint bears all of the hallmarks of the sovereign citizen theory. For example, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated the Thirteenth Amendment in that they are
reap[ing] the Benefits of my “Legal Person” account compelling un-natural benefit upon my Natural Person, slaving my Natural Persons Body when I Zikomo of the Hendrix family is the Sole Beneficiary of the Legal Person account HENDRIX ZEBADIAH ZIKOMO UCC1-308/311ARR.[Doc. 1-3 at 13 (underlining omitted).] Similarly, Plaintiff contends Defendants have breached their contract with him, explaining that
it is a “Contract” that shall lay the foundation of future violation for my “Legal Person” that I am the Sole Beneficiary of “HENDRIX ZEBADIAH ZIKOMO UCC1-308/311ARR” making this “Document Valuable” to my existing Civil Suit 42 U.S.C. § 1983 giving way to my “Contract Right (1851)[”] - A right to payment under a contract “not yet” earned by performance and not evidenced by a[n] instrument or chatt[el] paper; But shall soon become “Recognizable” through the Copyright Dealing of the “Legal Name/Person” that I represent fully aware of “Technical Trademark” Linked to my Tradename (1861) -“intellectual Property” of mine through the “Negotiable Instrument;” which is “Uniq[u]e Chattel” (1886) being “Incorporated * Correct * Status * Breach of Contract * / Tangible Chattel-Paper (2003).[”][Id. at 15 (underlining omitted).] Further, Plaintiff contends that
upon my inherited nobility, and upon my private “Indigenous Native American,[”] proper person status that places I HENDRIX ZEBADIAH ZIKOMO UCC-1-308/311ARR the authorized representative of the name above in all “cap” which
is linked to the world of commercial/commerce, meaning the name in all “cap” that[ i]s being contracted out has been done *unconscionable* making my hands clean and “Henry McMaster” *unclean hands* as he consciously par-take in the function of S. Carolina law which is *unconstitutional* as S.C. law becomes *void for vagueness* which violates my 5th *Amendment vested-rights* as he denies my *natural rights* that affect my “Indigenous Person” causing *duress* because I'm not able to “prosper under [the] 14th Amendment.” So this make[s] those acting under the *color of the law* as they violate “the 13th Amendment” as the Government has inslaved the body under a “name” making it an “entity” which is a *trademark* which belongs to “me” Hendrix Zebadiah Zikomo UCC 1-308/311ARR the *resident ambassador,* the true authorized representative of the *tradename* in “all cap,” that reaps all the financial benefits, while the flesh which is the *natural person* has “all” rights that is native to the Americas land, making what the Government is doing a violation under the (laws) of the *natural person* “linked to human rights/ unalienable rights.” Now that I am fully “aware” of this “process,” and (how to walk like an Egyptian): as to the father becomes the son and the son the father. It is now time to make me . . . privileged.[Id. at 16-17 (underlining omitted).] All of Plaintiff's filings in this case are replete with similar frivolous allegations.
These allegations are couched in terms of the sovereign citizen argument, which “has been rejected repeatedly by the courts.” Smith v. United States, No. 1:12-cv-00900, 2013 WL 5464723, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 30, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Adherents to the sovereign citizen theory “believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior.” United States v. Ulloa, 511 Fed.Appx. 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Presley v. Prodan, No. 3:12-3511-CMC-JDA, 2013 WL 1342465, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2013) (collecting cases describing the sovereign citizen movement and its common features), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 1342539 (D.S.C. Apr. 2, 2013).
Federal courts have repeatedly rejected the sovereign citizen theory as baseless. See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of an individual's claimed status . . . as a ‘sovereign citizen' . . . that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.”); United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding defendant's argument that he was “outside” the jurisdiction of the United States to be “completely without merit” and “patently frivolous” and rejecting it “without expending any more of this Court's resources on discussion”); United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing the “sovereign citizen” theory as having “no conceivable validity in American law”); Glover v. South Carolina, No. 5:16-cv-00969-JMC, 2017 WL 1836982, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. May 8, 2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-6846, 2017 WL 5197454 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 2017).
Based on a review of the allegations in the Complaint, the undersigned concludes that the entire Complaint appears to be rooted in the sovereign citizen theory. Indeed, nearly every allegation in the Complaint is premised at least in part on the sovereign citizen theory. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting claims in this case based on the sovereign citizen theory, his claims are subject to summary dismissal as frivolous.
