Opinion
No. CV08 402 41 38-S
February 10, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The Town of Easton ("Easton"), acting through its agent, the Town of Easton Animal Shelter Building Committee (hereafter "Committee"), received a special permit from the Town of Easton Planning Zoning Commission (hereafter "Commission") to replace a long existing animal shelter. The proposed location for the new shelter was to be on a 127-acre parcel of land on Morehouse Road, which had been purchased by the Town some years ago for multiple uses.
I. FACTS
The applicant in this matter, the Town of Easton Animal Shelter Building Committee, filed a special permit application with the Commission to construct a new animal shelter for the Town. The proposed animal shelter, to be operated by the Town's Police Department, was designed as a single-story building which would be residential in outward appearance and be less than 25 feet in height. The building was to be located approximately 500 feet west of Morehouse Road and at the southernmost end of the large parcel of property owned by the Town. The primary function of the new animal shelter was to house lost, found, and quarantined animals.
The proposed animal shelter was to be located on a 127-acre parcel of land on Morehouse Road which was purchased by the Town several years ago. This large tract also contains in its northerly portion a new elementary school and municipal recreation fields and was intended for a variety of municipal uses.
The proposed animal shelter was intended to be a replacement for an existing animal shelter in Easton also operated by the Town's Police Department, which is located on Westport Road and has been there since 1960. It is claimed that this existing facility is in a state of disrepair, is outdated and does not comply with existing State of Connecticut codes.
In making its findings and imposing its conditions, the Commission considered distance from residential homes, landscaping, providing visual and noise buffers, parking, lighting, sight lines for drivers, water supply and septic system. The Commission had a series of public hearing on both the site issue as well as the animal shelter issue. The Commission received a report from the Town's Land Use Director which noted that in September 2006, the Planning Zoning Commission completed work on the Town's new Comprehensive Plan of Conservation and Development which was eventually approved by the citizens of Easton at a Town meeting on April 30, 2007. The report analyzed eight sites and found that the site that was eventually selected had the most favorable attributes. The Morehouse Road site provided utilities and buffering from school and recreation facilities. The subsurface water disposal system met the requirements of the State public health code and this protected the water supply. Aquarion Water company expressed no concerns. No fault was found with the site as to audibility or visibility from Morehouse Road by the Engineer hired by the town and reports from the Easton Chief of Police that there was no existing safety problems in the Morehouse Road area. At the hearing before the Board expert witnesses from other towns testified as to the soundness of the proposal.
It should be noted that the Commission modified the submitted site plan in several important particulars "which are necessary to protect the neighborhood tranquility, preserve the natural character and passive recreation quality of the site, and assure public safety." Specifically, the Commission made the following findings:
A new animal shelter is a clear and well documented need of the Town;
The Commission found that residences situated to the east, south and west are approximately 700 feet distant, and the intervening terrain provides an effective natural buffer. The Commission found that the use "will be in harmony with the appropriate and orderly development of the neighborhood by reason of distance to the nearest residential properties" (ROR 50).
The Commission found that the Town's Plan of Conservation and Development recommends the southerly and westerly portions of the Town-owned 127-acre Morehouse Road tract as most suitable for passive recreation and open space, without precluding other compatible public uses. The animal shelter was deemed compatible. The Commission imposed the following specific stipulation:
Proposed use of the southerly portion of the 127-acre tract shall be multipurpose in character, for a forested park and open space tract providing passive recreation for town residents as its primary use and an animal shelter as a secondary use. Therefore, the animal shelter shall not exceed the extent of disturbed area shown on the side plan and the proposed building and outside exercise areas shall be designed to harmonize in appearance with the park-like surroundings.
The Commission also conditioned approval on the building and attached runs being reoriented so that the rear of the building would face into the hillside and be sound barred at the easterly and westerly ends with masonry walls, as well as with a sound deadening canopy or roof overhead. Other conditions included the following:
The applicant was required to consult with an acoustical engineer to determine whether additional sound-reducing measures in the design of the building or in the materials used are reasonable, appropriate and effective.
The building must be air conditioned and provided with sound-deadening walls.
Illumination of the site must be restricted to the periphery of the building.