Duplicative Action
Next, the undersigned notes that this action is duplicative as the present action appears to involve nearly identical claims and allegations against the same Defendants as a prior action Plaintiff filed in this Court. See Zikomo v. Johnson, No. 8:22-cv-01471-DCC-JDA (D.S.C. May 6, 2022). That action was summarily dismissed on October 6, 2022. Id., Doc. 25. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, id., Doc. 30, and his appeal remains pending in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
“[R]epetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as frivolous.” Paul v. de Holczer, No. 3:15-cv-2178-CMC-PJG, 2015 WL 4545974, at *6 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding the “Complaint should be summarily dismissed as a frivolous duplicate filing in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency”), aff'd, 631 Fed.Appx. 197 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that, “[b]ecause district courts are not required to entertain duplicative lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).” Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142, 2000 WL 1144623, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2000) (unpublished table decision); Wilkins v. Harley, No. 6:11-cv-3463-MBS-KFM, 2012 WL 256566, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 12, 2012) (“this duplicate § 1983 Complaint is frivolous and subject to summary dismissal”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 260159 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2012). Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, because the present action is a meritless duplicate of a prior lawsuit filed by Plaintiff, the present case is frivolous and subject to summary dismissal.
Defendants Entitled to Dismissal
Additionally, the named Defendants are all entitled to summary dismissal because they are either immune from suit or are not “persons” who may be sued under § 1983 or because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing their personal involvement. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); Rutland v. Dorchester Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:09-cv-274-SB, 2009 WL 1704331, at *2 (D.S.C. June 17, 2009) (“A defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a ‘person.'”). Further, “[i]n order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). While Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his Complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”).
As explained below, all of the Defendants named in this action are entitled to summary dismissal.
All Defendants
As an initial matter, the undersigned concludes that all of the named Defendants are subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff does not allege facts showing their direct involvement in any alleged unconstitutional conduct. Instead, Plaintiff merely names Defendants in the caption of his Complaint and makes general, conclusory allegations about the alleged violations of his rights. “However, such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012. WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012). Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the Complaint of personal involvement against any Defendant, they are each entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading). Further, each Defendant is entitled to dismissal for the additional reasons below.
Defendants Brittany Scott and Courtney Rea
Plaintiff identifies Defendants Scott and Rea as solicitors with the Thirteenth Circuit Solicitor's Office. [Doc. 1-3 at 2-3.] Defendants Scott and Rea are both entitled to prosecutorial immunity. In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors, when acting within the scope of their duties, have absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of proceedings that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 430. For example, when a prosecutor “prepares to initiate a judicial proceeding,” “appears in court to present evidence in support of a search warrant application,” or conducts a criminal trial, bond hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial “motions” hearings, absolute immunity applies. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-45 (2009). Here, these Defendants' alleged wrongful conduct appears intricately related to the judicial process. Therefore, Defendants Scott and Rea have absolute immunity and should be dismissed from this action.
In South Carolina, regional prosecutors are called Solicitors and Assistant Solicitors. See S.C. CONST Art. V, § 24; S.C. Code § 1-7-310.
Defendant Teal Johnson
Defendant Johnson is entitled to summary dismissal because she is not a state actor for purposes of this § 1983 action. As noted, in order to state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under the color of state law. Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). Defendant Johnson is identified as Plaintiff's public defender in the state court and is representing him on the charges at issue in this case. [Doc. 1-3 at 3.] However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that Defendant is a state actor. “[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317, 325 (1981); see also Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1980) (concluding a court-appointed attorney was entitled to dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 claim against him for want of state action). Plaintiff has not made any allegations to plausibly show that Defendant Johnson exceeded the “traditional functions as counsel.” Polk Cnty., 454 U.S. at 325; see also Trexler v. Giese, No. 3:09-cv-144-CMC-PJG, 2010 WL 104599, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2010) (finding attorney was entitled to summary dismissal in § 1983 action where attorney's representation in the state criminal case fell “squarely within the parameters of his legal representation” although the plaintiff was unhappy with the manner in which the attorney represented her). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Johnson are not proper in this § 1983 action, and she is entitled to dismissal for lack of state action.
Defendants Greenville County Detention Center and Police
Defendants Greenville County Detention Center and Greenville County and City Police are also entitled to summary dismissal. As noted, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” Harden, 27 Fed.Appx. at 178. These Defendants are facilities, buildings, or departments and, as such, are not subject to suit because they cannot be sued as a “person” in a § 1983 lawsuit. See e.g., Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”); Morrison v. Greenville Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-2657-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 7732598, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 936383 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018). Police departments, buildings, and correctional institutions usually are not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building-the detention center-is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F.Supp. 1131, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because it was not a “person” under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F.Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department). Accordingly, these Defendants are not proper parties to this action under § 1983.