The entrance to the site was moved approximately 50 feet to the north to accommodate plaintiffs. This was specifically done to minimize traffic hazards and to allow safe and convenient vehicle entrance. In addition, the driveway connecting the facility to Morehouse Road was required to be redesigned for a gentler grade, and the driveway is not permitted to enter the site directly opposite the driveways which currently exist on Morehouse Road. These particular conditions were imposed to accommodate the needs of immediate neighbors.
Staffing of the operation was discussed, including a requirement that the staff responsible for the animal shelter must assume responsibility for control of the animals on the site at all times.
II. LAW A. STANDARDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS 1. Burden
The burden of overturning the decision of any administrative board, including a Planning and Zoning Commission, rests squarely upon the plaintiffs. Goldreyer v. Board of Appeals, 144 Conn. 641, 646 (1957). The plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the authority acted improperly. Bora v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 161 Conn. 297, 300 (1971); Chouinard v. Zoning Commission, 139 Conn. 728, 731 (1953). When the evidence shows that the commission had an adequate basis for its decision, the conclusion must be drawn that its action was within its powers and should be sustained. Van de Mark v. Board of Zoning Appeals, West Haven, 1 Conn.Sup. 89, 90 (1935).
2. Scope of Review
The scope of the Court's review is limited in an administrative appeal. It is the role of the Superior Court, when an appeal is taken, to review the record to determine whether the zoning authority acted properly in the exercise of its functions and not to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the zoning authority. DeMaria v. Enfield Planning Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 540 (1970). Further, as stated in DeMaria, the Superior Court on appeal determines whether the reasons are reasonably supported by the record and whether they are pertinent to the considerations which the agency is required to apply under the Regulations. A court's review of a zoning decision is based on the record, which properly includes knowledge which zoning board members gain through personal observation of the site or personal knowledge of the area involved. Oakwood Development Corp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Torrington, 20 Conn.App. 458, 460, cert denied, 215 Conn. 808 (1990).
The decisions of zoning authorities are to be overruled only when it is found that the authority had not acted fairly, with proper motive and upon valid reason. McMahon v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of New Haven, 140 Conn. 433, 438 (1953); Mallory v. Town of West Hartford, 138 Conn. 497, 505 (1953); Mallory v. Town of West Hartford, 138 Conn. 497, 505 (1952). The court may only grant relief on appeal if it finds that the local zoning authority acted illegally, arbitrarily or in abuse of its discretion. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Trumbull, 186 Conn. 466, 470 (1982).
An administrative appeal to the court does not require or permit the court to review evidence de novo or to substitute its findings and conclusions for the decision of the zoning authority. Verney v. Planning Zoning Board of Appeals of the town of Greenwich, 151 Conn. 578, 580 (1964). The sole question is whether the authority acted legally and with its discretion. Lindy's Restaurant, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of City of Hartford, 143 Conn. 620, 622 (1956).
3. Special Permits
The power to regulate by special permit is found in § 8-2 of the Connecticut General Statutes which empowers a Zoning Commission to grant special permits "subject to standards set forth in the regulations and to conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, convenience and property values." The Easton Planning and Zoning Commission also exercises this power through its own Regulations in Article 7.
In evaluating an application for a special permit, an agency is governed by its own regulations, A.P.W. Holding Corp. v. Planning Zoning Board of the City of Milford, 167 Conn. 182, 186 (1974), and by Title 8 of the Connecticut General Statutes. Generally, a special permit allows an owner to put his property to use in a manner which is expressly permitted under the zoning regulations upon the issuance of a special permit. Parish of St. Andrew's Protestant Episcopal Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford, 155 Conn. 350, 353 (1976). The Commission may impose conditions where they are warranted by the regulations. Beckish v. Planning Zoning Commission of the Town of Columbia, 162 Conn. 11, 14-15 (1971). Where questions involving the issuance of special permits are fairly debatable, deference must be accorded to the Commission's decision. Lurie v. Planning Zoning Commission of the Town of Westport, 160 Conn. 295, 311 (1971).
The Supreme Court has supported the broad discretion granted to local zoning commissions in the special permit context. In Irwin v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Litchfield, 244 Conn. 619 (1998), the applicant applied to the commission for approval of a subdivision application and for a special exception. The applicant applied to the commission for approval of a subdivision application and for a special exception. The application was denied by the commission, which found that the proposed development was too intensive for this land. The commission also found that the application did not comply with standards in the town plan, including preservation of natural resources. The plaintiff-applicant appealed to the appellate Court, which concluded that the plan did in fact satisfy all relevant zoning regulations and that the commission had no discretion to deny the application for special exception. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, and stated that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the zoning commission had no discretion in considering the plaintiff's special exception application. "We previously have recognized that the special permit process is, in fact, discretionary." Irwin, supra. The Supreme Court concluded that general considerations such as public health, safety and welfare, which are enumerated in the zoning regulations, may be the basis for the denial of a special permit. The Supreme Court repeated that "the board is endowed with a liberal discretion, and its action is subject to review by the courts only to determine whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal." Irwin, supra, citing Connecticut Sand Stone Corp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Avon, 150 Conn. 439, 442, 190 A.2d 594 (1963), and Schwartz v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the town of Hamden, 208 Conn. 146, 152, 543 A.2d 1339 (1988).
Most recently, a trial court has reaffirmed this broad discretion. In Lamar Company of Connecticut, LLC v. Town of Fairfield Plan and Zoning Commission, 2008 WL 366557, the following was stated:
A special permit allows a property owner to use property in a manner expressly permitted by the zoning regulations. A permit is required, because the nature of the proposed use is such that its exact location and mode of operation must be regulated, because of unique factors. Whisper Wind Development Corporation v. Planning Zoning Commission, 32 Conn. App 514, 519 (1993). Although a commission has no discretion but to approve an application for a special permit if the regulations and statutes are satisfied: Westport v. Norwalk, 167 Conn. 151, 155, 355 A.2d 25 (1974); the special permit process is not purely ministerial. A municipal land use agency has a right to interpret its regulations, to determine whether general standards concerning health, safety and welfare, contained in the regulations, as been satisfied. Irwin v. Planning Zoning Commission, 244 Conn. 619, 627, 711 A.2d 675 (1998).
III. The Claim As it Relates To The Application Process:
Plaintiffs claim that the Town of Easton Animal Shelter Building Committee lacked authority or standing to make the original application on October 24, 2007 (ROR 1).
The special permit application listed as "applicant" the Town of Easton Animal Shelter Building Committee. In addition, since the owner of the property was the Town of Easton, the Town's First Selectman, William J. Kupinse, Jr., also signed the application on behalf of the record owner. This was a municipal project. Applicant claims that as the agent for the Town, the Committee was acting no differently than any other agent for an owner who fills out the application form and presents the application. Many applications are completed and presented by individual attorneys, surveyors or engineers acting as agents.
Applicants to land use boards are "permitted to act through agents." Petersen v. Willington Planning Zoning Commission, 1999 WL 171524, citing Huff v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Southbury, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 076559 (May 13, 1997; Flynn, J.), (2C.S.C.R. 737). "In such a situation, the principal for whom some agent acts must have standing." In our case, the Town itself was the principal. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint dated September 26, 2008, admits that the Town was the owner (Paragraph 2).
The record owner, Town of Easton, consented to by the signature of First Selectman William Kupinse:
1. The legal notice of the animal shelter application (ROR 9), which clearly references this special permit application as being by the "Town of Easton."
2. The November 26, 2007 minutes of the Commission (ROR 12, p. 2), identify this as a "Town of Easton Proposal to relocate an existing animal control shelter facility . . ." Similarly, the final minutes of the December 10, 2007 Commission meeting reference a "Town of Easton proposal" to relocate the animal shelter.
3. The legal notice placed in the local newspaper (ROR 10) noted that the application is filed by the "Town of Easton" on the "Town-owned 127-acre Morehouse Road property." The application itself was presented by a professional engineer "hired by the police commission" (ROR 59).
4. The legal notice, which lists the proposed site for the Animal Control Shelter as the "Town-owned 127-acre Morehouse Road property" (ROR 13).
5. A report prepared by John Hayes, Consultant and Land Use Director, and presented to the Commission, which references the Town Plan, which was brought by the Board of Selectmen to a Town meeting on April 30, 2007 where it was "unanimously endorsed by the Town's people in attendance." The new Town Plan recognized the use of the 127-acre Morehouse Road property as desirable for a variety of municipal uses.