Defendant Henry McMaster
Defendant McMaster, who is identified as the Governor of South Carolina [Doc. 1-3 at 3], is subject to dismissal because Plaintiff has made no plausible allegations against him in his Complaint to state a claim for relief that is cognizable. Further, to the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendant McMaster is responsible for any conduct alleged in the Complaint under a theory of respondeat superior, the undersigned recommends dismissal. “The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action.” Dickerson v. South Carolina, No. 4:21-cv-00110-TLW-SVH, 2021 WL 537200, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 25, 2021) (recommending dismissal of Henry McMaster), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 535401 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2021); see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-74 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any such facts. Accordingly, Defendant McMaster is entitled to summary dismissal.
Defendant Magistrate Judge Hudson
Defendant Hudson is entitled to dismissal because he has absolute judicial immunity. Defendant Hudson is identified in the Complaint as a magistrate judge on the Greenville County Magistrate Court. [Doc. 1-3 at 4.] It is well settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they have acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351-64 (1978); see also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12-13. Absolute immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Here, Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Hudson appear to relate to his judicial actions. Thus, because the alleged misconduct of Defendant Hudson arose out of his judicial actions, judicial immunity squarely applies and should bar this lawsuit against him.
State Entities/Corporation
Finally, Defendant “State Entities/Corporation” is also subject to dismissal. It is unclear what the identity is of this Defendant. In any case, this Defendant is subject to dismissal for the same reasons as the Defendants above.
Claims Subject to Dismissal
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff has asserted any claims that are not subject to dismissal for the reasons already stated, they are subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
Younger Abstention
First, the Court should abstain from hearing Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief. The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to the charges pending against Plaintiff in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions as well as his current detention in the Greenville County Detention Center on those charges. Although Plaintiff seeks money damages, his Complaint challenges his continued detention, and he has filed various motions seeking dismissal of his state charges and release from custody.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus). “Release from pretrial detention is simply not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.” El v. Fornandes, No. 2:19-cv-3045-RMG-MGB, 2019 WL 7900140, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (explaining a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to get out of jail), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6712057 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2019).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief related to his pending state court criminal charges, including dismissal of those charges, such claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that the pending state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are improper and violate his constitutional rights. Plaintiff asks that the charges against him be dismissed. Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin the pending state court criminal proceedings against him. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Rels., 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state court criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations related to his pending criminal actions; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted “that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from adjudicating Plaintiff's claims.
Failure to State a Claim
Further, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal because his allegations fail to state a claim for relief. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert claims for violations of the Fourth Amendment (for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution), the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (for due process violations), the Sixth Amendment (for speedy trial issues), and the Eighth Amendment (for denial of bond). The Court will address each of these claims in turn below.
Plaintiff makes reference to other statutes and constitutional provisions, including the First and Seventh Amendments. However, he has failed to present any allegations to support a claim for relief under either the First and Seventh Amendments or any other law or statute. As such, the undersigned concludes that, to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert claims not addressed herein, those claims would be subject to dismissal for failing to state a claim.
Fourth Amendment, False Imprisonment
First, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting claims for unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, false imprisonment, and/or malicious prosecution, his claims are without merit. The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Section 1983 actions premised on claims including false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
Here, because Plaintiff has failed to present facts concerning the specific circumstances of his arrest and detention, he has failed to plead the minimum facts necessary to state a cognizable claim for a Fourth Amendment violation. This is so because, under § 1983, a public official cannot be charged with unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, or malicious prosecution when the search and arrest are based on probable cause. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause.”). Moreover, “an indictment, ‘fair upon its face,' returned by a ‘properly constituted grand jury,' conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)); see also Provet v. S.C., No. 6:07-cv-1094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (explaining § 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded based on the filing of an indictment). Here, the grand jury sitting in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit filed indictments for most, if not all, of the charges pending against Plaintiff. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts. org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers listed above) (last visited Dec. 9, 2022). The indictments act as a bar to Plaintiff's claims for money damages as to those charges and his present incarceration in the Greenville County Detention Center. Therefore, any claims related to those charges and his incarceration are subject to summary dismissal.
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Due Process
Likewise, to the extent that Plaintiff's allegations may be construed as asserting due process claims under the Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendments, any such claims fail because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing he was subjected to any deprivation of due process to support such a claim. To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a procedural due process violation with regard to the charges pending against him, the investigation into the crimes he is charged with, or his purportedly unlawful incarceration, he has failed to allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible. Additionally, such claims are subject to dismissal for the reasons already stated. First, Plaintiff premises each of his claims on the sovereign citizen theory, which is patently frivolous and not cognizable. Also, the Court should abstain from deciding such claims under Younger. Further, at this stage, the valid indictments against Plaintiff act as a bar to any such claims.