6. On October 23, 2007, a letter from First Selectman William J. Kupinse, Jr., to the Commission stated as follows:
At its meeting on October 18, 2007, the Board of Selectmen voted to refer the Animal Control Shelter Committee's application for a special permit to side a shelter on the southerly end of the Morehouse Road property to you Commission pursuant to Section 8-24 of the Connecticut General Statutes.
(ROR 22). This document is conclusive that the entire Board of Selectmen authorized the Committee to proceed with the application on its behalf and as its agent to the Commission. The record reveals that a variety of Town of Easton officials spoke in their official capacities in support of the application, including the Police Chief, the Town Engineer, the Zoning Enforcement Officer, and the Land Use Director (ROR 47).
7. The Commission's approval of the project was ultimately addressed and mailed to the Board of Selectmen of the town of Easton and is referenced as the "Town's application" (ROR 51).
8. The issue of "standing of private parties to apply for special permits and variances" was discussed and resolved many years ago, Richards v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Wilton, 170 Conn. 319 (1976). The Supreme Court first noted in this case that "[i]n 1961, the commission granted a special permit to the Wilton high school building committee to use certain land owned by the town of Wilton" for school purposes. Richards at 319 (emphasis added). It is clear from this statement alone that a building committee (or animal shelter committee) operating as agent of the town, can process a planning and zoning application.
Applicant alleges (1) the Easton rules do indeed allow for the owner to authorize the application; and (2) the Committee's interest in the application is clear and fits into the above criteria. The Easton procedure is shared by municipalities throughout the State.
Plaintiffs argue that the Committee is merely an "advisory group," not a "recognized legal entity" (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 4). Plaintiffs offer no citations that an applicant, acting as an agent for the owner, must be a "recognized legal entity" to make an application on behalf of the owner. The school building cited in Richards, supra, was no more a "recognized legal entity" than the Town of Easton Animal Shelter Building Committee. A lawyer, architect, or engineer applying on behalf of an owner is not a "recognized legal entity," but merely an agent with standing to apply for an owner with the owner's permission.
Obviously the Committee cannot bring a lawsuit or be sued. The owner of the property is the Town of Easton, which would be the proper party to any lawsuit. Plaintiffs' use of Baker v. Kerigan, 149 Conn. 596 (1962) is irrelevant. A finding that the representative town meeting cannot "delegate its powers of decision to any committee" is not akin to the Easton situation, where the Committee made no decision at all. The Committee, after express authorization from the Board of Selectmen and First Selectman, merely filed an application on behalf of the town for this municipal project. Plaintiffs improperly hinge the ability to sue and be sued with the ability to file an application. No authority supports this claim. Applications can be filed and are routinely filed by similar committees with the Town's written approval, as set forth in the applicable town rules.
Plaintiffs' reliance on Elementary School Building committee of the Town of Fairfield v. Placko, 2003 Conn.Super. LEXIS 474 ( 2003 WL 971839) (FBT-CV-020398162-S; February 21, 2003, Rush, J.) [ 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 168], is misplaced. In that a case, an administrative application was actually brought by Turner Construction Company, the company charged with building the school. The tree warden denied the application and the building committee itself brought the appeal in court. A motion to dismiss was granted since the building committee was not authorized to sue or be sued in its own name. Again, this case is inapposite to the Easton situation. No one suggests that the Committee can file a suit or be sued. The Committee applied on behalf of the Town of Easton, accompanied by Town officials at the hearing, authorized in writing by the Board of Selectmen and First Selectman, as owners in accordance with the Commission's regulations. This procedure is far from unusual.
It should be noted that plaintiffs have waited until this trial proceeding to raise this novel argument for the first time, even though they appeared and spoke on their own and through counsel at the Commission level. The Connecticut courts have held that a party's failure to raise an issue at the agency level precludes it from judicial review. Strong v. Conservation Commission of Town of Old Lyme, 28 Conn.App. 435, 437-38 (1992); Archambault v. Wadlow, 25 Conn.App. 375, 377 (1991); Portillo v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 2002 Ct.Sup. WL 31304177 (September 17, 2002; Robinson, J.; Schuman, J.); in Evans, the court reasoned, [t]he plaintiff's failure has hampered this court's review . . . because of the plaintiff's commission, the commission did not have an opportunity to clarify what its regulations mean. The plaintiff's failure to present this claim to the commission prevents judicial review.
In Dragan v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 223 Conn. 618, 633 (1992), our Supreme Court held that "[a] party to an administrative proceeding cannot be allowed to participate full at hearings and then, on appeal, raise claims that were not asserted before the board." Dragan, 223 Conn. at 632. The Court reasoned "[b]ecause the plaintiff never asserted during the course of the license revocation proceeding that his right to cross-examine Connor had been violated and because he failed to utilize available administrative remedies to cure any alleged defect, we conclude that the plaintiff waived his right to cross examine Connor." Id. at 632.
Raising the issue now at this time works great prejudice against the Town of Easton and to the Town of Easton Animal Shelter Building Committee. Had the issue been raised in any manner earlier, both the Town of Easton and the Committee could have addressed the issue on the merits, made appropriate changes, and resolved any concerns at that time. Having failed to raise the issue in a timely fashion, plaintiffs are precluded from raising it now.
The record reveals that the proposed animal shelter is to be placed on the 127-acre Town-owned property (ROR 6). A report by John Hayes, Consultant and Land Use Director, discusses the Town Plan and the Town's plans for this important and large area (ROR 17). Mr. Hayes' report confirms that the original plan for this large parcel is for a new elementary school, town recreational fields, and other municipal activity areas. Mr. Hayes notes that there were originally three proposed areas on this land "not in conflict with Town Plan Recommendations for school, park, recreation and open space areas . . ." (ROR 17, p. 3.) It is clear from this document that the 127-acre parcel was intended for multiple municipal uses.
Plaintiffs claim that "the subject property is used for an elementary school and is under the control of the Easton Board of Education" (Plaintiff Brief, p. 6). There is indeed a new elementary school on the property, which the Board of Education controls along with school plan areas. A review of the maps reveals that the school building is 2,465 feet from the animal shelter site. The record (ROR 6) also reveals that the areas utilized for Board of Education purposes are perhaps a quarter of the overall property. The site plan for that school, which is a matter of public record and well known to the Commission, identifies the jurisdiction of the Board of Education over the school and school areas. The proposed animal shelter is outside that school jurisdiction.
A memorandum from the Planning and Zoning Commission itself (ROR 23) confirms that the use of this 127-acre Morehouse Road property for the animal shelter "would be compatible in concept" with the Town Plan.
The Easton Zoning regulations ("Regulations") provide for special permit approvals in Article 7. The Regulations provide, among other conditions, that the proposed use will serve a community need or convenience; that the location and scope of the use, the nature and intensity of the operations, the size of the site in relation to it; and the location of the site with respect to street access to it, are such that it will be in harmony with the appropriate and orderly development of the neighborhood in which it is located; that appropriate landscaping, screen plantings and exterior illumination are required; that there will not be objectionable noise, fumes, or vibrations; and that the parking will be of a sufficient size for the proposed use.
Article 4, Section 4.3 of the Regulations provide for a number of uses permitted by special permit. The categories are generally broard. Article 4, Section 4.3.3. allows by special permit for "uses of the town including municipal recreation facilities, fire house, police station or public library." The record supports the conclusion by the Commission that the animal shelter is a "use of the town." It is well established that the Commission has reasonable discretion to interpret its own regulations and decide whether it applies in a particular situation. Graff v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Killingworth, 277 Conn. 645 (2006).
IV. SPECIAL PERMIT STANDARDS
The Regulations outline special permit standards in Article 7. This article specifies the criteria for special permit applications. These are the standards which provide the primary focus of any special permit application. As one well-known treatise states:
The test for approval of special permit or special applications is the same whether the function of approving them has been delegated to the zoning commission, zoning board of appeals or the planning commission. The agency's functions is to decide whether (1) the proposed use of the property is permitted under the zoning regulations, (2) the standards in the zoning regulation are satisfied, and (3) whether conditions necessary health, safety, convenience and property values, as provided in section 8-2 of the General Statutes can be established. The circumstances under which special permits can be issued and the test for judicial review are stated in Chapter 5 and section 33:4. The agency's resolution should comply with the three-part test for special permits.