Next, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging a substantive due process claim with regard to the conditions of his confinement, he has failed to allege facts to state a plausible claim. “To prevail on a substantive due process claim, a pretrial detainee must show unconstitutional punishment by proving that the challenged conditions were either (1) imposed with an expressed intent to punish or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, in which case an intent to punish may be inferred.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotation omitted). However, “Plaintiff's allegations do not rise to state a claim of a constitutional magnitude.” Brown v. Polk, No.4:21-cv-1229-TMC-TER, 2021 WL 3080966, at *2 (D.S.C. June 28, 2021) (discussing the requirements for a pretrial detainee to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 3080 157 (D.S.C. July 21, 2021). In sum, Plaintiff has made no allegations concerning the conditions of his confinement and has not identified any cognizable injury as to those conditions.
Sixth Amendment, Speedy Trial
Next, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants have violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. “The Sixth Amendment provides that an ‘accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,' and this right has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Vaughn v. Greenwood Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 8:07-cv-2022-TLW-BHH, 2008 WL 5378265, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 24, 2008).
Although Plaintiff appears to allege that he has been denied the right to a speedy trial, he does not allege the violation of any federal statute. Even if he had, the Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3116, et seq., applies only to criminal prosecutions brought by the United States and not to those brought by state or local governments. See United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 451 (4th Cir. 2012). Further, this “federal court should abstain from considering a speedy-trial claim at the pretrial stage because the claim could be raised at trial and on direct appeal.” Julius v. Dickers, No. 4:18-cv-105-HMH-TER, 2018 WL 1545698, at *3 n.3 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 1536572 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2018). As previously discussed, this Court should abstain under Younger from hearing Plaintiff's claims because he has available state court remedies. See, e.g., Tyler v. South Carolina, No. 9:12-cv-260-RMG-BM, 2012 WL 988601, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 22, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 988596 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012). As such, Plaintiff's speedy-trial claim under the Sixth Amendment should be dismissed.
Eighth Amendment, Denial of Bond
Finally, Plaintiff's cursory allegations that he has been denied bond are without merit. The Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive finds imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see also Grimes v. Pszczolkowski, No. 1:14-cv-13, 2015 WL 144619, at *22 (N.D. W.Va. Jan. 12, 2015). “However, the United States Constitution does not establish an absolute right to bail, nor does federal statutory law provide a right to bail in state criminal cases.” Odom v. Smalls, No. 3:09-cv-0629-PMD, 2009 WL 3805594, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 12, 2009). “The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing merely that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.' This Clause, of course, says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987). Accordingly, “Plaintiff has no federal right to be released on bond,” and his claims against Defendants concerning the denial of his bond therefore must fail. Odom, 2009 WL 3805594, at *3 (emphasis omitted).
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state any cognizable constitutional claim, and this action is therefore subject to summary dismissal on this basis in addition to the other reasons stated above.
Plaintiff's Motions Should be Denied
As noted, Plaintiff has filed several motions. [Docs. 7; 14.] Plaintiff's motions, like his Complaint, challenge his current incarceration, attack his pending state court criminal proceedings, and contain patently frivolous allegations premised on the sovereign citizen theory. As such, they should be denied as frivolous. Additionally, because the undersigned recommends dismissal of this action, the motions may be denied as moot.
Dismissal of This Action Should be Deemed a “Strike”
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (“PLRA”), requires this Court to engage in a preliminary screening of any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The PLRA limits the ability of prisoners to file civil actions without prepayment of filing fees. McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 393 (4th Cir. 2009). Specifically, the PLRA contains a “three strikes” rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The PLRA's three strikes rule was enacted to bar prisoners who have filed prior frivolous litigation in a federal court from pursuing certain types of federal civil litigation without prepayment of the filing fee. McLean, 566 F.3d at 393-94 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).
Here, because the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim and for being frivolous and because the claims in this action are duplicative of Plaintiff's prior frivolous action filed in this Court, the undersigned recommends that this case be deemed a strike for purposes of the PLRA's three strikes rule. See Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721, 1727 (2020) (“A dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim counts as a strike, whether or not with prejudice.”).
RECOMMENDATION
Consequently, for the reasons stated above, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal). Further, it is recommended that the dismissal be deemed a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. See Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019). Here, Plaintiff's state criminal charges remain pending at this time, and he can raise the issues complained of herein with the state court.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).