R. FULLER, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES: LAND USE AND PRACTICE 620 § 21:9 (3d ed. 2007)
Article 7 states quite clearly that the Commission must make findings regarding the standards in Article 7, sec. 7.2.1. The Committee complied with the standards in § 7.2.1 (ROR 2). Each of the six applicable specific standards is addressed by the Committee. Similarly, the Commission itself also made specific findings for all six applicable standards in § 7.2.1. as required in the Regulations.
Plaintiffs claim that this project fails to satisfy Article 5 of the Regulations. The standards regarding the water supply and watershed in the "General Requirements" of Article 5 include a board reference to Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection publications on watersheds, along with a variety of other references, which as minimum lot areas for each district in town, shape requirements, frontage requirements, building size, regulations on signs, swimming pools, tennis courts, tag sales, parking, lighting, satellite dishes, and driveways.
The general requirements regarding water supply and the watershed were fully satisfied (ROR 2, 5, 21, 25, 40, 51). There is no requirement that a special permit resolution expressly recite conformance with every requirement of the regulations, including every single standard in the General Requirements. The Commission has discretion in how to render its special permit resolution. The record supports that no harm to the watershed occurred.
The law in Connecticut is clear that the Commission was not compelled to follow a specific format in its final resolution. Our Supreme Court has long ago stated such precision in the form of a resolution is not required:
To find error in the manner in which the board made its required findings or that those findings did not fully comply with the standards enumerated in the regulations would compel this court to indulge "in a microscopic search for technical infirmities" in the board's action and would unscrupulously interfere with "the legitimate activities of civic administrative boards." Silver Lane Pickle Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 316, 319, 122 A.2d 218.
Parish of St. Andrew's Protestant Episcopal Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals of City of Stamford, 155 Conn. 350 (1967).
V. THE COMMISSION CONSIDERED IMPACT ON ADJACENT LAND VALUES
The evidence in the record makes clear that the Commission heard and considered substantial evidence in the record as to the impact not only on adjacent land but on the entire neighborhood. A partial summary of such evidence includes the following:
1. The Committee noted that the height of the shelter would be limited to 25 feet; that the building is located 550 feet west of Morehouse Road; that the gravel driveway will be lined with existing trees; other trees will be preserved; fencing will be utilized; lighting will be kept to a minimum; the kennels will be located to the rear of the building.
2. A report by Land Use Director John Hayes analyzes impact on adjacent areas (ROR 17). The report summarizes the "favorable attributes" of the site and attaches a chart analyzing all proposed locations and impact on neighborhood.
3. Testimony by the project engineer that the closest residence, owned by a Mrs. Brown (not the Plaintiffs) is 730 feet away (ROR 61, p. 11); that trees will be preserved; that the center of Morehouse Road is 530 feet away; testimony that with regard to the animal shelter's location "there are no houses in the south, no houses to the rear of in proximity . . . The house directly opposite . . . is over 1,000 feet away . . . You have a pretty well sealed area here . . . septic is way down in front . . . so you will have a good buffer with trees . . ." (ROR p. 8, 59).
4. A comment by the Commission chair notes that "the new location will be further away from residential homes than the existing facility on Westport Road" (ROR 59, p. 12).
5. Revisions to the plans for the animal shelter were made directly in response to neighbor comments. Those revisions were reported to the Commission at the January 14, 2008 hearing (ROR 61). The animal exercise area was altered so that it "will be blocked from sight looking from the street;" alterations to the driveway; planting of white pines to "act as a natural buffer from noise from the neighbors." The driveway itself was moved 50 feet to the north to accommodate the neighbors and to increase the safety of the sightlines. The engineer concludes that the new sightlines now exceed the town guidelines.
The Commission specifically found that with the conditions imposed, the animal shelter will not "discourage the appropriate use and development of the adjacent area." In findings by the Commission and imposition of 11 conditions to "protect the neighborhood" insure that the value of the adjacent properties will not be impaired.
Plaintiffs' appeal is dismissed.